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ABSTRACT	
This	 thesis	 has	 sought	 to	 investigate	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 governance	 system	
relating	to	basketball	in	Taiwanese	society	with	emphasis	on	the	development	of	
basketball	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 societal	 development	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 in	 the	
broader	 political‐cultural	 environment.	 Two	 complementary	 theoretical	
approaches	 are	 adopted	 in	 this	 study:	 those	of	 governance	 theory	at	 the	meso	
level	of	analysis;	and	a	strategic‐relational	approach	at	the	macro	level	to	explain	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 governance	 decisions	 are	 taken	 in	 strategically	 selective	
contexts	which	facilitate	and	constrain	certain	actions	and	thus	outcomes.		
The	 empirical	 analysis	 draws	on	 a	 qualitative	 case‐study	 approach,	which	was	
based	 on	 documentary	materials	 and	 semi‐structured	 interviews.	 Three	major	
cases,	namely,	the	collapse	of	the	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance,	the	emergence	of	
the	Super	Basketball	League	and	the	sporting	links	with	China,	were	selected	on	
the	 basis	 of	 their	 significance	 in	 the	 operational	 governance	 of	 basketball.	 The	
first	is	a	specific	event,	the	second	focuses	on	a	particular	process,	and	the	third	
on	 the	 impact	 of	 context.	 The	 perceptions	 of	 the	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 specific	
groups	 were	 reviewed	 in	 order	 to	 compose	 insights	 into	 their	 account	 of	 the	
principal	 interests	 and	 forces	 in	 the	 governance	 system.	 Interview	 transcripts	
and	 government	 reports	were	 subject	 to	 coding	 employing	Nvivo	9	qualitative	
data	analysis	software,	and	coding	and	analysis	were	undertaken	employing	an	
ethnographic	content	analysis	approach.	
While	governance	theory	provides	an	explanatory	framework	at	the	meso‐level	
of	 analysis,	 the	 thesis	 argues	 for	 embedding	 this	 within	 a	 wider	 strategic	
relational	 meta‐theoretical	 account.	 This	 emphasises	 the	 dialectic	 relationship	
between	strategic,	reflexive	actors	and	the	strategic	selectivity	of	the	context	of	
decision‐making	which	privileges	certain	strategies	and	tactics,	and	explains	the	
structural	 coherence	 (and/or	 patterns	 of	 incoherence)	which	 have	 emerged	 in	
the	evolving	nature	of	the	governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.			
By	 focusing	 on	 these	 three	 inter‐related	 studies,	 we	 provided	 linked	 spatio‐
temporal	 forms	 of	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 provided	 the	
strategic	 context	and	strategic	 resources	 for	 the	emergence	of	 the	SBL	and	 the	
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Sina	Basketball	Club’s	migration	to	China.	Subsequently	the	case	of	the	SBL	and	
Sina	 provided	 the	 strategic	 context	 and	 strategic	 resources	 for	 Taiwanese	
players’	 migration	 to	 China	 as	 individual	 sportsmen.	 The	 thesis	 has	 thus	
produced	explanations	of	how	the	outcomes	of	one	case	provide	the	strategically	
inscribed	 selectivity	 of	 the	 next	which	with	 recursively	 selected	 strategies	 and	
tactics	 on	 the	 part	 of	 stakeholders	 produces	 the	 structured	 coherence/pattern	
(and	 /	 or	 incoherence)	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	 (male)	 prospective‐professional	
basketball	system.	
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Chapter	one	
Introduction	
	
1.1	Research	Questions	and	Research	approach	
This	 thesis	 aims	 to	 investigate	 the	 governance	 system	 relating	 to	basketball	 in	
Taiwanese	society	with	emphasis	on	 the	development	of	basketball	against	 the	
backdrop	 of	 societal	 development	 in	 Taiwan.	 Taiwan	 has	 undergone	 several	
stages	of	rapid	and	fundamental	changes	in	the	period	since	the	end	of	Japanese	
occupation	and	the	arrival	of	the	Chinese	Nationalist	Government	(KMT)	under	
Chiang	 Kai‐Shek	 in	 1949.	 Politically,	 the	 country	 went	 through	 a	 peaceful	
transition	from	military	dictatorship	to	a	form	of	liberal	democracy	in	the	1990s.	
Economically,	it	transformed	from	an	agrarian	and	preindustrial,	to	an	industrial	
economy	and	became	a	vital	 link	 in	 the	global	high‐tech	manufacturing	 supply	
chain.	It	has	long	been	known	as	one	of	Asia’s	Tiger	economies,	but	its	export‐led	
growth	model	has	also	been	hit	hard	by	global	recession.	
Basketball	is	a	weather	vane	for	Taiwanese	development,	which	had	its	origins	in	
the	 military.	 Prior	 to	 the	 exodus	 to	 Taiwan,	 KMT’s	 General	 Wang	 Shi‐Shuan	
established	 the	 first	military	 basketball	 team	 in	 Guizhou,	 China	 in	 1939.	Many	
basketball	 teams	 were	 formed	 soon	 afterwards	 and	 games	 held	 among	 the	
military	academies	promoted	basketball	in	the	military	system	during	the	period	
of	 the	 Chinese	 Civil	 War	 (Shia,	 2008).	 When	 the	 KMT‐led	 government	 of	 the	
Republic	 of	 China	 was	 defeated	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party,	 the	 former	
relocated	to	Taiwan,	where	social	development	was	to	be	led	by	the	military	elite.	
Among	 the	 influential	 military	 figures	 were	 fervent	 basketball	 supporters	
including	mid‐to‐high	ranking	generals;	hence,	basketball	became	Taiwan’s	most	
popular	 sport	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 the	 1960s.	 Despite	 continued	military	 tension	
across	 the	 Taiwan	 Strait	 during	 the	 period,	 the	 island	 enjoyed	 a	 rather	 stable	
political	 and	 economic	 growth,	which	 nurtured	 the	 founding	 and	 expansion	 of	
state‐owned	and	private	businesses	such	as	Yulon,	Taiwan	Bank,	Cathy	Life,	and	
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Taiwan	 Electricity.	 These	 companies	 made	 a	 substantial	 contribution	 to	 the	
development	 of	 basketball	 by	 establishing	 their	 own	 semi‐professional	
basketball	teams.	This	allowed	the	development	of	overseeing	organisations	and	
regulations	alongside.	In	the	1980s,	the	political	atmosphere	was	further	relaxed	
following	 the	 lifting	 of	 the	 Martial	 Law,	 and	 this	 was	 accompanied	 by	 rapid	
economic	 growth	 of	 and	 higher	 education	 levels.	 With	 the	 popularisation	 of	
basketball	taking	place	organically,	many	enterprises	also	financially	sponsored	
intra‐company	amateur	basketball	teams	(Liu	&	Wang,	1999).		
The	 Chinese	 Basketball	 Alliance	 (CBA),	 Taiwan’s	 first	 professional	 basketball	
league	 was	 launched	 in	 1993.	 The	 parent	 companies	 that	 sponsored	 these	
professional	teams	had	expected	increasing	returns	on	investment	on	the	basis	
of	 audience	 growth	 projections	 with	 a	 backdrop	 of	 average	 annual	 7%	 GDP	
growth.	 However	 due	 to	 the	Asian	 financial	 crisis	 in	 1997,	 Taiwan’s	 economic	
condition	declined	in	the	late	1990s	plus	the	domestic	political	context	changed	
because	of	a	change	of	the	party	in	power	in	2000,	the	parent	companies	could	
no	long	afford	to	fund	the	budget	of	basketball	teams	especially	since	the	league	
had	lost	the	TV	rights	fee	with	the	withdrawal	of	its	contracted	broadcaster.	The	
mounting	difficulties	resulted	 in	 the	collapse	of	 the	CBA	 in	2000.	Starting	 from	
2003,	the	Taiwan	government	sought	to	revive	basketball	industry	in	Taiwan	by	
assisting	 the	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	 (CTBA)	 to	 set	up	 the	Super	
Basketball	 League	 (SBL).	 The	 SBL	 is	 a	 unique	 “prospective‐professional1”	
basketball	 league	overseen	through	consultation	with	state‐affiliated	experts	 in	
management	and	marketing,	while	each	 team’s	day	 to	day	operation	 is	 carried	
out	by	private	enterprises.	Unfortunately,	after	many	years	of	operation,	the	SBL	
had	 not	 met	 expectations,	 and	 many	 talented	 players	 sought	 to	 transfer	 to	
foreign	 basketball	 league	 such	 as	 the	 Chinese	 and	 Japanese	 leagues,	 largely	
because	 the	 complicated	 relationship	 between	 the	 league	 and	 the	 clubs	 had	
resulted	in	some	management	failures.		
																																																								
1	The	original	purpose	for	the	government	to	promote	the	SBL	was	to	re‐launch	the	professional	
league	and	the	operation	of	the	SBL	should	move	towards	complete	professionalisation.	
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Within	 this	 context,	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 has	 not	 been	 a	
smooth	 process	 as	 it	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	
changes	in	Taiwan.	This	research	therefore	aims	to	explore	the	trajectories	and	
the	nature	of	development	of	 the	governance	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan.	The	key	
research	question	to	be	addressed	is	thus	as	follows:	
How	can	we	explain	the	trajectories	and	the	nature	of	development	
of	the	governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan?		
In	order	to	answer	this	core	question	we	need	to	consider:	
 Who	are	the	key	stakeholders	 in	 the	governance	of	basketball	system	in	
Taiwan?	What	are	their	interests?		
 What	strategies	do	they	adopt	in	seeking	to	realise	these	interests?	
 What	 role	 do	 the	 concepts	 of	 systemic	 governance,	 good	 governance,	
political	 governance,	 and	 strategic‐relations	 play	 in	 explaining	
governance	behaviour?	
 How	do	the	 instances	of	strategic	calculation	draw	upon	and	modify	 the	
strategically	selective	contexts	within	which	they	are	undertaken?	
Past	research	on	sport	and	leisure	in	Taiwan	has	mainly	focused	on	discussion	of	
participants’	values	and	perceptions,	and	on	constraints.	Thus	 the	main	stream	
research	 effort	 in	 this	 domain	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 ‘micro’	 level,	 with	 concrete	
objectives	 and	 largely	 positivist	 methods.	 However	 our	 own	 focus	 on	 what	
follows	 in	 this	 thesis	 relates	 to	 understanding	 the	 strategic	 shaping	 of	 the	
professional	 basketball	 industry	 per	 se,	 and	 its	 development	 in	 a	 changing	
political	and	economic	climate.		
In	 order	 to	 develop	 the	 core	 argument	 of	 the	 thesis	 the	 study	 employs	
governance	 theory	 to	 explain	 and	 evaluate	 the	 behaviour	 of	 key	 actions	 or	
stakeholders	who	shape	the	system;	through	governance	theory	in	this	instance	
it	 looks	 beyond	 the	 limitation	 of	 proscriptive	 or	 normative	 governance.	Henry	
and	Lee	(2004)	suggest	there	are	three	approaches	to	governance	evident	in	the	
literature	 ‐	 systemic,	 organisational	 and	 political	 governance.	 The	 notions	 of	
systemic	and	political	governance	are	useful	 to	 the	present	study	as	 it	seeks	to	
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analyse	the	interaction	between	various	stakeholders	in	order	to	understand	the	
nature	of	their	action	and	how	they	exercise	their	power.	Governance	structures	
work	with	 influence	 from	 other	 structures.	 In	 the	 Taiwanese	 sporting	 context,	
social	 class,	 political	 structures,	 media,	 sponsors,	 coaches,	 players	 and	 club	
owners	are	groups	of	 stakeholders	whose	 interests	and	actions	are	 relevant	 to	
governance	issues.	This	study	aims	not	only	to	‘describe’	the	governance	system	
as	an	interaction	of	stakeholders	but	also	to	‘explain’	which	stakeholders	win	in	
different	battles	on	the	basis	of	for	example	social	class	or	political	support.	The	
study	 moves	 beyond	 meso‐level	 governance	 concerns	 to	 the	 macro‐level	
considerations	of	strategic	relations	evaluating	broader	structural	forces	such	as	
social	class	and	economics,	as	well	as	 looking	at	individual	views	on	the	micro‐
level	to	generate	an	explanation	of	why	certain	outcomes	have	occurred	within	
this	structure.	
The	analysis	takes	place	at	three	levels	that	are	underpinned	by	meta‐theoretical	
concerns	 of	 ontology,	 epistemology	 and	 methodology,	 which	 decide	 what	
approach	will	be	used,	and	what	will	count	in	the	investigation	for	this	research.	
This	 thesis	 adopts	 a	 critical	 realist	 approach,	which	 argues	 that	 structures	 are	
socially	constructed,	and	which	though	not	observable	directly	may	be	inferred	
from	directly	observable	phenomena.	Thus	the	research	needs	an	understanding	
of	 underlying	 social,	 political,	 and	 economic	 structures	 to	 complete	 the	
explanation	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan.	 At	 the	 micro‐level	 we	
draw	 on	 interview	 data	 with	 key	 stakeholders	 explaining	 the	 individual’s	
perspectives	 on	 governance	 and	 their	 own	motivations.	 At	 the	 meso‐level	 we	
address	governance	actors	from	key	groups	of	stakeholders.	Governance	theory	
is	used	to	conceptualise	how	the	system	of	governance	has	developed	over	time.	
However	 at	 a	macro	 or	meso	 theoretical	 level	we	will	 consider	ways	 in	which	
strategic	 relations	 develop	 as	 consequences	 of	 past	 actions,	 context	 of	 present	
actions	and	products	of	 future	actions.	At	 the	macro	 level	we	explain	 the	 roles	
played	 by	 the	 state	 and	 the	 related	 actors	 in	 outcomes	 of	 the	 development	 of	
basketball	from	Marxist,	pluralist,	and	elitist	perspectives,	the	differences	among	
which	will	 also	be	discussed.	Figure	1.1	 illustrates	 the	 logical	 flow	of	 concepts,	
which	form	the	basis	of	the	research.		
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Figure	1.1:	Conceptual	 Schema	 for	 the	 Investigation	of	 the	Governance	of	Basketball	 in	
Taiwan	
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1.2	Thesis	Structure	
The	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 constituted	 of	 a	 historical,	 theoretical,	 and	
methodological	 discussion	 in	 chapters	 2	 to	 4	 followed	 by	 cases	 studies	with	 a	
detailed	discussion	and	analysis	of	empirical	data	in	chapters	5	to	8.		
Chapter	2	provides	political,	economic,	social,	analysis	of	 the	post	Chinese	Civil	
War	 ROC/Taiwan,	 outlining	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	
development,	in	particular	the	development	of	basketball,	to	provide	the	context	
for	the	explanation	of	the	governance	of	basketball.	The	chapter	firstly	explores	
the	 social	 context	 of	 Taiwan	 with	 a	 political‐economic	 emphasis.	 It	 also	
subsequently	reviews	the	development	of	sport	policy	in	Taiwan.	We	divide	the	
development	 of	 sport	 policy	 into	 three	 periods	 by	 the	 respective	 key	 policies	
made:	 the	 post‐civil	 war	 period,	 the	 period	 during	 which	 the	 Department	 of	
Education	 had	 overall	 responsibility	 for	 sport,	 and	 the	 period	 in	 which	 sport	
policy	became	the	responsibility	of	the	National	Council	on	Physical	Fitness	and	
Sports	 (NCPFS)	 and	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council	 (SAC).	 Following	 this,	 we	
summarise	key	chronological	details	of	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	
with	 a	 focus	 on	 all	 amateur,	 semi‐professional,	 professional,	 and	 prospective‐
professional	levels.		
Chapter	 3	 is	 a	 theoretical	 review	 that	 reviews	 theories	 of	 the	 state,	 and	
governance	theory,	as	well	as	 the	strategic	relational	approach.	Theories	of	 the	
state	 including	 the	 Marxist,	 pluralist,	 and	 elitist	 accounts	 are	 reviewed	 as	 we	
adopted	them	to	analyse	the	nature	of	the	development	of	Taiwan.	The	concept	
of	 systemic,	 organisational,	 and	 political	 governance	 provides	 us	 with	 a	
framework	 for	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan.	
Subsequently	 the	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 is	 reviewed,	 going	 beyond	
explanations	of	meso‐level	governance	outcomes	to	establish	a	wider	framework	
of	analysis	at	the	macro‐level	to	explain	the	nature	of	the	context	within	which	
governance	 take	 place,	 and	 how	 the	 consequences	 of	 previous	 battles	 or	
struggles	shape,	enable	and	constrain	subsequent	governance	decisions.		
Chapter	4	takes	the	methodological	concerns	into	consideration,	seeking	to	link	
ontological,	 epistemological,	 and	 theoretical	 position	 to	 methods	 used.	 The	
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philosophical	 premises	 for	 the	 research,	 in	 the	 form	of	 critical	 realism,	will	 be	
discussed.	 As	we	 regard	 the	 social	 structures	 as	 socially	 constructed,	 a	 critical	
realist	approach	is	adopted	for	this	research.	The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	
synthesise	insights	to	generate	a	framework	for	an	analysis	of	the	governance	of	
basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 through	 a	 qualitative	 approach	 ‐	 involving	 documentary	
analysis	 and	 conducting	 qualitative	 interviews	 with	 key	 informants.	 25	
interviews	were	undertaken	with	stakeholders	within	the	basketball	system.	The	
interviewees	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	involvement	in	specific	aspects	of	the	
strategic	context	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.	Interview	transcripts	and	government	
reports/proceedings	of	parliamentary	debates	were	subject	 to	 thematic	 coding	
employing	Nvivo	9	qualitative	data	analysis	software;	coding	and	analysis	were	
undertaken	 employing	 an	 ethnographic	 content	 analysis	 approach.	 This	
approach	 employs	 a	 protocol	 which	 allows	 the	 application	 of	 both	 pre‐
determined	 deductive,	 researcher‐imposed	 categories,	 and	 inductively	
determined,	 categories	 or	 codes	 arising	 from	 respondents’	 comments,	 thereby	
reflecting	respondents’	‘world	view’.				
Chapter	5,	6,	and	7	address	the	phenomenon	of	sports	governance	in	the	context	
of	 Taiwanese	 basketball.	 The	 analysis	 for	 this	 research	 consider	 three	 cases	 /	
junctures	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 governance	 of	 Taiwanese	 basketball,	 The	 first	 is	 a	
critical	 event	 –	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Chinese	 basketball	 Association	 (CBA),	
Taiwan’s	 first	 professional	 basketball	 league	 in	 1999.	 The	 second	 is	 a	 critical	
process	 –	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 and	 running	 a	 new	 semi‐professional	 or	
prospective	professional	league.	The	third	is	a	critical	contextual	set	of	factors,	
the	development	of	sporting	and	economic	relations	with	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China.	The	major	focus	 in	chapter	5	 is	on	the	 investigation	of	the	collapse	of	
the	CBA	and	the	governance	failures	associated	with	this	event.	It	deals	with	the	
dynamic	 in	 different	 key	 stakeholder	 groups	 within	 the	 systemic	 governance	
system	 and	 addresses	 organisational	 governance	 issues	 as	 well	 as	 the	
involvement	of	political	governance.	
Chapter	6	presents	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	the	Super	Basketball	
League	(SBL)	and	the	governance	issues	for	the	operation	of	the	SBL.	It	explores	
the	processes	of	the	launching	of	the	league	and	the	rationales	of	key	stakeholder	
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such	 as	 the	 government,	 the	 basketball	 association,	 the	 clubs,	 the	 media,	 and	
players/coaches	and	so	on.	It	adopts	a	web	of	systemic	governance	to	explain	the	
power‐relation	 between	 the	 key	 stakeholders	 and	 address	 the	 significant	
involvement	of	 the	government	 in	 the	emergence	of	 the	SBL.	Furthermore	 this	
chapter	is	also	concerned	with	the	issues	of	organisational	governance	especially	
the	power	struggles	among	stakeholder	groups	for	the	operation	of	the	SBL.			
Chapter	 7	 is	 a	 case	 study	 for	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 and	 economic	
relations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.	Two	key	events	have	been	used	to	
help	explore	the	dynamic	power	struggles	between	the	government	and	relevant	
stakeholders	such	as	the	clubs,	the	players,	and	the	administrator	of	the	Chinese	
League	 in	 shaping	 the	policy	outcomes	 for	 the	decision	of	 the	migration	of	 the	
clubs	and	players.	The	first	event	investigated	is	‘the	transfer	of	Sina	Basketball	
Club	 to	 the	 Chinese	 League’,	 which	 happened	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 in	
2001.	The	second	one	is	‘Taiwanese	basketball	players’	migration	to	China.	This	
chapter	 illustrates	 the	 nature	 of	 the	migration	 of	 the	 clubs	 and	 players	with	 a	
focus	on	their	perspectives	while	the	government	had	its	political	considerations	
and	the	clubs	had	commercial	interests	to	pursue.		
Chapter	 8,	 the	 concluding	 chapter,	 is	 divided	 in	 two	 sections.	 The	 first	 section	
provides	an	analysis	which	goes	beyond	the	meso‐level	explanation	to	a	macro‐
level	discussion	of	the	strategic	relations.	Jessop’s		(1982,	1990,	2005)	strategic‐
relational	approach	offers	a	wider	framework	of	analysis	at	the	macro‐level	for	
this	 study	 without	 prescribing	 restrictive	 boundaries	 for	 empirical	 work.	 The	
second	 section	 provides	 an	 overview	 for	 this	 research,	 and	 responds	 to	 the	
research	question.	It	seeks	to	outline	the	research’s	‘contribution	to	knowledge’	
in	this	research	area.		
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Chapter	Two		
The	Historical	Context	of	Basketball	in	Taiwan	
	
2.1	 The	 Development	 of	 Politics,	 the	 Economy,	 and	 of	 Sport	
Policy	
Taiwanese	society	can	be	said	to	have	gone	through	a	series	of	relatively	distinct	
phases	since	the	arrival	of	Chiang	Kai‐Shek	and	the	defeated	nationalists	in	1949.	
From	 1949	 to	 1987	 the	 KMT	 imposed	 authoritarian	 rule	 and	 banned	
participation	by	any	other	party.	Martial	Law	was	enforced	to	suppress	attempts	
by	 political	 groups	 and	 individuals	 to	 form	 opposition	 parties.	 	 The	 period	 of	
martial	law	also	allowed	KMT	to	impose	its	dominance	on	military	and	national	
defence	issues.	In	the	late	1980s	new	political	parties	were	permitted	to	contest	
elections	and	martial	law	was	lifted	in	1987.	In	2000	a	presidential	candidate	of	
the	 Democratic	 Progressive	 Party	 (DPP),	 the	 largest	 opposition	 party,	 was	
elected,	 followed	by	the	founding	of	a	new	DPP	government.	However,	the	DPP	
government	from	2000	to	2008	was	plagued	by	declining	economic	growth	and	
scandalous	embezzlements	by	President	Chen	Shui‐Bian's	party.	KMT’s	Ma	Ying‐
Jeou	 won	 the	 presidential	 election	 in	 2008,	 making	 the	 second	 inter‐party	
transfer	 of	 power	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Taiwan.	 Economically,	 Taiwan	 enjoyed	
remarkable	growth	from	the	1950s	till	the	late	1990s.	The	economic	growth	first	
took	on	the	form	of	agricultural	development	in	the	period	from	the	mid‐1950s	
to	 1970s,	 subsequently	 industrial	 development	 (1970s‐1980s),	 and	 more	
recently	 increased	 technology	 and	 knowledge‐based	 production	 and	 services	
have	become	evident	(Chen,	2001;	Cheng,	2001).			
During	 the	 economic	 expansion,	 the	 country	 experienced	 prosperous	
development	 in	 a	 range	 of	 industries.	 Accompanied	 by	 political	 liberalisation,	
which	 had	 allowed	 several	 former	 sports	 stars	 to	 join	 the	 Legislator	 Yuan	 as	
locally	 elected	 legislative	 representatives,	 the	 sport	 industry	 gradually	
developed,	 diversified,	 and	 sport	 policy	 became	 a	 more	 systematic	 activity.	
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However,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 sport	 industry	 was	 inevitably	 affected	 by	
politics	 and	 the	 cyclical	 nature	 of	 the	 economy.	According	 to	 the	 ‘White	 Paper	
Sport	Policy	 in	Taiwan’	 (Sport	Affairs	Council,	 1999),	 there	 are	 four	 important	
periods	 in	 the	 development	 of	 sports	 policies	 in	 Taiwan.	 These	 are:	 the	 initial	
period	 of	 martial	 law	 (1949‐1969);	 later	 period	 of	 martial	 law	 (1970‐1986);	
post‐martial	 law;	and	the	beginning	of	 liberal	democracy	(1987‐1996),	and	the	
period	of	the	establishment	of	the	National	Council	on	Physical	Fitness	and	Sport	
(1997‐2012).	 However,	 this	 thesis	 only	 focuses	 on	 the	 key	 stakeholders	 who	
shaped	 the	 sport	 governance	 system.	 The	 review	 of	 the	 development	 of	 sport	
policy	 in	 Taiwan	 is	 hence	 limited	 to	 the	 organisation	 responsible	 for	 policy‐
making.	The	history	of	 sports	policy	 in	Taiwan	 could	 be	 roughly	broken	down	
into	 three	 periods.	 These	 are	 the	 post‐war	 period	 (1949‐1973),	 the	
establishment	of	Department	of	Physical	Education	(DPE)	(1973‐1997)	and	the	
establishment	 of	 the	 National	 Council	 on	 Physical	 Fitness	 and	 Sport	 Affairs	
Council	(NCPFS/SAC)	(1997‐2012).	
	
2.1.1	 Post	 Chinese	 Civil	 War	 Period	 and	 the	 Fundamental	 of	 Sport	
Development	in	Taiwan	
In	 1949,	 the	 ROC	 government	 was	 defeated	 in	 the	 Chinese	 Civil	 War.	 The	
Communist	Party	of	China	established	the	People's	Republic	of	China	in	Beijing	
while	 the	ROC	 government	 relocated	 to	 Taiwan.	 In	 the	 post	 Chinese	 Civil	War	
Period,	the	government	sought	to	re‐build	a	new	social	system	for	‘fighting	back’	
in	Taiwan.	A	 lack	of	resources,	 the	conflict	between	mainlanders	and	islanders,	
and	 losing	 international	 recognition	 resulted	 in	 a	 crisis	 of	 political,	 diplomatic,	
educational	and	economic	conditions	for	Taiwan.		
In	 fact,	 the	KMT	put	emphasis	on	 the	development	of	 the	military	at	 that	 time.	
When	 Chiang	 Kai‐shek	 and,	 later,	 his	 son	 Chiang	 Ching‐kuo	 ruled	 the	 island,	
policies	 serving	 Taiwan’s	 long‐term	 domestic	 development	 was	 put	 on	 hold,	
while	 unification	 with	 the	 Chinese	 mainland	 was	 prioritised.	 All	 policies	 of	
political,	 economic	 and	 social	 development	 were	 completely	 aligned	 with	 the	
goal	 of	 “returning	 to	 the	Mainland	 and	 re‐gaining	 control	 of	 the	mainland”.	 In	
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order	 to	build	 the	 island	 into	a	base	 for	 ‘recovering	 the	Chinese	mainland’,	 the	
ruling	elites	of	 the	KMT	government	 imposed	harsh	authoritarian	rule	coupled	
with	 intense	 propaganda	 efforts	 to	 ‘re‐sinicize’	 local	 residents	 (Wang	 &	 Chen,	
2008).	The	KMT	government	enforced	Martial	Law	on	May	20th	1949.		In	order	
to	maintain	the	regime’s	stability,	 the	KMT	banned	the	 formation	of	opposition	
parties	and	social	movements.	All	policies	pertaining	to	the	state’s	development	
were	 set	 by	 the	KMT	alone.	 President	 Chiang	Kai‐Shek,	who	was	 the	 leader	 of	
political	and	army	elites,	decided	the	direction	of	development	of	Taiwan	in	the	
initial	 period	 of	 martial	 law.	 The	 first	 priority	 of	 the	 KMT	 government	 was	
military‐preparedness.		However,	the	internal	challenge	of	the	KMT	government	
was	 not	 only	 to	 maintain	 the	 regime’s	 stability;	 but	 also	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
challenges	 of	 external	 environment	 such	 as	 cross‐strait	 (China‐Taiwan)	
relations,	the	global	economy,	and	foreign	relations	(Shu,	2005;	Su,	2004).	Given	
those	 two	 types	 of	 demand,	 the	 most	 specific	 and	 urgent	 needs	 were	
reconstruction	and	livelihood	of	the	people	seeking	food	and	clothing,	in	addition	
to	 striving	 for	 international	 recognition.	 Therefore,	 in	 addition	 to	 military‐
preparedness,	 the	 government’s	 primary	 objectives	 were	 maintenance	 of	
economic	stability	and	the	prevention	of	rising	inflation.	In	addition,	the	aid	from	
the	 U.S	 to	 Taiwan	was	 also	 a	 key	 to	 developing	 Taiwan’s	 economy	 during	 the	
post‐war	 period.	 U.S	 aid	 accounted	 for	 40%	 of	 gross	 domestic	 capital	 in	 the	
1950s,	the	U.S	assistance	was	approximately	100	million	dollars	every	year	from	
1951	to	1965,	and	aid	from	U.S	had	helped	the	Government	to	reduce	the	rate	of	
inflation	from	3400%	in	1949	to	9%	in1951(Weng,	1986).		 
Lee	(2005)	mentioned	that	the	development	of	sports	in	society	in	general	was	
very	difficult	 to	 implement	 in	 the	post	Chinese	Civil	War	period	because	of	 the	
lack	of	resources.	Although	the	government	was	keen	to	build	an	army	in	order	
to	 prepare	 for	 the	 right	 movement	 to	 fight	 for	 regaining	 mainland	 China,	 the	
promotion	 of	 sports	 was	 scrapped,	 and	 the	 direction	 of	 development	 was	
diverted	 to	 military	 preparedness.	 Chiang	 Kai‐shek	 once	 said:	 “the	 base	 of	 an	
army	is	based	on	its	fitness.”	Therefore,	maximising	the	fitness	level	of	all	ranks	
in	the	military,	especially	the	higher	ranks,	was	the	highest	priority.		
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In	 1950,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 published	 Anti‐Communist	 National	
Education	Guidelines.	The	P.E.	educational	thrust	of	this	period	was	focused	on	
military	 training	 as	 the	 government	 was	 still	 hoping	 to	 re‐gain	 control	 of	
Mainland	China.	 In	1951,	 in	order	 to	 improve	 the	physical	 level	of	 the	national	
army,	 the	Ministry	of	Defence	set	up	an	 internal	organisation	 to	 take	charge	of	
the	 physical	 training	 of	 the	 national	 army.	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Defence	 set	 up	 an	 external	 association,	 the	 main	 aim	 of	 which	 was	 to	 assist	
research	 and	 to	popularise	 sports	within	 the	 army	 to	 increase	 the	health	 level	
and	 the	ability	of	 the	army,	which	 fostered	 the	 importance	of	 sports	 in	 society	
and	 developed	 the	 vision	 to	 host	 international	 competitions(Su,	 2004;	 Tseng,	
2000).	Meanwhile	the	government	tried	to	use	‘education’	to	be	the	fundamental	
driver	in	achieving	the	goal	‘returning	to	the	mainland’.	In	1956,	the	Ministry	of	
Education	 published	 an	 Outline	 of	 Student	 Fitness	 Training	 in	 All	 Levels.	 The	
main	purpose	was	that	by	using	different	sports,	students	were	able	to	exercise	
regularly	 to	 improve	 their	body	 fitness	and	 to	put	 their	 fitness	 to	good	use	 for	
the	country.	Although	it	was	in	the	name	of	educational	institute’s	P.E.	class,	but	
in	fact	it	was	aimed	to	improve	the	general	fitness	level	of	the	military	force	(Su,	
2004:	74).					
Since	 1955,	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 physical	 training	department	was	 allocated	 to	
political	 departments	 in	 each	 military	 service.	 Under	 the	 military	 state,	 the	
background	 of	 most	 instructors	 of	 physical	 training	 was	 largely	 from	 the	
military,	 and	 training	 in	educational	 institutions	 thus	 focused	on	basic	military	
and	combat	skills.	At	this	time,	PE	lessons	 in	educational	 institutions	were	also	
based	on	the	military.		
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 post	 Chinese	 Civil	 War	 period,	 there	 was	 a	 mostly	
unstructured	 plan	 for	 social	 sports.	 The	 China	 National	 Amateur	 Athletic	
Federation	 was	 re‐established	 in	 1951	 in	 Taipei.	 It	 aimed	 to	 assist	 the	
government	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 PE	 nationwide	 as	 the	 highest	 unofficial	 PE	
authorities.	Its	main	purpose	was	to	set	up	competition,	which	would	involve	the	
whole	nation,	and	to	participate	in	the	Asian	and	Olympic	games.	From	1953,	it	
set	up	9	different	sports	committees	to	support	its	aim.	Then	it	set	up	36	sports	
committee	 till	1973,	when	 the	Department	of	Physical	Education	was	 founded.	
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However,	 there	were	still	no	effective	policies	on	Sports;	 it	was	 focused	on	 the	
physical	side,	which	again	aimed	to	support	the	military	elites’	ideology	of	fitness	
for	combat	(Tan,	1986;	Wu,	1981).		
However,	this	situation	changed	after	the	economic	transition	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s.	 Taiwan	 began	 to	 implement	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 a	 four‐year	 economic	
development	 plan	 in	 1953	 and	 decided	 to	 develop	 import	 substitution	
industries.	The	development	of	light	industry	helped	achieve	rapid	accumulation	
of	 capital,	 labour	absorption,	 and	 the	goal	of	 adequate	 supply	 for	 the	domestic	
market.	A	number	of	 tools	were	 implemented,	 such	 as	 capital	 controls,	 import	
and	 export	 controls,	 foreign	 exchange	 controls,	 and	 price	 controls,	 which	
improved	competiveness	in	terms	of	scope	of	products	and	production	costs.		
The	 agriculture‐oriented	 society	 began	 to	 restructure	 due	 to	 the	 decline	 of	
agricultural	population	and	significant	changes	in	manufacturing	producers	from	
food	 processing	 to	 textiles,	 bicycle	 production	 (Su,	 2004).	 The	 strategy	 to	
transform	 into	an	 industrial	export	economy	had	greatly	 improved	 the	 level	of	
industrial	development.	The	value	of	 industrial	production	grew	on	an	average	
annual	 growth	 rate	of	11.7%	between	1953	and	1962,	 and	 the	 contribution	 to	
Taiwan’s	 gross	domestic	product	 (GDP)	 raise	 from	15.4%	 in	1953	 to	21.9%	 in	
1962.		This	became	the	foundation	of	the	economy	in	the	1960’s	(Chen,	2003).	
In	 the	 1960s,	 Taiwanese	 markets	 started	 to	 open;	 the	 government	 gradually	
changed	the	policy	of	import	substitutes	to	export	orientated	policies.	Export	of	
industrial	products	started	to	exceed	export	of	agricultural	products.	At	the	same	
time,	the	government	started	to	lift	several	restrictions	that	had	been	placed	on	
local	 industries	 to	 encourage	 international	 trade	 and	 to	 attract	 foreign	
investment.	 In	addition,	 the	economic	boost	 in	the	western	countries	 increased	
the	export	market	size,	which	also	played	an	important	role	in	the	policy.	Since	
1963,	the	value	of	manufacturing	output	has	exceeded	that	of	agriculture	output,	
and	 hence	 this	 became	 known	 as	 “Period	 of	 Manufacture”.	 Since	 Taiwan	 had	
successfully	transformed	itself	from	an	agrarian	society	to	an	industrial	country,	
this	 transformation	has	 set	up	a	platform	 for	 the	political	 structures	 to	 change	
and	the	rise	of	middle‐class	(Hsiao,	1989;	Liu,	1988)	
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Following	 the	 economic	 growth,	 the	 relationship	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 China	
resembled	 that	 of	 a	 ‘cold	 war’	 style	 confrontation,	 the	 sport	 policy	 had	 been	
constructed	 towards	 a	 more	 balanced	 style	 which	 the	 government	 not	 only	
focused	on	military	 fitness	but	also	considered	the	general	sports	development	
although	 it	 still	 sought	 to	 use	 sports	 to	 gain	 the	 international	 recognition.	 In	
order	 to	 increase	 Taiwan’s	 international	 relationship,	 government	 started	 to	
concentrate	on	producing	competitive	sport	(Jian,	1994).	The	first	 formal	sport	
policy	published	by	 the	Executive	Yuan	on	16th	of	March	1968	 since	 the	KMT	
government	withdrew	 to	Taiwan	was	 ‘Developing	Sport	 for	All	 and	Cultivating	
Sport	 Elites	 Programmes’.	 It	 set	 up	 a	 two‐dimension	 sport	 policy.	 On	 one	
dimension,	 it	 concentrated	 on	 the	 popularity	 of	 sports	 to	 increase	 the	 health	
status	of	the	general	public.	The	aim	of	the	other	dimension	was	to	increase	the	
competitiveness	of	athletics	and	to	participate	in	international	competitions.	The	
Ministry	of	Education	followed	the	 instructions	to	plan	the	project	to	assist	the	
aims.	During	this	period,	the	increased	number	of	local	sports	competitions	and	
facilities	 and	 the	 training	 of	 elite	 athletics	 had	 been	 a	 good	 start	 towards	
increased	participation	by	the	general	populace	in	sports.		The	twin	goals	of	the	
programme	 –	 sports	 for	 all	 and	 elite	 sport	 remained	 the	 core	 aims	 of	 sports	
development	after	the	DPE	and	the	NCPFS	was	founded	(Liu,	2003;	Tsai,	1994).	
In	conclusion,	although	sports	development	was	not	the	first	priority	of	the	KMT	
government	 in	 the	 post	 Chinese	 Civil	 War	 period,	 the	 PE	 development,	 in	
particular	 “Developing	 Sport	 for	 All	 and	 Cultivating	 Sport	 Elites	 Programmes”	
became	the	fundamental	drivers	of	sport	development	in	Taiwan.		
	
2.1.2	Political	and	Economic	Transition	and	 Sport	Development	after	 the	
Establishment	of	the	Department	of	Physical	Education	
In	 the	 period	 of	 the	 1970s‐1980s,	 Taiwan’s	 politics	 moved	 towards	 more	
liberalisation	and	the	economy	grew	rapidly.	The	political	and	economic	context	
has	profound	implications	for	the	development	of	sport	(Lee,	2005;	Liu,	2003)	
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International	 relationships	 were	 difficult	 to	 build	 after	 Taiwan	 was	 expelled	
from	 the	 United	 Nations	 in	 1971.	 Economically,	 America	 ended	 its	 economic	
support	 for	Taiwan	on	June	30th	1965	when	Taiwan’s	economy	began	to	grow	
through	 its	 own	 resources.	 The	 government	 also	 began	 to	 implement	 9	 year	
compulsory	 education	 from	 1968.	 	 In	 short,	 from	 the	 early	 1970s,	 Taiwan's	
domestic	 political	 and	 economic	 development	 was	 facing	 major	 changes	 in	
international,	 diplomatic,	 and	 economic	 terms	 and	 in	 the	 context	 there	 were	
domestic	political,	economic,	social,	and	cultural	experiences	in	various	systems.		
In	 this	 context,	 politically,	 the	 KMT	 government	 began	 implementing	 a	
“localisation	policy”,	disregarding	the	provincial	elites.	The	KMT	created	changes	
to	the	government's	leadership	structure.	Chiang	Ching‐Kuo,	the	premier	and	the	
son	of	Chiang	Kai‐Shek,	inherited	the	presidency	in	1975	and	lifted	Martial	Law	
in	1987.	In	Chiang	Ching‐kuo’s	era,	major	innovations	were	introduced	including	
political	parties,	and	the	implementation	of	cross‐strait	exchanges	in	the	political	
and	economic	changes,	signalling	a	new	stage	of	transformation	for	Taiwan	(Liu,	
2003;	Su,	2004).		
This	was	the	period	of	Taiwan’s	economic	development	and	its	evolution	from	an	
agricultural	 to	an	 industrial	economy.	However	 in1973,	war	 in	 the	Middle	East	
caused	the	first	oil	crisis,	which	had	profound	impact	on	the	global	economy.	In	
order	to	tame	inflation	during	this	period,	the	government	took	various	energy‐
saving	measures	while	 reducing	 import	 restrictions	 to	 increase	supply,	but	 the	
result	of	 these	constraints	and	world‐wide	economic	recession	was	a	broke	on	
economic	growth	(Wang,	1978).	There	was	a	second	energy	crisis	 in	1979,	 the	
price	rose	though	slightly	less	rapidly	than	the	first	energy	crisis,	but	the	Taiwan	
economy	still	 faced	a	considerable	impact.	 In	order	to	save	the	economic	crisis,	
the	 government	 launched	 "Ten‐great‐constructions"	 in	 1974,	 hoping	 that	
massive	 public	 investment	 would	 drive	 economic	 recovery.	 These	 10	
constructions	 investments	 focused	 on	 the	 construction	of	 public	 infrastructure	
(Hsiao,	1989).	
It	seemed	that	Taiwan	had	had	a	smooth	transition	domestically	from	the	1960s	
to	 the	 1970s.	 However,	 regarding	 foreign	 relations,	 the	 country	 suffered	 huge	
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setbacks	in	the	1970s.	Taiwan	was	expelled	from	the	UN	in	1971	and	the	United	
States	 switched	 recognition	 to	 the	PRC	 in	 1979.	 From	 the	mid‐1970s,	 “Taiwan	
virtually	 became	 a	 pariah	 in	 the	 international	 community,	 most	 members	 of	
which	 chose	 to	 recognise	 the	 PRC	 as	 the	 sole	 legitimate	 government	 of	 China,	
though	 the	 KMT	 still	 stubbornly	 insisted	 it	 represented	 all	 of	 China”	 (Yu	 &	
Bairner,	2008:	218).	After	leaving	the	UN	in	1971,	sports	were	used	as	an	avenue	
to	 participate	 in	 international	 competitions	 to	 gain	 recognition.	 The	
government’s	 orientation	 for	 sports	 policy	 moved	 from	 general	 fitness	 or	
military	 fitness	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 cultivation	 of	 talented	 athletes,	
international	events	and	diplomatic	activities.		
The	 Department	 of	 Physical	 Education	 (DPE)	 under	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education	
was	set	up	 in	 the	above	context.	After	 the	Ministry	of	Education	conducted	the	
5th	 national	 education	 conference	 in	 1970,	 the	Ministry	 (1970)	 identified	 that	
due	to	the	changes	and	the	needs	at	that	time,	the	National	Sport	Committee	did	
not	have	the	capacity	to	fulfil	the	nation’s	requirement	in	sport.	At	the	time,	most	
countries	 had	 their	 own	 independent	 sporting	 authorities;	 as	 a	 result,	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Education	 requested	 in	 1970	 that	 the	 Executive	 of	 Yuen	 have	 an	
independent	 sporting	 authority.	 After	 three	 years	 of	 negotiation	 and	 several	
changes	to	organisational	structures,	the	Department	of	Physical	Education	(the	
DPE)	 was	 formed	 on	 31st	 of	 October	 1973.	 The	 original	 National	 Sport	
Committee	was	revoked	and	the	original	employees	were	merged	into	the	DPE.	
The	DPE	was	 the	highest	department	 in	 the	government’s	 structure	 to	manage	
physical	education	programmes	and	to	oversee	sports	development.			
On	 7th	 December	 1973,	 the	 government	 announced	 that	 each	 educational	
institute	 would	 be	 required	 to	 set	 up	 a	 sporting	 department.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
Department	 of	 Education	 of	 Taiwan	 Province	 and	Department	 of	 Education	 of	
Taipei	 City	 set	 up	 Physical	 Education	 Offices	 around	 the	 same	 period	 of	 time.	
However,	 as	 too	many	different	 organisations	 handled	 sport	 issues,	 this	 led	 to	
difficulties	 in	 promoting	 sports.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 DPE	 has	 been	 encouraging	
Department	 of	 Education	 in	 different	 cities	 to	 set	 up	 Physical	 Education	
Divisions.		
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As	mentioned	earlier,	 the	 ‘Developing	Sport	 for	All	 and	Cultivating	Sport	Elites	
Programmes’	announced	by	Ministry	of	Education	focused	on	sports	promoting	
and	 training	 sport	 talents	 for	 international	 competitions.	 Hence,	 after	 the	
establishment	of	the	DPE	and	PE	divisions,	these	sport	organisations	(governing	
bodies)	 followed	 the	 guideline	 to	 develop	 sport	 policies.	 The	 most	 significant	
instance	 was	 ‘The	 Active	 Implementation	 of	 Sport	 for	 All	 Scheme’,	 which	 was	
attempted	to	“achieve	mental	and	physical	balance	through	healthy	exercise	for	
the	 population	 and	 develop	 elite	 sport	 to	 achieve	medals	 on	 the	 international	
stage”	 (Liu,	 2003:	 98).	 Practical	 approaches	 of	 the	 scheme	 are	 (a)	 building	
venues	 for	 various	 sports	 and	 enhancing	 the	 supply	 of	 sport	 equipment;	 (b)	
enhancing	training	method	to	improve	athletic	skills,	standards	and	participation	
in	international	competitions;	(c)	actively	promoting	martial	arts	and	folk	sports;	
(d)	expanding	the	promotion	of	sport	for	all	and	increasing	national	health;	(e)	
actively	 expanding	 international	 sports	 exchange	 activities	 (Ministry	 of	
Education,	1979).	The	 implementation	of	 this	programme	changed	 the	original	
policy,	 which	 broadened	 school	 sports	 and	 social	 sports	 to	 two	 more	 specific	
dimensions,	which	were	‘sports	for	all	on	a	leisure	dimension’	and	‘elite	sports’	
(Ministry	of	Education,	1980).	“This	was	the	first	time	that	concept	of	sport	as	a	
leisure	activity	had	been	promoted	as	Taiwan	had	been	effectively	improving	its	
economy	 since	 the	 late	 1970s”	 (Lee,	 2005:	 124).	 Indeed,	 since	 the	 DPE	 was	
responsible	for	administration	of	sport	affairs,	 ‘Sport	for	All’	had	been	set	as	an	
essential	policy	goal.	This	period	can	be	considered	as	the	fundamental	stage	of	
sport	development	in	Taiwan.	
In	1973,	the	oil	crisis	led	to	widespread	inflation	and	economic	downturn	in	the	
world.	As	a	result,	the	price	of	raw	materials	and	goods	increased	dramatically,	
causing	 shortages	 within	 Taiwan.	 To	 counter	 the	 energy	 crisis	 in	 1979,	 the	
government	 promoted	 the	 proposal	 of	 the	 ‘12	 Developments’.	 The	 12	
Developments	 provided	 a	 basic	 level	 of	 fundamental	 support	 for	 heavy	
industries	and	 it	also	minimized	the	 impact	 that	 the	energy	crisis	brought.	The	
period	between	1963	and	1980	is	the	period	in	which	Taiwan	enjoyed	its	highest	
growth	rate.	Despite	the	oil	and	energy	crisis,	the	average	growth	rate	per	year	
was	18%	(Government	Information	Office,	2004).	
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Partly	in	response	to	the	economic	recession	caused	by	the	second	energy	crisis,	
the	 Government	 established	 Hsinchu	 Science	 Park	 in	 1981.	 The	 government	
began	 emphasising	 the	 development	 of	 "strategic	 industries"	 in	 1984.	 In	 the	
same	 year,	 the	 government	 declared	 that	 business	 should	 become	 more	
internationalised	 and	 government‐owned	 enterprises	 could	 be	 privatised.	 The	
government	 also	 announced	 that	 the	 "investment	 incentive	 regulations"	would	
be	 allowed	 expire	 in	 1990,	 which	 meant	 that	 the	 government	 would	 avoid	
intervening,	 and	 would	 support	 market	 liberalisation.	 The	 government	
subsequently	 utilised	 the	 "Statute	 for	 Upgrading	 Industries"	 in	 1991	 which	
fastered	a	rapid	growth	of	export	trade	(Government	Information	Office,	2003).	
Taiwan's	industrial	sector	had	to	cope	with	the	challenges	of	a	new	era	to	move	
towards	 the	 diversification	 of	 business	 strategy,	 while	 80%	 of	 Taiwan's	
production	value	was	contributed	by	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs).	The	
SMEs	were	considered	to	have	achieved	outstanding	performance	(Pon,	2009).		
A	rapid	political	democratisation	also	took	place	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	and	it	
had	 turned	 years	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	 into	 a	 constitutional	 right	 protected	 by	
law.	The	Martial	Law	enacted	in	1949	not	only	imposed	a	ban	on	political	parties	
but	also	on	private	newspapers.	From	the	1980s,	an	opposition	movement	began	
to	 challenge	 the	 KMT	 regime.	 In	 September	 1986,	 the	Democratic	 Progressive	
Party	 (DPP)	 was	 founded2.	 The	 Martial	 Law	 had	 been	 removed	 on	 15th	 July	
1987,	and	the	first	direct	election	for	the	legislators	was	held	in	1989.	Taiwan’s	
political	atmosphere	has	changed	rapidly	from	an	elitist	style	to	a	pluralist	style	
where	 the	 Taiwanese	 people	 could	 freely	 elect	 their	 representatives	 into	
Legislator	Yuan.	Various	political	parties	compete	in	regular	elections,	and	more	
official	posts	are	now	filled	by	elections	(Government	Information	Office,	2003).		
In	 the	 1980s,	 the	 economy	 changed	 from	 protectionism	 towards	 the	 modern	
open	 environment	 while	 economic	 and	 social	 developments	 also	 experienced	
major	 changes.	 Regarding	 the	 development	 of	 sport,	 in	 1978,	 after	 Kaohsiung	
																																																								
2	The	most	distinguishes	the	DPP	from	the	KMT	is	its	inclination	towards	Taiwan	independence,	
that	is,	the	permanent	political	separation	of	Taiwan	from	China.	
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City	 was	 promoted	 to	 a	 municipality,	 it	 set	 up	 the	 first	 PE	 Division	 in	 the	
Department	of	Education.	 Shortly	 afterwards,	Taipei	City	 and	Taiwan	Province	
also	 set	up	 the	PE	Division	 in	 their	 educational	department,	 this	has	made	 the	
national	 PE	 organisational	 structure	 more	 complete.	 After	 1980,	 when	
Kaohsiung	 City	 and	 Taipei	 City	 had	 set	 up	 PE	 Division,	 this	 led	 to	 a	 more	
centralised	structure	for	the	country	to	lead,	organise,	plan	and	promote	its	sport	
programmes	(Su,	2004)	
In	this	context	of	political	and	economic	transition,	even	though	sport	until	this	
stage	 had	 understandably	 simply	 not	 been	 one	 of	 the	 central	 concerns	 of	 the	
KMT	 regime,	 there	was	 a	new	 stimulus	 for	 the	 department	 of	 sport	 in	Taiwan	
after	the	DPE	took	the	responsibility	of	the	administration	of	the	PE	programme	
and	the	development	of	sport	(Lee,	2005;	Liu,	2003)	
However,	 the	DPE	 faced	a	massive	 failure	when	 the	national	 team	did	not	win	
any	medal	 in	 the	 1998	 Seoul	 Olympic	 Games.	 The	 DPE	 sought	 to	 improve	 the	
performance	 of	 sport	 in	 all	 levels,	 and	 introduced	 a	 new	 ‘National	 Four‐Year	
Sports	Programme’.	This	programme	 focused	on	eight	 aims,	which	were	 (a)	 to	
establish	a	school‐league	match	system	at	all	levels	of	schools,	and	set	up	county‐
league	 matches;	 (b)	 to	 cultivate	 sport	 talents	 with	 a	 long‐term	 plan;	 (c)	 to	
establish	awards	and	a	career	development	system	for	excellent	athletes;	(d)	to	
improve	 the	 standard	 of	 coaches	 and	 referees;	 (e)	 to	 upgrade	 sport	 science	
research	and	academic	studies;	 (f)	 to	renovate	and	 improve	sport	 facilities;	 (g)	
To	 strengthen	 international	 sport	 academic	 exchange;	 and	 (h)	 to	 promote	
traditional	folk	sports.	
There	 was	 an	 important	 feature	 in	 this	 programme:	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
league	match	system.	The	programme	had	brought	in	an	NCAA	type	system	for	
Taiwan	and	 created	a	new	system	 for	 sport	 events	 in	 schools.	 It	 also	 aimed	 to	
combine	facilities	development,	marketing	and	professional	staff	in	school	sports	
(Huang	&	Chen,	2006;	Su,	2004).	We	could	say	 it	became	the	foundation	of	 the	
new	 system,	 which	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 High	 School	 Basketball	
League	(HBL)	and	University	Basketball	Association	(UBA)	in	the	future.	
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In	 1989,	 in	 response	 to	 actual	 business	 needs,	 the	 China	 National	 Amateur	
Athletic	Federation	had	been	restructured	 into	 two	different	organisations:	 the	
Republic	 of	 China	 Sports	 Federation	 (ROCSF)	 and	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Olympic	
Committee.	The	ROCSF	was	responsible	for	domestic	sport	development	and	the	
Chinese	 Taipei	 Olympic	 Committee	 was	 responsible	 for	 Olympic	 and	
international	sport	affairs.		
The	issue	of	sport	development	was	discussed	in	the	Seventh	National	Education	
Conference,	which	was	conducted	in	1994.	There	were	seven	aims	formed	in	the	
congress	(Ministry	of	Education,	1994).	These	aims	were:	
a. To	provide	appropriate	sport	policies	and	strategies	 for	developing	
sport.	
b. To	 establish	 the	 sports	 administration	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 the	
administrative	work	more	efficiently.	
c. To	utilise	 the	 social	 resources	more	 effectively	 and	 to	promote	 the	
implementation	of	‘Sport	for	All’	policy.	
d. To	provide	more	sport	facilities	and	to	manage	them	effectively.	
e. To	 train	 sports	 elites	 effectively	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 sport	
performance.	
f. To	be	actively	 involved	 in	 international	 sports	affairs	and	establish	
contacts	 in	 all	 possible	 areas	 and	 to	 provide	 policy	 for	 sport	
exchanges	between	both	sides	of	the	Taiwan	Straits.	
g. To	promote	the	development	of	physical	education	and	the	quality	of	
teaching	in	school.		
To	sum	up,	government	began	to	establish	the	structure	of	sport	administration	
in	 a	planned	way	 after	 the	 establishment	of	 the	DPE.	The	 sport	 administrative	
organisation	 of	 central	 government	 and	 local	 government	were	 ‘adjusted’.	 The	
DPE	 also	 clarified	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 ROCSF,	 the	 Chinese	 Taipei	
Olympic	Committee	and	the	NGBs.	A	two‐dimensional	sport	policy	(Elite	sports	
and	 Sport	 for	 All)	 had	 been	 set	 up	 after	 establishment	 of	 the	 DPE.	 Hence,	 the	
period	 between	 1973	 and	 1990	 was	 the	 foundation‐laying	 period	 for	 the	
development	of	sports	in	Taiwan.		
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Furthermore,	 due	 to	 political,	 economic	 social	 transformation	 plus	 the	
promotion	 from	 sport	 policies,	 public	 and	 private	 business	 had	 begun	 to	
build/sponsor	 sport	 teams	 in	 this	 period.	 The	 State‐owned	 enterprise	 was	 an	
important	resource	of	sport	teams.	State‐owned	enterprises	had	been	cultivating	
many	well‐known	star	players,	which	helped	the	development	of	elite	sports	in	
Taiwan.	 Support	 for	 of	 amateur	 sport	 leagues	 and	 baseball	 were	 the	 most	
popular	sponsors’	choice	for	private	corporations	to	invest	in,	and	the	Taiwanese	
professional	baseball	league	‐	Chinese	Professional	Baseball	League	(CPBL)	was	
set	 up	 in	 1990.	 	 In	 the	 next	 three	 years,	 amateur	 basketball	 also	 became	
extremely	 popular.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 1993,	 the	 Taiwanese	 professional	 basketball	
league	 ‐	 Chinese	 basketball	 Alliance	 (CBA)	was	 established	 in	 the	 backdrop	 of	
stable	economic	growth	and	high	social	 expectations.	The	establishment	of	 the	
two	professional	sport	 leagues	made	the	development	of	sport	 in	Taiwan	more	
complete.	
Increases	in	gross	national	product,	national	income	and	economic	growth	rates	
in	 the	 1980s	 to	 the	 1990s,	were	 experienced	 in	 Taiwanese	 society,	 generating	
money	 to	drive	 the	advent	of	consumer	society	 in	Taiwan.	With	 the	support	of	
sport	 policies,	 it	 was	 a	 period	 of	 comprehensive	 development	 for	 the	 sports	
industry	from	the	1990s.	
	
2.1.3	 The	 Modern	 Taiwan	 and	 the	 Establishment	 of	 the	 Sports	 Affairs	
Council	
As	we	mentioned	above,	Taiwan's	 economy	grew	 rapidly	 through	 its	 export	 in	
the	1980s	experiencing	a	 stable	 economic	 context	with	a	 growth	 rate	of	 about	
6.7%.	However,	 after	1988	Taiwan’s	 export	 growth	 slowed	down	compared	 to	
the	previous	decade	because	Taiwan's	trade	surplus	with	the	United	States	and	
other	 countries	 led	 to	 pressure	 to	 appreciate	 the	 Taiwan	 currency.	 The	
government	 therefore	actively	promoted	 industrial	upgrading,	and	also	pushed	
for	 the	 development	 of	 high‐tech	 industry	 and	 its	 value	 until	 the	 1990s.	 The	
information	 technology	 industry	 became	 Taiwan's	 most	 important	 foreign	
exchange	 earner.	 	 Taiwan	 is	 the	 largest	manufacturer	of	 semiconductors,	 of	 IT	
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hardware,	and	the	second	largest	manufacturer	of	LCD	screens	and	DRAM	in	the	
world,	 ranked	behind	only	South	Korea	(Government	 Information	Office,	2004;	
Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs,	2008,	2009a,	2009b).	The	data	shows	that	Taiwan	
had	 already	 successfully	 transformed	 to	 a	 high‐tech	 industry‐based	 economic	
system	 (J.	 Hsu,	 2011).	 Taiwan's	 economic	 development	 had	 seen	 a	 shift	 from	
import	 substitution	 industrialisation,	 through	 industrial	 exports	 in	 labour‐
intensive	 sectors,	 to	 the	 current	 emphasis	 on	 the	 IT	 industry.	 With	 the	 rapid	
growth	 of	 domestic	 private	 consumption	 and	 public	 investment	 needs,	 IT	
industry	and	service	sector	became	the	main	industry	in	Taiwan	from	the	1990s	
(Cheng,	2001;	Liu,	2003;	Su,	2004).		
The	successful	transition	of	the	Taiwanese	economic	structure	allowed	the	KMT	
to	transform	the	political	structure	from	the	top	of	the	political	hierarchy	ain	the	
1980s.	 Following	 the	 end	 of	 martial	 law	 in	 1987	 and	 subsequent	 economic	
growth,	 the	KMT	government	made	efforts	 to	create	a	more	 liberal	democratic	
society	 and	 the	 Taiwanese	 people	 became	 more	 concerned	 with	 political	
matters.	Taiwan	politics	had	transformed	from	an	authoritarian	regime	to	multi‐
party	politics	after	Chiang	Ching‐Kuo	 lifted	 the	order	of	martial	 law	and	ended	
the	ban	on	 forming	political	parties	and	private	newspapers.	Furthermore,	Lee	
Teng‐Huei,	who	became	the	president	after	Chiang	Ching‐Kuo	(son	of	Chaing	Kai‐
Shek)	died	on	13th	 January	1988,	 announced	 the	 termination	of	 the	 'Period	of	
Mobilisation	 for	 suppression	 of	 the	 Communist	 Rebellion'	 and	 he	 supported	
party	politics	actively	(Liu,	2003).	After	the	government	held	elections	regularly,	
the	DPP's	 standing	was	enhanced	with	many	 important	political	victories	 from	
its	foundation	in	1986.	The	DPP	received	41	percent	of	the	vote	in	the	city	and	
county	 magistrate	 elections	 in	 1993.	 Then	 Chen	 Shui‐Bian	 won	 the	 Taipei	
Mayoral	elections	in	1994.	The	direct	voting	for	legislators,	elections	for	Mayors	
of	 Municipalities	 and	 Taiwan	 province,	 and	 eventually	 for	 the	 president	 were	
held	 in	 1996.	 These	 contexts	 showed	 that	 Taiwan	 politics	 had	 become	 a	
democratised	system.		
With	 the	 industrial	 transformation	 and	 upgrading	 of	 the	 value	 chain,	 the	
Taiwanese	 economy	 performed	 very	well	 until	 the	 Asian	 financial	 crisis	 broke	
out	 in	Thailand	 in	1997.	The	Asian	 economy	had	performed	well	 and	was	 still	
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improving	 in	 the	 1990s,	 especially	 in	 Taiwan.	 However,	 on	 2nd	 of	 July	 1997,	
Thailand	adopted	a	floating	exchange	rate,	which	led	to	the	devaluation	of	THB,	
as	 a	 result,	 the	 Thai	 stock	 market	 went	 down	 dramatically.	 Soon	 this	 had	
influence	 on	 the	 markets	 of	 Malaysia,	 Indonesia,	 Philippine,	 Singapore,	 Hong	
Kong,	Taiwan,	South	Korea	and	Japan.	The	crisis	led	to	devaluation	of	the	major	
currencies,	a	dramatic	drop	in	share	prices	and	soon	it	influenced	GDP,	and	the	
inflation	 rate	 and	 unemployment	 rate.	 The	 Asian	 financial	 crisis	 seriously	
damaged	 Taiwan’s	 economic	 development.	 It	 caused	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 economic	
growth	 rate	and	 industrial	production,	 a	 fall	 in	exports,	 and	 the	devaluation	of	
the	New	Taiwan	Dollar.	
After	 the	 inter‐party	 power	 transfer	 of	 power	 in	 2000,	 the	 DPP	 government	
failed	 to	revitalise	 the	Taiwanese	economy.	From	2000	to	2007(under	 the	DPP	
regime),	 the	 average	 economic	 growth	 rate	was	 4.1%,	which	 is	 a	 40%	decline	
from	the	previous	decade	(annual	average	of	6.5%	from	1991	to	1999).	Taiwan	
also	 ranked	 last	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 growth	 rate	 in	 the	 four	 “Asian	 Tigers”	
(Hong	Kong,	South	Korea,	Singapore,	and	Taiwan).	This	marked	a	stark	contrast	
to	 the	 Chiang	 Ching‐Kuo	 era,	 during	 which	 Taiwan	 had	 the	 most	 successful	
economy	among	the	Four	Asian	Tigers	(Economic	Daily	News,	2008).	
In	the	50	years	of	KMT	regime,	the	government	debt	was	2	trillion	3,575	billion	
NTD.	However,	in	the	eight	years	of	DPP	regime,	the	total	government’s	dept	was	
2	trillion	288	billion	NTD.	Taking	into	account	the	sale	of	over	six	hundred	billion	
NTD	worth	of	 government’s	properties,	 the	debt	was	more	 than	 that	of	 the	50	
years	 of	 the	 KMT	 regime.	 	 Moreover,	 as	 the	 debt	 had	 been	 increasing,	 the	
government	 decided	 to	 engage	 in	 less	 capital	 investment,	 the	 proportion	
constituted	by	investment	dropped	from	5.36%	of	total	GDP	in	1999	to	3.30%	in	
2007.	Also,	the	government	funds	used	for	higher	education	also	dropped	from	
4.8%	to	3.9%	(Economic	Daily	News,	2008;	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs,	2009b).	
As	noted	before,	the	export	industry	and	the	high‐tech	industry	are	the	economic	
backbone	of	Taiwan.	However,	 the	market	share	of	Taiwanese	export	 in	global	
trade	 decreased	 from	 2.19%	 in	 1997	 to	 1.85%	 in	 2006,	 indicating	 that	
Taiwanese	 products	 were	 not	 as	 competitive	 they	 once	 were.	 Even	 the	
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percentage	of	hi‐tech	exports	has	been	decreasing	after	2000.	For	example,	 the	
percentage	of	electrical	goods	dropped	from	the	peak	of	56.3%	of	GDP	in	2000	to	
47.9%	 in	 2007	 (Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Affairs,	 2009a,	 2009b).	 This	 was	 of	
significance	for	the	decreasing	market	share	of	Taiwanese	products	in	the	world.	
Moreover,	 the	 profit	 margin	 of	 value‐added	 processes	 of	 electrical	 goods	 also	
declined	in	those	years.	Some	contract	manufacturers	even	reported	lower	profit	
margins	than	the	traditional	industries,	such	as	textile	and	clothing.	
These	figures	indicate	the	Taiwanese	economy	declined	badly	while	the	DPP	was	
in	power.	Moreover,	after	the	second	transfer	of	power	in	2008,	Chen	Shui‐Bian,	
the	 former	 President	 admitted	 he	 had	 transferred	 an	 enormous	 amount	 of	
capital	to	overseas	banks	in	August.	In	November,	he	was	taken	into	custody,	and	
he	 was	 charged	 in	 December.	 Many	 scandals	 relating	 to	 the	 Chen	 Shui‐Bian	
administration	staff	were	also	revealed	to	the	public.	As	KMT's	Ma	Ying‐Jeou	won	
the	 Presidency	 election	 in	 2008	 with	 7.65	 Million	 votes,	 the	 political	 and	
economic	 situation	 of	 Taiwan	 has	 changed	 dramatically.	 Firstly,	 the	 tense	
situation	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 China	 became	 more	 relaxed,	 as	 the	 KMT	
government	was	not	adopting	the	 'Aggressive	Taiwan	Independence	Approach'	
adopted	 by	 the	 DPP	 government.	 Economically,	 the	 new	 government’s	 policy	
allowed	for	more	flexibility	for	business	across	the	Taiwan	Straits.		
In	 the	 same	 year,	 KMT	 won	 the	 7th	 Legislative	 election	 (KMT	 won	 81	 seats,	
71.7%	of	the	total).	With	Pan‐Blue	Coalition3,	they	had	86	seats	in	total,	76.1%,	of	
the	total	seats.	This	marked	the	2nd	power	transfer	in	the	history	of	Taiwan,	and	
made	the	KMT	the	governing	party	again	(Chang	&	Holt,	2009).	
																																																								
3	Generally	 there	 are	 two	main	 political	 coalitions	 in	 Taiwan.	 The	 parties	 that	 hold	 the	 same	
political	 ideology	 with	 KMT	 were	 classified	 in	 the	 Pan‐Blue	 coalition	 because	 the	 KMT’s	
representative	 colour	 is	 blue.	 The	 KMT	 forms	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 Taiwanese	 Pan‐Blue	
coalition,	 which	 supports	 eventual	 unification	 with	 the	 mainland.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
parties,	that	hold	similar	positions	in	terms	of	political	ideology	to	that	traditionally,	which	had	
been	associated	with	strong	advocacy	of	human	rights	and	a	distinct	Taiwanese	identity,	were	
members	of	the	Pan‐Green	Coalition.	
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In	 the	 eight	 years	 of	DPP	 regime,	 the	 “Locking	 in4”	 policy	 adopted	by	 the	DPP	
government	 had	 led	 to	 the	 devaluation	 of	 Taiwanese	 business.	 Since	 the	 2008	
presidential	 election,	 the	 political	 situation	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 China	 has	
stabilized	and	the	possibility	of	an	armed	conflict	has	decreased	dramatically.	As	
investors	are	less	likely	to	invest	in	potential	flashpoints,	the	stabilised	political	
situation	would	persuade	and	attract	more	investment	into	Taiwan.	In	the	eyes	
of	 international	 investors,	Taiwan	has	become	a	quality	stepping	stone	into	the	
greater	 Chinese	 market.	 More	 importantly,	 Taiwan’s	 domestic	 investment	 has	
been	affected	by	a	net	outflow	of	capital	during	 the	eight	years	of	DPP	regime,	
during	which	the	amount	of	investment	made	on	foreign	currency	offshore	funds	
has	been	estimated	at	about	20.87	billion	USD,	two‐thirds	of	the	Taiwanese	GDP	
per	 annual	 year.	 As	 the	 political	 situation	 in	 Taiwan	 has	 become	more	 stable,	
experts	have	anticipated	 the	 return	of	 capital	back	 to	Taiwan;	 the	 total	 sum	of	
outward	capital	flow	is	more	than	the	net	worth	of	Taiwan’s	stock	market.	As	the	
interest	 rate	 has	 dropped	 to	 a	 new	 low,	 capital	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 directed	 to	
domestic	investment	in	Taiwan	(Lin,	2010).	
However,	 in	 2009,	 Taiwan’s	 economy	 grew	 by	 just	 4.3%,	 short	 of	 the	 5%	
predicted	 by	 the	 government	 (Ministry	 of	 Economic	Affairs,	 2009a).	 The	 stock	
market	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis.	 Due	 to	 the	 global	
recession,	Taiwan’s	economy	had	not	performed	as	expected.		
Despite	 KMT’s	 dominant	 majority	 in	 the	 legislative	 Yuan	 and	 Ma’s	 sweeping	
victory	in	2008,	poor	co‐ordination	among	the	President,	the	Executive	Yuan,	the	
Legislative	 Yuan	 and	 the	 committee	 of	 KMT	 resulted	 in	 unsatisfactory	
performance	 early	 in	 KMT’s	 term.	 The	 DPP,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 trying	 to	
bounce	back	from	their	failure.	Despite	having	less	than	a	quarter	of	the	seats	in	
the	 Legislative	 Yuan,	 they	 have	 successfully	 publicised	 several	 issues	 that	
highlighted	KMT’s	weakness.	Led	by	Tsai	Ing‐Wen,	the	DPP	was	on	track	to	turn	
																																																								
4	The	DPP	hold	a	strong	Taiwanese	identity,	it	tightened	the	economic	exchange	policy	between	
Taiwan	and	China	when	it	was	in	power.		
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around	its	reputation.	However,	their	efforts	were	derailed	by	several	members	
who	were	involved	in	corruption	and	violence	scandals	in	2010.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 provide	 a	 general	 background	 of	 Taiwan’s	 political	 situation	
because	the	sport	administrative	structure	also	faced	major	changes	in	the	1990s	
due	to	the	shift	of	policy	priorities	to	a	stronger	focus	on	sport	development	from	
the	 mid‐1990s,	 which	 marked	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 National	 Council	 of	
Physical	Fitness	and	Sports	(NCPFS).		
In	1995,	 the	Chinese	Taipei	University	Sports	Federation	held	a	symposium	on	
Taiwan’s	strategies	for	sports	development	in	the	21st	century.	On	that	occasion,	
it	 was	 proposed	 that	 a	 “National	 Sports	 Committee”	 be	 established.	 The	
Organisation	Act	of	 the	Sports	Affairs	Council	 (SAC)	of	 the	Executive	Yuan	was	
promulgated	 on	 January	 12,	 1998.	 The	 SAC	 thus	 officially	 became	 the	 nation’s	
central	 authority	 governing	 sports	 affairs,	 and	 is	 charged	 with	 promoting	 the	
development	of	sports	in	Taiwan	(Sport	Affairs	Council,	2012).	After	the	NCPFS	
was	 set	 up	 on	 October	 2,	 1998,	 the	 Legislative	 Yuan	 announced	 a	 decree	 to	
amend	 the	National	Sports	Law	on	October	21,	1998.	The	National	Sports	Law	
regulates	all	sports	development	in	Taiwan,	and	the	most	important	part	of	this	
amendment	was	to	change	the	sports	competent	authorities	from	the	Ministry	of	
Education	 to	 the	 NCPFS.	 Thus	 the	 NCPFS	 could	 have	 a	 clear	 identity	 when	
promoting	national	sports	affairs.		The	proposed	amendment	has	made	clear	that	
sports	 administration	 would	 move	 towards	 professionalism.	 For	 Physical	
education,	activity	and	school	sports	venues	opening,	maintenance	and	so	on,	the	
NCPFS	 coordinated	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 to	 effectively	 instruct	 and	 to	
supervise	the	implementation.	Under	this	amendment,	the	sports	administrative	
organisation	 structure	 and	 responsibilities	have	been	 clearly	 established.	After	
two	 operational	 results	 of	 the	 consultation	 between	 the	 NCPFS	 and	 the	
DPE/Ministry	 of	 Education,	 the	 national	 sports,	 athletic	 sports,	 community	
sports	and	 international	 sports	became	 the	responsibility	of	 the	NCPFS.	School	
sports	in	addition	to	international	sports	and	related	training,	elite	athletes,	and	
so	 on	 became	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education.	 After	 the	
establishment	of	the	NCPFS,	the	division	of	powers	and	responsibilities	were	set	
between	the	DPE	and	the	NCPFS.	The	lines	of	responsibilities	were	based	mainly	
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on	 the	 June	 22,	 2000	meeting	memorandum	 between	 the	 Executive	 Yuan,	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Education,	 and	 the	 Sports	 Commission.	 National	 Intercollegiate	
Athletic	 Games	 and	 National	 High	 School	 Games	 fell	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Education,	and	the	NCPFS	was	to	assist	from	1st	July	2000.		
Additionally,	 the	Legislative	Yuan	passed	an	amendment	to	 the	National	Sports	
Law	 in	 year	 of	 2000,	 including	 elimination	 of	 the	 status	 and	 mandate	 of	 the	
Chinese	 Taipei	 Olympic	 Committee.	 This	 was	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 history	 the	
Chinese	Taipei	Olympic	Committee	that	its	status	was	covered	by	legislation.	The	
National	 Sports	 law	 stipulated	 that:	 The	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Olympic	 Committee,	
subject	 to	 the	 International	 Olympic	 Committee	 Charter,	 would	 be	 the	 central	
competent	 authority	 in	 international	 sports	 affairs	 with	 the	 handling	 of	 the	
following:	 (a)	participating	 in	 the	Olympic	Games,	 the	Asian	Games,	East	Asian	
Games	 or	 other	 international	 Olympic	 Committee	 recognised	 multi‐sports	
related	 events;	 (B)	 application	 by	 the	 NGBs	 and	 sports	 federations	 for	
international	 recognition	 or	 endorsement;	 (C)	 dealing	 with	 other	 relevant	
international	 sports	 exchange	 transactions.	 The	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Olympic	
Committee	would	 represent	 Taiwan;	 apart	 from	 the	main	 task	 of	 delegation	 it	
also	 oversees	 participation	 in	 an	 international	 comprehensive	 sport,	 and	 has	
connection	with	international	sports	federations	(Chen,	2001).		
The	NCPFS	continued	with	most	of	the	tasks	of	the	DPE	and	expanded	many	new	
sport	policies.	While	reviewing	the	development	of	sport	through	a	White	Paper	
on	 Sport	 Policy	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 an	 annual	 report	 of	 the	 NCPFS/SAC,	 the	 main	
point	 of	 sport	 policy	 still	 focused	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 Sport	 for	 All	 and	
Enhancing	elite	athletic	performance	including:	(a)	to	promote	Sport	for	All	and	
to	enhance	national	physical	fitness;	(b)	to	improve	training	methods	and	quality	
and	win	medals	in	international	competitions;	(c)	to	establish	high	quality	sport	
environment	 and	 satisfy	 people’s	 demand	 for	 sport;	 (d)	 to	 actively	 attend	
international	sport	organisations	and	improve	national	 identity;	(e)	to	combine	
resources	 from	 government	 and	 private	 businesses	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	
development	of	sport.							
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However,	the	sport	policy	of	Taiwan	was	based	on	physical	education	in	schools	
as	its	basic	and	core	structure.	As	a	result,	the	development	of	the	sport	industry	
has	a	close	relationship	with	the	P.E.	policies	for	schools.	For	a	good	policy	to	be	
fulfilled,	 good	 legal	 support	 is	 required.	 Especially	 after	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
NCPFS,	the	direction	of	the	DPE	has	become	clearer.	One	direction	was	to	fix	and	
to	 improve	 the	regulations	related	 to	school	sports.	The	other	direction	was	to	
promote	‘school	sport	middle	term	scheme’.	It	aims	at	the	development	of	school	
sports,	 hoping	 to	 increase	 the	 quality	 of	 school	 sports	 by	 teaching,	 strategy	
setting	and	designing	of	teaching	materials	and	teaching	aids,	counselling,	review	
and	research,	development	and	further	education,	information	and	services.		
Hence,	after	the	NCPFS	was	founded	the	DPE	returned	to	its	emphasis	on	school	
sport.	 The	 objective	 of	 doing	 so	 was	 to	 achieve	 maximum	 capacity	 for	 high	
schools	and	universities	to	assist	in	sport	promotion.	From	another	perspective,	
the	 successful	 development	 of	 high	 school	 and	 university	 sports	 would	 be	 an	
important	factor	for	the	NCPFS	to	promote	‘Sport	for	All’	and	leisure	sports	with	
the	general	public	(Hung,	2001).	
The	policy	of	 the	DPE	was	oriented	 towards	 training	 to	attract	more	people	 to	
participate	in	sports.	For	example,	the	project	‘one	person	doing	one	exercise,	a	
school	 managing	 a	 team’	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 let	 students	 develop	 interest	 in	
certain	sports	and	to	encourage	them	to	participate	in	those	particular	sports	for	
the	rest	of	 their	 lives.	 	The	DPE	also	 tried	 to	 introduce	corporate	sponsorships	
into	sport	competitions.	For	example,	 the	High	School	Basketball	League	(HBL)	
had	 built	 up	 a	 successful	 relationship	 with	 Nike.	 The	 University	 Basketball	
Association	(UBA)	had	connections	with	BENQ.	At	 the	same	 time,	The	National	
Intercollegiate	Athletic	Games	and	National	High	School	Games	had	encouraged	
the	host	education	institute	to	bring	in	local	resources	and	to	use	the	concept	of	
sponsorship	and	marketing	to	hold	the	competition	(Huang	&	Chen,	2006;	Liang	
&	Tsai,	2006).	
Other	 than	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 competition	 sponsorships,	 the	 DPE	 has	
also	 counselled	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	 sporting	 facilities.	 For	 example,	 the	 policy	 of	
opening	national	high	school	sport	 facilities	 to	private‐sector	management	was	
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announced	 on	 2002.	 It	 stated	 that	 the	 committee	 for	managing	 the	 education	
institute’s	 sporting	 facilities	 can	 be	 formed	 by	 the	 institute	 itself	 or	 combined	
with	 the	 neighbourhood.	 In	 order	 to	 work	 with	 government	 policies	 to	
encourage	 firms	 to	participate	 in	public	works,	 the	guidelines	 for	building	 and	
operation	 of	 school	 swimming	 pools	 by	 private	 organizations	 were	 also	
announced	in	2002.	
In	the	policy	of	the	NCPFS,	it	had	some	connection	with	the	DPE’s	policies	on	the	
building	 of	 sporting	 facilities.	 The	 biggest	 step	 forward	 by	 the	 NCPFS	was	 the	
liberalisation	 and	 encouragement	 for	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	 sporting	 facilities.	 The	
authority	was	 issued	by	the	Executive	Yuan	for	a	Statute	for	Promoting	Private	
Participation	in	Public	Construction	and	was	established	on	the	14th	of	January,	
2000.	 There	 is	 a	 legal	 backing	 for	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	 sporting	 facilities	 via	 the	
process	known	as	BOT	(Build,	Operate,	and	Transfer).	The	aim	of	this	policy	is	to	
assist	with	the	Statute	for	Promoting	Private	Participation	in	Public	Construction	
that	was	 announced	on	 the	 9th	 of	 February,	 2000.	 The	 statute	 regulates	 sport	
facilities	to	be	for	public	use	or	as	an	avenue	to	gain	public	benefits.	In	order	to	
fulfil	 the	 capacity	 of	 sport	 facilities,	 the	 NCPFS	 had	 requested	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Economic	 Affairs	 to	 place	 several	 recreational	 facilities	 that	 were	 in	 the	
entertainment	 category	 into	 competitive	 and	 leisure	 sport	 entertainment	
category.	 Previously,	 in	 order	 to	 help	 the	 development	 of	 social	 services	 and	
individual	 service	 sectors,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Economic	Affairs	 had	 listed	 facilities	
such	as	bowling	centre,	gym,	swimming	pool,	 tennis	court,	 ice‐skating	stadium,	
football	 stadium	and	baseball	 stadium	 into	entertainment	category.	 In	order	 to	
promote	 the	 sport	 interest	 in	 the	 public,	 the	 NCPFS	 requested	 the	Ministry	 of	
Economic	Affairs	assign	the	facilities	mentioned	above	along	with	race	track,	golf	
driving	 range,	 paintball	 pitch	 and	 rock	 climbing	 centre	 the	 competitive	 and	
leisure	sport	category	(Chu	&	Lin,	2001;	Liu,	2005).	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 participation	 and	 the	 start	 of	 the	 big‐scale	 sports	
competition	 had	 a	 great	 effect	 on	 the	 sporting	 industry	 during	 the	NCPFS	 era.	
During	 the	 era,	National	 Sports	Games,	National	 Intercollegiate	Athletic	Games	
and	National	High	School	Games	had	been	the	three	biggest	sport	competitions	
within	 the	 country.	 After	 the	 NCPFS	 was	 founded,	 the	 committee	 identified	
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several	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 previous	 competitions:	 namely	 too	 many	 athletes	
participating	in	the	competitions,	low	standard	and	poor	quality	of	competitions.	
The	NCPFS	invited	scholars	and	experts	to	improve	the	standard	and	quality	of	
the	 competition.	As	 a	 result,	 the	NCPFS	 announced	guidelines	 on	how	 to	 stage	
national	 sports	 games,	 which	 became	 the	 main	 avenue	 for	 developing	 sport	
competition	 in	 Taiwan.	 The	 NCPFS	 also	 established	 guidelines	 for	 staging	 the	
National	Intercollegiate	Athletic	Games	on	March	24,	1999	and	the	guidelines	for	
the	National	High	School	Games	on	April	13,	1999	to	have	legal	backing	for	the	
three	main	national	competitions.	
The	 difference	 between	 the	 National	 Sports	 Games	 under	 the	 NCPFS	 and	 the	
games	held	before	was	that	the	former	were	more	commercial.	Since	the	concept	
of	 sport	 marketing	 and	 sponsorship	 began	 to	 develop	 along	 with	 sport	
development	 in	 Taiwan,	 sport	 no	 longer	 depended	 solely	 on	 the	 support	 from	
government.	 The	 concept	 also	 influenced	 other	 sports.	 For	 instance,	 Nike	
(Taiwan)	spent	ten	million	NTD	per	year	on	sponsoring	the	HBL,	contributing	to	
the	 success	 of	 the	 development	 of	 high	 school	 basketball.	 Chinese	 Taipei	
University	Sports	Federation	 (CTUSF)	 followed	 the	model	of	 the	HBL	 to	 set	off	
the	 development	 plan	 of	 a	 University	 basketball	 league	 with	 sponsors.	 The	
CTUSF	secured	sponsorship	from	BenQ	as	a	consistent	funding	source	and	also	
signed	 a	 TV	 broadcast	 contract	with	 Videoland	 (one	 of	 the	 sports	 channels	 in	
Taiwan).	It	made	the	University	Basketball	Association	(UBA)	into	a	well‐known	
sport	league	(Huang	&	Chen,	2006;	Lee,	2005).		
Professional	sports,	 including	professional	basketball	and	professional	baseball,	
were	an	important	part	in	the	policy	of	sport	development	after	the	NCPFS	was	
founded.	 In	1995,	 a	 second	professional	 baseball	 league	had	been	 set	 up	 –	 the	
Taiwan	Major	League	(TML),	which	led	to	a	split	in	baseball.	In	1999,	the	Chinese	
Professional	 Baseball	 League	 of	 Tigers	 and	Wei‐Chuan	Dragons	 dissolved,	 and	
the	 Chinese	 Professional	 Baseball	 League	 (CPBL)	 remained.	 The	 Chinese	
Professional	 Baseball	 League	 originally	 consisted	 of	 four	 separate	 enterprise‐
sponsored	 teams.	 However	 as	 a	 result	 of	 clashing	 of	 team’s	 interests,	 the	
formation	 of	 there	 was	 a	 fragmentation,	 such	 that	 decision‐making	 confusion	
and	divergent	views	was	frequently	evident	(Lee,	2008).	From	2000,	the	league	
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was	 plagued	 with	 gambling	 scandals	 involving	 players,	 resulting	 in	 a	 sharp	
decline	 in	 attendance	and	TV	 ratings.	The	attendance	actually	hit	 a	 record	 low	
with	an	annual	average	of	just	1676	people	in	live	audience	per	game	(Lee,	2011;	
Lee,	2005).		
The	 enthusiasm	 of	 baseball	 fans	was	 re‐ignited	when	 the	 Chinese	 Taipei	 team	
won	the	title	of	Asia’s	top	team,	ranked	third	in	the	Baseball	World	Cup	in	2001.	
The	 enthusiasm	 continued	 in	 the	 following	 year	 and	 led	 to	 a	 growth	 in	
attendances	of	up	 to	186%.	The	box	office	 in	 the	14th	season	of	 the	CPBL	saw	
even	more	substantial	growth.	For	the	playoff	championship	of	six	games	in	the	
14th	 season	 of	 the	 CPBL,	 all	 tickets,	 billboard	 advertising,	 sponsorship,	 and	
merchandise	 for	 sale,	 and	 businesses	 around	 the	 stadium	 revenue	 were	
estimated	 to	 have	 reached	 around	 10	million	 NTD	 in	 revenue	 per	 game	 (Lee,	
2008).	The	two	Leagues	(CPBL	and	TML)	also	merged	under	the	joint	efforts	of	
Taiwan's	 professional	 baseball	 managers,	 representatives	 of	 the	 two	 leagues,	
and	the	sporting	director	unit	of	the	Executive	Yuan.	Director	of	the	NCPFS	Lin	
Te‐fu	and	President	Chen	Shui‐bian	witnessed	the	signing	of	a	merger	agreement	
between	 the	 two	 leagues	on	 January	13,	2003,	and	Na	Lu	Bay	Company	 (TML)	
agreed	 to	 dissolve	 the	 ‘Taiwan	 Major	 League	 Baseball’,	 and	 promised	 their	
respective	 four	 teams	 would	 be	 downsized	 and	 grouped	 into	 two	 teams.	 The	
merger	 of	 the	 two	 leagues	 resulted	 in	 what	 is	 known	 today	 as	 the	 ‘Chinese	
Professional	Baseball	League’	(Lee,	2011).	
In	2003,	according	to	the	statistics	from	the	CPBL,	the	total	audience	was	close	to	
960,000	people.	Average	attendance	per	game	was	around	3,204.	 It	enjoyed	an	
increase	of	8.4%	comparing	to	2002.	The	revenue	on	tickets	had	increased	from	
65	million	NTD	 to	140	million	NTD,	which	has	more	 than	double	 the	previous	
year.	The	public	expected	that	the	CPBL	would	have	a	steady	and	stable	growth	(	
Lee,	 2008).	 However,	 on	 October	 9,	 2008,	 news	 broke	 out	 that	 players	 and	
employees	on	 the	 team	Media	Dragons	were	 involved	 in	match‐fixing	scandals.	
The	Media	Dragons	had	immediately	been	suspended	from	the	CPBL	as	a	result.	
On	the	11th	of	November	2008,	Chinatrust	Whales’	management	also	dismissed	
its	 team	 and	withdrew	 from	 the	 CPBL	 as	 a	 result	 of	match‐fixing	 scandal,	 low	
revenue,	 and	 difficulties	 in	 improving	 its	 standards.	 The	 CPBL	 announced	 that	
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the	 league	would	have	 to	 be	 disbanded	 if	 it	were	 to	 lose	 one	more	 team	 (Lee,	
2005,	2008)	
Due	to	the	gambling	scandal,	professional	baseball	in	Taiwan	was	on	the	brink	of	
collapse.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Executive	 Yuan	 announced	 the	 “Revitalisation	 of	 the	
Professional	Baseball	Programme”.	The	government	would	financially	assist	the	
teams	to	set	up	their	second	team	(equivalent	to	minor	league	in	the	US)	and	to	
improve	 the	 stadium	 hardware	 and	 infrastructure.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Education	
also	banned	players	who	were	 involved	 in	gambling	 scandals	 from	 teaching	 in	
education	 institutes.	This	regulation	came	on	March	29,	2009,	20	seasons	after	
the	birth	of	CPBL.	President	Ma	watched	 the	 first	match	of	 the	 season	and	 the	
first	lady	was	also	in	the	audience.	The	league	had	shrunk	to	just	four	teams	and	
people	expected	 it	 to	be	 the	end	of	match‐fixing	scandals.	However,	 in	October	
2009,	 a	 fifth	 gambling	 scandal	 was	 reported.	 This	 time	 the	 players	 involved	
belonged	to	the	most	popular	team,	Brother	Elephants.	This	dealt	another	blow	
to	the	development	of	the	CPBL.	
Given	that	 the	 turbulent	history	of	baseball	had	required	government	policy	 to	
be	 interventionist,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 investigate	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 same	
phenomena	might	be	repeated	in	basketball.	Basketball	also	faced	difficulties	in	
1998,	during	which	 record	 low	attendance	was	arguably	a	 result	 of	 the	South‐
East	Asia	financial	crisis.	Then,	the	league	was	forced	to	shut	down	indefinitely.	
In	2003,	following	the	negotiation	by	the	Director	of	the	NCPFS	Lin	Fu‐Te,	Super	
Basketball	League	(SBL)	was	founded.	However,	the	level	of	play	was	between	an	
amateur	 and	 a	 professional	 league,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 no	 parent	 company	 of	 the	
league	was	formed.	The	teams	used	business	models	to	market	themselves,	and	
various	people	from	different	teams	formed	the	league	committee.	However,	the	
Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association	 managed	 all	 the	 match	 matters.	 This	
management	 model	 created	 several	 issues	 and	 problems	 after	 the	 SBL	 was	
formed.	
Although	 the	 two	professional	 sports	 faced	 crisis	 in	 this	 period,	 they	 still	 kept	
developing	 under	 the	 NCPFS’s	 support.	 This	 illustrates	 that	 government	 and	
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policy	makers	were	persistent	and	determined	in	supporting	the	development	of	
the	two	sports.	
In	 2007,	 the	 NCPFS	 changed	 its	 name	 from	 the	 National	 Council	 on	 Physical	
Fitness	 and	 Sports	 (NCPFS)	 to	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council	 (SAC)	 in	 order	 to	
facilitate	 an	 easier	 understanding	 among	 those	 outside	 of	 Taiwan	 as	 to	 the	
nature	 of	 this	ministry's	 business.	 Therefore	we	 used	 ‘NCPFS’	 in	 the	 literature	
review	when	referring	to	events	which	happened	before	2007,	and	we	used	the	
SAC	in	the	section	of	discussion	when	referring	to	the	period	after	2007.		
On	 February	 3rd,	 2010,	 the	 government	 amended	 the	 Executive	 Yuan	
Organisation	 Law	 in	 order	 to	 overhaul	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 executive	
organisations.	Therefore	as	part	of	the	government	structural	reform,	the	Sports	
Affairs	Council	(SAC)	officially	merged	with	the	Ministry	of	Education	(MOE)	and	
was	renamed	the	Sports	Administration	(SA)	on	January	2nd,	2012.	The	central	
authority	governing	sports	affairs	became	an	administration	under	the	Ministry	
of	Education	again.		
Ho	 Jow‐fei,	 who	 is	 also	 a	 former	 head	 of	 the	 MOE's	 Department	 of	 Higher	
Education,	 took	 over	 the	 SA	 as	 the	 Director.	 He	 argued	 that	 the	 SA	 would	
combine	social	resources	with	school	sports.	The	Director	claimed	that	he	aimed	
to	 improve	cultivation	of	 sports	 talents	with	 systemic	and	 integrated	planning,	
and	 to	 establish	 a	 comprehensive	 program	 for	 athletes	 from	 early	 training	 to	
career	goals.	He	also	argued	that	the	2017	Summer	Universiade	in	Taipei	would	
be	 in	 line	 with	 the	 administration's	 policy	 goals,	 which	 include	 the	 display	 of	
national	strength	(Chen,	Lung,	&	Wang,	2013;	Lin,	2013).		
In	the	above	discussion,	we	have	reviewed	the	social	transitions	in	Taiwan.	Such	
as	 political	 and	 economic	 transformation,	 sport	 development	 went	 through	
different	 distinct	 periods	 and	 stages.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	will	 focus	 on	 the	
history	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 provide	 some	 implications	 linking	 the	
development	of	basketball	to	social	change.	
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2.2	The	Changing	of	Taiwanese	Basketball	Development	
The	history	of	Taiwan’s	basketball	can	be	divided	into	several	periods	according	
to	 organisations,	 structures,	 and	 skill‐levels.	 From	 1949	 to	 1962,	 the	 military	
system	 had	 strong	 influence	 on	 the	 development	 of	 basketball.	 From	 1963	 to	
1992,	 because	 of	 increasing	 sponsorship	 and	 resources	 from	 state‐owned	 and	
private	 businesses,	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 took	 on	 a	 semi‐professional	
structure.	Finally,	1993	to	2000	was	a	professional	basketball	period	when	the	
Chinese	 Basketball	 Alliance	 (CBA)	 was	 in	 operation.	 After	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
CBA,	 Taiwan’s	 basketball	 returned	 to	 a	 semi‐professional	 model.	 In	 2003,	 the	
Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	(CTBA)	set	up	the	Super	Basketball	League	
(SBL)	with	 government	 funding	 and	 private	 business	 resources.	 The	 league	 is	
neither	a	professional	league	nor	a	semi‐professional	one	because	it	is	owned	by	
the	CTBA	but	also	 run	by	 commercial	methods.	Therefore,	 the	period	after	 the	
establishment	of	the	SBL	is	considered	as	a	“prospective‐professional”	period.				
	
2.2.1	The	Amateur	Basketball	Period	in	Taiwan	(1949‐1962)	
Governmental	organisations,	 including	sport	governing	bodies,	moved	with	 the	
KMT	to	Taiwan	 in	1949	and	went	through	a	period	of	rebuilding.	Although	the	
development	of	sport	in	society	in	general	was	very	difficult	to	implement	in	this	
period,	 the	 army	 brought	 basketball	 fever	 to	 Taiwan	 and	 it	 soon	 became	 a	
popular	sport	in	the	army.	The	popularity	of	basketball	among	military	and	local	
communities	 was	 probably	 influenced	 by	 the	 military	 leaders’	 support	 as	 the	
military	 had	 a	 strong	 influence	 over	 local	 communities	 during	 the	 period.	
Basketball	 thus	 became	 a	 major	 sport.	 The	 development	 of	 basketball	 was	
military‐driven	because	 senior	 figures	 in	 the	 army	 liked	 the	game	and	had	 the	
power	to	promote	it.	
(a)	The	Linking	of	Amateur	Basketball	and	the	Military	Resources			
While	 reviewing	 the	development	 of	 basketball	 from	military,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	
review	the	teams	established	by	different	branches	of	military	service.	The	most	
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important	 team	 in	 this	 period	was	 the	 ‘Seven	 Tigers’,	 which	 was	managed	 by	
General	Shih‐Hsuan	Wang.	In	1950,	the	Seven	Tigers	won	the	national	basketball	
tournament	with	an	unbeaten	record.	When	the	Seven	Tigers	played	against	the	
Philippines	national	 team,	 the	 stadium	was	packed.	 Seven	Tigers	not	only	won	
games	but	also	showed	leadership	and	the	team	became	role	models	for	different	
age	levels	in	local	communities	(	Liu	&	Wang,	1999).	The	Seven	Tigers	fever	was	
the	beginning	of	basketball	development	in	Taiwan	(Kao,	2002).	However,	when	
General	Wang	 Shih‐Hsuan	 retired	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 army	 changed,	 the	
Seven	 Tigers	 was	 disbanded.	 However,	 the	 Combined	 Logistics	 Command	
(Ministry	of	National	Defence)	formed	a	new	basketball	team	"Flying	Camel"	and	
recruited	ex‐players	from	the	Seven	Tigers.	Moreover,	different	branches	of	the	
military	 also	 established	basketball	 teams	 to	promote	 basketball.	 For	 example,	
the	 Air	 Force	 Academy	 set	 up	 the	 first	 Air	 Force	 Basketball	 Team	 in	 1946.	
General	 Chou	 Chih‐Jou	 renamed	 the	 team	 “Ta‐Peng”.	 A	 rivalry	 developed	
between	Seven	Tigers	and	Ta‐Peng	and	 it	 eventually	boosted	popularity	of	 the	
sport	 in	Taiwan.	 In	1951,	Ta‐Peng	was	 invited	 to	visit	 the	Philippines,	marking	
the	 first	 overseas	 competition	 in	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 history	 (Liu	 &	 Wang,	
1999).	
In	 1951,	 the	 Military	 Sports	 Federation	 wanted	 to	 eliminate	 the	 antagonistic	
relationship	 between	 the	 armed	 services,	 so	 the	 Military	 Sports	 Federation	
recruited	elite	players	from	teams	such	as	Seven	Tigers,	Camels,	Ta‐Peng,	Ching‐
Kuang,	 and	 the	 Rail	 to	 set	 up	 a	 united	 team	 called	 "Ko‐Nan".	 This	 was	 the	
predecessor	 of	 the	 National	 team.	 In	 1959,	 the	 Ko‐Nan	 was	 reorganized	 into	
three	different	teams:	Ko‐Nana,	Kuo‐Kuang	and	Chung‐Hsing.	The	single	united	
team	 was	 dismantled	 in	 1961,	 and	 then	 the	 different	 armed	 services	 each	
developed	their	own	team	(Shia,	2008;	Sport_Affairs_Council,	1999).		
Although	the	system	was	subject	to	regime	change,	the	military’s	support	for	the	
game	 exerted	 a	 major	 positive	 influence	 on	 its	 development.	 Furthermore,	
military	 leaders	 not	 only	 used	 their	 own	 human	 resources	 to	 set	 up	 the	
basketball	 teams,	 but	 also	 provided	 places	 for	 the	 government	 to	 build	 up	
basketball	facilities.	
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As	 basketball	 flourished,	 the	 Basketball	 Association	 of	 ROC	 Sports	 Federation	
was	founded	in	July	1949.		The	Basketball	Association	of	ROC	Sports	Federation	
decided	to	build	a	small	court	for	basketball	games	on	Zhengzhou	Road	in	Taipei,	
where	the	Association	hosted	the	National	Basketball	Tournament	in	1950.	With	
the	growth	of	basketball	popularity,	a	single	court	was	inadequate	for	the	rising	
demand.	 The	 Basketball	 Association	 subsequently	 built	 a	 second	 court	 ‐	 the	
Military	Police	Court	on	 Jhonghua	road	in	Taipei.	The	military	police	court	was	
the	first	facility	that	had	large‐scale	seating	capacity	of	about	two	thousand	seats.	
And	it	was	also	the	first	court	with	a	night	lighting	system.	This	facility	played	an	
important	 role	 in	 the	 early	 days	 because	 it	 provided	 a	 suitable	 place	 for	 both	
players	and	spectators	to	have	a	game	(Wang,	2009).	In	1953,	a	new	court	‐	the	
Armed	Forces	Court	‐	was	built	 in	front	of	the	office	of	the	President	under	the	
authority	of	General	Chou	Chih‐Jou.	 It	 replaced	the	Zhengzhou	Road	Basketball	
Court	as	 the	main	basketball	 facility	 in	Taiwan.	This	 court	was	bigger	 than	 the	
Military	 Police	 Court	 since	 its	 capacity	 was	 7690	 seats	 (Shang,	 1955).	 The	
opening	of	this	court	marked	the	golden	era	of	Taiwanese	basketball	because	the	
facility	 provided	 a	 centred	 location	 for	 government	 to	 host	 basketball	
tournaments	(Kao,	2002).	
	
(b)	The	Political	Value	of	Basketball	Tournaments	
Support	 from	political	 and	military	 elites	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	
culture	 in	 Taiwanese	 society.	 In	 this	 period,	 there	 were	 many	 important	
cornerstone	 tournaments	 that	 had	 great	 influence	 on	 later	 development	 of	
basketball;	 these	 include	 the	 National	 Basketball	 Tournament,	 the	 Chieh‐Shou	
Cup,	the	Freedom	Cup,	and	Chung‐Cheng	Cup	(Ho,	2008;	Liu	&	Wang,	1999).	
a. The	 National	 Basketball	 Tournament	 is	 the	 first	 national‐level	
basketball	 tournament.	 This	was	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 competitive	
basketball	 in	 Taiwan.	 This	 tournament	 ceased	 in	 1990	 when	 the	
Ministry	of	Education	began	to	promote	a	national	basketball	league.	
b. The	Chieh‐Shou	Cup	(1952‐1962):	In	order	to	consolidate	the	People	
from	 the	 government’s	 policy	 and	 to	 involve	 young	 people,	 the	
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government	hosted	the	Chieh‐Shou	Cup	and	invited	domestic	teams	
and	overseas	Chinese	teams	to	participate.	
c. The	Freedom	Cup:	From	1954	 to	1996,	 the	government	hosted	 the	
Freedom	Cup	 to	 celebrate	 anticommunism,	 along	with	 the	national	
holiday	of	Freedom	Day.	
d. Chung‐Cheng	Cup:	In	April	1975,	the	country	mourned	the	passing	of	
President	Chiang	Kai‐shek.	In	order	to	commemorate	the	memory	of	
the	President,	the	"Chung‐Cheng5"	tournament	was	inaugurated.	The	
Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association	 has	 since	 adopted	 the	 name	
‘Chung‐Cheng’	 for	 the	 Chung‐Cheng	 Cup	 Basketball	 Tournament	
from	1975.	The	 concept	 of	 a	 basketball	 ‘league’	 appeared	with	 this	
tournament	 since	 it	 was	 divided	 into	 four	 groups	 (Men,	 Women,	
Men's	Youth,	Women's	Youth).							
When	 the	 KMT	 government	moved	 to	 Taiwan	 in	 the	 1950s,	 every	 policy	 was	
linked	to	the	‘anti‐communist’	movement.	The	value	of	the	early	development	of	
basketball	 was	 also	 based	 on	 the	 goal	 –	 spreading	 the	 government's	 political	
agenda	 to	 the	public.	 	 For	 example,	 the	purpose	of	 the	Chieh‐Shou	Cup	was	 to	
spread	 the	 idea	 of	 solidarity	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Freedom	 Cup	 was	 to	
promote	 the	 anti‐communism.	 Although	 the	 Chieh‐Shou	 Cup	 and	 the	 Freedom	
Cup	created	a	demand	 for	basketball	 as	a	 sport	 at	 that	 time,	 they	were	 largely	
instruments	to	advance	the	government’s	political	agenda.	
There	were	two	reasons	that	this	period	is	considered	as	an	amateur	basketball	
period.	The	first	one	was	that	the	development	was	military	driven	and	did	not	
involve	any	professional	organisation.	The	players’	skill	 therefore	only	reached	
amateur	level	compared	to	modern	basketball	standards.	The	second	reason	was	
that	 the	government	 treated	basketball	 solely	as	a	 leisure	activity.	 It	 should	be	
noted	that	the	general	public	did	not	have	leisure	activity	in	this	period	because	
the	post‐war	economic	condition	was	difficult.	Watching	basketball	thus	became	
a	 kind	 of	 spiritual	 sustenance	 for	 the	 general	 public.	 The	 military‐oriented	
government	also	used	basketball	as	a	 leisure	activity	for	soldiers.	However,	the	
																																																								
5	Honorary	name	of	President	Chiang	Kai‐Shek.	
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popularity	of	basketball	did	not	expand	to	every	corner	of	Taiwan,	even	though	
after	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 Court	 was	 built,	 basketball	 became	 a	 highlight	 of	 the	
sport	development	in	the	post	Chinese	Civil	War	period.	Because	of	the	conflict	
between	islanders	and	mainlanders6,	 in	the	sporting	context,	the	general	public	
believed	 that	 “mainlanders	play	basketball;	 islanders	play	baseball”.	Basketball	
therefore	as	a	main	sport	for	mainlanders,	was	a	sport	for	people	from	the	higher	
social	classes	to	play.	Islanders	had	less	chance	to	contact	basketball	(Shu,	2005).		
	
2.2.2	Taiwan	Semi‐Professional	Basketball	(1963‐1992)	
(a)	The	Establishment	of	Semi‐professional	Basketball	Teams	
The	 reason	 this	period	 is	 called	 ‘semi‐professional’	 is	 that	players	had	 to	go	 to	
work	 or	 to	 school	 in	 the	 daytime	 and	 then	 join	 the	 team	 for	 training	 in	 the	
evening.	 If	 they	 were	 absent,	 companies	 would	 deduct	 their	 salaries,	 or	 they	
would	even	be	relegated.	Therefore,	the	emphasis	on	regulation	and	organisation	
was	greater	during	this	period	than	in	the	1950s.	Players	were	expected	to	have	
great	integrity	and	commitment	to	their	companies,	in	addition	to	their	skills.	
Public	 sentiment	 also	 enhanced	 the	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan.	As	 a	
response	 to	 prevailing	 social	 atmosphere	 and	 the	 government’s	 policy7,	 many	
state‐owned	and	private	enterprises	set	up	basketball	teams.	In	1965,	Yen	Ching‐
Ling,	 the	 Proprietor	 of	 Yulon	 Company,	 established	 the	 Yulon	 basketball	 team.	
The	 Taiwan	 Tobacco	 and	 Wine	 Monopoly	 Bureau	 set	 up	 the	 Golden	 Dragon	
basketball	team	in	1973.	The	Taiwan	Bank	basketball	team	was	also	founded	in	
																																																								
6	In	the	post	Chinese	Civil	Period,	the	KMT	government	used	a	reason	that	“there	was	no	political	
talent	 from	 local	 Taiwan”	 to	 refuse	well‐educated	 islanders	 to	 take	mid‐to‐high	 government	
positions.	 It	caused	a	social	stratification	between	 islanders	and	mainlanders,	and	resulted	 in	
the	conflict	between	each	other	(Shu,	2005).	
7	The	 government’s	 sport	 policy	 focused	 on	 “promotion	 of	 sports	 for	 all”	 and	 “cultivation	 of	
sports	talents”	during	the	semi‐professional	period.	The	main	policy	of	sports	for	all	 in	1970s	
was	 to	 promote	 community	 sports	 (Lo,	 1985).	 As	 the	 support	 for	 the	 government’s	 policy,	
business	owners	set	up	basketball	teams	to	develop	basketball	talents	by	their	resources	(Ho,	
2003)	
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1973.	Not	only	were	men’s	basketball	teams	set	up,	but	teams	for	women	were	
also	 formed	 from	the	1960s.	For	example,	 the	Far‐Eastern	Women’s	Basketball	
Team	was	assembled	in	1965;	the	Cathay	Life	Women’s	Basketball	Team	was	set	
up	in	1969,	followed	by	Chunghwa	Telecom	team	in	1972	and	the	Taiwan	Power	
team	 in	 1976.	 These	 basketball	 teams	 were	 products	 of	 the	 stable	 political	
atmosphere	 and	 booming	 economy	 (Sport	 Affairs	 Council,	 2009).	 These	
companies	formed	the	culture	of	basketball	and	also	 improved	its	 level	of	play.	
This	also	prepared	the	way	for	professional	basketball		(Fu,	2008;	Wang,	2009).		
Table	2.1:	Main	Basketball	Teams	Set	Up	in	the	Semi‐Professional	Period	
Team	name	 Sponsor/	
Parent	
Company	
Mission/	purpose Features	of	
the	members	
Year	of	the	
establishment	
Yulon	Men’s	
Basketball	Team	
(private)	
Yulon	Motors		 Yulon	was	the	first	
basketball	team	
which	set	up	by	a	
private	business.	The	
founder	of	Yulon	
Motors,	Yen	Chin‐Ling	
supported	
government’s	policy	
“sports	for	all”	to	
develop	sport	talents	
by	private	businesses’	
resources.		
Yulon	recruited	
talented	
players	from	
University	
system	and	
amateur	
league.	
1965	
Taiwan	Tobacco	
and	Wine	
Monopoly	
Bureau's	Golden	
Dragon	Team	
(State‐owned)	
Taiwan	
Tobacco	and	
Wine	
Monopoly	
Bureau		
Supported	the	
government’s	policy	
to	develop	a	proper	
leisure	activity	for	
general	public	
It recruited	
talented	youth	
players	when	
the	team	was	
set	up.	
1968	
Flying	Camel	Men’
s	Basketball	Team	
(State‐owned)	
General	
Logistics	Dep
artment,	
Ministry	of	
Defence	
Provided	leisure	
activities	for	military,	
and	promoted	
basketball	
The	Flying	
Camel’s	
predecessor	
was	the	Seven	
Tigers	
Basketball	
team	which	
was	set	up	by	
General	Wang.	
It	transferred	
to	General	
Logistics	Depar
tment	in	1957	
and	changed	its	
name	to	Flying	
Camel	in	1963.		
1957	
Taipei	Bank	Men’s	
Basketball	Team	
Taipei	Bank	 Response	to	the	
government’s	policy	
to	promote	
basketball.	It	was	the	
first	basketball	team	
Mainly	
recruited	youth	
players.	
1972	
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which	set	up	by	a	
bank.	
Taiwan	Bank	
Men’s	Basketball	
Team	(State‐
owned)	
Taiwan	Bank	 Cultivated	young	
talents	for	the	state.	
Recruited	
Young	talents.	
1973	
Cathay	Life	
Women’s	
Basketball	Team	
(Private)	
Cathay	Life	
Insurance	Co.,	
Ltd.	
The	owner	of	Cathay	
Life	promoted	
basketball	because	he	
wanted	to	contribute	
to	the	community	
17	times	
Champion	for	
the	National	
League.		
1969	
Taipower	
Women’s	
Basketball	Team	
(State‐owned)	
Taiwan	
Power	
Company	
Supported	the	
government’s	policy	
to	promote	basketball	
Recruited	
youth	players	
1976	
Chunghwa	
Telecom	Women’s	
Basketball	Team	
(State‐owned)	
Chunghwa	
Telecom	
Supported	the	
government’s	policy	
to	promote	basketball	
Recruited	
youth	players	
1972	
Far	Eastern	
women’s	
basketball	team	
(Private)	
Far	
Eastern	Textil
e	Co.,	Ltd.	
Supported	the	
government’s	policy	
to	promote	basketball	
Mainly	
recruited	high	
school	players	
1965	
	
(b)	The	Establishment	of	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association		
The	enhancement	of	basketball	was	not	only	achieved	by	increasing	the	number	
of	 basketball	 teams	 but	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 organisations	 that	 led	 the	
development	of	basketball.	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	was	set	up	 in	
this	 period.	 The	 predecessor	 of	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association	was	 the	
ROC	 Basketball	 Committee,	 which	 was	 founded	 in	 1954.	 The	 ROC	 Basketball	
Committee	 was	 renamed	 the	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association	 (CTBA)	 in	
1973	 to	 promote	 domestic	 basketball	 development	 and	 international	
competition.	After	the	CTBA	was	founded,	the	development	of	basketball	was	no	
longer	led	by	the	military	elites.	The	first	chairman	was	Yen	Ching‐Ling,	who	was	
the	 founder	 of	 Yulon	Motors	 Company	 (Chinses	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association,	
2012).	 In	 fact,	 the	establishment	of	 semi‐professional	 teams	reflects	deepening	
involvement	 of	 private	 business	 with	 basketball.	 Therefore,	 in	 this	 period,	
military	 influence	 was	 on	 the	 wane	 and	 was	 instead	 replaced	 by	 the	 private	
sector.	
In	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 history,	 business	 owners	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	
the	development	of	basketball.	Business	owners	such	as	Yen	set	up	a	basketball	
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team,	and	also	operate	the	CTBA.	There	is	a	similar	case	under	this	structure	in	
recent	years,	Wang	Jen‐Ta,	the	owner	of	the	team	Dacin,	served	as	the	chairman	
of	 the	 CTBA	 for	 over	 twenty	 years	 (1989~	 2010)	 prior	 to	 taking	 over	 Dacin.	
Wang	 Jen‐Ta	 began	 to	 serve	 as	 the	 president	 of	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	
Association	 (CTBA)	 from	 1989.	 Wang's	 family	 dominated	 the	 development	 of	
Basketball	 in	Taiwan	 for	 twenty	years.	Wang	 Jen‐Ta	served	as	 the	president	of	
the	CTBA	from	1989	to	1997.	Then	Wang	Jen‐Ta	arranged	for	his	brother	‘Wang	
Jen‐Cheng’	to	be	the	chairman	from	1998	to	2001.	After	four	years,	Wang	Jen‐Ta	
was	 elected	 to	 be	 the	 chairman	 again.	Wang	 Jen‐Ta	 controlled	 the	CTBA	 again	
from	2001	to	2010	(Tseng,	2010).	Dacin	Tigers,	the	team	owned	by	Wang	Jen‐Ta,	
is	 one	 of	 the	 elite	 teams	 in	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 because	 it	 was	 one	 of	
professional	teams	in	the	CBA	period,	and	was	also	one	of	the	founding	teams	in	
the	SBL	(Chuzi,	2010).	
In	2010,	Wang	Jen‐Ta	announced	that	he	and	his	family	were	not	going	to	run	for	
the	 election	 of	 next	 chairman	 the	 CTBA.	 Then,	 Mao	 Cuo‐Wen	 was	 elected	
chairman	of	the	CTBA	with	great	expectations	because	when	he	was	the	Minister	
of	 Education,	 he	 had	 introduced	 the	 NCAA	 system	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
HBL,	However,	Mao	handed	 in	his	resignation	 in	2011,	and	Ting	Shou‐Chung,	a	
KMT	Legislator,	took	over	the	position.		
From	the	history	of	the	CTBA	executive	committee,	listed	in	Table	2.2,	we	can	see	
that	 the	key	persons	 leading	 the	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan	changed	
from	military	elite	to	business	elite.	And	now	the	political	elite	were	leading	the	
operation	of	the	CTBA.	
	
Table	2.2:	History	of	CTBA	Executive	Committee:		
Republic	of	China	Basketball	Committee	
Term	 Chairman	 Director	 Term	of	Service	
1	 CHOU	CHIH	JOU	 NIU	PING	YI	 1954/Jul/22	~1956/Aug/20	
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2	 YI	KUO	JUI	 LIU	PEI	CHENG	 1956/Aug/21	~1968/Sep/18	
3	 YEN	CHING	LING	 LIU	SHIH	CHEN	 1968/Sep/19	~1973/	Jul	/01	
Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	(CTBA)	
Term	 Chairman	 Secretary‐General	 Term	of	Service	
1	 YEN	CHING‐LING	
LIU	SHIH	CHEN	/
CHI	CHIEN‐HUNG	/		
MA	LAN‐FENG	
1973/Jul/02	~1977/	Jul	/15	
2	 YU	CHI‐CHUNG	 PENG	CHI	 	 1977/Jul/16	~1981/	Jul	/16	
3	 YU	CHI‐CHUNG	 PENG	CHI	 	 1981/Jul/17	~1985/	Jul	/31	
4	 CHANG	CHIEN‐PANG	 LIU	SHAO‐PEN	/	HSIEH	HENG‐FU	 1985/Aug/01	~1989/Jul	/15	
5	 WANG	JEN‐TA	 TAI	LI‐CHUN	/	TANG	MING‐HSIN	 1989/Jul/16~	1993/	Jul	/25	
6	 WANG	JEN‐TA	 TANG	MING‐HSIN	/	LI	KUANG‐HUAI	 1993/Jul/26	~1997/Sep/7	
7	 WANG	JEN‐CHENG	 YU	WEN‐WEI	 1997/Sep/8	~2001/Dec/9	
8	 WANG	JEN‐TA	 HUNG	PING‐TUN/		KAO	YUAN‐PU	 2001/Dec/10	~2006/Feb/12	
9	 WANG	JEN‐TA	 KAO	YUAN‐PU	 2006/Feb/13~	2010/Apr/30	
10	 MAO	GUO‐WEN	 HUANG	CHAO‐HO	 2010/May/01	~	2011/Apr/22	
11	 TING	SHOU‐CHUNG	 HUANG	CHAO‐HO	 2011/Apr/22	~	
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(c)	The	Membership	of	FIBA	and	William	Jones	Cup	Basketball	
Although	 domestic	 basketball	 development	 was	 enhanced	 from	 the	 1970s,	
Taiwan’s	participation	 in	 international	basketball	organisation	and	competition	
was	not	developed	well	because	of	the	country’s	lack	of	diplomatic	influence.		
In	 1971,	 Taiwan’s	 membership	 of	 many	 international	 sports	 federations	 was	
suspended	because	of	Taiwan's	expulsion	from	the	UN.	Taiwan’s	membership	in	
most	 international	 sport	 federations	 was	 replaced	 by	 that	 of	 the	 People’s	
Republic	of	China	(Shu,	2005).		In	1974,	the	International	Basketball	Federation	
(FIBA)	 invited	 the	 China	 Basketball	 Association	 to	 become	 a	 member	 and	
therefore	Taiwan’s	membership	was	suspended.	According	to	the	regulations	of	
FIBA,	members	cannot	participate	in	activities	with	non‐members.	Taiwan	thus	
lost	 the	opportunity	 to	participate	 in	competitions	at	 the	 international	 level.	 In	
1976,	 the	 CTBA	 asked	 FIBA	 secretary‐general	 William	 Jones	 to	 resume	 the	
membership	 of	 Taiwan	 and	 to	 permit	 basketball	 exchanges	 to	 be	 made	 for	
Taiwan.	 But	 the	 ROC/Taiwan	 government	 did	 not	 have	 a	 flexible	 policy	
regarding	what	 name	Taiwan	would	 use	when	 its	 team	 attended	 international	
sport	 meetings,	 hence	 FIBA	 could	 not	 reinstate	 its	 membership.	 However,	
secretary	general	William	 Jones	expanded	 the	William	 Jones'	Cup	 International	
Tournament	 in	Asia	and	authorised	the	CTBA	to	host	 it.	The	William	Jones	Cup	
(also	 known	 as	 the	 Jones	 Cup)	 has	 since	 become	 an	 international	 basketball	
tournament	 that	 is	 held	 annually	 in	 Taipei,	 Taiwan.	 It	 was	 named	 after	 a	
basketball	 promoter	 and	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 International	 Basketball	
Federation	(FIBA),	Renato	William	 Jones.	The	 tournament	started	 in	1977,	and	
has	been	held	 annually	 ever	 since.	 In	1981,	Taiwan	 re‐joined	 the	 International	
Basketball	Association	under	the	name	of	Chinese	Taipei	following	political	and	
diplomatic	arbitration	(Wang,	2009).								
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(d)	 National	 Four‐Year	 Sports	 Programme	 and	 the	 League	 System	 for	
Basketball	
Resources	 from	 the	 government	 and	 private	 sector	 boosted	 the	 growth	 of	
Taiwanese	 basketball	 development.	 The	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 allowed	
businesses	to	invest	more	in	basketball	(Wang,	2009).	Sports	policy	was	also	one	
factor	that	promoted	basketball	in	Taiwan.		
The	DPE	introduced	a	new	‘National	Four‐Year	Sports	Programme’	in	1987.	One	
of	the	aims	of	this	programme	was	to	establish	a	school‐league	match	system	at	
all	 levels	 of	 schools	 and	 to	 set	 up	 county‐league	matches.	 	 The	 DPE	 therefore	
introduced	 a	 new	 structure	 modelled	 on	 the	 National	 Collegiate	 Athletic	
Association	 (NCAA)	 system	 in	 the	 US	 to	 reform	 the	 structure	 of	 Taiwanese	
basketball	competitions	(Sun,	1997).	
Before	 the	DPE	promoted	 the	 league	 system,	 the	main	 competition	 system	 for	
basketball	in	Taiwan	was	based	on	tournaments.	Most	tournaments	had	no	fixed	
game	date/season.	Games	were	held	at	a	 single	venue	and	concentrated	 into	a	
relatively	 short	 time	 interval.	 This	 contrasts	 with	 a	 league	 system,	 which	
incorporates	a	hierarchy	of	 leagues	 in	basketball.	There	 is	a	 fixed	game	season	
allowing	 school	 teams	 to	have	 a	proper	 training	plan.	 In	 order	 to	promote	 the	
culture	of	high	school	sports,	a	home	and	away	set	of	fixture	was	also	adopted	to	
create	rivalries	between	schools.		
The	 DPE	 invited	 scholars	 and	 experts	 to	 develop	 a	 sport	 league	 suitable	 for	
Taiwan.	From	September	1987	to	July	1988,	for	the	first	time	the	DPE	hosted	the	
League	of	 the	University	Basketball	Association	 (UBA).	The	 league	was	divided	
into	 three	 conferences:	 northern,	middle	 and	 southern.	 It	 adopted	home/away	
fixtures	 from	 preliminaries	 through	 semi‐finals	 to	 finals.	 The	 league	 ignited	
rivalries	between	universities	in	almost	every	campus.	There	were	three	specific	
outcomes	of	the	DPE	hosting	the	UBA	(Huang	&	Chen,	2006):			
a. The	 promotion	 of	 a	 university	 basketball	 culture,	 and	 ‘sense	 of	
honour’.	
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b. The	 establishment	 of	 a	 traditional	 game	 season	with	 fixed	 training	
times	for	teams.				
c. Identification	 of	 basketball	 talent	 in	 the	 league	 and	 subsequent	
training	of	such	talent	for	national	teams.	
The	Chinese	Taipei	School	Sport	Federation	(CTSSF)	has	hosted	the	High	School	
Basketball	 League	 (HBL)	 since	 1988.	 The	 HBL	 was	 strongly	 supported	 by	
government	 funding	 from	1988	 to	 1995.	 After	 1995,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	HBL	 had	
grown	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 the	 government	 reduced	 its	 funding.	 The	 CTSSF	
actively	 sought	 business	 cooperation	 to	 provide	 the	 funding	 for	 the	 HBL	
employing	professional	sports	marketing	tactics	(Fu,	2008;	Shu,	2005).	In	1996	
the	CTSSF	signed	a	contract	with	NIKE	to	operate	the	HBL	together.	Because	of	
corporate	 sponsors,	 media	 and	 public	 relations	 and	 marketing	 strategies,	 the	
scale	 of	 the	 HBL	 grew	 rapidly	 from	 1996.	 Under	 the	 marketing	 strategies	 of	
CTSSF	and	NIKE,	the	number	of	teams	increased	from	48	teams	in	1988	to	344	
teams	in	2009.		The	HBL	has	become	the	most	popular	basketball	competition	in	
Taiwan	(Fu,	2008;	Ho,	2008).	The	establishment	of	the	school	basketball	league,	
especially	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 HBL,	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	 development	 of	
basketball	in	Taiwan	because	the	HBL	served	as	a	model	for	sports	events	at	the	
high‐school	level.	Not	only	did	this	promote	participation	in	the	sport	but	also	it	
helped	 to	 cultivate	 potential	 national	 players,	 and	 it	 was	 the	 first	 successful	
example	of	a	sport	event	being	developed	through	the	sponsorship	of	the	official	
organization	and	private	business	(Fu,	2008).		
In	 addition	 to	 school	 basketball,	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 basketball	 league	 was	
extended	to	adult	basketball.	In	1990	the	CTBA	combined	the	Freedom	Cup	and	
the	 Chung‐Cheng	 Cup	 to	 host	 the	 Fu‐Chi	 Cup	 basketball,	 which	 was	 a	 league	
running	for	four	months	per	season.	Following	four	years	of	continuous	growth,	
the	 CTBA	 changed	 its	 name	 to	 the	National	 Division	One	Basketball	 League	 in	
1994.	 The	 basketball	 system	 thus	 became	 more	 complete	 since	 with	 the	
development	of	this	national	adult	basketball	league.	
During	this	period,	transformation	of	the	political	situation,	rapid	growth	of	the	
economy,	 and	 the	 universal	 availability	 for	 citizens	 in	 Taiwan	 facilitated	 the	
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prosperous	 development	 of	 basketball.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 took	 the	
National	 Four‐Year	 Sports	 Programme	 as	 a	 major	 pivot	 to	 promote	 national	
sport	development	with	an	emphasis	on	the	sport	league	system.	The	HBL	can	be	
regarded	 as	 the	 product	 of	 government	 policy	 reforms	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 the	
1990s	(Shu,	2005).	It	formed	not	only	high	school	and	military	basketball	culture	
but	 also	 fuelled	 high	 expectations	 of	 basketball	 development	 on	 the	 part	 of	
public.	
In	1994,	the	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance	(CBA)	was	founded.	It	showed	the	value	
of	 the	 HBL	 because	 professionalization,	 which	 is	 a	 symbol	 of	 progress	 for	
basketball	 development	 in	 Taiwan,	was	 fostered	 by	 the	HBL	 (Fu,	 2009).	Many	
talented	basketball	players	and	professionals	were	found	in	the	HBL.	Moreover,	
basketball	 participation	 increased	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	
professional	league	because	a	positive	social	atmosphere	was	developed	through	
the	popularity	of	basketball	on	campus.		
	
2.2.3	Taiwan	Professional	Basketball	(1993‐1998)	
With	 the	 growth	 of	 basketball	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 the	 popularity	 of	 professional	
sport	 both	 in	 Taiwan	 (professional	 baseball)	 and	 in	 the	 world	 (NBA),	 the	
development	of	basketball	reached	a	peak	in	the	early	1990s.	In	addition	to	the	
National	Division	One	Basketball,	the	President’s	Cup	Tournament	was	set	up	in	
1995.	The	President’s	Cup	Tournament	was	the	biggest	tournament	at	the	non‐
professional‐level.	The	participation	of	the	President’s	Cup	included	14	teams	of	
the	National	Division	one	Basketball	 League,	 top	 four	of	 the	UBA	Division	one,	
top	four	of	the	UBA	division	two	and	top	eight	of	the	Taiwan	province	game	(Kao,	
2002;	Liu	&	Wang,	1999).	This	tournament	provided	an	important	stage	for	the	
potential	 professional	 players	 and	 the	 development	 of	 non‐professional	
basketball.		
With	 the	 rise	 of	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 culture,	 four	 teams	 (Yulon,	 Hung‐Kuo,	
Tera,	and	Lucky)	announced	the	establishment	of	the	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance	
(CBA).	 They	 then	 established	 the	 CBA	 Company,	 which	 was	 dedicated	 to	 the	
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organisation	 of	 games	 and	marketing	 affairs.	 In	November	 1994,	 the	 first	 CBA	
season	opened,	and	Taiwanese	basketball	had	reached	a	professional	level.	Fully	
commercial	 marketing	 also	 introduced	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 to	 a	 new	 era.	
However,	in	1998,	as	a	result	of	the	Asian	Financial	Crisis	and	ensuing	recession,	
the	parent	company	of	Tera	was	 in	severe	financial	difficulties	and	tried	to	sell	
the	basketball	team	(Lee,	2000;	Wen,	2010).	The	financial	difficulty	damaged	the	
operation	of	the	CBA.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Eastern	 multimedia	 group	 refused	 to	 pay	 the	 down	
payment	 on	 the	 fifth	 season’s	 TV	 rights	 fee,	 which	 was	 responsible	 for	 TV	
broadcasting.	 Because	 spectators	 of	 the	 CBA	 dwindled	 over	 four	 seasons,	 the	
Eastern	 multimedia	 group	 used	 ‘box	 office	 underperformance’	 as	 a	 reason	 to	
negotiate	 the	TV	 rights	 fee	 for	 the	 fifth	 season.	 Finally	 the	 shortage	 of	 income	
from	 the	 TV	 rights	 fee	 resulted	 in	 a	 financial	 crisis	 for	 the	 CBA	 (Huang,	 2006;	
Shu,	2005;	Wen,	2010).		
In	March	1999,	due	to	the	poor	management	of	this	event	over	several	years	by	
the	 Eastern	 multimedia	 group,	 the	 board	 of	 the	 CBA	 resorted	 to	 suspending	
operation	in	game	67	of	the	fifth	season	(Lee,	2000).	It	was	initially	anticipated	
that	the	suspension	would	be	temporary,	but	it	was	permanent	(Wen,	2010).	
In	 the	early	part	of	 the	CBA	 lockout,	 the	managers	of	each	of	 the	 teams	hoped	
that	 the	 owner	 of	 Dacin	 (Wang	 Jen‐Ta,	 who	 was	 also	 the	 chairman	 of	 CTBA)	
would	 deal	 with	 this	 situation.	 Chao	 Li‐Yuan,	 director	 of	 the	 Sports	 Affairs	
Council,	also	tried	to	save	the	CBA.	However,	Wang	and	Chao	had	different	view	
about	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 crisis	 during	 CBA	 lockout.	 Wang	 subsequently	
announced	 that	Dacin	would	 leave	 the	CBA	 to	 register	 in	 the	National	Division	
One	Basketball	League	(Wen,	2010).	This	meant	that	there	was	no	support	from	
the	 CTBA	 and	 despite	 support	 from	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council,	 the	 CBA	 still	
collapsed.		
In	the	beginning	of	the	CBA	lockout,	the	teams	decided	to	resume	the	operation	
of	the	CBA	without	support	 from	the	chairman	of	the	CTBA.	However	the	most	
popular	 team,	Hung‐Kuo,	 suddenly	announced	 that	 they	would	not	 continue	 in	
division	 one	 but	 would	 dissolve	 the	 team	 because	 the	 parent	 company	 had	
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financial	problems.	After	the	dissolution	of	the	Hung‐Kuo	team,	the	president	of	
the	Yulon	group,	Yen,	felt	pessimistic	about	the	development	of	the	new	season	
without	 Hung‐Kuo	 and	 announced	 that	 his	 team,	 Yulon,	 would	 also	 be	
withdrawn	 from	 the	 CBA.	 Immediately,	 the	 Lucky	 Cement	 basketball	 team	
followed	 Yulon’s	 path,	 leading	 to	 CBA’s	 collapse.	 After	 co‐ordinating	 with	 the	
Sports	Affairs	 Council	 and	 the	 parent	 companies	 of	 teams,	 the	 CBA	decided	 to	
suspend	the	6th	season	in	November	1999	since	it	could	not	continue	to	operate	
with	the	on‐going	suspension	(Lee,	2000;	Wen,	2010)	
The	 period	 of	 professional	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 (the	 Chinese	 Basketball	
Association,	1993‐1999)	lasted	for	five	years	only.	The	factors	causing	the	CBA	to	
suspend	the	league	included	the	Asian	financial	crisis,	the	TV	rights	dispute,	poor	
management,	 lack	 of	 a	 long‐term	 plan,	 a	 lack	 of	 the	 knowledge	 to	 run	 a	
professional	 sport,	 and	 facilities	 which	 could	 not	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 fans(Ho,	
2008;	 Lee,	 2000;	 Shih,	 2001;	 Wen,	 2010).	 The	 suspension	 of	 the	 CBA	 finally	
ended	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	in	1990s.	
	
2.2.4	Taiwan	Prospective‐Professional	Basketball	(2000~)	
(a)	Post‐CBA	period	
When	 the	 CBA	 was	 suspended,	 most	 of	 the	 teams	 chose	 to	 re‐register	 in	 the	
Division	One,	and	BenQ,	which	took	over	the	Hung‐Kuo	basketball	team,	decided	
to	 leave	Taiwan	 and	 register	 in	 the	 China	 Basketball	 Association.	 The	 highest‐
level	of	competitive	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	was	thus	downgraded	to	that	of	the	
National	Division	One	Basketball	 League	 and	 the	President’s	 Cup.	 This	made	 a	
huge	impact	on	players’	performance,	the	business	investment,	and	the	number	
of	spectators	(Ho,	2008;	Huang,	2006)		
	
(b)	The	Establishment	of	the	Super	Basketball	League	
Because	 basketball	 has	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 participation	 and	 basketball	 is	 the	
most	popular	youth	sport,	the	Sport	Affairs	Council	(SAC)	actively	helped	CTBA	
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to	 plan	 a	 high‐level	 basketball	 league.	 The	 Super	 Basketball	 League	 (SBL)	was	
founded	in	2003.	However,	the	SBL	is	still	not	a	professional	league	although	the	
goal	 of	 the	 league	 is	 professionalization.	When	 the	 first	 SBL	 season	 opened	 in	
2004,	the	National	Division	One	Basketball	League	was	suspended	because	with	
elite	teams	registered	in	the	SBL,	resulting	in	a	reduction	of	spectators.	A	further	
change	 was	 that	 the	 name	 of	 the	 President’s	 Cup	 was	 changed	 to	 that	 of	 the	
National	 Amateur	 Basketball	 Tournament	 and	was	 reduced	 in	 scale,	 involving	
only	teams	from	the	men's	division	two	and	the	women's	division	(Liu	&	Wang,	
1999).			
In	order	to	promote	the	Taiwan	basketball	industry,	the	director	of	the	SAC,	Lin,	
made	 an	 effort	 to	 host	 the	 Super	 Basketball	 League	 (SBL)	 in	 2003.	 The	 CTBA	
established	the	council	of	the	SBL	based	on	the	original	structure	of	the	Chinese	
Taipei	Basketball	Association	under	the	full	support	of	the	Sport	Affairs	Council.	
The	main	principles	of	the	SBL	are	(Sport	Affairs	Council,	2003):	
a. The	SBL	will	be	the	highest‐level	basketball	game	in	Taiwan.	
b. The	SBL	Council	was	established	under	the	structure	of	the	CTBA.	
c. The	number	of	teams	was	restricted	to	six.	
d. The	number	of	student	players	would	be	reduced	year	by	year	and	
teams	could	employ	foreign	player	under	regulations.	
e. The	playing	season	would	be	adjusted	to	accommodate	by	the	date	of	
the	HBL,	the	UBA	and	international	events.	
f. TV	broadcasting	was	essential.		
In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 better	 environment,	 the	 SAC	 spent	 twenty	 million	 NTD	
repairing	 the	 facilities.	 They	 added	 approximately	 800,000	 NTD	 to	 the	 annual	
budget	 for	 each	 team	 and	 co‐operated	with	NIKE	 and	ESPN.	Both	 helped	with	
sponsorships,	marketing	and	broadcasting	(Hsu,	2006).	This	brought	new	life	to	
Taiwan’s	basketball	and	showed	the	determination	of	the	participants.	Through	
all	the	efforts	mentioned	above,	Taiwan’s	basketball	culture	was	revived.	
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(c)	The	SBL	as	a	Prospective‐Professional	Basketball	League	
As	previously	mentioned	the	 foundations	of	Taiwanese	professional	basketball,	
the	 High	 School	 Basketball	 League	 (HBL)	 and	 the	 University	 Basketball	
Association	(UBA),	were	inspired	by	the	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Association	
(NCAA)	 model	 in	 America.	 In	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 NCAA’s	 tournament	 as	 an	
amateur	 sports	 system,	 essentially	 competitions	 involving	 unpaid	 athletes	 are	
governed	 by	 several	 layers	 of	 authority:	 community	 leagues,	 school	 athletic	
associations,	 state	 and	 national	 regulatory	 boards,	 the	 National	 Collegiate	
Athletic	 Association	 (NCAA)	 and	 other	 supervisory	 organisations	 at	 the	 non‐
professional	level,	governed	according	to	the	Amateur	Sports	Act,	and	the	rules	
and	processes	of	the	Olympic	Movement.	In	the	American	model	there	is	a	sharp	
distinction	 between	 amateur	 and	 professional	 sports,	 each	 with	 its	 own	
structures.	Professional	sports	are	governed	primarily	by	their	own	league	rules	
and	 the	 process	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 (James,	 2008:	 104).	We	 can	 see	 some	
elements	of	this	model	in	the	system	of	the	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance	(CBA)	in	
Taiwan:		
the	structure	of	sports	organisation	in	North	America	involves	
a	closed	system	of	competition.	The	major	sports	leagues	in	the	
United	States	are	generally	closed	and	autonomous,	each	with	
an	 average	 of	 30‐32	 teams.	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	
governmental	regulation,	the	teams	in	each	league	co‐opt	their	
own	membership.	(James,	2008:	104).		
However,	the	concept	of	‘divisions’	for	sports	leagues	in	the	Taiwanese	context	is	
evident	 in	 amateur	 sport	 which	 can	 be	 related	 or	 compared	 to	 the	 ‘European	
model’.	However	as	James		points	out,	the	European	model	relates	to	integration	
of	 amateur	 and	 professional	 divisions.	 James	 (2008:103)	 	 argues	 that	 “the	
European	 Sports	 Model	 reflects	 an	 open	 system	 of	 national	 competitions	 in	
which	 individual	 clubs,	 organised	 comprehensively	 from	 the	 grassroots	 to	 the	
top	professional	tier	in	a	pyramid	structure,	move	up	or	down	in	status	generally	
based	on	merit	at	the	end	of	a	season”.	On	the	other	hand,	the	European	model	is	
largely	 a	 policy	 construct	 based	 on	 the	 European	 intergovernmental	
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arrangements	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cultural	 history	 of	 European	 sports	 governance	
since	 the	 European	 Commission	 "has	 taken	 the	 position	 that	 the	 pyramid	
structure	of	sport,	along	with	promotion	and	relegation,	are	important	aspects	of	
the	 culture	 of	 sport	 in	 Europe,	 and	 that	 preservation	 of	 [such	 cultural]	
institutions	 (and	 presumably	 after	 such	 cultural	 aspects	 of	 sports)	 is	 an	
important	 interest	 that	should	be	considered	 in	determining	whether	 the	rules	
and	policies	of	leagues	and	governing	bodies	are	lawful	under	EU	law,	including	
competition	law	(Roberts,	2001)8"(James,	2008:	p.	102).		
Even	though	some	features	of	the	European	and	American	models	are	evident	in	
the	 structure	 of	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 in	 different	 periods,	we	 cannot	 say	 that	
European	or	Northern	American	model	had	been	replicated	in	Taiwan.	Currently	
the	highest	level	of	basketball	league	is	the	SBL,	which	is	an	independent	league	
with	no	promotion	system	linking	it	with	the	amateur	league.	It	is	much	smaller	
than	 either	 American	 or	 European	 national	 leagues	 tend	 to	 be	 (with	 only	 six	
clubs	in	the	SBL).	It	is	also	not	a	fully	professionalised	basketball	league.	In	this	
study,	we	argue	that	the	SBL	is	a	league	with	‘prospective‐professional’	structure	
as	it	cannot	be	described	as	having	the	characteristics	of	a	professional	league	or	
semi‐professional	league.	Our	use	of	the	term	‘prospective	professional	league’	is	
designed	to	suggest	the	Taiwan‐specific	nature	of	the	‘solution’	to	the	problems	
of	establishing	a	professional	league	in	basketball.	 	Although	the	league	was	set	
up	in	the	context	of	a	trend	of	globalised	sports	professionalisation	it	has	its	own	
local	specificities.	The	original	purpose	for	the	government	to	promote	the	SBL	
was	to	re‐launch	the	professional	league,	the	CBA,	and	the	operation	of	the	SBL	
was	designed	 to	allow	a	move	 towards	 complete	professionalisation.	However,	
the	 SBL	 emerged	 as	 a	 basketball	 league	 with	 unusual	 and	 locally	 specific	
arrangements,	 with	 the	 marketing	 of	 a	 professional	 sport	 undertaken	 with	
assistance,	including	some	funding,	by	the	government,	but	with	each	club’s	day‐
to‐day	operation	carried	out	as	private	enterprise.	The	 league	has	however	not	
moved	 towards	 complete	 professionalization,	 and	 it	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	we	
																																																								
8	Page	number	of	source	quoted	(Roberts	2001)	not	cited	in	the	original	(James,	2008).	
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focus	largely	on	the	Taiwan	model	rather	than	the	better	known	(or	more	widely	
covered	in	the	literature)	versions	of	the	European	and	American	model.	
In	 this	 context,	 the	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	 Association	 (CTBA)	 is	 the	 non‐
governmental	body	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.	The	main	responsibility	of	the	CTBA	
is	to	popularize	basketball	within	Taiwan.	The	SBL	is	a	league	made	up	of	seven	
teams;	 they	 need	 the	 CTBA	 to	 organise	 the	 fixtures,	 ticket	 sales,	 stadium	 and	
referees.	They	do	not	have	their	own	executive	or	administrative	personnel.	
The	 Sports	 Affairs	 Council	 (SAC)	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 official	
sports	law;	its	functions	include	assisting	and	supervising	sports	activity	within	
Taiwan.	However,	 the	managing	method,	along	with	positioning	and	success	of	
the	SBL,	 is	not	directly	related	with	 the	SAC.	As	 the	SBL	does	not	have	 its	own	
executive	team	and	funds,	they	rely	on	the	CTBA	to	be	in	charge	of	the	fixtures.	
	
(d)	The	Crisis	of	the	SBL	
After	 a	 few	 years	 of	 operation,	 the	 SBL	 seemed	 to	 have	 experienced	 the	 same	
boost	as	in	the	early	years	of	the	CBA.	However,	although	the	SBL	clubs	received	
fees	 for	 the	TV	 rights,	 they	 also	 had	 to	 pay	 the	 salaries	 of	 the	 players	 and	 the	
operating	 costs	 of	 the	 teams.	 Ticket	 profits	 all	 belonged	 to	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	
managers	of	teams	felt	considerate	dissatisfaction.		
The	SBL	finished	its	sixth	season	in	2006.	The	management	of	the	SBL	operation	
was	short‐sighted	largely	because	there	was	no	consensus	between	stakeholders	
(Lung,	 2009).	 The	 operating	 model	 of	 the	 SBL	 was	 unlike	 that	 promoted	 in	
theory	or	described	by	stereotypes,	of	professional	and	semi‐professional	sports.	
Indeed	 its	 operating	 model	 is	 unique.	 Furthermore,	 the	 parent	 companies	 of	
some	 teams	 are	 state‐owned	 companies,	 an	 example	 of	 which	 is	 the	 Bank	 of	
Taiwan.	 The	 budget	 of	 these	 teams	 has	 to	 be	 examined	 by	 the	 Assembly	 (the	
Legislative	 Yuan),	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 these	 teams	 may	 thus	 be	 linked	 with	
politicians.		
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Although	 the	 SBL	 revived	 enthusiasm	 for	 Taiwan	 basketball,	 there	 have	 been	
many	 problems	 with	 its	 management.	 Future	 development	 of	 the	 SBL	 is	 still	
subject	 to	 many	 uncertainties.	 The	 SBL	 committee	 planned	 to	 start	 an	
independent	league,	with	its	own	executive	team	and	its	own	marketing	team.	It	
wanted	 to	 solve	 its	 problems	 although	 it	 had	 no	 real	 power	 as	 the	 CTBA	
controlled	resources.	The	main	reason	behind	its	difficulty	is	that	the	SBL	teams	
did	not	have	stake	in	the	SBL,	which	is	dominated	by	the	owner	as	a	single	team.	
Decisions	were	made	in	the	SBL	committee,	but	the	power	of	final	decision	was	
still	controlled	by	the	CTBA	(Lung,	2009)	
The	 SBL	 committee	was	made	 up	 of	managers	 from	 the	 founding	 teams.	 Even	
though	the	managers	meet	routinely	to	deal	with	affairs	of	the	league,	they	made	
disputes	regularly.	This	was	largely	caused	by	the	fact	that	they	did	not	have	the	
power	and	resources	to	solve	problems.	They	are	dependent	on	the	CTBA	to	take	
care	of	such	matters	and	to	use	its	resources	to	solve	problems.	As	the	power	of	
arranging	fixtures	is	 in	the	hands	of	CTBA,	the	SBL	committee	has	to	wait	until	
the	CTBA	has	arranged	the	fixtures	in	order	to	deal	with	TV	broadcast,	marketing	
and	management	strategies.	As	evidenced	by	the	08/09	season	(6th	season),	the	
system	still	operated	with	a	poor	management	approach,	and	the	teams	did	not	
have	 income	 in	 their	 account	 or	 cash	 at	 their	 disposal,	 and	 the	 bills	 with	 the	
marketing	 company	 remained	 unclear	 (Chu,	 2009).	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 operation	
and	governance	of	the	SBL	therefore	provides	interesting	case	study,	which	is	to	
be	further	discussed	in	chapter	6.	
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Chapter	Three	
Theoretical	Context	
	
Having	 discussed	 the	 historical	 context	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 two	
complementary	theoretical	approaches	have	been	adopted	in	this	study,	namely	
governance	 theory	 (Henry	 &	 Lee,	 2004)	 and	 the	 strategic‐relational	
approach(Jessop,	 1982,	 1990,	 2005).	 These	 approaches	 have	 been	 used	 to	
identify	 how	 such	 outcomes	 were	 mediated	 and	 shaped	 and	 to	 explore	 the	
different	 sets	 of	 interests	 that	were	 involved.	Most	 importantly,	 they	 also	 help	
address	 the	 question	 regarding	 how	 power	 was	 exercised	 and	 which	
stakeholders	were	benefited	by	the	governance	decisions.		
	
3.1	Defining	Governance	
The	 concept	 of	 governance	has	become	widely	 employed	 since	 the	1980s.	The	
original	meaning	of	the	term	“governance”	was	control.	It	has	been	considered	to	
be	 synonymous	 with	 the	 term	 “government”,	 and	 it	 refers	 to	 all	 processes	 of	
governing,	whether	undertaken	by	a	government,	market,	or	network,	whether	
over	 a	 family,	 tribe,	 formal	 or	 informal	 organisation,	 or	 territory,	 and	whether	
through	 laws	and	norms,	power,	or	 language	(Bevir,	2012).	However,	since	the	
1990s,	due	to	the	increasingly	complex	dynamics	between	businesses	and	policy	
makers,	 governance	 is	 no	 longer	 assumed	 to	 be	 of	 a	 top‐down	 hierarchical	
system;	 there	 is	 less	 focus	 on	 the	 state	 and	 its	 institution	 but	 more	 on	 the	
interaction	 of	 agents	 of	 government	 and	 civil	 society	 in	 the	 policy	 making	
process	(Bevir,	2012;	Kazancigil,	2002),	and	the	definition	of	governance	shifted	
from	“government”.	Rosenau	(1992:	5)	defines	governance	as	“a	set	of	regulatory	
mechanisms	in	a	sphere	of	activity,	which	function	effectively	even	though	they	
are	 not	 endowed	 with	 formal	 authority”.	 It	 includes	 informal	 and	 non‐
governmental	mechanisms	where	systems	of	rule	at	any	level	within	which	goals	
are	 pursued	 through	 the	 exercise	 of	 control	 have	 transnational	 repercussion.	
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More	specifically,	Rhodes	(1996:	652‐653)suggests	that	governance	refers	to	“a	
new	 process	 of	 governing;	 or	 a	 changed	 condition	 of	 ordered	 rule;	 or	 a	 new	
method	by	which	society	is	governed”.		
In	 fact,	 the	 late	 1980s	 saw	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 Anglo‐Governance	 School	 as	
governance	 became	 a	 widespread	 academic	 interest	 for	 research	 in	 public	
administration;	 governance	 has	 since	 been	 identified	 as	 having	 broader	
meanings	 (Davies,	 2009a;	Marinetto,	 2003,	 2012;	Marsh,	 2011).	 Stoker	 (1998:	
18)	summarises	contemporary	governance	perspectives	in	five	propositions:	
a. Governance	refers	to	a	set	of	institutions	and	actors	that	are	drawn	
from,	but	also	beyond,	government.		
b. Governance	 identifies	 the	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 and	
responsibilities	for	tackling	social	and	economic	issues.		
c. Governance	 identifies	 the	 power	 dependence	 involved	 in	 the	
relationships	between	institutions	involved	in	collective	action.		
d. Governance	 is	 about	 autonomous	 self‐governing	 networks	 of	
actors.		
e. Governance	recognizes	the	capacity	to	get	things	done	which	does	
not	 rest	 on	 the	 power	 of	 government	 to	 command	 or	 use	 its	
authority.	 It	 sees	 government	 as	 able	 to	 use	 new	 tools	 and	
techniques	to	steer	and	guide.	
	
3.2	The	Change	Nature	of	Governance	Studies	
Governance	theory	began	from	a	reflection	on	state‐centred	government	failure.	
Early	 concepts	 of	 governance	 focused	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 administrative	
effectiveness	and	efficiency	because	the	state	played	a	centre	role	and	controlled	
key	 resources	 in	 the	 1980s.	 Governance	 theory	 subsequently	 shifted	 to	 a	
reflection	on	both	government	and	market	failure	emphasising	the	rising	of	non‐
state	 actor	 and	 organisations,	 confusion	 between	 public	 sector	 and	 private	
sector,	and	transformation	of	power.	The	shift	of	governance	is	considered	as	a	
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feature	 of	 the	 postmodern	 state	 which	 changed	 from	 deconstruction	 of	
hegemony	to	differentiation	(Davies,	2009a,	2009b).		
Bevir	 and	 Rhodes	 (2010)	 suggest	 that	 there	 are	 three	 waves’	 of	 studies	 of	
governance	since	it	emerged	in	the	1980s.	There	are	eight	different	perspectives	
for	 the	 first	 wave	 (Pierre,	 2000;	 Rhodes,	 1996):	 1.	 Governance	 could	 be	 a	
minimal	 state	 using	 market	 mechanisms	 to	 transfer	 public	 services.	 2.	
Governance	could	be	corporate	governance,	which	means	management	solutions	
for	business	corporations	could	influence	public	sectors.	3.	Government	could	be	
new	public	management	 to	 emphasise	 competition,	markets	 and	 customers.	 4.	
Governance	 could	 be	 good	 governance	 to	 create	 effective	 political	 linking	with	
private	actions.	5.	Governance	could	be	international	interdependence	to	analyse	
international	political	and	social	relationships	such	as	the	influence	of	multi‐level	
governance	 to	 the	 state	 and	 government.	 6.	 Governance	 could	 be	 a	 socio‐
cybernetic	 system	 to	 highlight	 the	 weakness	 of	 rule	 by	 a	 single	 actor.	 7.	
Governance	could	be	a	new	political	economy	to	discuss	the	solution	for	failing	
state	economy.	8.	Governance	as	network	between	organisations.	In	this	sense,		
“Governance	 includes	 all	 those	 activities	 of	 social,	 political	 and	
administrative	 actors	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 purposeful	 efforts	 to	 guide,	
steer,	 control	or	manage	sectors	or	 facets	of	 society”	 (Kooiman,	1993:	
2).	
First‐wave	studies	of	governance	focused	on	the	construction	of	policy	networks.	
This	 policy	 network	 approach	 was	 a	 response	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 new	 public	
administration	and	management	in	the	1980s	and	the	neo‐liberalist	revolution	of	
the	 1990s.	 In	 order	 to	 transfer	 public	 services	 and	 resources	 efficiently	 and	
effectively,	it	is	essential	to	establish	different	policy	networks,	including	market	
mechanisms,	 professional	 organisations,	 trade	 association	 and	 corporations	
(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2010,	2011;	Marsh	&	Rhodes,	1992;	Pierre,	2000).		
Bevir	 and	 Rhodes	 (2010:	 22)	 summarise	 first‐wave	 studies	 of	 governance	 as	
“typically	describing	changes	in	the	state	and	its	links	to	civil	society	as	akin	to	a	
differentiated	 polity.	 This	 polity	 was	 characterized	 by	 a	 hollowed‐out	 state,	 a	
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core	 executive	 fumbling	 to	 pull	 rubber	 levers	 of	 control,	 and,	 most	 notably,	 a	
massive	spread	of	networks”.		
The	second‐waved	studies	of	governance	focus	on	the	extension	of	state‐centred	
network	 governance	 to	 discuss	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 governance	 of	
governance,	 and	 meta‐governance	 (Kooiman	 &	 Jentoft,	 2009;	 Peters,	 2009).	
Meta‐governance	 is	 not	 a	 monolithic	 mode	 of	 governance	 but	 a	 governance	
model	 that	 involves	 the	 management	 of	 complexity	 and	 plurality,	 which	 are	
decided	by	 the	changing	of	phenomena	 to	adjust	policy	 choices	and	 to	allocate	
resources	 (Jessop,	 2002).	 This	 emerging	 meta‐governance	 role	 means	 that	
networking,	negotiation,	noise	reduction,	and	negative	co‐ordination	take	place	
‘in	 the	 shadow	 of	 hierarchy’	 (Scharpf,	 1994:	 40	 cf.	 Jessop,	 2002).	 Bevir	 and	
Rhodes	 (2010:	 22)	 therefore	 argued	 that	 “second‐wave	 studies	 of	 governance	
herald	a	return	to	the	state	with	the	idea	of	meta‐governance.	We	pronounce	the	
death	 of	 both	 narratives,	 because	we	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 single	 account	 or	
theory	of	contemporary	governance,	only	 the	differing	constructions	of	 several	
traditions”.			
Compared	to	the	orientation	of	policy	network	fin	the	first	wave,	and	the	state‐
centred	meta‐governance	 in	 the	 second	wave,	 Bevir	 and	 Rhodes	 (2010,	 2011)	
identify	 a	 society‐centred	approach	 to	 governance	 studies,	with	 the	absence	of	
concern	 for	 the	 state.	 They	 (2010)	 argue	 that	 the	 first	 and	 second	waves	 only	
focused	on	macro,	comprehensive,	unified	and	 law‐like	regularities,	and	reified	
notion	of	structure.	However,	they	argue,	micro	perspective	of	actors’	choice	and	
meaning	 should	 be	 the	main	 objective	 of	 governance	 studies.	 Therefore	 Bevir	
and	Rhodes	 (2010)	 contrast	 these	narratives	with	 a	 third‐wave	of	 governance.	
They	argue	“that	the	state	arises	out	of	the	diverse	actions	and	practices	inspired	
by	varied	beliefs	and	traditions.	The	state,	or	pattern	of	rule,	 is	 “the	contingent	
product	 of	 diverse	 actions	 and	 political	 struggles	 informed	 by	 the	 beliefs	 of	
agents	rooted	in	traditions”.	
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3.3	Sport	Governance	
Growing	interest	in	sport	governance	has	been	cultivated	by	concerns	about	the	
management	of	sport	organisations.	For	example,	in	the	field	of	sport	governing,	
“governance	focuses	on	developing	the	strategic	direction	and	the	way	by	which	
management	 implements	 the	 direction	 of	 governing	 board	 by	 reviewing	 and	
monitoring	 developments	 and	 providing	 the	 principles	 that	 will	 underline	 the	
day‐to‐day	 management”	 (UK	 Sport,	 2004:	 8).	 Sport	 organisations	 need	 to	
ensure	 their	 respective	 governance	 systems	 reflect	 good	 practice	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	organisational	outcomes	(Hoye	&	Cuskelly,	2012).	 In	 this	 regard,	Sport	
and	 Recreation	 New	 Zealand	 (2004)	 had	 identified	 20	 common	 governance	
challenges	for	sport	organisations:	
1. Complex	and	confusing	governance	structures	which	 fail	 to	ensure	
accountability	 or	 to	 cope	 with	 changes	 to	 the	 operating	
environment.	
2. Lack	 of	 a	 systematic	 approach	 for	 governing	 boards	 to	 do	 their	
work.	
3. Lack	of	training	for	board	members.	
4. Boards	 focussing	 too	 much	 on	 operational	 rather	 than	 strategic	
issues.	
5. A	failure	to	tackle	major	policy	issues.	
6. Being	reactive	rather	than	proactive.	
7. Boards	 focussing	 on	 reviewing	 decisions	 instead	 of	 making	
decisions.	
8. Failing	to	define	appropriate	accountability	measures	for	the	board	
and	staff.	
9. Failing	 to	 define	 the	 results	 which	 an	 organization	 is	 striving	 to	
achieve.	
10. Poor	delineation	of	the	roles	of	the	board	and	staff.	
11. Appointing	the	wrong	people	to	the	board.	
12. Focusing	 on	 compliance	 issues	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 enhancing	
organizational	performance.	
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13. Failing	to	define	the	responsibilities	of	the	board	and	staff.	
14. Having	low	performance	expectations	of	board	members.	
15. Poorly	skilled	and	inexperienced	board	members.	
16. Failing	to	manage	the	relationship	between	the	board	and	staff.	
17. Developing	expectations	that	exceed	the	organization’s	capability.	
18. Poor	succession	planning	for	board	members	or	key	staff.	
19. Ad	hoc	attempts	to	address	governance	problems.	
20. Failing	 to	 provide	 a	 clear	 framework	 for	 board	members	 to	 carry	
out	their	duties.	
Although	the	above‐listed	challenges	are	mainly	concerned	with	the	wellbeing	of	
organisational	 structure,	 especially	 its	 available	 resources	 and	 management,	
sport	governance	also	involves	the	broader	context	of	power	dynamics.	In	other	
words,	 sport	 governance	 also	 seeks	 to	 address	 questions	with	 regard	 to	 	 how	
organisations	are	actually	governed	and	how	power	is	exercised	or	how	power	
should	be	exercised	responsibly	(Lee,	2008).	Henry	and	Lee	(2004),	drawing	on	
Leftwich	(1994)	suggest	there	are	three	approaches	to	sport	governance	evident	
in	the	literature	‐	systemic,	organisational	and	political	governance.		
According	 to	 Leftwich,	 systemic	 governance	 refers	 to	 a	 system	of	 political	 and	
socio‐economic	relations;	 it	could	also	be	thought	of	as	“a	democratic	capitalist	
regime	that	 is	presided	over	by	a	minimal	state	which	is	also	part	of	 the	wider	
governance	of	 the	new	world	order”	 (Leftwich,	1994:	371).	As	 an	extension	of	
Leftwich’s	 interpretation,	 the	 concept	 of	 traditional	 governance	 shifted	 from	 a	
top‐down	 hierarchical	 system	 to	 a	 policy‐network	model	which	 involves	more	
non‐state	actors	and	organisations.	Henry	and	Lee	(2004:	27)	suggest	that	“the	
notion	of	Systemic	governance	underlines	 the	nature	of	a	key	shift	 in	 the	way	
that	sport	is	organised	and	controlled	–	a	shift	that	is	away	from	the	government,	
or	 its	 direct	 control”.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 old	 hierarchical	 model	 is	 no	 longer	
suitable	 to	 the	 study	 of	modern‐day	 governance	 of	 sports.	 Indeed,	 governance	
systems	and	policy	evolution	can	only	be	observed	 in	a	contemporary	complex	
web	of	interactions	between	stakeholders	in	which	different	groups	exert	power	
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in	different	ways	 and	 in	different	 contexts	 (I.	Henry,	Amara,	 Liang,	&	Uchiumi,	
2005).		
As	systemic	governance	puts	emphasis	on	the	interaction	of	organisations	and	of	
groups	working	within	and	across	organisation,	Henry	and	Lee	(2004:	29)	argue	
that	there	are	three	major	policy	implications:		
1. It	is	clear	that	in	such	a	context,	significant	policy	change	can	only	
be	 achieved	 by	 negotiation,	 and/or	 trade‐off	 between	 various	
parties	in	the	network.		
2. Governing	 bodies	 of	 sport	 in	 such	 contexts	 no	 longer	 govern	 or	
wholly	 control	 their	 sport,	 or	 at	 least	 if	 they	 do,	 they	 do	 so	 by	
virtue	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 negotiate	 outcomes,	 rather	 than	 by	
dictating	those	outcomes	to	passive	recipients	of	their	message.	
3. This	has	implications	not	only	for	the	organisations	but	also	for	the	
skills	required	of	the	people	who	work	within	them.	The	skills	are	
much	 more	 those	 of	 negotiation	 and	 mutual	 adjustment	 than	
rational,	ordered	planning	and	control.		
Moreover,	 in	 the	 classic	 concept,	 governance	 has	 the	 nature	 of	 ‘steering’	 and	
‘guiding’	the	political	system	(Kooiman,	1993;	Stoker,	1998).	As	an	extension	of	
the	 classic	 governance	 concept,	political	governance	 refers	 to	 the	 steerage	 of	
the	 system,	 which	 means	 government	 or	 governing	 body	 might	 use	 indirect	
solutions	rather	than	direct	legitimacy	or	authority	to	“steer”	the	system	or		the	
policy	making	process	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 its	 goal.	 In	 the	 sports	 field,	 political	
governance	focuses	on	the	processes	by	which	government	or	governing	bodies	
seek	to	steer	the	sports	system	to	reach	their	desired	outcome	or	to	guide	actors	
within	the	system	to	achieve	their	goal	through	deployment	of	strategies	such	as	
moral	 persuasion,	 financial	 incentives,	 and	 regulations,	 (Henry	 and	 Lee,	 2004;	
Lee,	2005).		
The	 notions	 of	 systemic	 and	 political	 governance	 are	 useful	 in	 the	 current	
context	 as	 the	 study	 seeks	 to	 analyse	 the	 interaction	 between	 various	
stakeholders	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 actions	 and	 how	 they	
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exercise	 their	 power.	 Governance	 structures	 work	 with	 influence	 from	 other	
structures.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 sports	 in	 Taiwan,	 social	 class,	 political	 structures,	
media,	 sponsors,	 coaches,	 players	 and	 club	 owners	 are	 groups	 of	 stakeholders	
whose	interests	and	actions	are	relevant	to	governance	issues.		
The	 notion	 of	 corporate	 governance	 or	 good	 governance	 has	 a	 considerable	
history	 since	 it	 has	 permeated	 development	 discourse	 by	 researchers,	 public	
sector	 bodies	 and	 even	 private	 banks	 (Henry	 &	 Lee,	 2004;	 Weiss,	 2000).	
However,	McNamee	 and	 Fleming	 (2007:	 428)	 argue	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 public	
sector	 sports	 organisations,	 “we	 should	 take	 corporate	 governance	 simply	 to	
mean	 the	structuring	of	an	organisation	so	as	 to	achieve	 its	aims	or	mission	 in	
ways	 that	 are	 ethically	 defensible”.	 In	 this	 sense,	 standards	 of	 conduct	 and	
business	 ethics	 are	 issues	 related	 to	 sport	 governance.	The	 third	 type	 of	 sport	
governance	 –	 corporate	 or	 organisational	 governance	 deals	 with	 the	
principles	 of	 how	 organisations	 should	 operate	 as	 the	 concept	 refers	 to	 “the	
ethical	 standards	 underpinning	 the	 relations,	 methods	 and	 instruments	 of	
relations	 between	 organisations”	 (Hindley,	 2007:	 5).	 Therefore	 this	 notion	
entails	that	the	aims	or	purposes	of	sport	organisations	must	be	guided	by	some	
principles	and	must	display	 integrity	across	the	 full	 range	of	 the	organisations’	
activities	 (McNamee	 and	 Fleming,	 2007,	 Henry	 and	 Lee,	 2004).	 	 Specifically,	
Henry	 and	 Lee	 (2004:	 31)	 claim	 there	 are	 seven	 principles	 that	 cover	 the	
expanded	notion	of	good	organisational	governance:		
Transparency:	 clarity	 in	 procedures	 and	 decision‐making,	
particularly	in	resource	allocation.	Organisations	charged	with	care	
of	 a	 public	 good	 such	 as	 sport	 have	 a	 particular	 obligation	 not	
simply	to	act	in	a	fair	and	consistent	manner	but	also	to	be	seen	to	
do	so.	Thus	their	inner	workings	should	be	open	to	public	scrutiny	
as	much	as	possible.		
Accountability:	 sporting	 organisations	 are	 not	 only	 responsible	 to	
financial	investors	through	financial	reporting	procedures,	but	also	
to	those	who	invest	other	resources	in	the	organisation	–	athletes,	
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coaches,	 parents,	 supporters,	 sponsors	 and	 so	 on,	 even	 if	 that	
investment	is	largely	emotional	rather	than	material.	
Democracy:	access	to	representation	 in	decision‐making	should	be	
available	 to	 those	 who	 make	 up	 the	 organisation’s	 ‘internal	
constituencies’	–	example	 ‘internal	constituencies’	 include	players,	
supporters,	and	managers	as	well	as	owners.	
Responsibility:	 for	the	sustainable	development	of	the	organisation	
and	 its	 sport,	 there	 should	 be	 stewardship	 of	 their	 resources	 and	
those	of	the	community	served.	
Equity:	 in	treatment	of	constituencies	–	for	example	gender	equity	
in	treatment	of	sports	participants	and	in	terms	of	positions	within	
the	 organisation;	 and	 equity	 in	 treatment	 of	 sports	 participants	
(and	employees)	with	disabilities.	
Effectiveness:	 establishing	 and	 monitoring	 of	 measures	 of	
effectiveness	with	measurable	and	attainable	targets.	
Efficiency:	 achievement	 of	 goals	 with	 the	 most	 efficient	 use	 of	
available	resources.	
Having	 outline	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 debate	 around	 the	 concept	 of	 globalisation	
above	we	move	on	to	focus	on	a	specific	and	largely	centred	actor,	the	state,	its	
role	in	the	contemporary			context	and	the	implications	for	sport.		 	
	
	
63	
	
3.4	Theories	of	the	State	
The	focus	of	this	thesis	is	on	the	governance	of	basketball,	which	manifests	itself	
on	 three	 levels/forms,	namely	corporate,	 systemic,	and	political	governance.	 In	
understanding	of	the	unfolding	nature	of	governance	critical	to	any	or	all	of	these	
three	dimensions	of	governance	 is	 the	role	of	 the	state.	 In	political	governance	
the	 state	 seeks	 to	 steer	 and	 influence.	 In	 corporate	 governance	 the	 state	may	
place	obligations	on	various	types	of	organisations.	 In	systemic	governance	the	
state	 is	 one	 of	 a	 range	 of	 stakeholders	 engaged	 in	 a	 system	 of	
cooperation/conflict,	 of	 confrontation/mutual	 adjustment,	 in	 debate/implicit	
rivalry.	In	each	case	the	state	is	likely	to	be	a	central	actor.	But	what	is	the	state?	
How	can	we	account	for	its	'behaviour'?		How	effective	is	it	in	indicating	certain	
policy	 outcomes	 in	 our	 case	 in	 sport	 generally	 and	 in	 basketball	 specifically?	
How	 does	 it	 engage	 with	 other	 actors?	 To	 answer	 theses	 question	 and	 other	
related	 questions	 we	 firstly	 need	 to	 review	 different	 perspectives	 on,	 or	 the	
theories	of,	the	state.		
The	following	sections	will	therefore	outline	four	major	perspectives	on	the	state	
in	terms	of	their	core	ideas,	definition(s),	the	nature	of	state	structure,	and	state	
organisations.	Following	these	separate	accounts	of	the	four	major	perspectives,	
the	 key	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 each	 perspective	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	
relation	to	the	actors’	power,	each	of	which	implicitly	or	explicitly	adopts	one	or	
more	 of	 the	 perspectives.	 This	 is	 important	 because	 the	 nature	 of	 power	 is	
subject	to	different	circumstances	regarding	policy	and/or	governance.		
	
3.4.1	Marxist	Perspectives	on	the	State	
To	understand	the	nature	of	claim	made	by	Marxist	about	 the	state,	one	has	to	
distinguish	on	 the	one	hand	between	 traditional	 structuralist or	 fundamentalist	
Marxism	 and	 neo‐Marxism	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 fact	 it	 is	 Marxists	 (rather	 than	
necessarily	 Marx	 himself	 or	 Engels)	 who	 have	 promoted	 various	 forms	 of	
Marxist	 theories	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 traditional	 Marxist	 perspectives	 alone	 are	
divided	into	three	types,	the	state	as	an	instrument	of	capitalist	control,	the	state	
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as	an	arbiter	between	classes,	and	the	state	as	a	functional	entity,	by	Dryzek	and	
Dunleavy	 (2009),	 or	 into	 four	 types,	 the	 state	 as	 the	 repressive	 arm	 of	 the	
bourgeoisie,	 the	state	as	an	 instrument	of	 the	ruling	class,	 the	state	as	an	 ideal	
collective	 capitalist,	 and	 the	 state	 as	 a	 factor	 of	 cohesion	 within	 the	 social	
formation,	by	Hay	(2006).		
In	fact,	based	on	the	context	of	Marxism,	the	focus	of	decision	making	processes	
is	 the	 conflict	 between	 classes	 and	 economic	 power	 as	 the	 power	 of	 decision	
making	was	held	by	the	bourgeoisie.	Thus	the	 logic	of	 “classes”	and	“economy”	
could	be	seen	as	 two	main	element	of	any	explanation	of	 the	state	 for	Marxist.	
These	can	be	represented	by	instrumentalism	and	Structuralism.	From	the	logic	
of	 classes,	 the	 state	 is	 a	 product	 of	 class	 struggle.	 Hay	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 the	
state	is	an	instrument	of	the	ruling	class,	and	the	repressive	arm	of	bourgeoisie.	
The	 dominant	 class	 therefore	 controls	 the	 state	 machine	 and	 expands	 its	
interests.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 instrumentalism,	 the	 state	 is	 the	 executive	
committee	for	managing	the	common	affairs	of	the	whole	bourgeoisie	(Giddens	
et	 al.,	 1991;	 Marx	 &	 Engels,	 1954	 cf.	 Hung,	 2006).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 state	 is	
recognised	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 the	 dominant	 class	 (Taylor,	 1995).	 Since	 the	
dominant	 class	has	 the	 same	character	and	 the	dominant	 class	 can	control	 the	
state	totally,	the	state	becomes	an	instrument	for	capitalism	to	strengthen	and	to	
exploit	 its	 interests	 (Giddens	 et	 al.,	 1991;	 Wang,	 1996).	 With	 regard	 to	 the	
concept	 of	 instrumentalism	 and	 social	 class,	 the	 capitalist	 class	 exercises	 its	
power,	economic	power	in	particular,	to	control	the	state.	The	working	class,	on	
the	 contrary,	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 influence	 activities	 of	 the	 state	 due	 to	 weaker	
economic	power.	
Even	 though	 the	 state	might	act	 like	an	arbiter	 that	has	autonomy	 in	policy	or	
decision	making	 to	 balance	 the	 class	 struggle	 (Dryzek	 &	 Dunleavy,	 2009),	 the	
state	is	still	an	instrument	of	the	dominant	class	because	the	latter	also	acts	as	an	
arbiter	 to	 sustain	 the	 wellbeing	 of	 itself.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 maintaining	 the	 class	
structure	and	balance	because	decisions	and	policies	are	made	by	officials	who	
serve	the	state	to	secure	the	development	of	capitalist	production	(Giddens	et	al,	
1991).	 As	Heywood	 (2002:	 91)	 argues	 that	 "the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 state	 is	 only	
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relative,	in	that	the	state	appears	to	mediate	between	classes	in	conflict,	and	so	
maintain	the	class	system	itself	 in	existence",	 from	the	economic	perspective	of	
theories	 of	 the	 state	 considers	 that	 although	 the	 state	 may	 appear	 to	 have	
autonomy	to	act,	the	function	of	the	state	is	actually	to	maintain	the	existence	of	
the	capitalism.	Dunleavy	and	O'Leary	(1987)	argue	that	Marx	and	Engels'	work	
indicated	 that	 the	 state	 organisation	 and	 policy‐making	 come	 from	 the	
fundamental	 imperatives	of	maintaining	capitalist	development.	Changes	 in	 the	
socio‐economic	 environment	 would	 decide	 the	 evolution	 of	 political	 and	 legal	
superstructure,	but	its	function	would	remain.	
Therefore,	the	concept	of	state	structuralism	is	such	that	all	of	a	state’s	actions,	
regardless	 of	 whether	 a	 policy	 appears	 to	 benefit	 the	 working	 class,	
predominantly	 serve	 the	 capitalist	 structure.	 In	 other	 words,	 although	 some	
policies	may	not	immediately	appear	to	be	conducive	to	the	capitalists,	they	will	
eventually	 result	 in	 the	 long‐term	 benefit	 for	 the	 capitalists	 by	 preserving	 the	
existing	 system.	 The	 state	 does	 not	 necessarily	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	 an	
individual	capitalist,	but	rather	the	survival	of	the	capitalism	as	a	system.	Within	
this	context,	the	responsibility	of	the	capitalist	state	officials	and	politicians	is	to	
maintain	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 state,	 since	 if	 bureaucracies	 cannot	 maintain	
economic	 development;	 this	 would	 not	 only	 damage	 capitalists	 but	 also	 state	
organisations	and	state	actors.	
However,	instrumentalism	could	not	fully	explain	the	nature	of	the	state	because	
instrumentalism	 assumes	 that	 all	 officials	 of	 the	 state	 are	 members	 of	 the	
capitalist	 class,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 Furthermore,	 the	 assumption	 that	 all	
policies	could	always	result	in	benefit	for	the	capitalist	class	is	also	questionable.	
This	 perspective	 ignores	 the	 internal	 form	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 state	 which	
cannot	 be	 easily	 reduced	 to	 explanation	 through	 the	 concept	 of	 class	 (Jessop,	
1990;	Wang,	 1996).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 structuralist	 state	 theory	 also	 ignores	
influence	of	the	working	class.	It	assumes	that	the	structure	decides	the	relative	
autonomy	 of	 the	 state,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 the	 detail	 of	 how	 the	 state	 is	
operated	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	 this	 structure	 (Jessop,	 1990).	 In	 order	 to	
respond	to	the	criticism	of	traditional	Marxist	account,	Neo‐Marxism	account	of	
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the	state	emerged	seeking	to	provide	a	more	adequate	account	of	the	autonomy	
of	politics,	class	struggle,	and	social	activities.		
Neo‐Marxist	 accounts	 are	 influenced	 in	 particular	 by	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Italian	
political	 theorist	Gramsci	and	his	use	of	 the	concept	of	hegemony.	Orthodox	or	
fundamentalist	Marxist	approaches	argue	that	the	function	of	the	state	is	simply	
to	maintain	the	capitalist	system,	that	is	the	condition	of	the	creation	of	surplus	
value	to	be	expropriated	by	these	who	own	the	means	of	production.	The	notion	
that	the	existing	(capitalist)	system	is	the	 ‘only	way’,	or	 ‘the	best	way’	operates	
‘in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 working	 classes’	 are	 perspectives	 reproduced	 largely	
subconsciously	 by	 the	 state	 (through	 for	 example	 the	 educational	 system,	 or	
judiciary)	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 (media	 interests).	 This	 reflects	 ‘false	 class	
consciousnesses’,	 a	 term	 Marxists	 use	 to	 characterize	 the	 failure	 to	 recognize	
one’s	own	class	interests.	
Gramscian	hegemony	theory	rejects	the	view	that	people	are	largely	‘fooled’	into	
seeing	the	world	in	a	‘false’	manner,	but	argues	that	there	are	battles	over	which	
ideas,	 perspectives	 on	 the	 world	 should	 predominate,	 and	 that	 capitalist	
interests	 tend	 to	 predominate	 because	 of	 the	 ability	 economically	 dominant	
elements	to	influence	and	control	the	nature	and	direction	of	political	debate.	
For	traditional,	fundamental,	or	structural	Marxists	therefore	the	state	operates	
in	whatever	manner	will	suit	in	necessary	function	that	is	to	preserve	the	system	
of	 the	reproduce	–	of	capital.	Under	such	circumstances	any	explanation	of	 the	
role	 of	 the	 state	 can	 ultimately	 be	 reduced	 to	 this	 fundamental	 functional	
requirement.	For	neo‐Marxists,	however	the	role	of	the	state	is	not	a	necessary	
requirement	or	functional	necessity,	 its	role	is	contingent,	 that	 is	 it	depends	on	
the	 dominance	 of	 sets	 of	 ideas.	 This	 dominance	 is	 not	 always	 contested,	 since	
conditions	of	consensus	to	accept	the	status	quo	usually	obtain.	For	example	not	
everybody	 agrees	 with	 conservative	 party	 value,	 but	 they	 agree	 to	 abide	 by	
electoral	 outcomes	 which	 place	 a	 conservative	 party	 in	 power.	 However,	 this	
consensus	 can	 break	 down	 and	 open	 conflict	 can	 occur,	 as	 was	 evidenced	 for	
example	in	the	various	rebellious	of	the	Arab	Spring.	For	neo‐Marxists	the	focus	
of	explanation	is	on	how	the	various	sub‐element/actors	of	the	state	are	able	to	
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maintain	 the	 status	 quo,	 and	 in	 our	 case	 how	 sport	 can	 be	 used	 to	 secure	 or	
challenge	the	status	quo.			
	
3.4.2	Elitist	Perspectives	on	the	State	
Elite	theory	emerged	at	the	end	of	nineteenth	century	while	the	early	European	
elitists	had	a	tendency	to	be	anti‐socialist,	anti‐communist,	anti‐democratic,	and	
anti‐egalitarian.	 They	held	 that	 political	 power	 is	 always	 controlled	 by	 a	 small	
elite	 group	 (Dryzek	 &	 Dunleavy,	 2009;	 Heywood,	 2002).	 The	 definition	 of	 the	
term	 ‘elite’	 is	 the	 highest,	 the	 best,	 or	 the	 excellent.	 It	 refers	 to	 a	 minority	 in	
whose	hands	power,	wealth	or	privilege	is	concentrated,	justifiably	or	otherwise	
(Heywood,	2002).	Therefore,	direction	of	public	policy	would	be	decided	by	the	
ruling	 elite’s	 preferences	 and	 values.	 In	 other	 words,	 social	 structures	 which	
allow	unfair	 distribution	 of	 power	become	 the	norm.	A	 small	 number	 of	 elites	
control	most	 social	 resources	and	decide	policy	 for	 the	state.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
policy	making	 process	 in	 the	 elitist	 account	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 top‐down	 form	 in	
which	 the	majority	 is	 ruled	by	 the	minority.	Dunleavy	and	O'Leary	 (1987:164)	
argue	that	"all	elitism	theorists	define	the	state	organisationally	as	a	compulsory	
institution	which	successfully	maintains	a	monopoly	of	legitimate	force	within	a	
given	territory".				
The	development	of	elite	theory	can	be	divided	into	three	periods:	classical	elite	
theory,	 democratic	 elite	 theory,	 and	 radical	 elite	 theory	 (Dunleavy	 &	 O’Leary,	
1987).	The	most	 influential	elitists	 in	 the	early	elite	 theory	are	Gaetano	Mosca,	
Vilfredo	 Pareto	 and	 Robert	 Michels	 (Dunleavy	 &	 O’Leary,	 1987;	 Evans,	 2006;	
Heywood,	 2002).	 Mosca,	 as	 an	 elitist	 pioneer,	 used	 the	 conception	 of	 elite	 to	
analyse	 society.	 He	 addressed	 the	 history	 of	 politics	 within	 the	 conception	 of	
elite	domination:			
In	all	society…	two	classes	of	people	appear	‐	a	class	that	rules	and	a	
class	that	is	ruled.	The	first	class,	always	the	less	numerous	performs	
all	 politics	 functions,	monopolizes	 power	 and	 enjoys	 the	 advantages	
that	 power	brings,	whereas	 the	 second,	 the	more	numerous	 class,	 is	
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directed	and	controlled	by	the	first	(Mosca,	1939:	50	quoted	in	Evans,	
2006).	
In	Mosca's	view,	there	are	always	two	levels	in	a	society.	A	minority	group	rules	
the	masses.	 Furthermore,	 the	minority	 group	will	 use	political	 formula	or	 self‐
justification	to	maintain	their	power.	This	means	 it	can	manipulate	and	control	
the	 masses.	 This	 is	 supported	 by	 Vilfredo	 Pareto,	 an	 Italian	 economist	 and	
sociologist,	 who	 held	 that	 the	 elites	 are	 those	 individuals	 who	 have	 excellent	
ability	in	any	particular	sphere	and	that	there	are	two	kinds	of	elite	in	the	elite	
group:	governing	elite	and	non‐governing	elite.	The	governing	elite	refer	to	the	
people	 who	 are	 the	 leaders	 in	 ruling	 a	 society,	 and	 the	 non‐governing	 elite	
cannot	 rule	 the	 society	 directly	 (Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary,	 1987).	 Although	 the	
conception	of	governing	elite	has	much	in	common	with	Marxist's	conception	of	
ruling	 class,	 the	 classic	 elite	 theory	 has	 been	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	
Marxist	 theory.	 Elitists	 held	 that	 Marxist	 theory	 cannot	 explain	 the	 fact	 that	
society	is	ruled	by	elites	(Parsons,	1995).	It	is	inevitable	that	power	is	controlled	
by	a	minority	group	as	all	organisations	will	manifest	an	oligarchic	trend,	and	it	
is	 thus	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 democratic	 politics	 (Michels,	 1959).	 The	 theory	 is	
"based	on	the	tendency	within	all	organisations,	however	democratic	they	might	
appear,	for	power	to	be	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	small	group	of	dominant	
figures	who	can	organise	and	make	decisions,	rather	than	being	in	the	hands	of	
an	apathetic	rank	and	file"	(Heywood,	2002).	For	classic	elitists,	the	elite	group	
would	 always	 control	 the	 state	 and	 its	 society	 (Dye	 &	 Zeigler,	 2008).	 They	
oppose	 the	 pluralist	who	 argues	 that	 power	 is	 separated,	 and	 also	 oppose	 the	
Marxists	who	argue	that	power	will	not	be	concentrated	in	minority	groups	after	
revolution.	 	 Even	 though	 revolution	may	 create	 a	 classless	 society,	 it	will	 also	
create	new	elites	to	rule	the	society.	 In	this	sense,	 the	state	has	to	be	seen	as	a	
machine	controlled	by	non‐state	elite	(Dunleavy	and	O'Leary,	1987).		
The	 classic	 elitist	 position	 is	 critical	 of	 the	 system	 of	 popular	 representation,	
suggesting	the	representative	politics	is	for	capitalist	to	protect	their	interest.	It	
may	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 elitist	 perspective	 is	 not	 compatible	 with	 the	 idea	 of	
democracy,	because	elite	theory	is	based	on	the	notion	that	"an	elite	can	control	
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social,	economic	and	political	power	through	its	expertise,	ownership	of	wealth	
and	property,	social	status,	 intelligence,	and	economic	and	political	guile,	and	a	
mass	of	all	other	citizens,	disorganised	and	excluded	from	effective	influence	on	
public	 policy"	 (Dryzek	 and	 Dunleavy,	 2009:	 58).	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	
classical	elitist	who	strove	to	prove	that	democracy	was	a	myth,	the	democratic	
elitists	 combined	 ideas	 from	 elite	 theory	 and	 pluralist	 theory	 to	 explain	 a	
democratic	society.	There	are	two	main	arguments	for	the	democratic	elitist:	the	
first	 is	 the	compatibility	of	bureaucracy	and	democracy,	and	 the	second	 is	 that	
competition	between	elites	 is	the	main	point	of	democratic	elitism.	Weber	held	
that	 the	 representative	 government	 and	 the	 elite	 can	 coexist	 in	 a	 society.	 The	
elites	 could	 focus	 on	 the	 bureaucratic	 system,	 leading	 the	 bureaucracy.	 In	 this	
sense,	it	is	easy	to	influence	the	state	with	external	interests	under	the	control	of	
the	bureaucracy.	However,	it	is	possible	to	balance	the	interest	of	bureaucracies	
and	 the	masses	when	making	 policy	 and	 supervising	 bureaucracies	 through	 a	
strong	 and	 powerful	 parliament.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 the	 democratic	 elitist	
argues	 that	 representative	 politics	 is	 not	 contrary	 to	 the	 elitist	 thinking	
(Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary,	 1987).	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 Held	 (2006),	Weber	
was	 concerned	 with	 the	 need	 to	 explain	 the	 effective	 balance	 among	 political	
authority,	 skilled	 leadership,	 efficient	 administration	 and	 degree	 of	 political	
accountability.		
Moreover,	 liberal	 democracy	 is	 a	 solution	 to	 rule;	 it	 is	 a	 process	 for	 political	
leaders	 or	 groups	 to	 compete	 and	 to	 earn	 public	 recognition,	 as	 supported	 by	
Schumpeter’s	 arguments	 that	 "an	 institutional	 arrangement	 for	 arriving	 at	
political	decisions	in	which	individuals	acquire	the	power	to	decide	by	means	of	
a	 competitive	 struggle	 for	 people's	 vote"	 (Schumpeter,	 1944	 cf.	 Dunleavy	 &	
O’Leary,	1987:	142‐143).	Therefore	democracy	and	socialism	can	be	compatible	
as	a	form	of	competitive	elitism	(Held,	2006).	Hence,	competition	for	the	power	
of	decision‐making	in	democratic	politics	can	certainly	be	expected.	Democratic	
politics	 is	 compatible	 with	 elite	 theory	 because	 the	 elite	 should	 consider	 the	
demands	and	interests	of	voters	in	order	to	win	elections.	For	democratic	elitists,	
the	democratic	system	can	render	power	competition	to	come	out	into	the	open,	
but	the	democratic	society	can	avoid	unequal	distribution	of	power.		
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In	fact,	the	democratic	elitists	pay	much	attention	to	the	leadership	of	the	elite	in	
a	democratic	society	because	a	small	group	of	elites	can	lead	the	policy	making	
process.	 However,	 because	 political	 elites	 need	 to	 earn	 the	 power	 through	
election	 in	 a	 democratic	 society,	 they	must	 be	 responsible	 to	 voters.	 Dunleavy	
and	O’Leary	(1987)	liken	the	state	to	a	vehicle	without	a	driver	in	a	democratic	
elitist	 society;	 all	 the	 groups/parties	 desire	 a	 share	 of	 the	 power	 to	 drive	 the	
state	and	policy	forward	in	the	decision	of	their	preferences.	
Radical	 elite	 theory	was	developed	 in	America	 in	 contradistinction	 to	 pluralist	
theory.	 The	 theory	 refers	 to	 the	 state	 as	 one	 that	 is	 controlled	 by	 social	 elites	
who	are	not	exposed	to	the	competition	of	elections.	The	elites	can	dominate	the	
government	by	a	non‐accountable,	 illegitimate	and	exploitative	style	(Dunleavy	
and	 O'Leary,	 1987).	 For	 radical	 elitists,	 the	 new	 administrative	 elite	 had	
influenced	 contemporary	 political	 system.	 Mills	 (1956:	 167‐169)	 takes	 on	 the	
perspective	 of	 the	 ‘power	 elite’,	 in	 which	 he	 observes	 that	 there	 is	 a	 close	
relationship	between	economic	 elites	 and	 governmental	 elites	 –	 ‘the	 corporate	
rich’	and	the	 ‘political	directorate’.	 In	 this	account	American	society	 is	ruled	by	
the	 power	 elites	 who	 are	 warlords,	 political	 directorates	 and	 corporation	
chieftains.	The	power	elites’	decisions	can	produce	certain	effects	on	the	whole	
of	 society	 (Mills,	1956:	18).	He	also	 states	 the	existence	of	 a	political	 structure	
called	 "the	 triangle	 of	 power".	 The	 triangle	 of	 power	 is	 a	 three‐level	 system	
within	 which	 government	 officials	 are	 of	 the	 highest	 level,	 various	 interest	
groups	are	of	the	middle	level,	and	proletariats	make	up	the	level	controlled	by	
bureaucracies.	The	triangle	of	power	uses	state	resources	and	controls	the	policy	
making	process	in	a	society.	Therefore	the	power	elites	occupy	most	of	top	and	
influential	 positions	 in	 the	 major	 organisations.	 Through	 social	 network	 and	
influences	over	education	institutions,	the	power	elites	maintain	their	position	in	
the	most	significant	areas	of	a	society.		
In	 conclusion,	 in	 the	 power	 elite	 model,	 the	 elite	 is	 a	 cohesive	 group	 and	 the	
power	 elite	 group	 is	 closely	 united	 by	 ‘common	 or	 overlapping	 interests’	
(Heywood,	 2002).	 The	 radical	 elitist	 believes	 that	 the	 state	 is	 defined	 as	 a	
corporatist	 network,	 which	 responds	 to	 pressures	 from	 both	 economic	 and	
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bureaucratic	 elites	 (Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary,	 1987;	 Liu,	 2003).	 The	 capitalist	
society	and	industrial	society	are	thus	ruled	by	a	new	managerial	level	which	is	
composed	of	administrators,	technicians	and	government	officials.		
	
3.4.3	Pluralist	Perspectives	on	the	State	
Pluralism	is	one	of	the	mainstream	theories	in	modern	political	science	and	has	
exerted	considerable	 influence,	 for	example,	 in	concepts	of	democracy,	analysis	
of	 interest	 groups,	 public	 administration,	 public	 policy	 making,	 governance	
theory	and	theories	of	the	state.		
Pluralism	 is	 derived	 from	 early	 liberal	 political	 philosophy;	 it	 “recognises	 the	
existence	of	diversity	in	social,	institutional	and	ideological	practices,	and	values	
that	diversity”	(Dunleavy	and	O'Leary,	1987:	13).	Thus	it	opposes	the	notion	of	a	
single	and	invisible	sovereignty	that	is	embodied	in	the	state	(M.	Smith,	2006).	
Dunleavy	 and	O'Leary	 (1987)	 argue	 that	 the	 European	 pluralists’	 focus	 on	 the	
state	and	sovereignty	is	reflected	in	the	idea	of	philosophers	such	as	John	Locke	
and	 Montesquieu,	 who	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 absolute	 power	 in	 the	 political	
system	and	that	power	does	not	solely	come	from	authority.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	 early	 American	 pluralists	 took	 ‘groups’	 as	 the	 core	 of	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	
American	 federal	 political	 processes.	 For	 example,	 Bentley	 (1967)	 addresses	
groups	as	the	raw	materials	of	political	life.	Contrary	to	the	English	pluralists,	he	
places	 more	 emphasis	 on	 political	 activity	 and	 process.	 Because	 of	 different	
political	 circumstances,	 the	 European	 pluralists	 focus	 on	 state	 structure	 and	
sovereignty,	while	their	American	counterparts	 focus	on	political	process.	Even	
though	the	focuses	are	different,	they	share	a	similar	notion	of	politics	with	the	
same	 assumptions:	 pluralists	 reject	 the	 state	 monism	 and	 they	 value	 group,	
organisational	 autonomy,	 activity	 and	 diversity	 (Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary,	 1987;	
Heywood,	2002;	Dryzek	and	Dunleavy,	2009).		
Pluralists	argue	that	unlike	the	traditional	society	 in	which	power	 is	controlled	
by	 a	 few	 people,	 power	 is	 dispersed	 in	 the	 modern	 society.	 For	 example,	 in	
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former,	 a	 landlord’s	 ownership	 of	 properties	 was	 viewed	 by	 the	 society	 as	
equivalent	 to	 having	 power	 and	 reputation.	 However,	 in	 modern	 society,	
different	people	in	different	fields	could	have	different	resources	and	power.	For	
example,	a	capitalist	might	have	economic	power	but	he	might	not	have	political	
influence.	 People	who	 have	 political	 influence	might	 not	 have	 influence	 in	 the	
education	system	and	so	on	(Dahl,	2005;	Wang,	1996).		
Since	pluralists	value	group	autonomy	and	group	competition	in	gaining	control	
of	 social	 and	 political	 resources,	 the	 state	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 an	 arena	 of	 conflict	
between	government	departments	that	represent	a	range	of	interest	groups	and	
external	groups	themselves.	Because	the	state’s	resources	and	organisations	are	
limited,	 competition	 and	 conflict	 is	 inevitable.	 Power	 of	 the	 state	 comes	 from	
different	 organisations	 or	 sources.	 Therefore	 the	 diffusion	 of	 power	 among	
different	 organisations	 or	 groups	will	 limit	 the	 concentration	 of	 power	 in	 any	
simple	activity.	However,	in	the	pluralist	perspective,	the	state	machine	is	a	part	
of	 government	 system	(Wang,	1996);	pluralists	 tend	 to	 take	government	as	 an	
object	 of	 study	 rather	 than	 the	 state.	 Dunleavy	 and	O'Leary	 (1987)	 argue	 that	
pluralists	regard	the	state	as	discrete	organisations.	When	pluralists	analyse	the	
political	 process,	 they	 focus	 on	 the	 group’s	 interests,	 largely	 ignoring	 explicit	
definition	 or	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 state	 per	 se.	 In	 other	 words,	 pluralists	
focus	on	how	society	 influences	 the	political	 system	rather	 than	contemplating	
the	structure	of	the	state.		
In	 this	 sense,	 the	 policy‐making	 process	 within	 the	 state	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	
negotiation	 among	 interests	 groups.	 Dahl	 (1963:	 25)	 claims	 that	 “important	
government	 policies	 would	 be	 arrived	 at	 through	 negotiation,	 bargaining,	
persuasion	and	pressure	at	considerable	number	of	different	sites	in	the	political	
system”.	 In	politics,	 groups	are	 formed	on	 the	basis	of	 common	 interests.	Each	
group	is	under	the	pressure	to	drive	the	government	to	gear	its	policies	such	that	
the	 group	has	maximum	access	 to	 resources.	 As	 Smith	 (1990:	 302‐304)	 notes,	
"pressure	 group's	 access	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 social	 position	 of	 the	
group,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 it	 is	 organised,	 the	 level	 of	 finances	 and	 degree	 of	
mobilisation”.		
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The	 state	 is	 like	 an	 instrument	which	 reflects	 the	 result	 of	 the	 competition	 of	
interest	groups.	As	different	groups	have	 their	power	 in	different	policy	arena,	
state	 organisations	 will	 have	 different	 positions	 in	 response	 to	 opinions	 of	
different	groups.	Thus	the	main	 function	of	the	state	 is	 to	receive	 ‘orders’	 from	
different	 interest	 groups	 and	 to	 satisfy	 group	 demands	 in	 policy‐making.	 For	
pluralists,	 interest	 groups	 are	 the	 main	 actors	 in	 the	 political	 process	 and	
"through	 interest	 group	 representation,	 individuals	 and	 groups	 can	 mobilise	
collective	 influence	 that	 can	 press	 government	 to	 make,	 discard	 or	 alter	
decisions"	 (Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary,	 1987:35).	 Dryzek	 and	 Dunleavy	 call	 this	 a	
weather	 vane/cipher	 model	 which	 means	 the	 state’s	 activity	 will	 reflect	 the	
influence	of	the	strongest	pressure	groups	in	a	given	policy	area:		
The	government	machine	functioned	as	no	more	than	a	weather	vane,	
assessing	the	groups	influence	behind	different	policy	alternatives	and	
then	reflecting	it	faithfully	(2009:	50).		
The	 state	 is	 thus	 seen	 to	 have	 taken	 on	 a	 passive	 role	 for	 the	 expression	 of	
struggles	 between	 interests	 groups	 in	 society.	 The	 idea	 that	 the	 policy	 reflects	
the	result	of	the	competition	between	interest	groups	is	similar	to	elitist	theory	
that	the	winner	can	decide	the	direction	of	the	policy.	However,	Dahl	argues	“no	
single	 organised	 political	 interests,	 party,	 class,	 region	 or	 ethnic	 groups	would	
control	 all	 of	 these	 sites”	 (1963:	 25).	 Thus	 there	 is	 no	 group,	 which	 can	
permanently	dominate,	in	a	pluralist	society.	One	group	has	the	advantage	on	a	
given	issue	but	may	not	have	the	same	level	of	dominance	over	other	groups	on	
all	 issues.	 Although	 there	 are	 various	 groups	 which	 can	 influence	 the	 policy‐
making	 process,	 no	 particular	 group	 is	 able	 to	 dominate	 permanently	 the	
decision‐making	process	(Smith,	1990).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary	 argue	 the	 state	 can	 be	 neutral	 in	 a	
proper	oligarchy:	
Since	the	1950s	pluralists'	normative	ideal	form	for	the	state	has	been	
one	which	balances,	re‐weights	and	referees	pressure	group	contests	
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to	 protect	 unorganised	 or	 weakly	 organised	 groups	 'in	 the	 public	
interest'	(1987:	45).		
The	 state	 can	 take	 on	 a	 neutral	 position	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways:	 the	 first	way	 is	
through	laissez‐faire/non‐intervention;	the	second	is	achieved	by	ensuring	that	
competition	 between	 interest	 groups	 is	 properly	 regulated,	 for	 example,	 by	
market	norms;	the	third	is	active	neutrality	which	means	the	state’s	intervention	
to	ensure	more	equable	forms	of	competition.	Thus	Miliband	(1969)	argues	that	
the	state	may	be	neutral	but	may	play	an	active	role	as	mediator,	balancer	and	
harmoniser	of	interests.		
Since	 the	state	can	play	an	active	role,	Marsh	(1995:	18)	argues	 that	 “the	state	
may	manipulate	 taxation	 and	 expenditure	 policies	 to	 increase	 state	 revenues;	
control	 imports	 or	 exports	 for	 strategic	 reasons;	 or	 restrict	 union	 power	 to	
create	 an	 image	 of	 governing	 competence”.	 However,	 Dunleavy	 and	 O'Leary	
(1987)	present	 another	 liberal	 democratic	 view	of	 the	 state	 –	 the	broker	 state	
model.	In	the	broker	state	model,	Dunleavy	and	O'Leary	(1987)	argue	that	public	
policy	is	the	aggregation	of	pressure	group	activities	taking	place	inside	the	state	
apparatus.	State	officials,	agencies,	and	elected	officials	have	their	own	interests	
in	 policy	making	 processes.	 In	 short,	 policy	 is	 the	 result	 of	 group	 competition	
outside	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 which	 is	 mediated	 by	 the	 self‐interested	
bureaucracies	 of	 state	 actors	 within	 the	 state	 apparatus.	 The	 state	 is	 thus	 an	
intermediary	 with	 its	 interests	 in	 the	 competition.	 Hence,	 in	 the	 broker	 state	
model,	 state	officials	and	agencies	are	 in	a	special	position	 that	allows	 them	to	
lead	policy	in	ways	which	reflect	state	actors’	own	interests,	as	well	as	those	of	
powerful	external	stakeholders.	
However,	 traditional	pluralism	was	 criticised	because	pluralism	puts	 emphasis	
on	 processes	 and	 activities	 but	 ignores	 the	 influence	 from	 social	 structure	 or	
social	 class.	Miliband	 (1969:	146)argues	 that	 “the	major	 organised	 interests	 in	
these	 societies,	 and	notably	 capital	 and	 labour,	 compete	on	more	or	 less	 equal	
terms,	 and	 that	 none	 of	 them	 is,	 therefore	 able	 to	 achieve	 a	 decisive	 and	
permanent	 advantage	 in	 the	 process	 of	 competition”.	 Indeed,	 different	 groups	
that	hold	different	resources	can	have	different	level	of	influence	on	the	policy‐
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making	process.	Lindblom	(1977:	170)	therefore	develops	an	explanation	of	the	
privileged	position	of	business.	He	argues	that	business	plays	a	decisive	role	 in	
the	public	policy	making	process.	“Business	leaders	will	always	have	privileged	
access	 to	 the	 corridors	 of	 power,	 and	 business	 interests	 will	 always	 be	 given	
great	 weight”	 (Dryzek	 and	 Dunleavy,	 2009:	 133).	 In	 this	 sense,	 neo‐pluralism	
recognises	that	some	groups	are	indeed	more	influential	than	others.	However,	it	
still	holds	that	capitalists	are	not	the	only	group	served	by	the	government	and	
that	there	are	still	different	groups	which	can	influence	the	government’s	policy–
making	process.		
In	 fact,	 ‘governance’	 has	 been	 recognised	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 neo‐pluralism	 in	
order	 to	 compensate	 for	 traditional	 pluralism’s	 failure	 to	 consider	 the	
complexity	 of	 policy	 network.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 policy‐
making	processes	in	civil	society	feature	‘governance’	rather	‘government’	(Bevir,	
2012).	 	Therefore,	 it	 is	inadequate	to	discuss	the	role	of	the	state	or	the	policy‐
making	 process	 solely	 in	 the	 ‘government’	 level.	 Despite	 this,	 pluralism	 is	 still	
quite	useful	because	it	provides	the	perspective	that	the	state	is	decided	by	the	
society	and	it	emphasises	the	observable	activities	for	power	and	the	state.	Even	
though	 there	 are	 still	 debates	 on	 pluralism	 in	 political	 science,	 the	 primary	
assumptions	of	pluralism,	such	as	the	process	of	group	competition	and	policy‐
making,	that	the	role	of	the	state	per	se	or	the	market	are	not	always	ultimately	
the	 most	 important	 factors	 in	 decision‐making,	 and	 that	 groups	 can	 be	 an	
alternative	 to	 the	 state	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	 collective	 organisation	 and	 the	
production	of	collective	goods,	are	still	crucial	when	conducting	policy	analysis.		
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3.5	Strategic	Relational	Approach	
This	study	aims	not	only	to	‘describe’	the	governance	system	as	an	interaction	of	
stakeholders	but	also	to	‘explain’	which	stakeholders	win	in	different	battles	on	
the	 basis	 of	 social	 class	 or	 political	 support,	 for	 example.	 The	 study	 moves	
beyond	 meso‐level	 governance	 concerns	 to	 macro‐level	 consideration	 of	
strategic	 relations,	which	 includes	 evaluation	of	broader	 structural	 forces	 such	
as	social	class	and	economics.	The	study	also	looks	at	the	individual	views	on	the	
micro‐level	 to	 build	 an	 explanation	 as	 to	 how	 and	 why	 certain	 outcomes	 had	
developed	 within	 this	 structure.	 Jessop’s	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 (1982;	
1990;	 2005)	 provides	 a	 framework	 for	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 structure	 and	
agency	for	the	Taiwanese	basketball	context.		
As	 an	extension	of	 the	 theories	of	 the	 state,	 Jessop	 (1982)	 treats	 the	 state	 and	
power	as	relational	concepts.	 In	 this	sense,	 conflicts,	 struggles,	and	balances	of	
forces	from	different	times	and	periods	will	tend	to	result	in	different	structures	
and	 events.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 state	 will	 transform	 with	 different	 historical	
conditions	 such	 as	 society,	 economy,	 politics	 and	 strategies.	 The	 state	 is	 an	
outcome	 of	 historical	 events.	 Furthermore,	 power	 should	 be	 analysed	 within	
social	 relations	 since	 as	 Jessop	 argues	 that	 “power	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	
complex	 social	 relation	 reflecting	 the	 balance	 of	 forces	 in	 a	 given	 situation”	
(1982:	253).	Therefore,	the	study	of	the	state	or	power	can	not	only	focus	on	the	
state	 or	 power	 structure;	 the	 outcomes	 of	 complex	 relations	 must	 also	 be	
analysed.		
In	 Jessop’s	 state	 theory,	 the	 state	 is	 ‘form‐determined’.	 “The	 state	 is	 a	 social	
relation;	state	power	is	form	determined	condensation	of	the	balance	of	political	
forces”	 (Jessop,	 1982:	 149).	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 state	 is	 institutional	 ensembles	
including	 the	mechanism	of	 social	 representation,	 the	 internal	organisations	of	
the	 state,	 and	 social	 intervention	 from	 the	 state	 (Jessop,	 1982;	 Wang,	 1996).	
Because	the	state	is	formed	by	different	organisations	and	institutions,	the	state	
itself	 has	 no	 power,	 and	 the	 state’s	 power	 is	 exercised	 by	 these	 institutions.	
Specifically,	 Jessop	argues	that	“there	are	always	specific	sets	of	politicians	and	
state	officials	 located	 in	 specific	parts	of	 the	state	system	who	activate	 specific	
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powers	 and	 state	 capacities	 inscribed	 in	 particular	 institutions	 and	 agencies”	
(1990:	367).	Therefore,	for	Jessop,	the	state	is	viewed	as	being	a	strategic	terrain	
and	 the	emphasis	has	 focused	 increasingly	on	 strategic	 considerations	 (Taylor,	
1995).		
Jessop	 suggests	 that	 “the	 core	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 comprises	 a	 distinct	
ensemble	of	institutions	and	organisations	whose	socially	accepted	function	is	to	
define	and	to	enforce	collectively	binding	decisions	on	the	members	of	a	society	
in	 the	 name	 of	 their	 common	 interest	 or	 general	 will”	 (1990:	 341).	 Different	
interest	groups	therefore	will	 try	 to	employ	strategies	 to	gain	the	power	of	 the	
state.	 In	 this	 sense,	 in	 Jessop’s	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 (SRA),	 actors	 are	
identified	as	conscious,	reflexive	and	strategic.	Hay	(2002:	131)	argues	that	“the	
strategic	 actors	 are,	 broadly,	 intentional	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 may	 act	
purposively	in	the	attempt	to	realise	their	intentions	and	preferences”.	Therefore	
the	SRA	puts	emphasis	on	the	strategic	content	of	actions.	The	actor	is	capable	of	
devising	and	revising	the	means	required	to	realise	their	intention.	The	actor	will	
monitor	 the	 context	 to	 make	 a	 strategic	 calculation	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 the	
preference	of	the	context.		
However,	SRA	does	not	only	focus	on	examining	the	actors,	but	it	also	adequately	
analyses	structurally‐inscribed	selectivities.	On	one	hand	the	structure	can	be	a	
limitation	 for	 some	 actors,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 may	 benefit	 and	 facilitate	
different	actors.	The	 strategic	environment	 itself	 is	 ‘strategically	 selective’.	The	
environment	 favours	certain	strategies	over	others	as	means	 to	 realise	a	given	
set	of	intentions	or	preferences”	(Hay,	2002:	129).	In	short,	the	form	or	structure	
of	the	state	is	arranged	such	that	it	is	inevitable	for	certain	actors	(individual	or	
collective)	 to	benefit	 from	 the	strategies,	which	may	be	unfavourable	 for	other	
actors.	 There	 is	 “a	 limited	 number	 of	 interests	 dominating	 a	 variety	 of	 policy	
network;	 as	 such;	 certain	 interests	 would	 have	 much	 greater	 access	 to	 policy	
making	 and	 their	 strategies	would	 be	 privileged”	 (Marsh,	 1995:	 18).	 However	
the	selectivity	is	not	always	linked	to	privileged	class.	Other	selectivities,	such	as	
gender,	 regional,	 or	 local	 interests,	 could	 also	 be	 forces	 influencing	 the	 actor’s	
actions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 factors	 of	 time	 and	 space	 should	 be	 taken	 into	
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considerations	 because	 a	 strategy	 may	 be	 useful	 in	 a	 certain	 period,	 but	
ineffective	 in	 another	 period.	 “We	 must	 engage	 in	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 many	
determinations	that	are	combined	in	a	concrete	conjuncture	and	show	how	they	
are	interrelated	as	causation”	(Jessop,	1982:	213).		
Figure	3.1:	Structure,	strategy	and	agency	in	the	strategic‐relational	approach	
	
Source:	Adapted	from	Hay	(2002:	131).	
It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 strategic	 actor	 and	 the	 strategic	 selective	 context	 are	
dynamically	 interactive	while	dealing	with	 the	 recursive	 selection	of	 strategies	
and	 actions.	 “The	 SRA	 interprets	 structures	 in	 terms	 of	 structurally‐inscribed	
spatio‐temporal	 strategic	 selectivities	 inherent	 in	 particular	 patterns	 of	 social	
actions”	 (Jessop,	 2005:	 53).	 Therefore	 the	 outcome	 of	 social	 events	 is	
strategically	selected	in	a	framework,	illustrated	in	Figure	3.1.	“The	emergence	of	
relatively	 stable	 structural	 ensembles	 involves	 not	 only	 the	 conduct	 of	 agents	
and	their	conditions	of	action	but	also	the	very	constitution	of	agents,	identities,	
interests	 and	 strategies”	 (Jessop,	 2005:	 53).	 Since	 the	 actor	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	
strategic,	 he	 or	 she	 may	 take	 intuitive,	 routine	 or	 habitual	 strategies	 and	
practices	or	explicitly	strategic	actions	in	order	to	reach	his	or	her	goal.	However,	
the	strategic	action	will	result	in	‘direct	effects’	on	the	context	and	these	effects	
may	transform	the	structure	of	context	 for	 future	strategy.	Moreover,	 the	actor	
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may	 develop	 enhanced	 awareness	 of	 ‘strategic	 learning’	 or	 structure	 and	
constraints/opportunities	 they	 impose,	 providing	 the	 basis	 from	 which	
subsequent	 strategy	 might	 be	 formulated	 and	 perhaps	 prove	 more	 successful	
(Hay,	 2002:	 133).	 In	 conclusion,	 actors	 are	 never	 fully	 constituted	 as	 single‐
minded	and	omnicompetent	supports	of	structures	but	are	typically	expected	to	
have	 a	 plurality	 of	 identities,	 interests,	 desires,	 and	 affects	 as	well	 as	 differing	
and	 variable	 degree	 of	 knowledgeability	 and	 practical	 competence.	 	 Also	
structures	 and	 their	 associated	 structural	 tendencies	 (including	 their	 various	
selectivities)	are	never	fully	constituted	but	remain	vulnerable	to	transformation,	
dependent	on	continued	action	along	certain	lines	for	their	reproduction	(Jessop,	
2005:	53).	SRA	therefore	provides	a	useful	approach	and	 framework	 for	policy	
analysis	in	a	given	context	within	a	specific	period	of	time	without	missing	some	
of	the	insights	of	other	kinds	of	theories.	This	is	supported	by	Jessop’s	claim	that	
the	 “strategic	 relations	 approach	 aims	 to	 produce	 theoretically	 informed	
analyses	 of	 strategic	 calculation	 and	 practices	 and	 how	 they	 overdetermine	
social	relations	more	generally”	(Jessop,	1990:	264).		
	
3.6	Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	we	have	reviewed	the	dominant	perspectives	 in	theories	of	 the	
state	as	well	as	governance	theory	and	strategic	relations	theory.	Such	theories	
invite	particular	types	of	question,	for	example,	who	are	the	key	stakeholders	in	
the	 basketball	 system?	Which	 sets	 of	 stakeholders	 dominate?	Whose	 interests	
are	 served	 by	 the	 principles	 of	 corporate	 governance	 adopted?	 How	 do	
stakeholders	 interact,	 negotiate	 or	 compete	 to	 achieve	 their	 goal	 as	well	 as	 to	
shape	 or	 resist	 the	 system?	With	 responses	 to	 these	 questions,	we	 are	 able	 to	
identify	the	trajectory	of	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.		
In	particular,	governance	theory	is	a	meso‐level	theory	which	helps	us	to	explain	
the	current	situation	of	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.	Theories	of	the	
state	including	Marxist,	pluralist	and	elitist	accounts	help	us	to	analyse	the	role	
of	 the	 state	 and	 activities	 within	 it.	 Strategic	 relations	 theory	 with	 a	 meta‐
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theoretical	 perspective	 leads	 us	 to	 underlines	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 phenomena	
with	interactions	between	actors	and	context.	Thus	we	approach	our	study	of	the	
development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	with	these	considerations	to	identify:	
 Who	are	the	key	stakeholders	 in	 the	governance	of	basketball	system	in	
Taiwan?	What	are	their	interests?		
 What	strategies	do	they	adopt	in	seeking	to	realise	these	interests?	
 What	roles	do	the	concepts	of	systemic	governance,	good	governance,	and	
political	governance	play	in	explaining	governance	behaviour?	
 How	do	the	 instances	of	strategic	calculation	draw	upon	and	modify	 the	
strategically	selective	contexts	within	which	they	are	undertaken?	
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Chapter	Four		
Research	Strategy	and	Methods	
	
4.1	Introduction	
This	study	aims	to	explore	the	trajectories	and	the	nature	of	development	of	the	
governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan,	and	to	map	out	the	strategic	relations	which	
characterise	and	explain	the	‘pace’	and	‘direction’	of	change	in	this	development.	
In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 our	 aim,	 the	 analysis	 will	 focus	 on	 highlighting	 the	
network	of	 actors	 that	 constitute	 the	basketball	 system	and	 the	ways	 in	which	
their	 interactions	 shape	 the	 system	 in	 three	 critical	 events	 or	 processes.	 One	
preliminary	point	should	be	made	which	is	that	we	are	considering	were	a	set	of	
bodies	and	decisions	which	deal	solely	with	male	basketball.	Thus	 the	 fact	 that	
all	 players	 and	 virtually	 all	 other	 stakeholder	 groups	 are	 male	 is	 implicitly	
accepted	feature	of	this	part	of	the	sport	domain.		
This	 chapter	will	 discuss	 the	 theoretical,	 ontological,	 epistemological	 positions	
adopted	by	the	researcher	in	developing	this	explanation	and	their	relationship	
to	the	research	methods	employed	in	this	study.	While	the	researcher	intends	to	
describe	 and	 justify	 the	 research	 process,	 the	 opening	 section	 deals	 with	
philosophical	 considerations,	 relating	 to	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	
factors,	 which	 underpin	 this	 research.	 While	 philosophical	 considerations	 are	
inevitably	made	prior	to	‘data	collection’;	they	provide	the	necessary	context	for	
adopting	 particular	 research	 approaches.	 Thus	 the	 definition	 of	 philosophical	
premises	of	my	argument	 is	 intended	 to	make	 this	account	more	coherent	and	
consistent	 per	 se,	 justifying	 the	 choice	 of	 appropriate	 methodology.	
Subsequently,	 the	 methods	 adopted	 in	 this	 study	 are	 identified	 in	 the	 third	
section.	
	
	 	
	
	
82	
	
4.2	Aims	of	the	Research	
It	 is	 worth	 reminding	 ourselves	 of	 this	 study’s	 research	 aims	 before	 engaging	
with	 the	 discussion	 in	 this	 chapter	 because	 the	 aims	 inform	 the	 direction	 our	
research	strategy	will	take.	While	this	study	seeks	to	explore	the	trajectories	and	
the	 nature	 of	 development	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan,	 it	
addresses	the	following	aims:	
	
 Who	are	the	key	stakeholders	 in	 the	governance	of	basketball	system	in	
Taiwan?	What	are	their	interests?		
 What	strategies	do	they	adopt	in	seeking	to	realise	these	interests?	
 What	roles	do	the	concepts	of	systemic	governance,	good	governance,	and	
political	governance	play	in	explaining	governance	behaviour?	
 How	do	the	 instances	of	strategic	calculation	draw	upon	and	modify	 the	
strategically	selective	contexts	within	which	they	are	undertaken?	
	
Answer	to	these	questions	are	to	be	derived	from	and	developed	in	analysis	of	,	
three	 case	 study	 events	 and	 processes	 in	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 basketball	 in	
Taiwan.	Governance	 theory	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	middle	 range	 approach	 for	
which	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 bases	 are	 founded	 in	 a	 more	
fundamental	position.	This	chapter	will	therefore	go	on	to	argue	why	a	strategic	
relational	 approach	 provides	 an	 appropriate	 basis	 on	 which	 to	 form	 a	
governance‐based	 account.	 Figure	 4.1	 illustrates	 the	 logic	 for	 such	 a	 choice	 of	
research	strategies.	
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Figure	4.1:	Logic	flow	for	choosing	research	strategies	
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4.3	Philosophical	Considerations	
Two	 primary	 philosophical	 considerations	 should	 concern	 any	 social	 theorist.	
The	first	is	ontological,	the	philosophy	of	what	exists	(Blaikie,	2009;	C	Hay,	2002;	
Marsh	&	Stoker,	2010).	The	second	is	epistemology	or	knowledge	of	what	exists,	
and	 how	 such	 knowledge	may	 be	 gained	 (Bryman,	 2008;	 Hay,	 2002;	Marsh	&	
Stoker,	 2010;	 Sparkes,	 1992).	 Effectively	 researchers	 are	 required	 to	 choose	
between	 different	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 positions	 in	 order	 to	 justify	
the	 selection	 of	 methods	 and	 their	 application.	 Table	 4.1	 therefore	 seeks	 to	
identify	 the	 principal	 positions	 which	 are	 open	 to	 researchers,	 and	 their	
relationship	to	methods	adopted.	
There	 are	 three	major	 approaches	 to	 social	 enquiry.	 The	 first	 is	 positivism.	 In	
ontological	 terms,	 the	 positivist	 holds	 a	 foundationalist	 perspective	 which	
contends	 that	 the	 world	 exists	 independently	 of	 one’s	 knowledge	 of	 it.	
Epistemologically,	 it	 is	 objectivist	 arguing	 that	 the	 world	 or	 phenomena	 are	
directly	observable.	Since	the	positivist	believes	that	knowledge	is	derived	from	
sensory	experience	by	experimental	or	comparative	analysis,	it	adopts	scientific	
methods	 seeking	 the	 elimination	 of	 subjectivity	 to	 build	 scientifically‐based	
findings	 to	 represent	 reliable	 and	 causal	 relationships	 between	 social	
phenomena	 (Blaikie,	 2003;	 Denscombe,	 2002;	Marsh	&	 Stoker,	 2010;	 Sparkes,	
1992).	However,	 Blaikie	 (1993:	 102)	 asserts	 that	 “observers	 are	 active	 agents,	
not	passive	receptacles”	due	to	their	role	within	various	societal	cultures	which	
have	the	ability	 to	shape	their	ontological	beliefs.	Therefore,	direct	observation	
might	not	 be	 fully	 objective	because	 ‘observations	 are	 theory‐loaded’	 and	 thus	
“there	is	more	to	seeing	than	meets	the	eyeball”	(Hanson,	1958	cf.	Blaikie,	1993:	
102).	 With	 reference	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 this	 study,	 if	 we	 seek	 to	 draw	 a	
comprehensive	picture	of	the	governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan,	the	positivist	
approach	 will	 not	 permit	 us	 to	 recognise	 all	 of	 the	 elements	 that	 have	
underpinned	 and	 shaped	 the	 system	 because	 some	 behaviours,	 relationships,	
and	structures	cannot	be	observed	directly.		
In	contrast	to	positivists,	the	interpretivist,	in	terms	of	ontological	position,	holds	
an	anti‐foundationalist	perspective,	which	contends	that	the	world	does	not	exist	
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independently	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 it,	 but	 that	 we	 construct	 the	 world	 in	 the	
process	of	‘making	sense’	of	it.		
Interpretivists	 indicate	 that	 social	 phenomena	 have	 different	 meanings	 for	
different	 people	 and	 thus	 that	 social	 scientists’	 main	 task	 is	 to	 identify	 these	
subjective	 meanings	 so	 that	 we	 can	 explain	 why	 people	 behave	 as	 they	 do.	
Therefore	 in	 epistemological	 terms,	 interpretivists	 argue	 that	 the	 world	 is	
socially	 or	 discursively	 constructed	 and	 as	 such	 many	 phenomena	 are	 not	
directly	observable.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	researcher	will	need	to	 ‘enter’	a	society’s	
meaning	 system	 to	 appreciate	 the	 meaning	 of	 social	 activities	 because	 only	
subjective	 interpretation	 could	 explain	 the	 social	 behaviour	 appropriately	
(Sparkes,	1992;	Bryman,	2008;	Hay,	2002;	Marsh	&	Stoker,	2010).	However,	Fay		
(Fay,	 1975	 cf.	 Blaikie,	 1993)	 argues	 interpretivism’s	 over‐focus	 upon	
interpreting	 the	 intentions	 of	 social	 actors	 and	 interpretivist	 overlooks	 the	
effects	 that	 unintended,	 structural	 causes	 may	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 agency	
behaviour	 and	 thus	 interpretivism	only	 partially	 describes	 reality.	Hence	 if	we	
take	 the	 extreme	 interpretivist	 position,	 an	 agency‐centred	 approach,	 with	 its	
focus	on	the	subjective	 interpretation	of	social	behaviour,	we	will	not	only	 lack	
objectivity	 but	 also	 fail	 to	 recognise	 the	 interaction	 between	 structure	 and	
agency,	which	is	one	of	aims	of	this	study.	
In	rejecting	therefore	the	‘objectivity’	of	scientific	reference	to	a	foundationalist	
reality,	as	in	the	case	of	a	positivist	paradigm,	and	the	subjective	construction	of	
the	 interpretivist’s	 view,	we	wish	 to	 identify	 a	middle	 ground,	 the	premises	 of	
which	are	outline	below:	
 Structures	exist	independently	of	the	individual	but	do	not	determine	human	
actions	in	a	causal	sense.	
 Individuals	can	make	free	choices	in	terms	of	the	actions	they	undertake,	but	
these	 actions	 are	 not	 completely	 free,	 since	 they	 are	 chosen	 from	 among	 a	
restricted	range	of	possible	actions.	
In	this	sense,	we	need	a	modified	form	of	foundationalism	and	a	modified	form	of	
anti‐foundationalism,	 which	 is	 a	 position	 between	 two	 extreme	 poles,	 and	 it	
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should	 allow	 analyse	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 structures	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	
structures	 as	 a	 context	 of	 behaviours.	 Furthermore	we	 need	 a	 position,	which	
also	 allows	 for	 the	 discussion	 of	 individuals	 and	 choice	 even	 though	 we	
recognise	that	choices	of	how	to	act	are	limited	by	the	resources	available.	
Bhaskar’s	critical	realism	is	a	distinct	version	of	the	realist	philosophy	(Bhaskar,	
1997).	 Critical	 realists	 believe	 there	 is	 an	 independent	 reality,	 which	 can	 be	
differentiated	into	three	levels:	the	‘empirical’,	the	‘actual’	and	the	‘real’.	In	these	
three	levels,	experienced	event	can	be	directly	observed	in	the	 ‘empirical’	 level,	
all	 events	whether	experienced	or	not	 comprise	 the	 ‘actual’	 level	 and	 the	 ‘real’	
level	 embracing	 the	 mechanisms,	 which	 generate	 events	 (Houston,	 2001).	
Critical	 realism	 with	 its	 modified‐foundationalist	 position	 perspective	 thus	
provides	us	a	middle	position	in	ontological	 terms,	meaning	that	 it	asserts	that	
extend	reality	is	‘real’	but	also	in	‘socially	constructed’.	Jessop	(2005)	claims	that	
critical	 realism	 holds	 an	 ontological	 realism	 and	 epistemological	 relativism	 as	
critical	realist	believes	that	a	real	world	exists	with	underlying	structures,	which	
may	not	be	directly	observed	–	these	structures	are	constructed	by,	and	are	the	
context	of	social	action,	therefore	in	epistemological	terms	it	allows	us	to	know	
explain	these	structures	by	virtue	of	the	evidence	of	their	implications.		
However	 our	 analysis	 does	 not	 stop	 at	 the	 identification	 of	 real	 structures,	
because	as	Jessop	(2005)	argues	the	explanation	of	social	outcomes	is	premised	
upon	 an	 understanding	 of	 strategically	 selective	 context	 and	 strategic	 and	
reflexive	 actors	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously	 employing	 resources	 available	 in	
these	 contexts	 to	 achieve	 strategic	 goals.	 In	 other	 words	 strategic	 relations	
theory	 invites	us	 to	go	beyond	 the	 focus	on	structure	or	agency	 to	capture	 the	
dialectical	relationship	between	the	two.	
The	 paradigms	 identified	 in	 Table	 4.1	 highlight	 their	 respective	 assumptions.	
Strategic	 relations	 theory	 shows	 significant	 features	 of	 critical	 realism	 but	
promotes	an	understanding	of	‘real’	strategic	context,	rather	than	simply	of	real	
structures,	 and	 seeks	 to	 capture	 the	 diachronic	 nature	 of	 such	 actors	 and	
structures	by	identifying	ways	in	which	outcomes	of	strategic	action	at	one	point	
in	time	become	the	structural	context	for	future	action.		
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Table	4.1:	The	epistemological	and	ontological	assumptions	of	three	major	approaches	to	
social	enquiry	
Assumptions	 Positivism	 Critical	Realism	 Interpretivism	
Ontology	 Foundationalist	‐
contends	that	the	world	
exists	independently	of	
our	knowledge	of	it	
	
Modified‐
Foundationalist	‐	
contends	that	the	world	
exists	independently	of	
our	knowledge	of	it	
Anti‐Foundationalist	‐
Contends	that	the	world	
does	not	exist	
independently	of	our	
knowledge	of	it	
	
Epistemology	 Scientific	/	Objectivist	/	
Phenomena	is	directly	
observable	
	
Scientific	/	Subjectivist	
/	Phenomena	might	not	
be	directly	observable	
	
Hermeneutic	/	Subjectivist	
/	Phenomena	is	not	
directly	observable	
	
Methodology	 Knowledge	is	derived	
from	sensory	
experienced	by	
experimental	or	
comparative	analysis	
	
Science	is	an	
empirically	based,	
rational	and	objective	
enterprise	to	provide	
true	explanatory	and	
predictive	knowledge	
	
Knowledge	is	derived	from	
everyday	socially	
constructed	concepts	and	
meanings.	The	researcher	
enters	this	social	world	to	
understand	these	
meanings	
	
The	role	of	
research	
Science	is	an	attempt	to	
gain	both	predictive	
and	explanatory	
knowledge	of	the	
external	world	
	
Explanation	is	the	
primary	objective	of	
science	by	discovering	
the	connections	
between	phenomena	
and	knowledge	of	the	
underlying	structures	
and	mechanisms	at	
work	
	
Due	the	belief	that	
objective	analysis	is	
impossible	in	research	as	
all	knowledge	is	
discursively	laden,	causal	
relationships	are	also	seen	
as	impossible.	Thick	forms	
of	description	is	therefore	
the	primary	objective	
	
Focus	 Identifying	the	
phenomena	associated	
with	critical	events	(e.g.	
by	measuring	statistical	
association	
Identifying	the	
relationship	between	
structural	context	
(political,	economic,	
social,	cultural	
conditions)	and	agents’	
behavior	
	
Investigating	the	
discursive	construction	of	
governance	system	as	a	
phenomenon	
Potential	
research	
questions	
What	are	the	statistical	
correlates	of	critical	
events?	
Who	are	the	key	
stakeholders?	
What	policy‐making	
process,	and	what	
resources	were	
available	to	these	key	
actors	given	the	
historical	context	?	
How	is	the	process	for	
operating	the	league?		
Why	and	how	are	they	
able	to	define	it	as	a	
downturn	of	
development	of	
basketball	rather	than	a	
minor	issue	for	sport?	
	
What	are	the	conditions	
(economic,	social,	political,	
cultural	structural	
conditions)	under	which	it	
is	possible	for	agents	to	
introduce	governance	of	
basketball?	
What	are	conditions	under	
which	agents	can	bring	
about	a	‘corruption’	of	
basketball?	
Source:	Adapted	from	Blaikie	(2003);	Marsh	et	al.	(1999);	Sparkes	(1992)	
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4.4	Adequacy	of	Theory	
Given	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 the	 research,	 I	 am	 looking	 for	 theories,	 which	
allows	me	to	identify	how	the	outcomes	investigated	were	mediated	and	shaped,	
and	in	particular	how	different	sets	of	interests	were	implicated,	how	power	was	
exercised,	 and	 whose	 interests	 were	 met	 in	 governance	 decisions.	 Two	
complementary	 theoretical	 approaches	 are	 adopted	 in	 the	 research,	 those	 of	
governance	theory	(IHenry	&	Lee,	2004;	Hindley,	2002)	and	a	strategic	relational	
approach	 (Jessop,	 1982,	 1990,	 2005),	 which	 are	 complementary	 rather	 than	
competing	 perspectives	 operating	 at	 different	 levels	 (the	meso	 and	 the	macro	
levels	respectively).	
Henry	and	Lee	(2004)	suggest	there	are	three	approaches	to	governance	which	
can	 be	 recognised	 as	 operating	 among	 the	 various	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 sports	
system.	 The	 concept	 of	 ‘systemic	 governance’	 addresses	 competition,	
cooperation	 and	 mutual	 adjustment	 between	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 sport	
industries.	‘Organisational	governance’	concerns	managerial	behaviour	implying	
a	normative	 approach	with	 ethically‐informed	 standards.	 ‘Political	 governance’	
concerns	 the	 steering	 rather	 than	 commanding	 role	 played	 by	 the	 state	 or	
governments	 or	 governing	 bodies	 who	 seek	 to	 employ	 influence	 rather	 than	
force	or	regulation	to	steer	the	sport	system.	
Governance	 theory	 is	a	useful	approach	 to	examine	 the	dynamics	of	 the	power	
struggles	 between	 various	 stakeholders	 within	 the	 sporting	 governing	 system	
(Henry,	 Amara,	 Liang,	 and	 Uchiumi,	 2005).	 Using	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 as	 an	
example,	 the	 CTBA	 as	 a	 national	 federation	 has	 the	 power	 to	 influence	 the	
contractual	 frameworks	 for	player,	 clubs	 and	media;	Nike	as	 a	 sponsor	 (which	
helped	 the	 SAC	 to	 establish	 the	 SBL)	 could	 apply	 pressure	 to	 have	 its	 own	
interests	met.	 State‐owned	 companies	 as	 the	parent	 companies	of	professional	
clubs	are	also	involved	within	the	system.		In	such	a	complex	sport	business	and	
policy	 environment,	 we	 can	 employ	 the	 notion	 of	 systemic	 governance	
underlying	interaction	between	the	major	actors	the	real	structures.	In	addition,	
when	 governments	 or	 governing	 bodies	 within	 the	 system	 seek	 to	 steer	 the	
sports	system,	they	may	use	moral	pressure,	financial	or	other	incentives,	rather	
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than	 licensing,	 regulation	 and	 control	 to	 achieve	desired	outcomes	where	 they	
do	 use	 the	 latter	 this	 reflects	 direct	 governing	 rather	 than	 governance.	 The	
concept	 of	 political	 governance	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 and	 explain	 such	 governance	
activity.	 Governance	 refers	 to	 all	 those	 activities	 of	 social	 political	 and	
administrative	 actors	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 purposeful	 efforts	 to	 guide,	 steer,	
control	 or	 manage	 sectors	 or	 facets	 of	 societies	 (Kooiman,	 2003).	 Through	
approaches	 of	 governance	 theory,	 we	 shall	 find	 some	 implications	 of	 the	
structure	of	political	and	economic	relationships	and	rules	within	the	basketball	
system	in	Taiwan.			
Furthermore,	 governance	 structures	work	 alongside	with	 influence	 from	other	
structures.	 In	 the	context	of	 sport	development	 in	Taiwan,	gender,	 social	 class,	
political	sporting	or	businesses	structures,	could	represent	important	features	of	
the	system.	If	we	want	to	fully	understand	the	 ‘real’	with	underlying	structures	
and	social	constructions,	we	should	not	only	‘describe’	the	governance	system	as	
an	 interaction	 of	 stakeholders	 but	 also	 ‘explain’	 which	 stakeholders	 win	 in	
different	 battles	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 gender,	 social	 class,	 political	 support	 etc.	 We	
need	to	move	beyond	meso‐level	to	macro‐level	explanations	to	look	at	broader	
structural	 forces	 like	 gender,	 social	 class,	 economics,	 as	well	 as	 looking	 at	 the	
individual	 views	 in	 the	micro	 level	 to	 generate	 an	 explanation	 of	 why	 certain	
outcomes	 developed	 within	 this	 structure.	 This	 study	 therefore	 adopts	 a	
strategic	relations	approach,	which	provides	an	appropriate	approach	to	address	
the	role	of	the	state	in	areas	of	social	action.			
While	 governance	 theory	 covers	 meso‐level	 forms	 of	 analysis	 at	 the	 meta‐
theoretical	 level,	 Jessop	(2005)	 indicates	that	“the	strategic	relational	approach	
links	 other	 versions	 of	 critical	 realism	 in	 the	 social	 science”	 by	 exploring	 the	
complex	 interaction	 of	 structure	 and	 agency.	As	 Jessop	 (1990:	264)	 points	 out	
this	 approach	 “aims	 to	 produce	 theoretically	 informed	 analyses	 of	 strategic	
calculation	and	practice	 and	of	 how	 they	over	determine	 social	 relations	more	
generally”.	 The	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 thus	 offers	 a	wider	 framework	 of	
analysis	 for	 this	 study	without	prescribing	 restrictive	boundaries	 for	 empirical	
work.	
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“The	 key	 relationship	 in	 the	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 is	 not	 that	 between	
structure	 and	 agency,	 but	 rather	 the	 more	 immediate	 interaction	 of	 strategic	
actors	 and	 strategic	 context	 in	 which	 they	 find	 themselves”	 (Hay	 2002:	 128).	
Indeed,	“both	the	structures	and	their	selectivity	are	considered	as	significant	as	
well	as	the	role	of	various	stakeholders	within	and	around	sport”	(Lee,	2005:70).	
Thus	this	approach	can	be	adopted	to	investigate	the	strategic	relations	between	
stakeholders	 involved	 with	 the	 development	 of	 sport	 policy.	 Specifically,	
structure	 is	a	starting	point	 in	 the	strategic	relational	approach,	and	the	action	
takes	 place	 in	 a	 context	within	which	 the	 structure	 has	 ‘strategic	 selectivities’	
(Hay,	1995;	Hay,	2002).	For	example,	the	SBL,	a	top	basketball	league	in	Taiwan,	
is	 structured	 in	 a	way	which	 largely	 privileges	 the	 best	 players.	 Only	 the	 best	
players	from	the	high	school	league	and	the	university	league	in	Taiwan	can	play	
in	this	league.	In	this	context,	the	SBL	is	structured	to	be	strategically	selective;	
this	rule	strongly	influence	who	can	be	a	part	of	the	league.	This	does	not	mean	
that	general	players	of	average	find	it	impossible	to	play	in	the	SBL	but	it	is	much	
more	difficult	for	them	to	be	selected/	involved.		
Although	the	structures	both	enable	and	constrain	actors,	 they	may	try	to	alter	
such	 structures	 by	 strategic	 learning.	 “Agents	 are	 reflexive,	 capable	 of	
reformulating	within	limits	their	own	identities	and	interests,	and	able	to	engage	
in	strategic	calculation	about	their	current	situation”	(Hay,	1996:	124).	Thus	the	
strategic	relational	approach	not	only	holds	that	structures	have	selectivities	but	
also	 considers	 that	 actors	 have	 their	 own	 strategies.	 There	 is	 an	 active	
interaction	between	structure	and	agency.	So	actors	can	effect	outcomes,	which	
are	 enabling	 or	 constrained	 by	 the	 structures.	 For	 the	 research	 strategy,	 this	
approach	has	clear	implications	since	it	involves	structural	context,	actors’	action	
and	the	strategic	links	between	them.		
As	Hay	(2002:	127)	points	out	“structure	and	agency	do	not	exist	as	themselves	
but	through	their	relational	 interaction”.	Structure	and	agency	are	independent	
analytically	but	they	are	interwoven	in	practice.	In	practical	terms,	the	strategic	
relational	approach	does	not	 focus	on	 theoretical	abstractions	of	 structure	and	
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agency	but	on	the	dialectical	interplay	of	structure	and	agency	in	the	real	context	
social	and	political	context	(Hay,	1995;	Hay,	2002).		
Although	Jessop	adopts	a	neo‐Marxist	approach	in	his	use	of	strategic	relations,	
the	strategic	relational	approach	is	about	more	than	simply	economic	relations.	
Just	 as	 it	 is	 argued	 in	our	discussion	of	 theories	of	 the	state,	neo‐Marxist,	neo‐
pluralist,	and	neo‐elitist	explanations	share	commonalities	which	mean	that	the	
decision	as	to	whether	economic	interests,	the	interests	of	elites,	or	the	interests	
of	other	interest	groups	prevail,	is	a	contingent	matter.	The	odds	may	be	staked	
in	 favour	 of	 particular	 interests	 but	 the	 strategic	 context,	 though	 selectively	
favouring	certain	groups	does	not	always	and	inevitably	favour	the	same	groups	
or	 strata	 of	 society.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 1950s	 the	 critical	 element	 of	 power	
relations	 in	 Taiwan	 was	 arguably	 that	 between	military	 elites	 and	 the	 rest	 of	
society,	with	 the	 elite	 using	 sport	 to	 try	 to	promote	 the	 acceptance	of	military	
hegemony	in	Taiwanese	society.	In	this	regard,	the	strategic	relational	approach	
is	not	necessarily	Marxist	 account	 in	 its	 application.	Thus	a	 strategic	 relational	
approach	 provides	 an	 appropriate	 framework	while	 the	 development	 of	 sport	
policy	 can	 be	 regard	 as	 “the	 consequences	 of	 interactions	 between	 social,	
political,	and	economic	context	and	various	stakeholders”	(Lee,	2005:	69).		
Thus	the	adoption	of	a	strategic	relational	approach	in	this	study	does	not	imply	
a	 focus	 on	 only	 one	 set	 of	 interests.	 I	 recognise	 that	 the	 economic	 context	 is	
important,	 but	 in	my	analysis	of	 theories	of	 the	 state	 I	 argue	 that	neo‐Marxist,	
neo‐elitist,	and	neo‐pluralist	perspectives	on	the	state	converge.	Thus	economic	
relations	 are	 only	 one	 set	 of	 relations	 for	 consideration	within	 a	 discussion	 of	
strategic	relations,	and	they	are	not	always	the	dominant	consideration.	Actually	
in	 the	 history	 of	 Taiwanese	 basketball,	 there	 were	 always	 different	 interests	
evident	in	its	development.	Military	relations	with	civil	society	represents	a	good	
example	 because	 this	was	 a	major	 determinant	 of	 the	 development	 of	 society	
and	basketball	in	Taiwan	in	the	1950s	to	1960s,	while	the	private	business	elites	
played	 a	 more	 prominent	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 semi‐professional	
basketball	 in	Taiwan	 in	 the	1970s	 to	 the	 1980s.	 Similarly	 China’s	 political	 and	
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economic	 role	 is	 a	 critical	 set	 of	 factors	 to	 understand	 if	 we	 are	 to	 explain	
developments	in	the	2000s.	
Thus	we	cannot	reduce	our	explanation	to	focus	only	on	power	of	the	military,	or	
on	the	competition	between	various	groups	in	society,	or	on	the	power	of	capital.	
For	 the	adoption	of	 the	strategic	relational	approach	and	 its	application	 in	 this	
study,	 we	 argue	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 different	 sets	 of	 interests	 within	 different	
contexts	is	important	in	order	to	analyse	the	interactions	between	structure	and	
agency	and	the	contingent	nature	of	the	resulting	outcomes.		
The	first	level	of	the	research	for	this	thesis	is	at	the	meso‐level	of	concerns	with	
governance	 of	 basketball.	 A	 strategic‐relational	 approach	 provides	 a	means	 by	
which	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 explanation	 of	 governance	 theory	 to	 identify	 actors’	
perceptions/explanations	of	their	own	and	others	strategic	action,	of	the	nature	
of	 the	 strategically	 selective	 context	 which	 provides	 actors	 with	 resources	 by	
which	to	act	or	to	be	constructed	from	acting,	and	of	the	strategies	facilitated	in	
the	meso	level	and	micro	level.			
	
4.5	Data	Analysis:	Method	Appropriateness	
4.5.1	Qualitative	Research	Method	and	Ethnographic	Content	Analysis	
Sparkes	 (1992:	 14)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 “ontological	 assumptions	 lead	 to	
epistemological	 assumptions	 which	 have	 methodological	 implications	 for	 the	
choices	made	regarding	particular	methods	or	techniques	of	data	collection	and	
the	 interpretation	 of	 findings	 arising	 from	 the	 research”.	 While	 this	 research	
adopted	a	critical	realist	position	in	order	to	construct	an	account,	the	researcher	
employed	 a	 qualitative	 research	 method	 with	 Ethnographic	 Content	 Analysis	
(Altheide,	1987,	1996)	to	conduct	 the	research	because	ECA	can	help	delineate	
patterns	of	human	action.		
Altheide	 (1987)	 argued	 ECA	 could	 be	 used	 to	 document	 and	 understand	 the	
communication	of	meaning,	as	well	as	to	verify	theoretical	relationships.		
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ECA	 follows	 a	 recursive	 and	 reflexive	 movement	 between	 concept	
development‐sampling‐data,	collection‐data,	coding‐data,	and	analysis	
interpretation.	The	aim	is	to	be	systematic	and	analytic	but	not	rigid.	
Categories	 and	 variables	 initially	 guide	 the	 study,	 but	 others	 are	
allowed	 and	 expected	 to	 emerge	 during	 the	 study,	 including	 an	
orientation	to	constant	discovery	and	constant	comparison	of	relevant	
situations,	 settings,	 styles,	 images,	meanings,	 and	 nuances	 (Altheide,	
1996:16).			
Concept	 development,	 sampling,	 data	 collection,	 coding,	 data	 analysis,	 and	
interpretation	are	 reflexive	within	ECA.	Even	 though	ECA	employs	 some	 initial	
categorisation,	 there	 is	greater	potential	 for	refinement	of	those	categories	and	
the	generation	of	new	ones	(Altheide,	1987).	Therefore	the	nature	of	ECA	allows	
researcher	 to	 employ	 both	 inductive	 and	 deductive	 method	 when	
conceptualising	 the	 data.	 Nevertheless	 though	 ECA	 focuses	 on	 actors’	
understanding	 of	 their	 context	 and	 motives,	 it	 can	 be	 complemented	 by	 a	
consideration	of	how	structures	are	thus	evidenced	or	constructed.		
In	this	research,	the	developing	of	the	analysis	protocol	follows	the	step	of	
Altheide	(1996):	
 Generate	a	research	question;	
 Become	familiar	with	the	context	within	which	the	documents	were/	
are	generated;	
 Become	familiar	with	a	small	number	of	documents;	
 Generate	 some	categories	 that	will	 guide	 the	 collection	of	data	 and	
draft	 a	 schedule	 for	 collecting	 the	 data	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 generated	
categories;	
 Test	 the	 schedule	 by	 using	 it	 for	 collecting	 data	 from	 a	 number	 of	
documents;	
 Revise	the	schedule	and	select	further	cases	to	sharpen	it	up.	
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4.5.2	The	Selection	of	the	Three	Case	Studies	of	Critical	Events/Processes	
In	order	 to	address	 the	 issues	surrounding	 the	governance	of	basketball,	 three	
critical	 events	 have	 been	 selected	 for	 investigation	 as	 case	 studies.	 Cases	 are	
units	 of	 analysis.	 What	 constitutes	 a	 case,	 or	 unit	 of	 analysis,	 is	 usually	
determined	 during	 the	 design	 stage	 and	 becomes	 the	 basis	 for	 purposeful	
sampling	in	qualitative	inquiry	(Patton,	1987:	447).	
The	 case	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	CBA	presents	 some	 interesting	 research	 issues.	
Who	use	what	tactics	to	promote	whose	interests	in	setting	up	the	league?	What	
these	 parties	 opposed?	 	 By	 whom?	 In	 what	 way?	 Why	 were	 such	 opposing	
parties	unsuccessful?	The	focus	here	is	on	understanding	a	critical	event	and	the	
factors,	outcomes	and	actors	which	brought	this	about.	
The	second	case	refers	more	to	an	on‐going	process	rather	than	an	event	per	se,	
in	 that	 it	 deals	 with	 the	 establishing	 of	 the	 SBL.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	 on‐going	
processes	in	the	development	of	the	league.	
The	third	case	focuses	less	on	processes	and	more	on	the	strategic	context,	and	
its	 impact	 on,	 or	 consequences	 for	 professional	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan.	 This	
context	 in	 effect	 reflects	 not	 to	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 but	 to	 the	 international	
context	within	which	it	takes	place.	
These	 three	 cases	 studies	 intend	 to	 deal	 with	 policy	 making	 for	 sport	 and	 its	
consequences	 for	 the	 development	 of	 elite	 basketball.	 The	 evidence	 of	 three	
cases	 illustrates	 features	 of	 elite	 basketball	 and	 power‐relations	 among	 the	
stakeholders	 in	 the	 basketball	 system,	 and	 in	 the	 wider	 social,	 economic	 and	
political	context.	
	
4.6	Data	Collection	
The	approach	 to	data	 collection	 is	 informed	by	a	 critical	 realist	position	which	
suggests	 that	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 be	 able	 to	 explain	 social	 phenomena	 we	 need	 to	
engage	with,	but	 to	go	beyond	the	 ‘empirical’	 level	 in	Baskhar’s	 terms.	Baskhar	
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suggests	that	although	actors	may	not	recognise	or	acknowledge	the	existence	of	
certain	underlying	causal	 structures	 (at	 the	 level	of	 the	 ‘real’)	nevertheless	 the	
existence	of	 such	structures	and	 their	 causal	 implications	can	be	 inferred	 from	
the	 researcher’s	 observations	 of	 individual	 interviews	 and	 their	 patterns	 of	
explanation/	behaviour	(Archer	et	al,	1998).	Having	recognised	or	hypothesised	
the	 existence	of	 such	 structures	 claims	 for	 their	 existence	 can	be	 evaluated	by	
asking	the	question	of	such	causal	structures	were	to	exist	at	the	level	of	the	real,	
what	would	we	subsequently	expect	to	see	at	the	empirical	 level	in	subsequent	
events?	This	is	in	essence	what	Baskhar	terms	a	retroductive	approach.		
Thus	 in	 our	 case	 study	 approaches	 we	 seek	 to	 employ	 semi‐structured	
interviews	 to	 generate	 data	 at	 the	 empirical	 level	 which	 can	 be	 evaluated	 for	
evidence	of	the	existence	and	impact	of	structural	causes	of	social	outcomes.	The	
interplay	 of	 structures	 and	 agency	 provides	 us	 with	 the	 resources	 for	
explanation	of	outcomes.	In	this	type	of	interview	the	following	are	anticipated:	
 The	interviewer	has	an	interview	guide	consisting	of	a	list	of	open‐ended	
questions	or	fairly	specific	issues	that	are	to	be	explored	(Bryman,	2008).		
 Questions	may	not	be	asked	following	the	sequence,	depending	rather	on	
the	natural	flow	of	conversation	(Gibson	&	Brown,	2009).		
 A	semi‐structured	interview	involves	a	less	formal	conversation	between	
the	 interviewer	 and	 interviewee(s).	 Thus,	 it	 enables	 the	 interviewer	 to	
probe	 beyond	 the	 answers	 for	 more	 information	 and	 allows	 the	
interviewee(s)	 to	 talk	 freely	 on	 a	 given	 issue	 and	 to	 provide	 their	 own	
experiences,	evaluations	and	interpretations	of	events	(Gibson	&	Brown,	
2009;	May,	2001).	
Empirical	work	involved	interviews	with	stakeholders	within	basketball	system	
from	three	sectors,	namely,	the	state	sector,	the	market	sector,	and	the	voluntary	
sector	in	Taiwan.		
According	to	Freeman	(1984),	stakeholders	are	any	group	or	individual	who	can	
affect	 or	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 achievement	 of	 (or	 the	 failure	 to	 achieve)	 the	
organization’s	objectives.	However,	with	different	orientations	of	organisational	
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research,	there	are	different	perspectives	on	the	definition	of	the	stakeholder,	for	
example,	the	distinction	between	internal	stakeholder	and	external	stakeholder,	
the	 distinction	 between	 institutional	 stakeholders	 those	 who	 are	 involved	 in	
legal	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 regulation,	 inter‐organisational	 entities	 or	 professional	
organisations	 that	 may	 be	 specific	 to	 a	 given	 industry	 (Donaldson	 &	 Preston,	
1995).	In	this	study,	we	use	the	term	‘key	stakeholder’	derived	from	concepts	of	
Donaldson	 and	 Preston	 (1995),	 and	 Carroll	 and	 Buchholtz	 (2005).	 Donaldson	
and	 Preston	 (1995)	 argue	 that	 stakeholders	 are	 defined	 by	 their	 legitimate	
interests	in	an	organisation,	and	Carroll	and	Buchholtz	(2005)	refer	to	‘primary	
stakeholders’	 as	 those	 actors	 who	 entertain	 a	 direct	 and	 contractually	
determined	relationship	with	a	given	entity.		
In	 this	 sense,	 we	 attempt	 to	 identify	 key	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 three	 cases.	 We	
sought	to	identify	those	who	were	the	most	influential,	and	those	who	were	the	
most	influenced,	people	or	groups	in	the	governance	of	the	basketball	system	in	
Taiwan.	 This	 process	 of	 identification	 took	 place	 in	 large	 part	 before	 the	
commencement	of	interviews	but	also	further	interviewees	were	identified	from	
the	 literature	 relating	 to	 the	historical	 context	and	policy	documents,	 and	by	a	
form	 of	 ‘snowball	 sampling’	 in	 drawing	 on	 interviewees’	 accounts	 of	 who	 key	
stakeholders	were.				
In	this	interview,	the	interviewees	will	tell	us	what	they	think	really	happened	or	
what	 that	 think	 is	 really	 in	 the	basketball	 context.	 In	 terms	of	 the	 aims	of	 this	
interview	we	try	to	obtain	the	interviewees'	perception	of	the	role	of	the	state/	
the	 market/	 the	 voluntary,	 identification	 of	 role	 of	 local,	 national	 and	
international	stakeholders.	Then	we	try	to	understand	their	level	of	influence	in	
particular	cases	as	well	as	the	social,	political,	economic	and	cultural	structures	
impacting	on	actors	and	options,	which	are	open	to	them	in	strategic	action.			
The	structure	of	the	interview	was	organised	into	seven	themes	with	interview	
questions	subsequently	to	be	developed	based	on	these	themes.	
1. The	interviewees'	perception	of	the	role	of	the	state	should	play	in	sport.	
a. Why	should	the	state	support	sport?	
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b. What	role	should	the	state	play	in	elite	sport?	What	role	should	the	
state	play	in	the	professional	sport?	
c. Has	the	state’s	role	changed	over	time?	
	
2. The	 interviewees'	perception	of	 the	difference	between	political	parties’	
goals	in	sports	policy.	
	
a. Are	 there	 any	 differences	 in	 sport	 policy	 between	 the	 principal	
political	parties?	
b. Is	 there	 any	 difference	 between	 the	 three	 periods	 of	 transfer	 of	
power	(from	KMT	to	DPP,	From	DPP	to	KMT	etc.)	in	sports	policy	
generally,	 and	 towards	 professional	 sport	 and	 basketball	 in	
particular?	
	
3. Which	groups/stakeholders	does	the	interviewee	come	into	contact	with,	
and	how	do	they	try	to	influence	sport	policy?	
	
a. Which	 are	 the	 kinds	 of	 groups/	 individuals,	 which	 are	 the	 most	
influential	 in	 relation	 to	 sport	 policy	 generally?	 What	 tactics	 do	
they	use	to	exert	influence?		
b. Are	there	any	groups	whose	interests	tend	to	be	ignored/	to	have	
had	little	influence?	
	
4. Which	groups/Stakeholders	the	interviewee	comes	into	counter	with,	and	
how	they	try	to	influence	basketball	policy?	
	
a. Who	are	the	most	influential	groups/	individuals	in	relation	to	the	
elite	basketball	system?	
b. What	 significant	 policy	 issues	 have	 emerged	 in	 relation	 to	
basketball	and	how	are	these	issues	resolved?	
c. How	 do	 these	 groups	 seek	 to	 extend	 influence?	 Are	 they	
successful?	
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d. Are	there	any	groups	whose	interests	tend	to	be	ignored/	to	have	a	
little	influence?	
	
5. Nature	of	 interaction	with/between	stakeholders,	 specifically	 in	relation	
to	player	contracts	and	wages.	
	
a. Who	was	responsible	for	setting	up	the	player	recruitment	and	the	
education	system?	
b. How	decisions	are	made	about	 the	player’s	 contract	 in	particular	
the	wages?	
c. Is	there	any	regulation	of	the	contract	between	teams	and	player?		
d. How	was	the	policy	decision	of	how	to	share	media	income	arrived	
at?	
	
6. Communications	between	stakeholders	
	
a. How	 do	 you	 get	 to	 know	 about	 the	 needs	 and	 attitudes	 of	 the	
stakeholders	 such	 as	 team	 owners,	 players,	 and	 fans	 etc.	 in	 the	
elite	sports	system?	
b. Are	 you	 ever	 contacted	 by	 players,	 fans,	 team	 owners	 other	
government	 departments	 or	 governing	 bodies	 etc.	 requesting	
support	or	action?	
c. What	actions?	How	did	you	respond?	
d. How	were	you	contacted?	
e. Have	 you	 ever	 contacted	 other	 stakeholders	 to	 request	 action?	
How?	What	happened?	
	
7. 	What	is	the	industrial	structure	of	basketball?	
	
a. Is	there	one,	or	a	small	number	of,	dominant	company/	companies	
or	 entities	 in	 elite	 basketball	 or	 is	 there	 a	 wide	 proliferation	 of	
competing	bodies?		
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b. How	has	the	structure	of	the	industry	changed	in	elite	basketball?	
(The	collapse	of	the	CBA	and	the	emerge	of	the	SBL)	
c. What	 impact	 has	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 in	 1998	 had	 for	 elite	
sports	(basketball)	business?	
d. With	regard	to	the	policy	decision	relating	to	the	emergence	of	the	
SBL:	who	proposed	this?	How	was	it	promoted?	
e. What	 impact	 has	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 SBL	 in	 2002	 had	 for	 the	
elite	sports	(basketball)	business?	
f. Does	the	state	provide	any	financial	support	or	support	in	kind	for	
elite	basketball	business?	
g. Does	 the	 state	 have	 a	 role	 to	 play	 in	 determining	 or	 influencing	
whether	players	can	play	in	China?	Why?		
h. What	 impact	 has	 the	 signing	 of	 ECFA	 (Economic	 Cooperation	
Framework	Agreement	with	China)	in	2010	had	for	the	elite	sports	
(basketball)	business?	
The	secondary	data	and	documents	of	the	study	are	considered	to	be	documents	
that	 reflect	 the	position	of	 an	actor	or	 actors	 and	must	 therefore	be	 subject	 to	
analysis.	 Secondary	 data,	 for	 example,	 government	 archives,	 documents	 of	
parliamentary	debates,	policy	documents,	newspaper	articles	and	so	on,	which	
were	 mainly	 concerned	 with	 policy	 structures	 were	 collected	 in	 the	 research	
since	 “documentary	 and	 archival	 sources	 offer	 great	 opportunities	 for	 political	
scientists	 to	 develop	 novel	 accounts	 and	 interpretations	 of	 significant	 events”	
(Burnham	et	al,	2004:	184).		
Combined	 with	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 and	 documentary	 analysis,	 the	
aspects	 of	 the	 structural	 context	 of	 basketball	 development	 in	 Taiwan	 are	
mapped	out	and	subsequently	analysed	with	the	data	from	various	stakeholder	
interviews.		
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4.6.1	Interviewee	Selection	
Empirical	 work	 involved	 interviews	with	 stakeholders	within	 the	 professional	
basketball	 system	 from	 three	 sectors,	 namely,	 the	 public	 sector,	 the	 private	
sector,	 and	 the	 volunteer	 sector	 in	 Taiwan.	 Basically,	 the	 interviewees	 were	
selected	on	their	ability	to	shed	light	on	specific	aspects	of	the	strategic	contexts	
(systemic	 governance)	of	professional	basketball	with	 specific	 reference	 to	 the	
three	case	study	events.	Within	the	public	sector,	5	 interviews	were	conducted	
with	the	government	officials,	the	Ministers	of	Sport,	Directors	of	Department	of	
Physical	 Education,	 who	 had	 responsibility	 for	 promoting	 sports	 policy	 in	
Taiwan.	 3	 politicians	who	were	member	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Yuan	 from	 the	DPP	
and	 KMT	 were	 selected.	 Within	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 13	 interviews	 were	
conducted	with	interviewees	who	represented	the	leagues,	clubs,	players	and	the	
media.	 Within	 the	 volunteer	 sector,	 4	 people	 were	 interviewed	 who	 were	
representatives	from	the	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	(CTBA),	Chinese	
Taipei	 University	 Sports	 Federation	 (CTUSF),	 and	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Taiwan	
Sport	University,	 the	educational	 institution	from	which	most	players	recruited	
to	 the	 professional	 basketball	 leagues	 originated.	 Interviews	 with	 volunteer	
bodies	aimed	to	provide	information	related	to	the	stakeholders’	perception	and	
response,	which	aided	 in	 informing	 the	 roles,	 the	public	 sector	and	 the	private	
sector	played.	Preliminary	interviews	were	conducted	contemporaneously	with	
some	actors	in	the	three	sectors	and	thus	presented	the	opportunity	to	evaluate	
the	adequacy	of	the	interview	schedule	as	well	as	to	elicit	credible	information	in	
later	interviews.	
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Table	4.2:	Time	Table	for	the	Interviews	of	the	Research	
Category	 Interviewees	 Date Place	 Code
Government	 Minister	of	the	Sports	Affairs	Council	(2002‐2004)	 13.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 G1	
Media	 Senior	Journalist	/	Media	expert	 16.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 M1	
Club	 Manager	of	the	Dacin	Tigers	 20.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 C1	
Coach	 Coach	of	Taiwan	Bank	Basketball	Club	 22.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 P1	
Politician	 Legislator	of	the	KMT		 22.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 L1	
Club	 Manager	of	Taiwan	Beer	Basketball	Club	 26.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 C2	
Coach	/	Player	
Coach	of	the	Taiwan	beer	basketball	team	
Former	player	of	Sina	basketball	club	
(1999~2002)	
Former	player	of	Hung	Kuo	(CBA,	1993~1998)		
29.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 P2	
Federation	 Zhao,	Coordinator	of	information	affairs	of	the	CTBA	 30.Dec.2010	 Taipei	 F1	
Academic	 President	of	National	Taiwan	Sport	University	 4.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 A1	
Sponsor	 Manager	of	Nike	(2001~2004)	 4.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 S1	
Media	 Manager	of	Videolands	sport	Channel	 6.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 M2	
Politician	 Legislator	of	the	DPP	 11.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 L2	
Federation	 Vice‐Chairman	of	CTBA	 12.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 F2	
Player	 Player	of	Yulon	basketball	Club	Former	player	of	Tera	Mars	(CBA)	 13.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 P3	
Sponsor	 CEO	of	Athletic	Sport	company	 15.Jan.2011	 Taichung	 S2	
Government	 Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(2008~2010)	 18.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 G2	
Coach	/	Player	Coach	of	the	Yulon	Basketball	Club	Former	player	of	Yulon	basketball	Club	(CBA)	 18.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 P4	
Federation	 Chairman	of	the	CTUSF		 19.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 F3	
Politician	 Legislator	of	the	the	DPP	 26.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 L3	
Government	
Head	of	Department	of	Sports	for	all,	Competitive	
Athletics	(1990~2002),	Deputy	Minister	of	the	
NCPFS	(2008~2010)	
27.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 G3	
Government	 Deputy	Minister	of	the	NCPFS	(2000~2002)	 28.Jan.2011	 Taipei	 G4	
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Media	 Kang,	Manager	of	ESPN	Taiwan	 11.Feb.2011	 Taipei	 M3	
Club	 Marketing	Coordinator	of	Dacin	Tigers	 14.Feb.2011	 Kaohsiung	 C3	
Player	
Player	of	Taiwan	beer	basketball	Club
Played	in	China	(CBA)	
Former	player	of	the	Luckipar	(CBA,	
1993~1998)	
21.Feb.2011	 Taipei	 P5	
Government	 Minister	of	the	SAC	(2002~2004)	 25.Feb.2011	 Taipei	 G5	
	
	
4.6.2	Document	Selection	
According	 to	 Altheide	 (1996:	 2),	 “a	 document	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 any	 symbolic	
representation	that	can	be	recorded	or	retrieved	for	analysis”.	In	terms	of	sport	
policy	development	in	Taiwan,	there	were	two	key	government	institutions,	the	
Department	 of	 Physical	 Education	 (DPE)	 in	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education,	 and	 the	
SAC,	 which	 provided	 relevant	 data	 for	 the	 research.	 The	 following	 list	 of	
documents	 represents	 the	 relevant	 policy	 documents	 identified	 as	 relating	 to	
sports	policy	in	general	and	basketball	in	particular,	which	were	held	by	the	two	
organisations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 researcher	 visited	 the	 database	 of	 two	
newspapers	in	Taiwan	to	search	all	relevant	report	related	to	the	research.	Two	
main	newspapers	were	 selected	 to	 reflect	different	policy	orientations,	namely	
China	 times	 (KMT	 ‐	 orientation)	 and	 Liberty	 times	 (DPP	 ‐	 orientation).	 All	
documents	used	were	coded,	and	the	codes	and	coded	elements	were	translated	
by	 the	 researcher	 with	 the	 coding	 undertaken	 in	 the	 Nvivo	 database	 of	 this	
study.	
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Table	4.3:	The	Key	Sources	of	Government	Documents	Reviewed		
Year	 Publisher	 Documents
1970	 Ministry	of	Education	 The	5th National	Education	Conference	Report	
1971	 Ministry	of	Education	 Education	Law
1974	 DPE	 The	Principle	of	International	Sports	Events	Subsidy	Application
Five	Year	Physical	Education	Development	Programmes,	1973‐
1978	
	
1975	 Ministry	of	Education	 Ministry	of	Education	Bulletin
1979	 Ministry	of	Education	 The	Active	Implementation	of	Sport	for	All	Scheme	
1984	 DPE	 Physical	Education	Regulation
1986	 DPE	 Active	Sport	for	All	Plan
1989	 Ministry	of	Education	 Ministry	of	Education	Bulletin
1989	 DPE	 National	Sport	Four‐Year	Programme
1994	 Ministry	of	Education	 The	7th National	Education	Conference	Report	
1998	 SAC	 National	Physical	Education	Law
1998	 SAC	 Four‐Wheel	Drive	Plan
1999	 SAC	 White	Paper:	Sport	in	Taiwan
2000	 SAC	 The	Active	Scheme	of	Sport	Development	in	the	21st	Century	
2002	 SAC	 Statistics	of	Sport	in	Taiwan
2003	 SAC	 Guidelines	of	Cross‐Strait	Sport	Relations
2004	 SAC	 The	2003	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	Major	Administration	Plan
2004	 SAC	 Challenge	2008:	The	Talent	Cultivating	Programme	in	the	
‘Electronic’	Era	in	Taiwan	
	
2004	 SAC	 Challenge	2008:	The	Talent	Cultivating	Programme	in	the	
‘Electronic’	Era	and	the	Promotion	of	International	Sport	
Interaction	Programme	in	Taiwan	
	
2005	 SAC	 The	2006	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	
	
2006	
	
2007	
	
2008	
	
2009	
SAC	
	
SAC	
	
SAC	
	
SAC	
The	2007	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	
	
The	2008	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	
	
The	2009	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	
	
The	2010	Annual	Report	of	the	SAC	
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4.7	Analysing	the	Data	
The	initial	stage	of	data	analysis	involved	protocol	development	and	data	coding.	
Following	 Altheid	 (1996)	 five	 steps	were	 followed	 as	 a	 process:	 (a)	 document	
selection,	 (b)	 protocol	 development	 and	 data	 collection,	 (c)	 data	 coding	 and	
organising,	(d)	data	analysis,	and	(e)	reporting	findings.			
Patton	 (Patton,	 1990:	 347)	 mentions	 that	 “data	 interpretation	 and	 analysis	
involve	making	sense	out	of	what	people	have	said,	looking	for	patterns,	putting	
together	 what	 is	 said	 in	 one	 place	 with	 what	 is	 said	 in	 another	 place,	 and	
integrating	what	different	people	 said”.	Therefore,	 the	process	of	data	 analysis	
starts	with	coding	and	categorising.	“A	code	in	qualitative	inquiry	is	most	often	a	
word	 or	 short	 phrase	 that	 symbolically	 assigns	 a	 summative,	 salient,	 essence‐
capturing	 and/or	 evocative	 attribute	 for	 a	 portion	 of	 language‐based	 or	 visual	
data”	 (Saldaña,	 2009:	 3).	 This	 research	 employs	 the	 Nvivo	 9	 qualitative	 data	
analysis	 software,	 which	 allowed	 us	 to	 develop	 a	 protocol	 for	 recording	 both,	
predetermined	 deductive,	 research	 imposed	 categories,	 and	 inductively	
determined,	categories	or	codes	arising	from	respondents’	comment	within	the	
notion	of	ECA	(Altheide,	1996).		
After	transcription	and	transfer	of	the	interview	data	to	the	Nvivo	database,	open	
coding	 was	 conducted.	 Both	 deductively	 using	 codes	 based	 on	 anticipated	
relevant	 material,	 and	 inductively.	 Initially	 235	 codes	 (free	 nodes)	 were	
identified.	These	 inductive	 and	deductive	 codes	 allowed	 the	 selection	 of	 direct	
quotations	 from	 the	 transcripts	 to	 identify	 themes	 and	 gain	 insight	 into	 key	
stakeholders’	 perspectives.	 Tables	 4.5,	 4.6,	 and	 4.7	 below	 provide	 the	
predetermined	and	emergent	themes	of	the	first	level	of	data	analysis.	
Table	4.4	the	emergent	themes	of	the	first	level	of	data	analysis	–	Case	1	
Tree	Node	 	 Reference	
emergence	of	the	CBA	 	 2	
Impacts	of	CBA	
collapse	
	 3	
Reasons	for	Collapse	of	 	 	
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CBA	
	 Asian	Financial	Crisis	 11	
	 Management	Failure	 9	
	 CBA	is	a	shell	corporation	 1	
	 Expend	too	much	 2	
	 Conflicts	between	Individual	
interests	
7	
	 No	enough	ticket	revenue	 3	
	 No	marketing	investigation	 2	
	 No	professional	CEO	 4	
	 Personnel	costs	is	too	high	 1	
	 Political	parties’	attitude	 1	
	 CBA	player's	salary	is	too	high	 3	
	 No	regulation	for	player's	wage	 2	
	 Dispute	of	broadcasting	fee	 5	
Government’s	support	
for	the	CBA	
	 	
	 Government	can	provide	facilities	 3	
	 Government	can't	support	CBA	
directly	
7	
	 No	Tax	reduction	from	the	
government	
1	
	 Supported	CBA	because	of	Sports	
for	All	
3	
	
Table	4.5	the	emergent	themes	of	the	first	level	of	data	analysis	–	Case	2	
Tree	Node	 	 Reference	
The	emergence	of	the	
SBL	
	 	
	 Why	set	up	the	SBL	 14	
	 Lin	created	the	SBL	 11	
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Role	of	key	
stakeholders	
	 	
	 Clubs’	role	 34	
	 CTBA	chairman's	role	 17	
	 CTBA's	role	 46	
	 government’s	role	 27	
	 KMT	and	DPP	preference	 8	
	 media's	role	 25	
	 players’	role	 23	
	 sponsor's	role	 10	
The	operation	of	the	
SBL	
	 	
	 broadcasting	rights	 32	
	 financial	facts	 41	
	 government	and	CTBA	didn't	
provide	facilities	
1	
	 HBL	is	better	than	SBL	 5	
	 Dispute	of		individual's	interests		 9	
	 marketing	for	the	league	 20	
	 no	planning	for	the	league	 7	
	 players	transfer	to	China	 1	
	 players'	wages	issue	 47	
	 policy	making	process	 10	
	 professionalise	 24	
	 problematic	CTBA	 19	
	 relationship	of	CTBA	and	Clubs	 14	
	 resources	 14	
	 owners	had	ultimate	power	over	
the	clubs	and	players	
2	
Social	context	 	 	
	 Taiwanese	social	culture	 4	
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	 Taiwanese	sports	market	 2	
	
Table	4.6	the	emergent	themes	of	the	first	level	of	data	analysis	–	Case	3	
Tree	Node	 	 Reference	
Reasons	to	go	to	China	 	 	
	 Market	scale	 10	
	 SBL's	poor	operation	 4	
	 Players’	wages	 7	
Concerns	to	go	to	China	 	 	
	 Finance	 4	
	 Skill	level	 9	
Government's	role	 	 30	
Difference	 between	
KMT	and	DPP	
	 8	
Cultural	factor	 	 4	
CTBA's	role	 	 20	
CTBA's	attitude	 	 22	
Commercial	aspect	 	 10	
Club's	attitude	 	 33	
China's	attitude	 	 14	
24	players'	list	 	 7	
Name	issue	 	 23	
	
From	the	pre‐selected	and	emergent	themes	of	the	first	level	of	data	analysis,	a	
process	 of	 analysis,	 “thematic	 coding”,	 was	 conducted	 that	 specified	 possible	
relationships	between	free	nodes	and	tree	nodes.	Here	a	framework	was	built	for	
each	case,	which	contained	all	codes	from	the	interviewee	data.	For	example,	the	
collapse	of	the	CBA	can	be	represented	in	the	following	manner:	
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Figure	4.2:	A	representation	of	the	coding	of	the	 first	case,	the	collapse	of	the	CBA,	 from	
the	interviewee	data	
	
However,	 in	 this	 research,	 we	 sought	 to	 have	 the	 “stories”	 of	 different	
stakeholders.	 For	 each	 of	 the	 three	 cases	 reviewed,	 codes	 pertaining	 to	 the	
interviews	undertaken	were	grouped	together	by	stakeholder	 in	order	that	the	
differences	and	similarities	between	such	groups	could	be	identified.		
As	the	analysis	of	 interview	data	was	based	upon	both	inductive	and	deductive	
processes	(Blaikie,	2000),	we	 identify	some	critical	 issues	such	as	broadcasting	
rights	and	the	relationship	between	stakeholders	inductively,	and	also	generate	
governance	 explanations	 deductively	 for	 each	 stakeholder	 group.	 For	 example	
the	map	of	code	for	the	case	of	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	is	reflected	in	Figures	4.3‐
4.7	for	five	sets	of	stakeholders.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
109	
	
Figure	4.3:	the	framework	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	by	the	government	officials	
	
	
Figure	4.4:	the	framework	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	by	the	CTBA	employees	
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Figure	4.5:	the	framework	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	by	the	media	account	
	
	
	
	
Figure	4.6:	the	framework	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	by	the	players	and	coaches	
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Figure	4.7:	the	framework	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	by	the	sponsors	
	
	
4.8	Validity	and	Reliability	
Validity	 refers	 to	 the	 truth	 value	 of	 findings	 which	 relates	 in	 quantitative	
research	 to	 “the	 issue	 of	 whether	 and	 indicator	 (or	 set	 of	 indicators)	 that	 is	
devised	to	gauge	a	concept	really	measure	the	concept”	(Bryman,	2001:	151).	In	
qualitative	research,	researchers	use	different	terms	to	represent	this	criterion,	
such	 as	 warrantability	 (Wood	 &	 Kroger,	 2000),	 credibility	 (Charmaz,	 2006;	
Lincoln	&	Guba,	1985),	or	authenticity	(Guba	&	Lincoln,	2008)	reflecting	ways	in	
which	we	develop	trustworthiness	for	our	qualitative	interpretation	of	the	data,	
and	the	reasonableness	of	the	conclusions	we	draw.	There	are	different	to	signify	
the	 truth:	 (1)	 prolonged	 engagement	 and	 persistent	 observation	 with	
participants	and	within	the	field;	(2)	using	triangulation	in	terms	of	data	sources,	
methods,	 investigators	 and	 theories;	 and	 (3)	 member	 checking	 in	 order	 to	
reaffirm	 or	 refine	 a	 participant’s	 view	 (Lincoln	 &	 Guba,	 1985).	 Furthermore,	
coherence	 of	 the	 analysis	must	 be	 achieved	 by	 ensuring	 that	 all	 arguments	 fit	
together	(Wood	&	Kroger,	2000).	Thus	since	we	are	dealing	with	qualitative	case	
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study	 approach,	 transcripts	 of	 data	 from	 interviews	 and	 documents	 including	
quotation	material	are	made	available	for	readers	if	required.		
Reliability	refers	to	the	consistency	of	a	measure	of	a	concept	and	with	ensuring	
that	 similar	 findings	 would	 be	 obtained	 if	 the	 research	 was	 conducted	 by	
someone	else	(Bryman,	2008;	Plummer,	2001).	 In	 this	 thesis,	 the	perception	of	
the	stakeholders	in	the	specific	groups	was	reviewed	in	order	to	develop	insights	
into	 principal	 interests	 and	 forces	 in	 the	 governance	 system.	 25	 interviewees	
were	 drawn	 from	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council,	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	
Association,	 legislators,	 clubs,	 coaches,	players,	media,	 and	 sponsors.	 Interview	
transcripts	and	government	reports/proceedings	of	parliamentary	debates	were	
subject	 to	 coding	 employing	 Nvivo	 9	 qualitative	 data	 analysis	 software,	 and	
coding	 and	 analysis	 were	 undertaken	 employing	 an	 ethnographic	 content	
analysis	 approach	 using	 both	 inductive	 and	 deductive	 approaches	 where	
explanations	both	emerged	from	the	data	and	were	predefined	in	the	nature	of	
the	interview	schedule.	In	order	to	maintain	the	reliability	for	this	research,	we	
translated	three	interview	transcriptions	from	Chinese	to	English	entirely.	I	and	
my	supervisor	read	them	independently	in	the	initial	stage	of	coding	process	to	
ensure	first	that	the	identifying	of	themes	for	coding	was	sensible,	and	second	to	
ensure	that	the	codes	once	identified	were	applied	consistently	in	the	analysis	of	
the	data.		
We	 then	 went	 through	 the	 process	 of	 analysing	 the	 data	 to	 build	 the	 coding	
frameworks.	 The	 frameworks	 we	 generated	 from	 the	 ethnographic	 content	
analysis	were	adopted	 in	order	 to	structure	 for	 the	 following	 three	chapters	of	
case	studies.		
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4.9	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	considered	how	the	key	 issues	 in	 terms	of	methodology	were	
addressed	in	this	research.	The	research	adopts	a	critical	realist	position	to	link	
ontology,	 epistemology	 and	 methods,	 and	 seeks	 to	 identify	 how	 interviews	
specify	directly	or	reflect	implicitly	their	perceptions	of	and/or	the	existence	of	
real	 underlying	 structures	 which	 shape	 (unable	 or	 constrain)	 particular	
outcomes.	Thus	a	case‐study	approach,	was	based	on	documentary	material	and	
semi‐structured	 interviews	 was	 adopted,	 with	 three	 major	 cases,	 namely,	 the	
collapse	of	the	CBA,	the	development	of	the	SBL	and	the	development	of	sporting	
links	 with	 China,	 were	 selected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 significance	 in	 the	
operational	governance	of	basketball.		The	following	three	chapters	develop	the	
analysis	of	these	cases.	
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Chapter	Five		
The	Critical	Incident:	the	Collapse	of	the	Chinese	
Basketball	Alliance	
	
5.1	Introduction	
This	 chapter	 focuses	on	extracting	useful	 information	 from	 the	 interviews	 that	
were	conducted	throughout	the	period	of	December	2010	to	February	2011.The	
aim	here	is	not	to	tell	‘the’	story	of	the	collapse	of	the	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance	
from	 the	 author’s	 point	 of	 view,	 but	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 ‘stories’	 from	 the	
standpoint	of	each	of	the	stakeholders.		
The	Chinese	Basketball	Alliance	 (CBA)	was	officially	 suspended	after	 the	game	
between	LUCKIpar	 and	Hung‐Kuo	Elephants	 on	14th	March,	 1999.	 There	 have	
been	various	explanations	of	the	suspension	of	the	CBA.	Reasons	include	impact	
of	the	1997	Asian	financial	crisis,	dispute	over	TV	rights	fee,	poor	marketing,	lack	
of	 long‐term	planning,	 franchise	owners’	 attitude,	 insufficient	 skill	 level	 on	 the	
part	of	domestic	players,	and	poor	facilities,	all	of	which	had	contributed	to	the	
collapse	of	the	CBA	(Ho	&	Chan,	2002;	Lee,	2000;	Wen,	2010).		
Although	seven	 interviewees	mentioned	the	dispute	over	TV	broadcasting	 fees,	
clearly	this	problem	did	not	arrive	overnight.	Other	problems	had	emerged	and	
existed	 in	 the	 professional	 basketball	 league	 since	 its	 very	 first	 season.	 In	 this	
section	 the	 perspectives	 of	 specific	 groups	 of	 stakeholders	 are	 reviewed	 in	 an	
attempt	to	build	a	multi‐faceted	account	of	the	events	and	developments	that	led	
to	the	collapse	of	the	CBA.		
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Table	5.1:	Key	events	in	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	
Date	 Events	
14/08/1993	 The	CBA	announced	it	establishment	
17/09/1993	 The	CBA	set	up	 its	preparatory	office	and	 the	 league	 included	 four	 clubs	–	Hung‐Kuo,	Yulon,	Tera,	and	Lucky	
28/03/1994	 The	CBA	company	was	officially	registered	in	the	Ministry	of	Economy	
06/11/1994	 The	CBA	held	its	opening	ceremony	for	the	inaugural	season	
12/11/1994	 The	first	game	of	the	CBA:	Hung‐Kuo	played	against	Yulon.	
28/04/1995	 The	champions	of	the	first	season	of	the	CBA:	Yulon	
18/07/1995	 Dacin	and	Hung‐Fu	joined	the	CBA	
14/11/1995	 The	opening	game	of	the	second	season	
21/05/1996	 Play‐offs	of	the	second	season	began,	and	the	champion	of	the	second	season	was	Hung‐Kuo	
07/12/1996	 The	third	season	began	and	the	CBA	began	to	fully	adopt	a	home‐away	game	system.	
02/01/1997	 Released	the	promotion	“watch	two	games	by	only	one	ticket”		
12/08/1997	 The	champion	of	the	third	season:	Hung‐Kuo	
01/01/1998	 The	opening	of	the	fourth	season	
0818/1998	 The	champion	of	the	fourth	season:	Hung‐Kuo	
31/12/1998	 The	opening	of	the	fifth	season.	ETTV	refused	to	pay	the	broadcasting	fee.	
21/01/1999	 The	CBA	Company	announced	a	ban	on	the	ETTV’s	broadcasting	on	21st	Jan,	1999	
14/03/1999	 the	CBA	was	officially	suspended	per	executive	board’s	decision	
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25/03/1999	 Vice	President	Lien	hosted	a	meeting	with	the	chairman	of	the	CBA	and	the	club	representatives	to	discuss	the	re‐opening	of	the	league	
01/01/2000	 The	 opening	 of	 the	 CBA	 Millennium	 Memorial	 Tournament	 which	 was	 a	warm‐up	tournament	for	the	re‐opening	of	the	CBA	
07/11/2000	 Hung‐Kuo	announced	its	dissolution	
23/11/2000	 Chen,	the	man	in	charge	of	re‐opening	the	league,	announced	its	failure	
	
	
5.2	The	Perspective	of	the	Media	
An	historic	account	of	the	inception	of	the	CBA	can	be	found	in	Wen	(2010),	who	
states	 that	 in	 1993,	 there	 were	 four	 domestic	 corporations	 which	 had	 jointly	
devised	 plans	 to	 set	 up	 a	 professional	 basketball	 league;	 the	 four	 were	 Yulon	
Motor	 Corporation,	 Tera	 Electronics	 Corporation,	 Hung	 Kuo	 Development	
Corporation	 and	 Lucky	 Cement	 Corporation.	 Each	 of	 the	 clubs	 secured	 125	
million	 TWD	 (2.5	 million	 GBP)	 from	 their	 owners	 to	 establish	 the	 Chinese	
Professional	Basketball	Corporation	(CPBC),	which	runs	 the	Chinese	Basketball	
Alliance	(CBA).	When	the	CBA	began	in	December	1994;	the	league	consisted	of	
four	 champion	 teams	 from	 Taiwan’s	 Amateur	 Division	 A	 Conference:	 Yulon	
Dinos,	 Tera	 Mars,	 Hung	 Kuo	 Elephants	 and	 LUCKIpar.	 Subsequently,	 Hung	 Fu	
Rams	 and	 Dacin	 Tigers	 joined	 the	 CBA	 in	 the	 second	 season	 (1995‐1996),	
expanding	 the	 league	 to	a	 total	of	 six	 clubs.	Because	 the	clubs	collectively	own	
the	CPBC,	which	 runs	 the	CBA,	 the	 league	was	 in	 essence	 owned	by	 the	 clubs.	
Structural	problems	related	to	how	the	 league	was	run	within	the	organisation	
were	 seen	by	 some	 commentators	 as	 a	 factor	 that	 led	 to	 the	CBA’s	 collapse.	A	
senior	 journalist	 (M1)	 claimed	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 CBA	was	 a	 significant	
problem,	which	led	to	poor	management:		
The	shares	of	the	CBA	belonged	to	six	clubs,	thus	the	manager	of	the	
CBA	was	assigned	from	one	of	the	these	six	clubs	for	a	fixed	term	of	up	
to	two	years	before	the	assignment	was	delegated	to	the	next	club.	It	is	
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not	 right	 for	a	 club	 to	 lead	and	 to	operate	 the	 league	 for	one	or	 two	
years	 (Interview	 with	 the	 Media,	 16/12/2010,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
This	 journalist	 argued	 that	 the	 league	 should	 hire	 a	 ‘proper	 manager’	 who	 is	
independent	of	the	clubs,	to	organise	and	to	operate	the	CBA	because	problems	
in	mechanism	of	operation	and	human	resource	arose	when	the	manager	of	the	
CBA	was	assigned	from	the	clubs.			
The	role	of	the	manager	of	the	CBA	was	only	for	show	because	the	club	
owners	 could	 ignore	 what	 he	 had	 decided.	 The	 six	 basketball	 clubs	
should	hire	a	professional	CEO	to	organise	and	to	operate	the	CBA,	to	
give	 a	 formal	 presentation	 to	 the	 shareholders,	 and	 to	 establish	 an	
independent	management	system.	These	mechanisms	should	address	
questions	as	 to	how	 to	do	annual	marketing,	how	 to	evaluate	and	 to	
identify	 the	 potential	markets	 and	 how	 to	 plan	 the	 season	 schedule	
(Interview	with	the	Media,	16/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	manager	of	 the	 league	had	dual	accountability,	 to	 the	 league	clubs	and	the	
wider	 public	 for	 the	 running	 of	 the	 system	 in	 a	 fair	 and	 open	manner,	 and	 to	
his/her	 employer	 of	 the	 organisation	 that	 own	 the	 clubs	 to	 which	 they	 were	
affiliated.		
The	 manager	 of	 Videoland	 Sport	 Channel	 (M2)	 also	 puts	 the	 blame	 on	 the	
owners	who	ran	 the	 league.	He	also	argued	that	 there	were	problems	with	 the	
financial	structure	of	the	league.		
In	the	CBA	era,	resources	for	the	league	to	operate	properly	came	from	
clubs.	 However	 clubs	 could	 not	 burn	 the	 candle	 at	 both	 ends.	 The	
league	 was	 not	 able	 to	 assume	 sole	 responsibility	 for	 its	 profits	 or	
losses.	 The	 only	way	 for	 the	 league	 to	make	money	was	 to	 hold	 the	
games	 (Interview	 with	 the	 Media,	 06/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
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However,	the	audience	attendance	rate	declined	year	after	year	since	the	second	
season	of	the	CBA;	hence	the	income	fell	short	of	the	expense.	M2	argued	that	the	
league	 was	 suspended	 because	 the	 clubs	 owners	 could	 no	 longer	 afford	 its	
operating	costs.		
The	 league	 asked	 for	 financial	 support	 from	 the	 clubs.	 The	 Clubs	
spread	 themselves	 too	 thin.	 They	 not	 only	 supported	 the	 cost	 of	
running	the	teams	but	also	needed	to	pay	for	the	cost	of	running	the	
league,	 which	 was	 the	 financial	 factor	 that	 eventually	 caused	 the	
suspension	(Interview	with	the	Media,	06/01/2011,	translated	by	the	
author).	
In	the	fifth	year,	 the	disputes	over	TV	rights	seemed	to	be	the	 last	straw	in	the	
suspension	of	the	CBA.	Lee	(2000),	for	example,	claims	that	the	TVIS	offered	NT$	
15	million	 alone	 for	 the	 rights	 to	 the	 first	 CBA	 season.	U2	 (the	 predecessor	 of	
ETTV)	beat	TVIS	in	bidding	for	the	second	season	of	TV	rights	by	offering	NT$	45	
million	since	the	average	attendance	of	the	first	season	was	over	2000.	After	the	
CBA	 established	 its	 reputation,	 the	 CBA	 agreed	 to	 a	 new	 three	 year	 NT$	 328	
million	deal	with	ETTV	that	allowed	ETTV	to	retain	sole	TV	rights	from	the	third	
to	the	fifth	season.	The	TV	rights	fee	for	the	fifth	season	was	about	NT$	1	billion,	
which	was	 the	 last	 year	 of	 the	3‐year	 contract.	However	 there	was	a	deadlock	
between	 the	 CBA	 and	 ETTV	 before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 fifth	 season.	 ETTV	
demanded	a	compensation	package	totalling	NT$	46	million,	which	was	used	as	
the	 first	payment	 for	 the	CBA’s	5th	season.	This	amount	was	based	on	 the	 fact	
that	the	CBA	violated	the	original	contract,	which	specified	the	completion	of	180	
games,	when	only	150	had	been	played.	Due	 to	 this	dispute,	 the	CBA	Company	
announced	a	ban	on	ETTV’s	broadcasting	on	21	 January,	1999.	ETTV	therefore	
terminated	TV	broadcasting	of	CBA	after	the	game	between	Luckipar	and	Hung‐
Kuo	on	same	date.	The	CBA	did	not	receive	anything	and	had	to	put	up	with	the	
losses	of	advertising,	and	box	office	revenue	because	there	was	no	broadcasting	
on	 TV	 (Lee,	 2000;	 Lee,	 2002).	 	 Furthermore	 some	 companies	 intended	 to	
suspend	league	play	because	they	could	no	longer	maintain	the	costs	of	running	
the	 clubs.	 Finally	 the	 CBA	was	 suspended	 in	what	 seemed	 to	 be	 an	 uncertain	
	
	
119	
	
situation,	 in	 that	 it	 was	 unclear	 at	 the	 time	 whether	 the	 suspension	 was	
permanent	(in	effect	disbanding	the	league)	or	temporary.	
The	story	suggests	that	the	way	the	league	was	operated	led	to	issues	concerning	
operation	and	TV	contracts,	all	of	which	eventually	brought	about	 the	collapse.	
The	 story	 here	 seems	 to	 imply	 that	 weakness	 of	 one	 element	 (the	 league)	
brought	down	the	other	elements.		
While	 Lee,	 a	 senior	 journalist	 (M1)	 argued	 that	 the	 crisis	 of	 TV	 rights,	 which	
brought	about	the	suspension,	was	allowed	to	happen	by	a	team	with	poor	crisis	
management	 skills	 and	 lack	 of	 experience,	 he	 also	 noted	 that	 there	 was	 a	
suspicious	situation	regarding	the	lawsuit	between	the	CBA	and	ETTV.		
Although	 the	 lawsuit	 did	 not	 last	 for	 a	 long	 time	 because	 CBA	
disbanded	soon	afterwards,	it	is	very	strange	that	the	dispute	over	TV	
rights	fee	ended	up	with	nothing	conclusive	(Interview	with	the	Media,	
16/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
He	argued	that	if	the	contract	process	had	been	clear,	then	the	CBA	should	have	
won	the	lawsuit.		
There	was	a	strange	situation	between	the	CBA	and	the	broadcast	unit,	
ETTV,	 because	 they	 both	 signed	 a	 contract,	 which	 indicated	 ETTV	
must	broadcast	 180	games	per	 year,	 however	 in	 the	4th	 season,	 the	
league	had	played	only	150	games.	ETTV	therefore	demanded	NT$	30	
million	 in	 total	 as	 compensation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 NT$	 1	 million	 per	
game.	The	CBA	argued	that	it	was	impossible	to	accept	this	condition,	
thus	 the	 situation	 went	 into	 a	 deadlock.	 If	 the	 CBA	 had	 survived,	 it	
would	 have	 been	 due	 to	 receive	 the	NT$	 100	million	 back	 from	 the	
ETTV,	 because	 the	 contract	 was	 still	 worth	 128	 million	 (Interview	
with	the	Media,	16/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
Here	the	journalist	places	the	blame	on	the	management	group	because	they	had	
not	run	the	league	properly,	and	he	also	implied	there	was	something	wrong	in	
the	case	of	the	lawsuit.		
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Thus	 the	 media‐based	 interviews	 and	 press	 accounts	 from	 the	 time	 suggest	
management	 failings	 were	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 wider	 structural	 problem,	 and	
these	contributed	to	the	failure	of	the	CBA.	
	
5.3	The	Perspective	of	the	Members	of	CTBA	staff	
Lee	(2000)	mentions	that	the	CBA	committee	assumed	that	the	rapid	expansion	
of	 the	 CBA	 would	 attract	 more	 spectators	 and	 bring	 in	 more	 profits.	 In	 the	
second	 season,	 the	 CBA	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 games.	 In	 addition,	 the	 CBA	
began	to	adopt	a	home‐and‐away	system	from	the	fourth	season.	However,	 the	
Vice	Chairman	of	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	(CTBA)	argued	that	the	
CBA	had	been	in	too	much	of	a	hurry	to	expand,	even	though	the	market	was	not	
big	enough	to	sustain	the	costs	required:	
We	did	 a	 survey	 in	 the	 CBA	 era.	We	needed	 over	 one	 thousand	 and	
two	 hundred	 spectators	 to	 cover	 one	 single	 game’s	 cost.	 However,	
only	 games	 that	 Hung‐Kuo	 played	 could	 reach	 that	 ticket	 revenue	
(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
Indeed,	 the	 ticket	revenue	could	not	cover	 the	costs	of	 the	CBA.	The	owners	of	
clubs	 had	 to	 pay	 fees	 to	 maintain	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 league,	 and	 they	 also	
needed	to	pay	the	wages	of	players.	But	the	critical	point	was	the	league	had	had	
a	 budget	 deficit	 problem	 since	 its	 inception.	 The	 Vice	 Chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA	
states	the	following:	
The	number	of	spectators	was	out	of	proportion	to	the	wage	you	paid	
to	players.	There	was	not	 that	much	earning.	The	players’	wage	kept	
inflating,	but	the	ticket	revenue	was	not	good	enough	to	cover	that.	By	
that	 time,	 there	 probably	 were	 not	 enough	 spectators	 unless	 Yulon	
were	 playing	 against	 Hung‐Kuo	 or	 Hung‐Kuo	 against	 other	 teams.	
Otherwise,	spectator	numbers	in	the	hundreds	were	not	able	to	cover	
the	 basic	 cost	 (Interview	with	 the	 CTBA,	 12/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).	
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Here	 the	 story	 or	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 individual	 as	 to	 blame	 either	 owners	
(giving	 in	 too	easily	 to	wage	or	 failing	 to	 appreciate	 economic	 realities)	or	 the	
players	(being	too	demanding	or	‘greedy’).	
The	fifth	season	started	in	1998,	which	was	a	year	after	the	Asian	financial	crisis	
had	become	a	full‐blown	economic	crisis	affecting	the	entire	Asian‐Pacific	region,	
including	 the	parent	 companies	of	 the	CBA	clubs.	 In	November	1998,	Hanyang	
Group,	 the	 parent	 company	 of	 the	 Mars	 team,	 had	 faced	 financial	 distress	
because	 of	 the	Asian	Financial	 Crisis.	 Then	 the	Hanyang	Group	 tried	 to	 sell	 its	
basketball	club.	The	Vice	Chairman	of	the	CTBA	(F2)	believed	that	impact	of	the	
Asian	 financial	 crisis	 on	 the	 construction	 industry	 in	 Taiwan	 was	 the	 main	
reason	behind	CBA’s	collapse.		
Many	parent	 companies	of	 the	CBA	clubs	were	deeply	 involved	with	
the	 construction	 industry;	 the	 parent	 companies	 of	 three	 of	 the	 six	
teams,	namely	Kong‐Kuo,	Hong‐Fu	and	Dacin	were	in	the	construction	
business.	The	parent	company	of	Luckipar	is	a	cement	company	but	it	
had	 a	 construction	 department	 as	 well.	 These	 construction‐related	
companies	 were	 hit	 hard	 by	 the	 Asian	 financial	 crisis	 as	 property	
prices	plunged	(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	
the	author).			
Despite	the	economic	difficulties,	the	fifth	season	opened	on	31	December,	1998	
as	scheduled	because	the	CBA	took	some	measures	to	maintain	the	operation	of	
the	 league.	These	measures	 included	cost	 reduction	 through	downsizing	of	 the	
league	 and	 securing	 of	 ten	 million	 NTD	 by	 the	 Executive	 Board	 in	 November	
1998	to	ensure	that	the	Mars	employees	would	not	be	dismissed.	However,	the	
operation	 of	 the	 CBA	 remained	more	 challenging	 than	 ever	 in	 the	 fifth	 season	
because	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Asian	 Financial	 crisis	 and	 a	 dispute	 over	 TV	
broadcasting	 rights.	 A	 staff	 member	 of	 the	 CTBA	 (F1),	 argued	 that	 the	 league	
made	a	wrong	decision	which	had	worsened	its	position.	
Because	of	the	dispute	over	TV	rights	fee,	the	league	decided	to	strip	
ETTV	of	its	broadcasting	rights.	However,	the	CBA	lost	media	attention	
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and	popularity	very	soon	after	the	termination	of	TV	broadcasting.	Of	
course,	the	ticket	revenue	was	getting	lower	and	lower	when	they	did	
not	 appear	on	 the	TV.	The	CBA	 then	 announced	 to	 suspend	 later	on	
(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	30/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 summary,	 the	 events	 leading	 up	 to	 CBA’s	 collapse	 have	 to	 do	 with	 factors	
internal	 to	 the	CBA,	as	well	 as	ones	external	 to	 it.	The	 interviewees’	 responses	
tend	 to	 converge	 upon	 the	 perception	 that	 poor	 management	 (internally)	
resulted	in	the	loss	of	TV	broadcasting,	which	dealt	the	final	blow	to	the	CBA.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 the	 interviewees	 and	 literature	 available	 in	 the	 media	 also	
attribute	 the	 collapse	 to	 a	 harsh	 economic	 environment	 (externally),	 with	
adverse	impact	on	the	parent	companies	of	four	of	the	six	teams.		
	
5.4	The	Perspective	of	the	Sponsors	
In	order	 to	 increase	 the	 attendance	 in	 the	 fourth	year,	 the	CBA	began	 to	use	 a	
home‐and‐away	system.	Hung‐Fu	operated	the	Taichung	market,	Tera	embraced	
Kaohsiung	 City	 as	 its	 home	 court,	 Dacin	 operated	 from	 the	 Fengshan	 stadium,	
and	Yulon	and	Lucky	managed	the	Hsinchu	market	together.	All	clubs	operated	
Taipei	City	and	Banchao,	and	Hung‐Kuo	was	 involved	 in	all	 cities	as	 it	was	 the	
most	famous	team	at	the	time.	The	CBA	committee	assumed	rapid	expansion	of	
the	league	would	attract	more	spectators	and	bring	in	more	profits.	However,	it	
turned	out	to	be	a	bad	idea	for	the	CBA	to	extend	its	business	to	different	cities	in	
Taiwan.	When	 asked	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 CBA,	 a	 former	 Nike	
manager	 (S1)	claimed	that	expanding	 too	much	was	a	wrong	decision	 for	CBA.	
He	states	 in	an	 interview:	“If	you	don’t	do	a	marketing	survey,	you	don’t	know	
the	break‐even	point.	Then	playing	in	different	cities	and	in	different	venues	is	to	
waste	money.”	
According	to	the	record,	 the	attendance	rate	was	on	a	decline	since	the	second	
season.	The	CBA	then	failed	to	break‐even	because	direct	costs	and	indirect	costs	
of	the	league	were	on	the	rise.	Since	it	adopted	a	home‐away	system,	the	league	
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needed	 to	pay	 for	 staff	 and	 facilities	 in	different	 cities.	 a	 former	Nike	manager	
(S1)		points	out:	
I	think	it	is	absolutely	correct	that	its	overextended	business,	the	high	
personnel	cost	and	hardware	budget,	which	we	mentioned,	led	to	his	
poor	management.	The	personnel	cost	was	really	too	high	because	all	
the	 people	who	worked	 for	 this	 league	 in	 different	 cities	 came	 onto	
the	 new	 payroll.	 Added	 costs	 included	 league	 staff,	 facility	
maintenance	staff	in	different	stadiums,	as	well	as	referees;	the	league	
had	to	absorb	all	 these	costs	 to	maintain	 its	own	business.	However,	
we	knew	 the	number	of	 fans	was	not	enough.	The	CBA’s	 income	 fell	
short	 of	 covering	 these	 positions	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	
04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
These	comments	show	that	this	sponsor’s	focus	was	on	the	economic	structure	
of	 the	 league	as	 the	main	 factor	explaining	 failures.	 In	addition,	He	argued	that	
there	was	no	long‐term	planning	for	organisational	structure,	budget,	marketing,	
players’	 recruitment,	 and	 promotion.	 As	 the	 poor	 management	 performance	
impacted	upon	fan	attendances,	profits	were	not	available	to	support	the	costs	of	
professionalization	of	the	sport.		
Furthermore	 the	 sponsor	 representative	 mentioned	 the	 philosophy	 of	 the	
managers	 and/or	 owners	 in	 Taiwan	 –	 The	 owners	 and	managers	 did	 not	 run	
professional	sports	teams	as	a	business	but	as	a	hobby	(or	as	an	‘appendage’	to	
promote	 their	main	 business).	 The	 former	Nike	manager	 (S1)	 further	 claimed:	
“Basically,	 the	 teams	 looked	 like	 appendages	 to	 the	 parent	 companies.	 The	
business	 owners	 were	 basketball	 fans	 and	 used	 the	 companies’	 marketing	
budgets	to	run	the	teams.	So	the	owner	could	support	a	team.	But	if	the	owner	
ran	his	parent	company	badly,	it	was	hard	for	him	to	operate	these	‘appendages’	
well”	(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
An	owner	of	a	sport	consulting	company	(S2)	drew	similar	conclusions:	
This	 situation	 in	 Taiwan	 is	 normal,	 because	 the	 government	 did	 not	
give	us	enough	financial	support	or	tax	incentives,	thus	I	had	to	spend	
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my	own	money	to	run	the	basketball	club.	If	I	am	having	a	tough	time	
with	my	 company’s	 finance,	 I	will	 cut	 the	 spending	 on	 the	 non‐core	
business	 first	 (Interview	with	 the	 sponsors,	 15/01/2011,	 translated	
by	the	author).	
Given	 this	 business	 philosophy,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 owners	 quit	
basketball	very	quickly	in	the	fifth	season	in	1999	when	the	Asian	financial	crisis	
took	a	toll	on	the	economy,	and	thus	the	parent	companies	of	the	CBA	clubs	were	
hit	hard	
	
5.5	The	Perspective	of	the	Government	Officials	
A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	Sports	Affairs	Council	(G3)	pointed	out	that	“all	
the	 meetings	 of	 the	 CBA	 adopted	 a	 collegiate	 system	 [a	 system	 of	 decision	
making	 by	 unanimous	 support].	 The	 manager	 therefore	 could	 not	 decide	
anything	because	everyone	in	the	meetings	had	a	right	of	veto”	(Interview	with	
government	 officials,	 27/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	 author).	 The	 club	 owners	
hoped	 to	 hire	 a	 professional	 manager	 to	 set	 up	 an	 independent	 and	 effective	
management	 team.	 However,	 the	manager	would	 have	 been	 ineffective	 in	 any	
event	 because	 of	 the	 veto	 system.	 Clubs	 could	 not	 come	 to	 a	 consensus	 or	
common	view	on	how	to	proceed,	and	it	became	difficult	to	iron	out	differences	
and	dealt	with	conflicts.	Combined	with	the	financial	problem,	this	situation	did	
not	allow	for	the	development	of	a	sustainable	management	for	the	CBA	league.	
In	addition	to	the	management	structure,	a	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	Sports	
Affairs	Council	(G3)	believed	the	key	issue	bringing	about	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	
was	the	dispute	over	the	TV	rights	fee.		
The	 TV	 rights	 fee	 was	 an	 important	 source	 of	 income	 for	 the	 clubs	
when	the	CBA	could	not	increase	profits	through	ticket	sales	and	other	
promotional	 activities.	 It	was	 a	 key	 factor	 ‐	 you	 cannot	maintain	 the	
league	 when	 you	 do	 not	 have	 a	 TV	 rights	 fee	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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Here	he	is	in	effect	suggesting	a	model	of	how	professional	basketball	in	Taiwan	
would	 operate.	 The	professional	 sport	 could	not	 operate	 profitably	 on	 its	 own	
term.	The	league	therefore	relied	on	the	TV	rights	fee	because	of	its	failings	as	a	
revenue	generator.	Thus	we	can	see	that	because	there	was	no	TV	rights	fee	in	
the	 fifth	 season,	 the	 owners	 could	 no	 longer	 support	 the	 clubs.	 In	 short,	 the	
basketball	league	presented	a	model	of	professional	sport	as	paid	for	by	media,	
so	that	without	media	funding	it	could	not	survive.	
When	 the	CBA	Executive	Board	announced	 the	suspension	of	 the	CBA	 in	1999,	
Lin	 did	 not	 believe	 that	 this	 was	 going	 to	 be	 the	 end	 of	 the	 CBA.	 Indeed,	 the	
public	 did	 not	 lose	 its	 enthusiasm	 for	 basketball	 during	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	
league,	 and	 about	 63%	 of	 the	 fans	 expressed	 the	 hope	 that	 the	 CBA	 would	
maintain	its	operation	(Hsu,	2006;	Shih,	2001).	The	media	attached	considerable	
importance	 to	basketball	because	as	much	as	10.2%	of	ball	 sports	 coverage	by	
electronic	media	was	 on	 basketball	 and	 the	 proportion	 rose	 to	 24.1%	 in	 print	
media	 (Shih,	2001).	According	 to	 the	statistics,	Hsu	 (2006)	argues	 that	Taiwan	
did	 not	 lack	 the	 market	 for	 basketball	 but	 it	 lacked	 ‘product’,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
games	which	were	worth	watching. 
A	 former	Deputy	Minister	of	 the	SAC	(G3)	mentions	 that	 the	KMT	was	actively	
involved	in	the	re‐launching	affairs	of	the	CBA	after	the	CBA	was	suspended.	
Chung,	 the	 coach	 of	 Mars,	 was	 instrumental	 in	 getting	 the	 KMT	
involved.	He	committed	himself	to	his	team	and	spent	his	own	money	
to	 maintain	 the	 club.	 Then	 the	 Broadcasting	 Corporation	 of	 China	
(BCC),	which	was	 owned	 by	 the	 KMT,	 began	 to	 support	 the	 club.	 In	
order	to	promote	the	party’s	political	interests	and	as	a	campaign	for	
the	election,	the	KMT	wanted	to	let	people	know	that	they	supported	
basketball	 and	 sports	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	
27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
That	was	why	Lien,	 the	vice	president	 then,	held	a	 forum	with	the	chairman	of	
the	 CBA	 and	 stakeholders	 to	 discuss	matters	 relating	 to	 the	 suspension	 on	 23	
March	1999.	A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G3)	states:	
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There	 are	 many	 reasons	 for	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 CBA.	 It	 was	 a	
difficult	 situation	 when	 the	 owners	 pursued	 their	 own	 interests.	
However,	the	Sports	Affairs	Council	(SAC)	pushed	them	to	re‐open	the	
league.	The	SAC	provided	 funding	 to	host	 some	events.	For	example,	
the	 SAC	 funded	 “the	 CBA	 Millennium	 Memorial	 Tournament”.	 Of	
course	 the	 SAC	 cannot	 directly	 fund	 a	 professional	 sport,	 but	 it	 can	
help	 the	 re‐opening	 by	 entrusting	 the	 CBA	 to	 host	 some	 basketball	
events.	Chen,	the	owner	of	Hong‐Fu,	was	in	charge	of	the	team	at	the	
re‐opening.	The	SAC	funded	them	to	host	some	promotional	events	to	
maintain	a	basketball	atmosphere	in	local	communities	and	in	schools.	
The	government	spent	a	lot	of	money	by	that	time	(Interview	with	the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Because	 the	SAC	 intended	 to	 re‐start	 the	 league,	 the	Minister	of	 the	SAC	had	a	
conversation	with	the	chairman	of	the	CTBA	in	October	1999.	However,	the	two	
protagonists	had	different	views	about	this	issue.	Zhao,	the	Minister	of	the	SAC,	
wanted	 to	 re‐start	 the	 league	 as	 soon	 as	 possible,	 but	 Ren‐Da	 Wang,	 the	
chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA,	wanted	 to	 solve	 the	 fundamental	 problems	 of	 the	 CBA.	
Wang	therefore	argued	that	the	most	significant	problem	faced	by	the	CBA	was	
its	 lack	 of	 facilities	 (Lin,	 1999;	 Wei,	 1999).	 The	 CBA	 did	 not	 have	 a	 proper	
stadium	 in	 which	 to	 stage	 the	 games.	 A	 deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G3)			
attended	 this	 meeting.	 He	 claims	 that	Wang	made	 “giving	 funding	 to	 his	 own	
company	to	build	a	new	basketball	stadium’	a	condition	for	him	to	support	the	
re‐opening	of	the	league”.	
Wang	 insisted	 that	 there	 was	 no	 proper	 stadium	 for	 basketball	 in	
Taiwan	after	the	Chunghwa	Stadium	had	burnt	down	in	a	fire	disaster	
in	 1989.	 Wang	 said	 if	 the	 SAC	 decided	 to	 build	 a	 new	 stadium,	 he	
would	then	fully	support	the	re‐opening	of	the	CBA.	Wang	wanted	to	
spend	around	eighty	million	NTD	to	build	a	stadium.	He	even	showed	
the	 construction	design	 in	 the	meeting.	He	asked	 the	SAC	 to	provide	
funding	 to	his	own	Dacin	Construction	Company	(Interview	with	 the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
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However	 the	 SAC	would	 not	 accept	Wang’s	 condition,	Wang	 therefore	 did	 not	
support	the	re‐opening.	Wang’s	decision	was	quite	influential	as	he	owned	one	of	
the	 professional	 CBA	 clubs	 ‐	 Dacin	 Tiger.	 A	 deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G3)	
argues	that	with	the	chairman	of	the	CTBA	and	the	owner	of	Dacin	unwilling	to	
support	the	re‐opening,	there	was	little	likelihood	for	the	league	reviving.		
In	October	1999,	Chen	(the	owner	of	Hung‐Fu)	took	over	as	the	chairman	of	the	
CBA,	 the	 CBA	 Company	 and	 the	 SAC	worked	 hard	 to	 re‐start	 the	 league	 using	
their	 political	 and	 economic	 influence	 aggressively.	 On	 1st	 Jan,	 2000	 the	 CBA	
launched	 a	 three‐month	 tournament	 called	 “the	 CBA	 Millennium	 Memorial	
Tournament”	as	preparation	for	the	re‐opening.	At	that	moment,	Mars	was	still	
struggling	financially	due	to	the	Asian	Financial	Crisis.	Under	the	operation	of	the	
CBA	 Company,	 the	 KMT	 decided	 to	 pay	 NT$	 3	 million	 to	 sponsor	 the	 Mars	
Company	so	that	the	tournament	could	be	successfully	restored.	But	on	31st	Jan,	
2000,	 the	 Yulon	 motor	 company,	 which	 had	 led	 and	 had	 supported	 Taiwan’s	
basketball	 for	almost	30	years,	 suddenly	announced	 that	 they	would	no	 longer	
participate	in	the	CBA	because	of	the	league’s	structural	problems.	In	April	2000,	
the	owner	of	the	Luckipar	also	announced	the	dissolution	of	his	basketball	team.	
But	Chen,	who	was	both	the	chairman	of	the	CBA	and	the	owner	of	the	Hong‐Fu	
club,	 tried	 to	 convince	 the	owners	 to	 stay	on	as	he	 insisted	 the	CBA	would	 re‐
open	on	the	17th	of	November	that	year.		
The	 above‐mentioned	 description	 of	 the	 events	 clearly	 suggests	 that	 the	
decisions	were	driven	by	the	club	owners’	interests.	The	deputy	Minister	of	the	
SAC	(G3)	claims	that	 the	reason	for	Chen	to	support	 the	re‐opening	of	 the	CBA	
was	that	he	could	profit	from	organising	the	re‐opening.	
Each	 of	 them	 spent	 10	million	 dollars	 on	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 re‐
opening.	 Because	 Chen	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 re‐opening	
arrangements,	he	managed	 the	budgets	and	expenses	 from	a	pool	of	
money.	Chen	entrusted	his	own	organisation	to	handle	the	re‐opening	
affairs	 and	 added	 related	 staff	 to	 the	 payroll.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 the	
organisation	 that	 belonged	 to	 Chen	 had	 been	 allocated	 most	 of	 the	
fund,	meaning	he	and	his	organisation	had	certainly	earned	money	at	
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the	expense	of	the	other	teams.	As	news	broke	out	that	Hong‐Fu	had	
itself	profit	arrange	to	from	the	common	pool	of	funds	that	collected	to	
re‐start	 the	 league,	 the	 owners	 of	 some	 teams	 decided	 to	 quit	
(Interview	with	 the	 government	 officials,	 27/01/2011,	 translated	by	
the	author).		
Thus	the	interviewee	suggests	that	the	CBA	clubs	decided	not	to	support	the	re‐
opening	 project	 because	 Chen	 had	 acted	 solely	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 his	 own	
company.	
In	the	case	of	the	suspension	of	the	CBA,	the	KMT	was	another	key	stakeholder.	
Not	 only	 did	 Lien,	 the	 Vice	 President	 of	 the	 country	 (a	 KMT	 representative)	
support	the	re‐opening	project,	but	the	KMT	also	spent	 from	its	own	budget	to	
buy	one	of	the	CBA	clubs,	the	financially	struggling	Tera	Mars.		
In	August	2000,	the	KMT	bought	the	Mars	team	for	NT$	25	million	and	entrusted	
the	Broadcasting	Corporation	of	China	with	management	of	the	team.	In	October	
2000,	Chien‐Chi	Chen,	a	legislator	of	the	KMT,	took	over	as	the	chairman	of	the	
CBA	 executive	 committee.	 Although	 the	 public	 anticipated	 that	 the	 CBA	would	
re‐open	in	November,	Hung‐Duo	Lin,	the	owner	of	the	Hung‐Kuo,	announced	on	
7th	 November,	 2000	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 most	 popular	 basketball	 team	 in	
Taiwan	because	of	the	financial	difficulties	of	its	parent	company.	The	day	after,	
Chen	also	dismissed	all	his	players.	These	actions	happened	 in	 ten	days	before	
the	re‐opening	was	due	to	take	place.	On	23rd	November,	2000	the	chairman	of	
the	 CBA	 officially	 announced	 that	 the	 CBA	would	 not	 be	 re‐opened.	 Thus,	 the	
KMT	had	invested	tens	of	millions	of	dollars	with	no	return.	The	Yulon	and	Mars	
team	registered	in	Division	One	to	play	in	the	amateur	tournament.	Then	Hung‐
Kuo	 was	 taken	 over	 by	 the	 Sina	 Corporation	 and	 changed	 its	 name	 to	 Sina	
Basketball.	The	 following	year	the	Sina	Basketball	 team	transferred	to	China	to	
play	in	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League.		
5.6	The	Players’	and	Coaches’	Perspective	
From	a	players’	perspective,	a	former	CBA	player	(P3),	mentioned	that	“players’	
wages	doubled	every	year	 to	a	horrific	 level.	The	 increase	 in	 the	players’	wage	
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was	a	consequence	of	the	increase	in	TV	rights	fee”	(Interview	with	the	players,	
13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	TV	 rights	 fee	 for	 the	CBA	 rose	by	22	 times	within	 two	years.	Wen	 (2010)	
argues	 that	 the	 rising	 income	 from	 TV	 rights	 fee	 gave	 players	 the	 bargaining	
ground	 to	 demand	 higher	 wages,	 but	 the	 clubs	 did	 not	 have	 a	 financially	
sustainable	plan	when	they	agreed	to	the	wage	increases.		
The	former	CBA	player	(P3)	summarises	the	collapse	of	the	CBA.	
There	were	three	main	factors	behind	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	from	his	
observation.	The	first	one	was	the	players’	wages.	The	second	one	was	
the	parent	 companies	of	 4	 of	 the	6	 clubs	who	are	 all	 in	 the	building	
and/or	 construction	 industry.	 When	 the	 Asian	 financial	 crisis	 took	
place,	 the	building	 industry	was	 in	 recession.	 In	 addition,	 the	parent	
companies	 of	 all	 six	 teams	 had	 held	 shares	 in	 one	 another,	 so	 the	
parent	companies’	structures	were	all	in	danger.	Therefore	they	resort	
to	 slashing	 funding	 for	 basketball.	 Then	 the	 third	 reason	 saw	 the	
catalyst	 of	 the	 collapse,	 which	 was	 the	 dispute	 over	 TV	 rights	 fee.	
Because	 TV	 broadcasting	 was	 the	 last	 financial	 lifeline	 for	 the	 CBA,	
termination	of	the	TV	contract	was	the	last	straw	(Interview	with	the	
players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
From	 this	 interviewee’s	 viewpoint,	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 player	 wage,	 the	 Asian	
financial	 crisis,	 and	 the	 dispute	 over	 TV	 rights	 fee	 were	 the	 three	 elements	
responsible	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA.	He	also	indicated	that	the	Asian	financial	
crisis	was	not	only	an	external	factor.	The	reason	why	the	Asian	financial	crisis	
was	so	damaging	for	the	league	was	because	club	ownership	was	concentrated	in	
construction	companies.	
A	former	CBA	player	(P4)	agreed	with	this	point	and	argued	that	the	CBA	relied	
too	heavily	on	a	single	area	of	the	market	for	ownership	and	support:	
Hong‐Kuo,	Lucky	Cement,	and	Hong‐Fu	were	all	in	the	same	business.	
In	 such	 an	 economic	 turndown,	 those	 companies	 were	 hit	 hardest.	
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Because	the	parent	companies	were	in	financial	crisis,	the	clubs	were	
unable	to	secure	loans	from	banks	to	get	past	the	difficult	period.	All	
they	 could	 do	 was	 to	 accept	 cost‐cutting	 changes	 from	 their	 parent	
companies	(Interview	with	the	players,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	
author).		
This	 former	CBA	player	 (P4)	 echoed	A	 former	CBA	player	 (P3)’s	 view	 that	 the	
only	 solution	 sought	 by	 the	 parent	 companies	 of	 the	 clubs	 in	 the	 midst	 of	
financial	difficulty	was	to	give	up	the	basketball	business,	and	the	loss	of	income	
from	TV	rights	only	expedited	this	process.		
In	the	past,	the	TV	rights	fee	was	over	NTD$	100	million.	Each	of	the	
clubs	used	to	have	NTD$	30~50	million	of	the	share	of	the	TV	rights	
annually.	 However,	 some	 clubs	 relied	 on	 the	 TV	 rights	 fee	 so	much	
that	they	used	their	entire	share	of	the	TV	rights	fee	to	pay	the	players	
and	to	maintain	the	operation	of	the	clubs.	Unfortunately,	when	ETTV	
refused	 to	 pay	 the	 fee,	 the	 parent	 companies	 did	 not	 have	 enough	
resources	 to	 maintain	 their	 basketball	 clubs	 (Interview	 with	 the	
players,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
In	summary,	the	players	and	coaches	interviewed	focused	on	three	major	issues,	
the	discussion	of	 the	players’	wages,	 the	 league	being	overly	dependent	on	 the	
health	of	the	construction	industry,	and	the	TV	rights	fee.	All	these	issues	were	
inter‐dependent.		
	
5.7	Summary	of	the	Case	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	has	been	to	explain	outcomes	from	the	perspectives	
of	stakeholders	for	the	first	case	–	the	collapse	of	the	CBA.	The	explanations	are	
summarised	 in	 Table	 5.2.	 There	 are	multiple	 perspectives	 about	what	 or	who	
was	responsible	for	different	outcomes.	
Four	interviewees,	key	informants	from	different	groups	of	stakeholders	argued	
that	 the	 structure	of	 the	CBA	was	problematic.	Government	officials	 suggested	
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the	CBA	presented	a	model	where	the	cost	of	professional	sport	was	met	by	the	
media,	 and	 the	 interviewees	 from	 the	 media	 echoed	 this	 perspective	 as	 they	
argued	that	the	CBA	relied	too	much	on	TV	rights	fee	and	suffered	from	the	lack	
of	of	funding	from	other	sources.	Indeed,	the	Taiwanese	basketball	system	could	
be	said	to	have	been	dominated	by	the	media	(we	will	return	to	discuss	the	role	
of	the	media	in	a	subsequent	chapter).		
In	 addition,	 the	 member	 of	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 players/coaches	 also	 made	 the	
argument	that	the	league	suffered	from	resource	dependency,	relying	on	a	single	
source	which	made	 it	 vulnerable	 to	 economic	 swings,	 the	 difference	 here	was	
that	 the	 ‘single	 source’	was	 the	 construction	 industry.	As	 foreign	and	domestic	
funds	retreated	from	stocks	and	property	investments,	the	real	estate	sector	was	
deprived	of	revenue.	As	a	result,	the	companies	gave	up	their	basketball	clubs	as	
a	means	 of	 reducing	 costs.	 These	 stakeholders	 suggest	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 business	
competence	allowed	the	league	to	be	overly	dependent	on	an	ailing	industry.		
Furthermore,	 the	 interviewees	 (CTBA,	sponsors,	and	government	officials)	also	
tended	 to	 place	 the	 blame	 on	 the	 owners.	 The	 CTBA	 argued	 that	 the	 owners	
failed	 to	 appreciate	 the	 economic	 reality	 that	 the	Taiwanese	market	 could	 not	
afford	 a	 professional	 league.	 The	 sponsors	 blamed	 the	 owners	 for	 treating	 the	
basketball	business	as	a	mere	hobby.	This	could	also	be	an	explanation	as	to	why	
the	owners	would	as	a	 first	option	give	up	the	clubs	when	they	had	difficulties	
because	the	basketball	clubs	were	seen	simply	as	an	appendage	of	their	parent	
companies.	 Specifically,	 the	 government	 officials	 blamed	 two	 club	 owners	 for	
acting	on	self‐interest	at	 the	expense	of	 the	wellbeing	of	 the	 league:	Wang,	 the	
owner	of	the	Dacin	tigers,	as	the	president	of	the	CTBA	during	the	season	of	the	
much‐anticipated	reopening,	and	Chen,	 the	owner	of	 the	Hung‐Fu	Rams,	as	 the	
leader	 of	 the	 re‐opening	 project.	 The	 two	 were	 accused	 of	 putting	 their	
companies’	 profits	 ahead	 of	 the	 overall	 development	 of	 the	 league	 during	 its	
suspension.	
However,	the	media,	CTBA	staff,	sponsors	and	the	government	official	all	argued	
that	 the	 collapse	of	 the	CBA	was	 caused	by	 the	 lack	of	 competence	of	 the	CBA	
committee.	 The	media	 argued	 that	 the	manager	 of	 the	CBA	 committee	 did	 not	
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have	 the	 real	 power	 of	 decision‐making	 because	 he	 was	 assigned	 by,	 and	
therefore	under	the	influence	of	the	club	owners.	The	CTBA	staff	argued	that	the	
CBA	 had	 collapsed	 because	 the	 CBA	 committee	 lost	 its	 broadcasting	 partner	
because	of	a	dispute	over	the	TV	rights	fee	with	ETTV.	The	sponsors	argued	that	
the	CBA	committee	made	a	poor	decision	to	overextend	the	league’s	profile	when	
the	market	 could	not	 support	 the	costs	of	professionalization.	The	government	
officials	also	recognised	that	the	manager	of	the	CBA	committee	could	not	decide	
anything	because	the	owners	in	the	meetings	had	a	right	of	veto.		
The	structure	of	the	CBA	seemed	to	be	that	of	a	completely	professional	league	
which	was	owned	by	the	CBA	Company,	and	 it	had	a	committee	to	operate	the	
league.	 However,	 the	 CBA	 Company	 was	 set	 up	 by	 the	 club	 owners,	 and	 the	
shares	were	owned	by	the	six	owners.	Even	the	manager	of	the	CBA	committee	
who	 took	 formal	 responsibility	 for	 the	operation	of	 the	CBA	needed	 to	 consult	
the	 owners	 before	making	 significant	 decisions.	 Specifically,	 the	 owners	 had	 a	
right	to	veto.	Therefore	if	a	decision	of	the	committee	had	a	negative	impact	on	
one	club,	the	club	owner	would	reject	it	even	though	the	decision	was	good	for	
the	long	term	operation	of	the	league.		
In	 short,	 the	 interviewees	 argued	 the	 collapse	 was	 due	 in	 part	 to	 resource	
dependency	 (though	 there	 was	 disagreement	 as	 to	 which	 resources,	 media	
income	 or	 construction	 industry	 investment,	 were	 at	 issue)	 but	 was	
predominantly	 the	 product	 of	 the	 CBA	 committee’s	 actions	 in	 taking	 poor	
decisions,	overextending	the	business,	reflecting	a	lack	of	sports	industry	specific	
business	skills.	These	weaknesses	were	fully	exposed	by	the	external	factors	that	
came	with	 the	 Asian	 Financial	 Crisis,	 eventually	 leading	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
league.		
Although	 the	 CBA	 (the	 League)	 was	 nominally	 the	 body	 responsible	 for	 the	
League,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 network,	 rather	 than	 top	 down,	 forms	 of	 governance	
operated	 in	 this	 case.	 In	 effect	 there	 were	 particular	 key	 stakeholders	 whose	
actions	were	 seen	 as	 critical	 to	 the	 outcome	 including	 the	 CTBA	 (the	 national	
association),	 Ren‐Da	Wang	 (the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA,	 and	 the	 owner	 of	 the	
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Dacin	 Tigers	 Club),	 clubs,	 players,	 Media,	 political	 parties,	 the	 SAC,	 and	 Vice	
President.		
It	is	clear	that	good	governance	principles	were	perceived	as	being	breached	in	
this	case.	The	manager	of	the	CBA	had	dual	accountability	(and	thus	a	conflict	of	
interests):	 to	 the	 league	 clubs	 and	 the	 wider	 basketball	 constituency	 for	 the	
running	 of	 the	 system	 in	 a	 fair	 and	 transparent	 manner;	 and	 to	 his	 /	 her	
employer	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 club	 to	 which	 s/he	 was	 affiliated.	 Moreover,	 as	
financial	 over‐dependency	was	 another	 important	 factor	 in	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
CBA,	 we	 argue	 that	 the	 principles	 including	 effectiveness,	 responsibility,	 and	
efficiency	 were	 not	 well‐established	 when	 the	 league	 demonstrated	 a	 lack	 of	
financial	risk	management	when	over‐expanding	the	market.		
There	was	also	a	 lack	of	effective	political	governance	evidenced	in	this	critical	
event	 as	 the	Vice	President	 of	 the	 country	 and	 the	 SAC	 tried	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	
government	 aim	 of	 ‘saving	 professional	 basketball’,	 with	 the	 KMT	 investing	
heavily	with	millions	dollars.		
We	will	revisit	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	illustrating	
the	actions,	tactics,	interests	and	outcomes,	which	stemmed	from	the	governance	
system	in	Chapter	8.1	 in	order	to	develop	a	comprehensive	discussion	of	 these	
three	inter‐linked	cases.		
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Table5.2:	Responsibility	for	outcomes	of	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	
Accounts	 Responsibility	for	outcomes	 Main	arguments
Media	 *	The	CBA	committee
	
	
	
*	The	manager	of	the	league	had	dual	accountability,	to	the	league	clubs	and	the	wider	
public	for	the	running	of	the	system	in	a	fair	and	open	manner,	and	to	his/her	employer	
the	organisation	owning	the	clubs	to	which	they	were	affiliated.	
*	The	CBA *	Relied	on	the	TV	rights	fee	too	much.
CTBA	staff	 *	The	owners *	Failing	to	appreciate	economic	realities
*	The	Players *	Being	too	demanding	
*	The	CBA
*	External	environment	(the		Asian	
Financial	Crisis)	
*	Impact	of	the	Asian	financial	crisis	on	construction	companies	was	the	main	reason	of	
the	CBA	collapse.	
	
*	The	CBA	committee *	The	CBA	lost	media	attention	and	popularity	very	soon	when	the	CBA	lost	the	TV	
broadcasting.	
Sponsor	 *	The	CBA	committee
	
	
*	Poor	management	decision	– overextended	business.
*	Poor	operation	impacted	upon	fan	attendances,	profits	could	not	support	costs	of	
professionalization	
*	The	owners
	
*	The	owners	or	managers	did	not	run	professional	sports	as	a	business	but	as	a	an	
appendage	to	their	main	business	
*	The	government * The	government	did	not	give	the	professional	sport	enough	financial	support
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Government	officials *	The	CBA	committee
	
	
*	The	CBA	adopted	a	collegiate system	[a	system	of	decision	making	by	unanimous	
support].	The	manager	therefore	could	not	decide	anything	because	everyone	in	the	
meetings	had	a	right	of	veto.	
*		The	CBA
	
*	The	basketball	league	presented	a	model	of	professional	sport	as	paid	for	by	media.
*	Wang	‐	The	president	of	the	CTBA *	Wang	only	concerned	his	own	interests	
	
*	Chen	–	The	leader	of	re‐opening	
project	
*	Chen	only	concerned	his	own	interests	
Players/Coaches *	The	Clubs
	
	
	
	
*	The	clubs	relied	on	the	TV	rights	fee
*	The	increasing	of	the	player	wage	was	a	sequel	of	the	increasing	of	the	TV	rights	fee.	The	
clubs	did	not	have	enough	income	from	the	TV	rights	fee	but	they	have	to	afford	the	
increasing	costs,	especially	the	players’	wages	
*	The	CBA *	The	CBA	relied	on	the	building	companies	too	much
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Chapter	Six	
The	Critical	Process:	the	Emergence	of	the	Super	
Basketball	League	
	
6.1	Introduction	
After	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Basketball	 Alliance	 (CBA)	 in	 Taiwan,	 the	
Division	One	Basketball	 Tournament	became	 the	only	 stage	on	which	 the	 elite	
players	could	play.	The	tournament	was	played	on	a	monthly	basis,	but	the	total	
number	 of	 matches	 decreased	 from	 sixty	 (a	 full	 CBA	 season)	 to	 just	 fourteen	
games.	The	shortened	season	and	the	decrease	 in	games	played	had	a	negative	
impact	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 players.	 To	 make	 matters	 worse,	 the	 media	
declined	 to	 broadcast	 basketball	 games	 because	 the	 tournament	 lacked	
competition,	 coupled	 with	 the	 turndown	 in	 international	 competition9.	 This	
marks	a	dark	period	of	nearly	four	years	in	Taiwan	basketball	(Hu,	2008).		
In	 2003,	 the	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council	 (SAC),	 Lin	 Te‐Fu,	
promoted	the	Super	Basketball	League	(SBL)	as	an	attempt	to	revive	basketball	
in	Taiwan.	Lin	met	with	 the	 chairman	of	each	club	 to	discuss	 the	affairs	of	 the	
league.	The	SAC	recruited	the	former	National	team	captain,	Cheng	Chi‐Long,	as	
the	 convener;	 it	 also	 invited	 the	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	 (CTBA),	
senior	 basketball	 players,	 and	 other	 professionals	 to	 form	 the	 ROC	 SBL	
promoting	 team	 (Chang,	 2004).	 In	 addition,	 the	 SAC	 invited	 the	 clubs	 from	
Division	 One:	 	 Yulon,	 Dacin,	 Broadcasting	 Corporation	 of	 China,	 Jeou‐Tai	
Technology,	Taiwan	Bank,	Taiwan	Beer,	and	Sina10	to	set	up	the	SBL.			
																																																								
9	Chinese	Taipei	Men’s	Basketball	Team	Ranked	7th	in	FIBA	Asian	Championship	in	2001,	ranked	
7th	in	the	Asian	Games	in	2002,	and	ranked	11th	in	FIBA	Asian	Championship	in	2003	which	was	
the	worst	ever	ranking	in	the	history	of	Chinese	Taipei	Men’s	Basketball	Team.		
	
10	Sina	 Basketball	 Club	 had	 registered	 and	 participated	 in	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China’s	
basketball	league	in	2001‐2003	and	had	returned	to	Taiwan	in	2003	
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The	SBL	season	began	in	December	each	year	and	finished	all	regular	fixtures	in	
May.	Every	club	had	thirty	matches	per	season.	The	top‐four	clubs	of	the	regular	
season	 entered	 the	 playoffs.	 The	 first	 season	 of	 the	 SBL	 opened	 on	 21st	
November,	 2003	 with	 broadcasting	 carried	 out	 by	 ESPN	 and	 marketing	
conducted	by	NIKE.	The	CTBA	took	on	the	tasks	of	the	organising	the	league	and	
officiating	matches.		
With	 the	 government’s	 support,	 the	 SBL	 was	 constructed	 under	 the	
administration	 of	 the	 CTBA.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 traditional	 amateur	 league,	 the	
SBL	had	to	handle	ticket‐selling,	TV	broadcasting	and	commercial	marketing.	It	
therefore	 became	 a	 ‘prospective’	 (or	 semi‐)	 professional	 league.	 However,	 the	
structure	 of	 SBL,	 being	 a	 prospective	 (or	 semi‐)	 professional	 league,	 brought	
with	 it	 a	 confusion	 of	 powers	 and	 responsibilities	 among	 the	 clubs,	 the	 CTBA,	
and	 the	 SAC.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 league	 was	 unable	 to	 operate	 effectively.	
Originally,	 it	 was	 intended	 that	 the	 clubs	 should	 co‐operate	 with	 the	 CTBA.	
However,	since	a	number	of	all‐star	players	transferred	to	China	and	the	number	
of	fans	decreased,	the	clubs	were	in	conflict	with	the	CTBA	throughout	the	nine	
years	of	the	league’s	operation.		
In	this	section	the	perspective	of	each	group	of	stakeholders	is	reviewed	in	order	
to	understand	the	emergence	and	operation	of	the	SBL.	
	
6.2	The	Perspective	of	the	Governmental	Officials	
Theoretically,	 Sport	 policy	 in	 Taiwan	 followed	 the	White	 Paper	 (Sport	 Affairs	
Council,	1999).	The	development	and	context	of	Taiwan	sport	were	discussed	in	
this	White	Paper,	which	also	raises	some	issues	and	provides	certain	solutions	as	
guidance	 for	 the	 development	 of	 sport	 in	Taiwan.	 In	 addition,	 the	 government	
also	 has	 its	 own	 agenda	 to	 be	 realised.	 For	 example,	 there	 is	 an	 annual	 policy	
plan	for	the	government	to	follow	and	to	execute	under	a	budget.	However,	there	
is	 still	 flexibility	when	delivering	 the	policy	plan.	 Such	 flexibility	 is	 reflected	 in	
the	comments	of	the	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G1).						
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In	the	system	in	Taiwan,	a	Minister	of	a	department	does	not	have	a	
fixed	tenure.	He	is	always	preparing	to	step	down.	He	does	not	know	
how	long	he	can	stay	in	his	position.	He	will	be	criticised	if	he	does	
not	have	any	political	achievements	by	the	time	he	steps	down.	It	is	
therefore	 inevitable	 for	 each	 Minister	 to	 have	 different	 policy	
directions,	 for	 which	 there	 is	 only	 a	 certain	 timeframe	 to	 deliver.	
Therefore	he	must	promote	what	he	wants	 to	achieve	aggressively.	
In	short,	every	head	of	department	will	think	about	what	he	should	
do	 in	this	position,	and	he	has	his	own	preference.	However,	 is	 this	
‘preference’	comprehensive	enough?	 It	 is	another	aspect	 (Interview	
with	 the	 government	 officials,	 13/12/2010,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).			
A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G4)	shared	this	viewpoint:		
There	are	many	policies	of	the	SAC	which	come	from	the	Minister	of	
the	SAC.	When	he	had	his	own	 ideal,	he	did	 focus	on	 some	specific	
affairs.	He	could	also	highlight	his	political	 achievement.	Therefore,	
the	 SBL	 is	 one	 of	 Lin’s	 achievements.	 Whether	 he	 used	 the	
government’s	 power	 and	 budget	 or	 his	 personal	 connections,	 he	
brought	 the	 SBL	 into	 existence.	 At	 that	 time,	 there	was	 no	 private	
sector	entity	willing	to	invest	in	it.	So	it	was	led	by	the	government	at	
the	 beginning.	 Then	 it	 became	 an	 autonomous	 league	 (Interview	
with	 the	 government	 officials,	 28/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
From	the	perception	of	government	officials,	it	is	clear	that	government’s	role	is	
so	 important	 that	 the	 preference	 of	 the	 Minister	 could	 become	 a	 major	
contributor	to	the	inception	of	a	prospective	professional	sport.		
There	 are	 certain	 regulations	 on	 the	 formation	 of	 policy.	 However,	
regulations	 were	 made	 by	 humans.	 In	 Taiwan,	 personal	 emotions,	
connections	 and	 relationship	will	 affect	 the	 policy‐making	 process.	
This	 results	 in	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 ‘the	 Minister’s	 opinion	 is	 the	
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policy’.	 For	 example,	 the	 SBL	 was	 what	 Lin	 wanted,	 he	 told	 his	
subordinates	 to	 make	 it	 happen	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	
officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Basically,	 the	general	direction	set	up	by	 the	central	government	sets	 the	basis	
for	policy	formation	by	the	SAC,	and	then	the	policy	is	adjusted	by	the	preference	
of	the	Minister.	However,	here	this	senior	politician	mentioned	the	importance	of	
‘relationship’	in	Taiwanese	culture.	Different	stakeholders	would	try	to	maintain	
relationships	with	 one	 another;	 similarly	 in	 a	 department,	 subordinates	would	
try	to	follow	the	Minister’s	personal	preferences.					
In	Taiwan,	the	highest	guiding	principle	for	sport	policy	is	the	White	Paper.	The	
White	 Paper	 is	 a	 roadmap	 for	 Taiwan	 sport	 development.	 For	 example,	 the	
section	of	the	paper	on	 ‘Issues	and	Solutions’	specifically	mentions	the	need	 ‘to	
enhance	competitive	sports’	(SAC,	1999:	71‐80)	because	competitive	sports	can	
be	a	tool	to	improve	international	exchange	which	Taiwan	could	use	to	raise	its	
international	 reputation	 via	 hosting	 mega	 events.	 In	 order	 to	 strengthen	 the	
basis	 of	 talent	 development,	 professionalisation	 of	 coaches,	 sport	 science	 and	
sport	 facilities,	 the	SAC	adopted	certain	 strategies.	One	of	 the	 strategic	aims	 in	
the	 White	 Paper	 was	 ‘to	 develop	 professional	 sport,	 to	 enhance	 the	 level	 of	
competition,	and	to	increase	participation.’	Details	are	listed	below:						
1. To	 develop	 a	 consensus	 for	 the	 ‘coexistence	 of	
professional	sports	and	amateur	sports’.	
2. To	review	the	current	situation	and	problems	of	professional	
sports.	 To	 improve	 the	 environment	 for	 developing	
professional	sports.	
3. To	 set	 up	 regulations	 for	 professional	 sports	 (draft	 system,	
game	 system,	 tax	 regulations,	 foreign	 players).	 To	 promote	
positive	interaction	of	professional	sporting	organisations.	
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4. To	 set	 up	 a	 system	 of	 professional	 players’	 registration.	 To	
improve	 the	 quality	 of	 professional	 sports.	 To	 raise	
attendance	and	participation.			
Following	the	plan	of	the	White	Paper,	the	SAC	focused	their	resources	and	effort	
on	two	popular	sports	–	baseball	and	basketball	–	in	Taiwan.	Regarding	baseball,	
the	 SAC	 pushed	 for	 the	 merger	 of	 two	 professional	 baseball	 leagues	 (Chinese	
Taipei	Professional	Baseball	League	and	Taiwan	Major	League).	After	the	merger	
took	place	in	2003,	the	SAC	shifted	their	focus	onto	basketball	at	a	time	when	the	
CBA	was	 suspended,	 leaving	 Division	 One	 amateur	 league	 as	 the	 highest‐level	
domestic	competition.	Although	entry	was	free,	attendance	remained	extremely	
low.	The	media	therefore	did	not	see	incentives	to	broadcast	the	games.	For	the	
SAC,	disappointing	attendance	and	lack	of	TV	broadcasting	proved	very	difficult	
for	 the	promotion	of	basketball.	 In	order	 to	solve	 this	problem,	 the	Minister	of	
the	SAC	took	the	initiative	to	help	the	CTBA	and	clubs	to	launch	the	SBL.		
A	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 mentioned	 that	 he	 played	 a	 direct	 role	 in	 the	
launching	of	the	establishment	of	the	SBL:	
The	planning	of	 the	 SBL	was	 really	 launched	by	 the	 SAC.	 I	went	 to	
visit	owners	and	leaders	of	the	teams	with	the	goal	of	inviting	them	
to	set	up	the	SBL.	I	went	with	my	subordinates	to	visit	them	and	to	
listen	 to	 what	 they	 thought	 about	 basketball.	 I	 had	 to	 understand	
what	owner’s	expectations	were	and	what	 they	thought	about	their	
clubs	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 13/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).			
Given	the	serious	nature	of	the	complex	power	relationship	between	the	SAC,	the	
CTBA	and	clubs,	the	new	league	could	not	be	a	fully	professional	one.	The	above	
respondent	said,	“I	went	to	visit	them	one	by	one.	Then	finally	we	agreed	that	we	
had	 just	 gone	 through	 the	 pain	 of	 the	 CBA,	 so	we	 should	 aims	 for	 the	middle	
ground	 between	 the	 CBA	 and	 the	 amateur	 league.	 It	 ended	 up	 being	 a	
prospective	professional	league	–	SBL”	(Interview	with	the	government	officials,	
13/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).			
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In	the	decision‐making	process,	the	decision	to	set	up	a	prospective	professional	
league	was	not	a	default	option	at	 the	beginning.	A	 former	Minister	of	 the	SAC	
argued:	
This	 (the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SBL)	 was	 of	 course	 the	 conclusion	
following	 our	 discussions.	 Some	people	 told	me	 that	we	 should	 re‐
open	 the	 CBA	 if	 that	 was	 possible.	 Some	 people	 argued	 that	 there	
was	no	market	for	a	professional	league.	After	I	visited	some	owners,	
I	realised	that	they	could	still	support	basketball,	but	their	resources	
were	 limited.	 For	 example,	 the	 cost	 of	 running	 a	 professional	 club	
was	60	million	NTD	for	each	year,	but	the	owners	could	only	afford	
30	million.	It	was	not	possible	for	them	to	increase	the	funding	to	60	
million.	 We	 shared	 the	 same	 interest,	 but	 after	 considering	 the	
current	 situation,	 we	 found	 a	 middle	 ground,	 which	 was	 the	 SBL.	
That	is	why	I	said	the	SBL	was	not	a	default	option.	It	came	out	after	
the	 discussion	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	
27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
In	 other	 words,	 the	 SBL	 was	 a	 compromised	 product.	 The	 decision	 maker	
originally	had	the	idea	to	advance	from	an	unattractive	amateur	league	to	a	more	
exciting	solution.	They	tried	to	construct	a	comprehensive	system	that	covered	
regulations,	 broadcasts,	 facilities	 and	 fixtures	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 fans.	
Nevertheless,	they	did	not	have	enough	resource	to	establish	a	fully	professional	
league.	 The	 SAC	 therefore	 became	 a	 guarantor	 for	 the	 SBL	 and	 provided	
resources	 for	 it.	 In	 this	case,	not	only	did	the	SAC	act	as	 the	coordinator,	but	 it	
also	provided	physical	resources.			
I	preferred	the	SBL	to	be	set	up	under	the	structure	of	the	CTBA	in	
order	 to	 use	 human	 resources	 and	 referees.	 It	might	 be	 not	 a	 fully	
professional	league	but	it	still	had	the	spirit	of	a	professional	league.	
Therefore	 broadcast	 and	 facilities	 all	 came	 from	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	
SAC.	What	does	the	opinion	of	the	SAC	mean?	It	means	the	SAC	had	
resources.	 I	 remember	 we	 spent	 millions	 to	 renovate	 the	 Taipei	
stadium	to	make	it	the	main	venue	of	the	SBL.	In	terms	of	broadcasts,	
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I	found	ESPN	and	introduced	them	to	the	CTBA	(Interview	with	the	
government	officials,	13/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).			
The	SAC	had	control	of	the	resources	for	sport	in	Taiwan.	In	the	case	of	the	SBL,	
it	did	play	a	crucial	role	because	it	arranged	the	game	system,	the	renovation	of	
facilities,	and	even	hired	up	the	broadcasting	media.		
Initiated	by	 the	 SAC,	which	 also	 gained	 support	 from	CTBA	and	 clubs,	 the	 SBL	
was	 formed.	 The	 SAC	 had	 played	 the	 role	 of	 auxiliary;	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	
national	 policy,	 its	 promotion	 of	 the	 SBL	 also	 led	 to	 the	 re‐emergence	 of	
Basketball.	 Clubs	were	 the	partners	of	 the	SBL	and	 formed	 the	SBL	 committee	
with	the	SAC.	Clubs	worked	with	the	CTBA	to	draw	up	regulations,	to	which	the	
clubs	are	subject.	The	establishment	of	the	SBL	was	an	event	motivated	by	policy,	
with	the	guarantee	of	government.	In	order	to	run	the	SBL	smoothly,	there	had	
to	be	seamless	cooperation	between	the	CTBA	and	SBL.	
However,	the	CTBA	and	the	SBL	committee	had	always	had	arguments	about	the	
leadership	 of	 the	 SBL.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 SBL,	 the	 SAC	 had	 assigned	 the	
CTBA	 to	 act	 as	 the	 senior	 manager	 of	 the	 new	 league	 and	 had	 used	 CTBA’s	
resources	to	help	the	SBL	get	on	track	much	quicker.	In	the	meantime,	in	order	to	
secure	the	rights	and	power	for	the	club,	the	CTBA	had	set	up	the	committee	of	
the	SBL	incorporating	managers	from	every	club	to	be	a	communication	channel	
between	the	clubs	and	themselves.	The	establishment	of	 the	SBL	was	based	on	
the	 prospective‐professional	 structure	 and	 this	 formed	 a	 unique	 structure	 and	
relationship	between	the	government,	clubs,	the	broadcasting	unit	and	the	CTBA.	
However	this	unique	structure	also	caused	some	management	problems.		
The	 current	management	was	plagued	by	 the	 lack	 of	 cooperation	between	 the	
SBL	 committee	 and	 the	 CTBA,	 resulting	 in	 an	 efficient	 league	 and	 a	 non‐
profitable	business.	The	distance	between	the	clubs	and	the	CTBA	left	little	room	
for	a	common	view,	and	thus	a	situation	was	hard	to	solve.		
A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G4)	believed	the	structure	of	the	SBL	was	
problematic.		
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The	 prospective‐professional	 league	 means	 it	 is	 not	 a	 real	
professional	 one.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 SBL	 cannot	 be	 a	 professional	
league	because	the	government	has	been	involved.	The	SBL	is	put	in	
the	 structure	 of	 the	 CTBA	 which	 means	 that	 the	 SBL	 cannot	 go	
forward.	It	would	be	a	better	development	for	the	SBL	to	become	an	
independent	organisation.	Then	the	SBL	would	not	be	controlled	by	
the	CTBA.	However,	 the	 situation	 is	 that	 the	 chairman	of	 the	CTBA	
owns	a	club	and	he	can	have	the	ticket	revenue.	It	is	not	a	good	thing	
for	sport	development	in	Taiwan.	The	SBL	should	be	independent	for 
it to be a truly professional basketball league (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).    
The	distribution	of	financial	interest	seems	to	be	an	important	issue	for	the	SBL.	
In	the	initial	plan	of	the	Government,	the	CTBA	was	to	be	the	co‐organiser,	and	
would	also	be	the	recipient	of	all	 ticket	sales	in	order	to	cover	organising	costs	
for	events.	The	clubs’	external	 income	was	only	from	broadcasting	rights	and	a	
few	 marketing	 activities.	 For	 the	 SBL	 in	 2008,	 before	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	
broadcasting	rights	were	worth	NTD	56	million	in	each	of	the	fourth	and	the	fifth	
seasons.	This	amount	was	equally	shared	by	the	6	teams,	as	indicated	in	Figure	
6.1.	In	recent	seasons,	due	to	poor	ratings	and	decreasing	levels	of	sponsorship,	
each	club	received	NTD	3.1	million.	Even	in	2013,	or	the	11th	season,	each	club	
was	projected	to	make	only	NTD	3.35	million.		
Table	6.1:	Broadcaster	and	Broadcasting	Rights	Fee	
Season	(Year)	 Broadcaster	 Rights	Fee	 Club	sharing	
1st	Season	(03‐04)	 ESPN	 5600000	 800000	
2nd	Season	(04‐05)	 ESPN	 27500000	 3500000	
3rd	Season	(05‐06)	 ESPN	 35000000	 5000000	
4th	Season	(06‐07)	 ESPN	+	Videoland	 56000000	 8000000	
5th	Season	(07‐08)	 ESPN	+	Videoland	 56000000	 8000000	
6th	Season	(08‐09)	 ESPN(free)	+	ELTA	 6440000	 920000	
7th	Season	(09‐10)	 ESPN	+	ELTA	 23000000	 3285714	
8th	Season	(11‐12)	 ESPN	+ELTA	 23000000	 3285714	
(Source:	Interviewee	C3	from	an	SBL	club)	
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The	SBL	clubs	also	wanted	a	share	of	the	ticket	revenue	because,	it	was	argued,	it	
is	the	players	who	play	the	games,	not	the	event	organisers.	However	all	revenue	
from	the	ticket	sales	went	 into	the	CTBA’s	account	and	the	clubs	were	short	of	
additional	 funds	 to	 pay	 their	 players.	 The	 clubs	 certainly	 felt	 it	 was	 unfair.	
However,	 from	 the	 CTBA’s	 perspective,	 it	 not	 only	 organised	 competitions	 but	
also	had	to	invest	in	human	and	material	resources;	the	cost	was	large	for	a	non‐
profit	organisation	as	there	were	limited	sources	of	funding.	The	CTBA	therefore	
met	its	costs	with	money	from	ticket	sales.	However,	after	some	discussion,	the	
CTBA	decided	to	have	revenue	from	the	ticket	sales,	and	the	clubs	were	to	have	
the	revenue	from	the	broadcasting	rights	fee.	The	conflict	between	the	clubs	and	
the	CTBA	was	created	because	of	individual	financial	interests	(Hu,	2008).	
In	 the	seventh	season,	62,946	tickets	were	sold;	based	on	the	gross	profit	with	
the	average	ticket	price	at	NTD	150,	the	CTBA	would	have	gained	NTD	9	million	
without	 conducting	 any	 marketing	 activity.	 However,	 the	 clubs	 believed	 the	
financial	allocation	was	unreasonable.	Among	them,	the	more	puzzling	point	was	
that	 ESPN	 had	 broadcast	 rights	 and	 marketing	 rights	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Even	
though	ESPN	had	paid	for	the	broadcast	rights,	the	CTBA	had	also	authorised	and	
paid	ESPN	for	marketing	activities.	In	general,	people	believed	that	ESPN	would	
try	 to	 reduce	marketing	 expenditures	 as	 a	 cost	 reduction.	Why	 broadcast	 and	
marketing	 rights	 had	 been	 given	 to	 the	 same	 company	was	 the	 question	most	
frequently	asked	of	the	CTBA.			
A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G2)	 claimed	 that	 signing	 the	 relevant	
contracts	for	broadcasting	rights	was	a	matter	for	the	business	entities	involved,	
and	the	government	had	no	role	to	play	(Interview	with	the	government	officials,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
Another	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G3)	 also	 noted	 that	 in	 terms	 of	
professional	 sports,	 the	 role	 of	 a	 government	 should	be	 as	policy	maker	 and	a	
supervisor.		
The	government	should	act	as	a	policy	maker	and	leave	the	practical	
work	 to	 others.	 When	 the	 others	 do	 some	 practical	 work,	 the	
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government	 then	 becomes	 a	 supervisor	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
However,	in	the	real	situation,	the	government	official	was	over‐involved	in	the	
decision	of	broadcasting	unit.	A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G3)	claimed	
that	
The	SBL	was	the	idea	of	Lin	(former	Minister	of	the	SAC).	He	gave	it	
to	 ESPN	 completely	 at	 the	 beginning.	 However,	 the	 CTBA	 went	 to	
argue	 that	 they	 had	 resources	 to	 support.	 Finally,	 the	 SAC	 co‐
operated	with	the	CTBA.	How	could	a	government	give	money	for	a	
TV	 channel	 to	 organise	 a	 basketball	 event?	 It	 was	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
Head	 of	 government	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	
27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 financial	 structure	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 SBL,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
revenue	from	broadcasting	rights,	funding	of	the	clubs	also	came	from	the	parent	
companies.	The	clubs	that	were	funded	from	the	state‐owned	enterprises	relied	
on	government	budget	and	as	a	consequence	had	a	social	responsibility	to	assist	
the	 country	 to	 cultivate	 basketball	 talent.	 Private	 companies’	 engagement	 in	
professional	 sports	 is	 mostly	 fuelled	 by	 business	 owners’	 love	 of	 the	 sport.	
Although	the	firm	size	and	capital	is	not	very	large,	they	still	put	a	considerable	
amount	of	money	and	resources	into	the	club	(Hu,	2008).	Hence,	it	may	not	have	
been	the	primary	objective	for	clubs	to	gain	a	direct	profit	from	the	SBL.	
A	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G1)	 argued	 that	 the	 small	 scale	 of	 the	 parent	
companies	 meant	 that	 they	 could	 not	 fully	 support	 the	 SBL,	 while	 large	
companies	did	not	want	to	support	basketball.		
Clubs	 in	 Taiwan	 did	 not	 have	 large	 parent	 companies	 to	 support	
them.	 Sometimes	 large	 companies	 were	 willing	 to	 support	 sports,	
but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 were	 concerned	 that	 the	 club	 might	
damage	the	brand	reputation.	In	the	basketball	industry,	only	Yulon	
was	 a	 large	 company,	 and	Broadcasting	 of	 China	 and	Taiwan	Bank	
were	state‐owned	companies	which	had	enough	resources	to	invest	
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in	 sport	 sponsorship	or	marketing	 (Interview	with	 the	government	
officials,	13/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).				
‘Is	 it	 good	 for	 the	 reputation	 or	 corporate	 image?’	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	 most	
important	 question	 when	 a	 Taiwanese	 company	 evaluated	 the	 benefits	 from	
supporting	sports.	Professional	baseball	 in	Taiwan	set	a	precedent	as	 to	how	a	
large	company	could	also	be	dragged	down	with	the	gambling	scandals	of	their	
baseball	 teams.	Other	than	gambling	scandals,	 for	a	basketball	club,	 if	 the	team	
did	not	perform	very	well,	 it	might	also	damage	the	reputation	of	the	company.	
Thus	business	owners	might	not	want	to	support	professional	sport	because	of	
the	risks.	A	formal	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G1)	mentioned	a	conversation	with	the	
chairman	of	the	Taiwan	Beer	company.	
The	chairman	told	me,	why	should	spend	I	money	for	a	club	that	did	
not	 really	 contribute	 to	 the	 company	 if	 they	 kept	 losing.	 A	 normal	
employee	of	my	company	 is	not	paid	nearly	as	well	 as	a	basketball	
player	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 13/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).			
In	 this	 sense,	 “could	 we	 get	 a	 positive	 reputation	 by	 winning	
competitions“	became	a	main	concern	of	the	owner.	A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	
the	SAC	(G4)	mentioned.	
18	million	for	the	Taiwan	Bank	was	affordable.	However,	if	the	club	
gained	 a	 negative	 reputation,	why	 should	 the	 company	 support	 it?	
For	example,	if	the	club	is	ranked	last	every	year.	Funding	a	sporting	
club	is	a	kind	of	investment	which	involves	high	risk	(Interview	with	
the	government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
To	 enhance	 the	 corporate	 reputation,	 large	 companies	 believe	 that	 sponsoring	
mega	events	will	be	more	effective	and	involve	lower	risk	than	sponsoring	clubs.	
Private	companies	that	sponsor	clubs	also	fear	losing	control	of	their	clubs	as	the	
government	would	seek	ever	more	involvement	for	national	sports	development.	
For	 example,	 the	 state‐owned	 companies	 followed	 the	 policies	 of	 the	
government	 to	 support	 sporting	 clubs.	 The	 cost	 of	 sponsoring	mega	 events	 is	
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much	 higher	 than	 sponsoring	 a	 domestic	 club.	 However	 some	 companies	 still	
choose	 to	 sponsor	 international	 mega	 events	 because	 of	 higher	 return	 on	
investment.	
As	 an	 example,	 a	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	 claimed	 that	 Acer	
would	rather	sponsor	the	F1	or	the	Olympics	and	BenQ	may	already	have	plans	
to	 sponsor	 the	 European	 Championship	 in	 the	 future.	 Although	 the	 cost	 of	
sponsoring	 a	 mega	 event	 could	 fund	 a	 domestic	 club	 for	 two	 or	 three	 years,	
companies	 with	 deep	 pockets	 would	 still	 choose	 the	 former.	 They	 would	 all	
prefer	to	invest	in	a	more	effective	sponsorship.	Business	is	business	(Interview	
with	the	government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
A	 Former	Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G1)	 argued	 that	 the	 income	 from	 professional	
sports	 is	 far	 less	 than	 expenditure	 of	 running	 a	 professional	 club.	 Owners	 are	
losing	 money	 because	 the	 sport	 industry	 is	 not	 big	 enough	 to	 support	
professional	sports.		
When	the	owner	of	a	big	company	allocates	budgets,	he	will	always	
consider	the	reputation	of	the	club.	Good	reputation	is	good	for	the	
parent	 company.	 However,	 if	 the	 club	 is	 risking	 getting	 a	 bad	
reputation,	 owners	 will	 think	 about	 putting	 budgets	 to	 other	
purposes	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 13/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
In	recent	seasons,	 the	size	of	audience	was	declining.	The	stadiums	were	quite	
deserted.	 Negativity	 surrounding	 the	 CTBA,	 clubs,	 and	 marketing	 unit	 was	
expanding.	Some	scholars	believed	the	declining	audience	was	due	to	the	lack	of	
excitement	in	the	games	(Lee,	2000;	Hu,	2008).	
Clubs	 in	Taiwan	used	to	give	 funding	to	elite	high	school	players.	Then	players	
joined	a	 SBL	 club	after	 graduating	 from	high	 school.	However,	 as	 clubs	 always	
wanted	the	best	players	to	play	for	them,	clubs	competed	with	each	other	to	give	
funding	 to	high	school	players.	Therefore,	 rich	clubs	could	always	 recruit	good	
players,	 but	 normal	 clubs	 such	 as	 those	 supported	 by	 state‐owned	 companies	
could	not	recruit	young	players	by	providing	pre‐contract	financial	incentives.		
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Because	 of	 this	 one‐sided	 competition	 between	 clubs,	 the	 relative	 strengths	 of	
players	 of	 the	 clubs became unbalanced. The SBL's main source of players was 
also	student	basketball	 leagues	 such	 as	 HBL	 and	 UBA.	 This	 adoption	 of	
traditional	 recruitment	 reinforced	 inequalities	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 “the	 big	 get	
bigger	and	the	small	get	even	smaller.	That	is	why	the	game	lacks	excitement	for	
people	to	watch”	(Hu,	2008).	
However,	a	former	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G1)	argued	that	the	recruitment	system	
would	not	be	a	problem	if	they	had	a	strict	draft	system.	
I	 believe	 the	 system	 is	 good.	 You	 can	 give	 funding	 to	 high	 school	
players,	but	you	cannot	say	they	are	all	your	property.	What	I	mean	
is	 clubs	 can	 cultivate	 players	 for	 the	 league	 to	 use	 in	 the	 future.	
Players	 should	 go	 through	 the	draft	 system.	The	 result	 of	 the	 draft	
may	 not	 always	 the	 best	 result	 for	 your	 own	 club.	 However,	 the	
performance	of	the	league	will	become	better	and	better	(Interview	
with	 the	 government	 officials,	 13/12/2010,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).			
However,	 Clubs	 in	 Taiwan	 seem	 to	 believe	 that	 once	 players	 are	 funded	 they	
become	 the	 property	 of	 clubs.	 Players	 are	weak	 in	 the	 basketball	 system.	 The	
SBL	has	a	maximum	salary	regulation	of	NTD	120000	every	month	per	player.		
A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G2)	mentioned		
For	 example,	 Yang	 Che‐Yi	 is	 a	 player	 who	 played	 for	 the	 National	
Team.	 He	 might	 have	 earned	 the	 top	 salary	 of	 NTD	 120000	 per	
month.	But	it	is	likely	he	will	have	a	negative	attitude	and	instead	be	
seeking	simply	to	avoid	 injury	when	he	plays.	 If	he	can	play	 longer,	
he	 can	 get	 more	 money.	 Once	 he	 is	 injured,	 he	 will	 lose	 the	 NTD	
120000	per	month.	So	 this	situation	means	 that	 the	games	are	of	a	
poor	 standard.	 However	 the	 government	 cannot	 intervene	 here	
because	this	is	a	commercial	activity	(Interview	with	the	government	
officials,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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Government	officials	argued	that	the	SBL	should	follow	market	mechanisms.	For	
example,	 the	 contracts	 of	 players	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 commercial	matter.	 If	
clubs	do	not	break	the	law,	government	cannot	get	involved.		
You	 can	 blame	 no	 one	 for	 the	 contract	 of	 players.	 It	 takes	 two	 to	
tango.	Good	players	will	 always	have	solutions.	 If	he	 is	 the	best,	he	
will	go	 to	NBA.	Or	you	can	 take	Tzeng	Wen‐Ting	as	an	example,	he	
now	 plays	 in	 China	 and	 he	 has	 a	 big	 contract	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 the	 view	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 the	 government	 had	 expected	 that	 basketball	
would	 develop	 in	 a	 healthy	manner.	 However,	 in	 practice,	 if	 stakeholders	 put	
their	 own	 interests	 first,	 the	 government	 cannot	 adjust	 its	 policy	 accordingly	
because	the	government	can	do	little	to	intervene	in	commercial	sport.		
	
6.3	The	Perspective	of	the	Members	of	the	CTBA	Staff	
The	 CTBA	 is	 a	 non‐governmental	 sporting	 organisation.	 Since	 1954,	 the	 CTBA	
has	 played	 a	 role	 in	 promoting	 basketball.	 It	 organises	 the	 national	 team	 and	
hosts	domestic	and	international	competitions.	The	CTBA	played	a	crucial	role	in	
the	emergence	of	SBL	because	it	was	responsible	for	running	the	league	once	the	
SAC	had	decided	the	policy	direction.			
A	vice	chairman	of	the	CTBA	(F2)	mentioned	that	the	idea	of	a	new	league	had	
come	from	fans’	pressure.	
After	the	suspension	of	the	CBA,	the	only	basketball	competition	left	
for	 fans	 to	 follow	was	 the	Division	One	Amateur	 League.	However,	
fans	 were	 not	 satisfied	 with	 it	 because	 they	 had	 previously	 had	 a	
professional	 league.	Therefore	 the	 SAC	became	actively	 involved.	 It	
sought	 to	 combine	 the	 resources	 of	 media,	 clubs,	 and	 other	
organisations	 to	 set	 up	 the	 SBL.	 Basically	 there	 were	 too	 many	
federations	 for	 the	 SAC	 to	 manage,	 so	 the	 SAC	 gave	 the	 CTBA	
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autonomy	 to	 promote	 the	 competition	 (Interview	 with	 the	 CTBA,	
12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Because	the	CTBA	is	a	non‐profit	organisation	and	it	thus	to	be	assumed	not	to	
get	involve	with	any	profit‐making	activity,	it	did	not	sell	tickets	for	the	Division	
One	Amateur	games.	The	entire	funding	of	the	CTBA	came	from	the	government	
and	sponsors.	However,	once	the	SBL	had	been	set	up,	the	SAC	gave	preference	
to	 the	 CTBA	 for	 it	 to	 handle	 the	most	 important	 part	 of	 this	 league	 operation	
(facilities,	 referees,	 fixtures	etc.).	The	clubs	agreed	to	 this	 in	order	to	make	the	
SBL	happen.	So	the	revenue	from	ticket	sales	was	allocated	to	the	CTBA	to	pay	
costs	of	organising	games.	
A	vice	chairman	of	the	CTBA	(F2)	mentioned	that	financial	issue	was	one	of	the	
considerations	of	the	CTBA	when	discussing	the	new	league.	
The	 focal	 point	 is	 ‘money’	 when	 the	 government	 authorises	 a	
national	federation	to	do	something.	For	example,	it	is	tough	for	the	
CTBA	to	host	the	competition.	The	budget	is	not	enough.	Fortunately,	
because	 the	 SBL	 has	 fans	 to	 support	 it,	 we	 can	 finance	 the	
competition	by	ticket	sales.	The	SBL	uses	ticket	revenue	to	cover	the	
fees	 for	 transportation,	 facilities,	 and	 human	 resources	 (Interview	
with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Actual	 operations	 were	 all	 managed	 by	 the	 CTBA	 because	 the	 government	
effectively	became	a	supervisor	after	it	had	initiated	the	policy.		
When	we	planned	the	SBL,	we	talked	to	the	clubs	in	advance.	Clubs	
which	had	the	ambition	to	play	and	passed	the	evaluation	would	be	
allowed	 to	 join	 the	 league.	Although	 they	were	under	my	 structure	
(the	CTBA),	we	discussed	things	with	them	when	we	planned	to	set	
up	 the	SBL.	What	 I	mean	by	 ‘under	 the	CTBA’s	 structure’	 is	we	did	
more	than	the	clubs,	and	we	supervised	them	like	the	SAC	supervised	
us	(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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The	CTBA’s	official	 considered	 its	 role	 to	be	 that	of	 an	 ‘authorised	 supervisor’.	
Clubs	were	supervised	by	 the	CTBA,	and	 the	CTBA	was	supervised	by	 the	SAC.	
When	decisions	were	to	be	made	for	the	SBL,	clubs	played	an	important,	but	not	
necessarily	a	critical	role.	However,	the	SBL	was	organised	under	the	structure	of	
the	CTBA,	and	the	CTBA	considered	 its	authority	 to	be	greater	 than	that	of	 the	
clubs.	 Such	 an	 organisation	 of	 the	 league	 with	 a	 confusion	 of	 powers	 led	 to	
problems	which	accumulated	for	future	operations.		
Although	 the	 CTBA	 official	 believed	 the	 CTBA	 played	 a	 supervisory	 role,	 he	
argued	 that	 all	 decisions	 were	 made	 together	 with	 clubs.	 He	 suggested,	 “We	
know	 the	 stakes	 involved	 in	 decisions.	 It	 is	 impossible	 for	 the	 CTBA	 to	 decide	
everything	 without	 the	 clubs’	 agreement”	 (Interview	 with	 the	 CTBA,	
12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
A	 member	 of	 the	 CTBA	 staff	 (F1)	 mentioned	 that	 before	 the	 CTBA	 made	
decisions	they	still	consulted	clubs	although	the	SBL	committee	existed	in	name	
only.		
The	SBL	committee	no	longer	hosted	any	meeting	anymore.	However	
before	 this	 season	 began,	 we	 (CTBA)	 still	 invited	 clubs	 and	
government	officials	to	discuss	matters.	For	example,	the	fixture,	the	
draft	 system,	 and	 the	 issue	 of	 players	 transfer	 to	 China;	 we	 had	
meetings	 before	 the	 season	 began.	 	 We	 addressed	 problems	 in	
advance	then	we	reached	a	common	view.	Once	the	CTBA	and	clubs	
have	 a	 common	 view,	 the	 operation	 and	 the	 planning	 of	 the	 SBL	
promotion	 ran	 more	 smoothly	 (Interview	 with	 the	 CTBA,	
30/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
This	member	 of	 the	 CTBA	 staff	 (F1)	 further	 claimed	 that	 although	 bidding	 for	
marketing	 and	 sponsorship	 had	 been	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 SBL	 committee,	
the	CTBA	had	taken	over	this	task	in	recent	seasons.		
The	decision	making	process	of	the	SBL	committee	followed	the	tradition	of	the	
CBA.	 It	 adopted	 a	 collegiate	 system	 [common	 right	 of	 members	 to	 exercise	 a	
veto].	The	goal	 for	adopting	such	a	system	was	to	reach	a	consensus	among	all	
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participants	in	order	to	avoid	losing	support	of	the	minority	group.	The	SBL	did	
not	adopt	a	voting	mechanism;	even	though	it	was	inefficient	to	spend	so	much	
time	and	effort	 in	discussion.	 In	such	discussions,	 it	can	be	observed	that	clubs	
set	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 parent	 companies	 as	 their	 first	 priority.	 If	 consensus	
was	not	achieved,	the	SBL	committee	simply	proved	ineffective.									
A	CTBA	member	of	staff	(F1)	believed	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	SBL	committee	
led	to	the	SBL’s	poor	marketing	campaign.	
Originally,	the	SBL	committee	was	responsible	for	marketing,	and	the	
CTBA	was	only	responsible	for	the	ticket	selling.	Now	the	CTBA	must	
decide	who	is	going	to	do	the	marketing	for	the	SBL.	Maybe	it	was	a	
problem	of	 communication;	we	did	not	decide	about	 the	marketing	
unit	 until	 very	 late.	 In	 the	 seventh	 season,	 we	 did	 not	 have	 a	
marketing	 plan	 until	 ten	 days	 before	 the	 opening	 game.	Marketing	
was	 a	 major	 weakness	 for	 the	 SBL	 (Interview	 with	 the	 CTBA,	
30/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
Now	 the	 final	 decision	over	marketing	 rights	was	 to	be	 taken	by	 the	CTBA.	 	A	
CTBA	member	of	staff	(F1)	claimed	that	it	was	reasonable	for	the	CTBA	to	take	
over	responsibility	for	this	because	clubs	could	not	reach	common	ground	on	it.	
When	 the	 SBL	 committee	 could	 not	 finish	 its	 job,	 the	 CTBA	 had	 to	
step	in.	Because	the	CTBA	is	the	official	organiser,	we	should	ensure	
that	 the	 games	 happen	 on	 time.	 In	 the	 last	 two	 seasons,	 we,	 the	
CTBA,	 had	 a	 discussion	 with	 the	 clubs	 over	 scheduling	 of	 games.	
Then	we	went	 to	 negotiate	with	 ESPN.	 “The	 SBL	 season	 should	 be	
opened	 in	 time”,	 that	was	 the	 first	 priority	 for	us.	This	 season	 (the	
8th	season)	we	discussed	with	the	clubs	and	ESPN	in	advance.	Then	
we	 announced	 that	 the	 opening	 game	was	 set	 to	 take	 place	 on	 25	
December.	The	 reason	we	did	 this	was	 to	give	 clubs	 time	 to	 set	up	
their	training	plan	and	for	fans	to	have	the	schedule	(Interview	with	
the	CTBA,	30/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
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It	seems	the	CTBA	staff	believed	that	they	had	done	a	good	job	to	connect	clubs,	
fans	 and	 the	 broadcasting	 unit.	 Faced	 with	 criticism	 of	 CTBA’s	 marketing	
strategy,	a	vice	chairman	of	the	CTBA	argued	that	the	CTBA	had	no	choice	but	to	
outsource	the	work	of	marketing	because	it	did	not	have	the	human	resources	to	
do	this	itself.	
CBA	was	a	professional	league	so	its	promotion	and	marketing	could	
be	 run	 by	 the	 association	 because	 they	 had	 enough	 resources.	 The	
SBL	 involved	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 CTBA,	 and	 the	 CTBA	 is	 just	 a	
corporation.	 Unlike	 a	 government	 department	 which	 has	 a	 lot	 of	
staff,	there	are	only	seven	full	time	employees	working	in	the	CTBA.	
How	 can	 we	 do	 the	 marketing	 very	 well?	 ESPN	 can	 achieve	
something	by	using	marketing	and	broadcasting	together	(Interview	
with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
A	Vice	Chairman	of	the	CTBA	(F2)	implied	that	the	decision‐making	of	clubs	was	
the	main	cause	of	the	problems	in	marketing	and	broadcasting.	
There	was	an	SBL	 committee	originally,	 and	 they	were	 responsible	
for	the	negotiation	of	marketing	and	broadcasting	rights.	In	the	sixth	
season,	the	bidding	for	broadcast	ran	aground;	ESPN	and	Videoland	
quit	 the	 negotiation.	 There	 was	 no	 unit	 to	 broadcast	 the	 SBL.	 The	
CTBA	could	not	sit	 idle	while	no	 fan	could	get	access	to	the	SBL,	so	
the	CTBA	got	 involved	aggressively.	Wang	was	 the	 chairman	at	 the	
time	and	he	got	involved	actively.	Finally	ESPN	came	back	on‐board	
to	broadcast	the	SBL	and	we	were	able	to	sell	tickets	(Interview	with	
the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
From	the	perspective	of	the	CTBA,	the	sale	of	TV	broadcast	rights	is	essential	for	
the	SBL.	A	Vice	Chairman	of	the	CTBA	(F2)	mentioned	that	ESPN	finally	agreed	to	
broadcast	the	SBL,	but	they	did	not	have	to	pay	any	rights	fee	to	the	SBL.		
We	asked	ESPN	to	come	back.	The	broadcasting	and	marketing	rights	
were	 a	 giveaway.	We	did	not	 ask	 them	 to	pay	 for	 the	broadcasting	
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and	marketing	 rights	at	 all	 (Interview	with	 the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
A	CTBA	staff	member	(F1)	explained	the	process	of	decision‐making	in	relation	
to	broadcasting	rights.	
We,	 CTBA,	 the	 clubs,	 and	 ESPN	 had	 a	 meeting	 together.	 What	 the	
CTBA,	 as	 a	 main	 organiser,	 wanted	 was	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 season	
opened	on	time.	Then	 it	was	 fine	 for	 the	clubs	and	ESPN	to	discuss	
the	details	of	the	broadcasting	fee	in	the	meeting.	However,	the	game	
organiser	was	the	CTBA;	it	was	the	only	entity	which	could	sign	the	
contract	with	 the	 broadcasting	 unit	 eventually	 (Interview	with	 the	
CTBA,	30/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
It	is	a	strange	contract	since	the	TV	broadcasting	fee	would	have	accounted	for	a	
majority	income	for	the	clubs.	This	issue	is	discussed	below	in	the	perspective	of	
another	stakeholder,	namely	the	media.	
Given	the	view	of	the	CTBA,	all	contracts	should	be	signed	by	the	main	organiser	
(i.e.	 the	 CTBA)	 because	 the	 SBL	 was	 not	 a	 professional	 league.	 However,	 this	
mechanism	became	a	point	of	criticism	towards	the	CTBA.		
On	 the	other	hand,	 a	Vice	Chairman	of	 the	CTBA	 (F2)	mentioned	 that	 the	 club	
owners	 did	 not	 support	 basketball	 because	 of	 the	 profit.	 The	 owners’	 concern	
was	 with	 the	 marketing	 and	 reputation	 of	 the	 parent	 company.	 This	 claim	
implies	that	the	size	of	the	broadcasting	fee	was	not	the	main	concern.	
The	SBL	is	not	a	professional	league.	It	is	a	semi‐professional	league,	
so	 the	 clubs	 participate	 in	 the	 SBL	 solely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
promoting	 their	 parent	 companies.	 The	 promotion	 was	 aimed	 at	
increasing	 public	 awareness	 that	 companies	 such	 as	 Taiwan	 Beer,	
Taiwan	 Bank	 or	 Dacin	 Building	 support	 basketball.	 They	 have	 no	
share	in	the	ticket	sales.	The	revenue	from	ticket	sales	was	to	be	used	
for	organising	 the	 league.	 In	 terms	of	 the	share	of	broadcasting	 fee,	
each	 club	 would	 only	 receive	 NTD	 8	 million	 per	 season	 at	 most.	
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However,	 it	 is	 just	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 costs	 for	 a	 club.	 So	 the	main	
reason	for	support	by	a	club	actually	comes	from	the	passion	of	the	
owner.	Taking	Yulon	as	an	example,	the	running	of	the	club	cost	the	
owner	 around	 NTD	 50	million	 per	 season.	 NTD	 8	 million	 was	 not	
worth	 a	 mention	 to	 the	 owners	 (Interview	 with	 the	 CTBA,	
12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
This	argument	underscores	the	position	of	the	CTBA.	The	CTBA	did	not	show	any	
real	 concern	 about	 the	 broadcasting	 fee,	 which	 would	 be	 the	 main	 income	 of	
clubs,	and	the	CTBA	obtained	all	the	ticket	revenue.	This	was	a	probable	irritant	
promoting	conflict	between	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs.			
From	 the	discussion	 above,	 the	CTBA’s	position	 clashed	with	 that	of	 the	 clubs.	
However,	on	the	issue	of	players’	contracts,	the	CTBA	and	clubs	shared	common	
ground.	 The	 CTBA	 and	 clubs	 set	 up	 a	 regulation	 concerning	 a	 salary	 cap	 for	
players	 –	 each	 player	 could	 only	 receive	 a	 maximum	 NTD	 120	 thousand	 per	
month.	 Apart	 from	 this,	 the	 CTBA	had	 no	 other	 regulation	 concerning	 player’s	
contracts	with	respect	to	clubs’	operations.		
According	to	a	statement	by	a	recent	vice	chairman	of	CTBA,	clubs	and	the	CTBA	
set	up	 the	regulation	 together	because	 the	CTBA	believed	 this	 regulation	could	
stabilise	the	development	of	the	SBL.	
We	did	not	like	the	clubs	to	be	involved	in	excessive	competition	or	
the	 bidding	 for	 elite	 players.	 For	 example,	 if	 Yulon	 gives	 its	 best	
player,	 Tseng,	 180	 thousand	 NTD	 per	 month,	 the	 best	 player	 of	
Dacin,	 Tian	 Lei,	 will	 complain	 about	 his	 monthly	 salary	 of	 120	
thousand	 NTD.	 We	 hope	 there	 is	 no	 excessive	salary	inflation	
(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 the	 actual	 operation	 of	 the	 SBL,	 there	 were	 many	 differences	 between	 the	
CTBA	and	clubs.	However,	they	keep	maintained	a	subtly	positive	relationship	in	
order	to	maintain	their	own	interests.	They	might	have	conflicts	on	one	issue	but	
at	the	same	time	remained	cooperative	on	others.	Faced	with	criticism,	the	CTBA	
believed	it	played	by	its	own	rule	successfully:			
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It	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 make	 everything	 perfect	 for	 the	 current	
organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 CTBA.	 Today’s	 basketball	
environment	 was	 established	 by	 everyone	 together	 including	 the	
clubs,	 CTBA,	 media,	 etc.	 People	 should	 not	 blindly	 criticise.	
Journalists’	 main	 interviewees	 were	 club	 representatives	 and	
players,	so	they	always	reported	the	complaints	of	these	two	sets	of	
parties.	Journalists	never	went	to	ask	for	the	views	of	the	CTBA.	That	
is	why	the	CTBA	was	always	being	criticised.	The	CTBA	had	a	role	to	
play	 in	 providing	 services.	We	 always	 try	 to	make	 things	 better	 to	
satisfy	 clubs	 and	 players.	 However,	 clubs	 and	 players	 are	 too	
demanding	 to	 be	 satisfied.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 referees,	 we	
cannot	avoid	the	mistakes	of	referees.	However	you	should	not	over	
interpret	in	arguing	that	one	mistake	as	the	cause	of	the	financial	loss	
of	 a	 club.	 People	 always	 say	 something	 positive	 about	 themselves.	
When	we	deal	with	the	complaints	of	clubs	and	players,	we	try	to	do	
our	best.	However,	we	will	ignore	the	demands,	which	are	made	of	us	
which	we	cannot	implement	(Interview	with	the	CTBA,	12/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).		
	
6.4	The	Perspective	of	the	Media	
The	 suspension	 of	 the	 CBA	 caused	 a	 certain	 impact	 on	 the	 development	 of	
Taiwan	basketball.	Not	only	did	players	 lose	 the	stage	on	which	 they	had	been	
able	to	display	their	skills	and	not	only	did	student	players	loss	a	potential	future	
career,	but	the	national	team	also	performed	poorly	in	international	competition.	
This	 situation	 did	 not	 change	 until	 the	 SAC	 began	 to	 resuscitate	 basketball	 in	
2003.	 Eleven	 of	 the	 key	 stakeholders	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research	mentioned	
that	 Lin	 Te‐Fu	 was	 the	 primary	 influence	 in	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 SBL.	 A	 senior	
journalist	(M1)	argued	Lin	Te‐Fu	created	the	SBL	during	his	administration.	
The	policy	–	‘To	create	a	basketball	league	suited	to	Taiwan’	did	not	
come	 from	 aides	 but	 from	 Lin	 himself.	 Firstly,	 in	 2003,	 Lin,	 as	 a	
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Minister	 of	 the	 SAC,	 used	 government	 budget	 to	 renovate	 Taipei	
White	Stadium.	Secondly,	he	invited	people	from	all	circles	to	set	up	
the	 league	 for	 the	 CTBA	 to	 operate.	 Lin	 combined	 government	
resources,	private	resources	of	clubs	and	advertising	resources	of	the	
media,	 against	 all	 the	 odds,	 to	 make	 a	 vision	 and	 to	 promote	
basketball	 development	 in	 Taiwan	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	
16/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	SAC	(2003)	mentioned	that	 in	order	to	 improve	the	basketball	situation	 in	
the	 downturn	 the	 SAC	 actively	 assisted	 the	 CTBA	 to	 plan	 the	 SBL.	 The	 SAC	
recruited	former	National	team	captain,	Cheng	Chi‐Long,	as	the	convener,	invited	
the	CTBA,	senior	basketball	players,	and	other	professionals	to	form	a	Republic	
of	China	Super	Basketball	League	Promotion	Team	in	April	2003.	The	managing	
board	 of	 the	 CTBA	 passed	 a	 resolution	 to	 set	 up	 the	 committee	 of	 the	 Super	
Basketball	 League	 in	 May	 2003.	 The	 committee	 consisted	 of	 eleven	 members	
from	the	SAC,	the	CTBA,	seven	clubs,	and	independent	community	members.	The	
SAC	used	 a	 special	 budget	 (NTD	20	million)	 to	 renovate	 the	 stadium.	The	 SAC	
also	decided	to	provide	NTD$	800	thousand	per	club	to	support	the	clubs	which	
would	participate	in	the	SBL	(SAC,	2003:	96).	
This	situation	reflects	the	context	of	the	development	of	sport	policy	in	Taiwan.	A	
former	 deputy	 minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G3)	 argued	 “sport	 policy	 in	 Taiwan	 was	
always	 initiated	 by	 the	 head	 of	 department.	 The	 policy	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Education	 came	 from	 the	 Minister	 of	 Education.	 The	 Policy	 of	 the	 SAC	 was	
dominated	by	the	Minister	of	the	SAC.	The	direction	of	policy	would	inevitably	be	
strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	 head’s	 subjective	 views”	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
At	 the	 time,	 Lin	 began	 to	 promote	 a	 new	 league	 because	 he	 recognised	 that	
basketball	development	was	suffering.	The	first	resource	he	turned	to	was	a	TV	
channel,	which	was	familiar	with	the	operation	of	basketball	games	–	Videoland	
Sports	Channel.	The	manager	of	Videoland	Sports	Channel	(M2)	claimed:	
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The	SBL	was	the	final	product	of	a	series	of	discussions.	Eight	years	
ago,	 Lin	 came	 to	 visit	 me	 and	 Ho	 (the	 general	 manager	 of	 the	
Videoland)	 in	order	 to	re‐start	 the	CBA,	and	his	major	concern	was	
whether	 the	 clubs	would	 refuse	 to	 join.	He	 therefore	 asked	 for	our	
support.	I	then	wrote	a	proposal	for	him	(Interview	with	the	media,	
06/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
However,	when	 the	SBL	emerged,	 the	SAC	and	 the	CTBA	did	not	 choose	 to	 co‐
operate	with	the	Videoland	Sport	Channel.	
After	we	wrote	 the	proposal,	 Lin	 said	 that	 the	 SAC	 could	not	 show	
partiality	to	Videoland,	so	they	opened	a	public	bid.	We	lost	the	bid	
because	 our	 team	was	 not	 strong	 enough	while	Nike	 offered	more	
resources	 than	 us	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	 06/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
ESPN	 co‐operated	 with	 Nike	 to	 win	 the	 bid.	 ESPN	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	
broadcasting	 and	 Nike	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 marketing	 of	 games.	 Such	 a	
combination	helped	them	to	win	the	bid	for	the	broadcasting	and	the	marketing	
rights.	From	the	perspective	of	the	media,	the	reason	for	the	successful	launch	of	
the	SBL	was	the	direction	provided	by	Minister	Lin	and	the	support	of	the	media.	
A	manager	of	ESPN	(M3)	claimed:	
Minister	Lin	played	an	important	role	in	seeking	the	participation	of	
ESPN/Nike.	We	put	 in	a	very	high	price	on	broadcasting	rights	and	
Nike	put	in	a	very	high	marketing	cost.	The	SBL	therefore	became	an	
event	 which	 the	 ESPN	 could	 not	 turn	 down	 (Interview	 with	 the	
media,	11/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
The	media	attributed	the	successful	launch	of	the	SBL	to	the	direction	of	Minister	
Lin	together	with	their	own	support	of	media.	Although	the	SBL	was	established	
with	government	support,	a	senior	journalist	argued	that	the	government	did	not	
really	assist	in	the	operation	of	the	SBL.	
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Take	Taipei	city	as	an	example,	the	Taipei	Dome,	which	was	built	by	
the	 government,	 is	 useless	 for	 the	 development	 of	 professional	
sports.	We	 need	 a	 stadium	which	 can	 accommodate	 five	 thousand	
people	 rather	 than	 a	 huge	 stadium	 with	 a	 capacity	 of	 twenty	
thousand	people.	Furthermore,	 there	was	no	 incentive	for	a	private	
company	 to	 support	 the	 development	 of	 basketball,	 such	 as	 tax	
reduction.	 The	 government	 should	 focus	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
development	(Interview	with	the	media,	16/12/2010,	translated	by	
the	author).	
According	 to	 the	 journalist,	 even	 though	 the	 government	 could	 not	 support	
commercial	sport	directly,	the	government	did	not	allocate	its	budget	very	well	
because	the	majority	of	the	budget	was	allocated	to	sports	in	which	Taiwan	had	a	
better	chance	of	succeeding	in	international	competitions.		
The	government	ignored	the	development	of	basketball	because	we	
cannot	 win	 medals	 in	 international	 competition.	 Nationalist	
sentiment	is	what	the	government	wants,	and	the	medal	for	baseball	
helped	them	to	achieve	 it.	This	means	in	Taiwan,	a	sport	which	can	
win	 a	 medal	 in	 international	 competitions	 can	 be	 a	 ‘competitive	
sport’.	 However,	 the	 government	 said	 basketball	 might	 actually	
become	 a	 ‘sport	 for	 all’	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	 16/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).		
A	senior	journalist	(M1)	went	on	to	argue	that	the	government	supported	sports	
for	‘political	reasons’.		
Both	 the	KMT	 and	 the	DPP	 treated	 sport	 the	 same	way.	 Sport	was	
used	as	a	 tool	by	politicians.	He	 further	mentioned	 that	 there	were	
three	points	considered	by	the	SAC:	first,	can	the	sport	win	a	medal?	
Second,	 can	 the	 sport	arouse	nationalist	 feeling	of	 citizen?	Third,	 is	
the	 sport	 popular?	 However,	 the	 SAC	 is	 primarily	 concerned	 with	
popular	sports	because	it	can	get	positive	scores	in	the	evaluation	for	
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government	 departments	 if	 it	 can	 demonstrate	 sporting	 success	
(Interview	with	the	media,	16/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).			
In	 this	sense,	 the	manager	of	a	TV	sport	channel	(M2)	argued	that	government	
involvement	 was	 not	 necessary	 for	 basketball	 development	 because	 the	
government	focused	on	political	aims	rather	than	real	sport	development.	
A	politician	does	not	want	anything	 to	go	wrong	during	his	 tenure.	
The	government	has	 its	 own	concerns	 in	 terms	of	 elections	 and	 its	
vote	 count.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 that	 they	 always	 said	 “professional	
baseball	 league	 cannot	 collapse	 or	 basketball	 league	 cannot	
collapse.”	Here	I	hold	a	different	opinion.	If	the	government	identifies	
professional	 sport	 as	 commercial	 activity,	 it	 should	 let	 the	 market	
decide	 everything	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	 06/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).					
In	this	manager’s	viewpoint,	government	should	encourage	the	private	sector	to	
support,	but	not	to	be	directly	involved	in	the	operation	of	the	sport.		
The	 government	 should	 set	 up	 some	 “incentives”	 for	 those	
companies	which	 support	 sport,	 for	 example,	 a	 tax	 reduction	 plan.	
The	government’s	 focus	should	be	on	 the	environment,	not	 just	 the	
hardware.	 The	 stadium	which	 was	 built	 by	 government	 should	 be	
used	by	 the	national	 team	as	 a	 training	 facility.	 So	 the	 government	
should	 encourage	 some	 big	 IT	 companies	 to	 get	 involved	 and	 give	
them	incentives.	If	different	levels	of	the	company	get	involved,	then	
different	levels	of	tax	reduction	can	be	given.	This	is	what	I	mean	by	
the	 environment,	 not	 just	 building	 a	 stadium	 out	 there	 (Interview	
with	the	media,	06/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Three	interviewees	in	the	media	group	argued	that	the	government	did	not	have	
a	practical	development	plan	for	the	future	of	basketball	but	instead	made	a	one‐
off	investment	(in	the	stadium).	
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6.5	The	Perspective	of	the	Sponsors	
In	terms	of	the	establishment	of	the	SBL,	A	former	Nike	manager	(S1)	addressed	
the	relationship	of	the	SAC,	ESPN,	and	Nike.	
At	that	point	in	time,	the	SAC	was	trying	to	do	more	things	in	sport	
because	 of	 the	 election.	 It	 was	 a	 political	 achievement	 to	 be	
addressed.	 However,	 Lin	 was	 genuinely	 supportive	 of	 basketball	
development	without	political	motives.	He	simply	wanted	to	re‐open	
a	 professional	 league.	 When	 we	 heard	 this	 news,	 we	 co‐operated	
with	ESPN	to	make	a	proposal.	In	this	proposal,	TV	broadcasting	was	
the	responsibility	of	ESPN	and	all	marketing	was	the	responsibility	of	
NIKE.	It	was	very	clear	when	we	signed	the	contract.	What	Nike	got	
was	 sixty	 percent	 of	 the	 advertisement‐selling,	 and	 the	 other	 forty	
percent	 was	 for	 ESPN	 to	 sell	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	
04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
This	 former	Nike	manager	 (S1)	mentioned	 that	 the	 government	 supported	 the	
establishment	of	the	SBL	because	the	government	played	a	role	as	a	promoter	of	
Sport	for	all.	
If	it	is	a	commercial	activity,	how	could	you	expect	the	government	to	
help	you?	If	it	is	not	a	commercial	activity	today,	and	you	do	not	sell	
tickets,	TV	broadcasting	 rights	 and	TV	advertisement,	 you	 can	be	a	
promoter	of	Sport	for	All.	Fine!	The	government	should	give	a	decent	
level	 of	 support	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
Indeed,	 in	 the	 government’s	 position,	 it	 could	 not	 support	 professional	 sports	
directly.	 The	 government	 had	 to	 use	 an	 alternative	 way	 to	 support	
professional/semi‐professional	sports.	Also	this	manager	implied	the	SBL	should	
represent	itself	as	‘sport	for	all’	rather	than	taking	side	with	‘competitive	sport’.	
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A	 former	 deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	 mentioned	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	
professional	sports	system	in	Taiwan	was	due	to	the	lack	of	a	single	government	
department	covering	all	the	responsibilities	for	supervising	professional	sport.	
Professional	 sport	 is	 complicated.	 It	 involves	 commercial	 activities.	
Commercial	 activities	 involve	 the	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs.	The	
problem	 is	 that	 if	 policy	 can	 guide	 a	professional	 sport	 to	promote	
the	sport,	then	of	course,	it	can	be	the	locomotive	of	the	sport	at	the	
amateur	 level.	 It	 is	 good	 for	 the	 development	 of	 national	 sport.	
However	 if	 it	 is	 a	 profit‐making	 unit,	 government	 is	 in	 a	 tough	
position.	If	the	government	supports	the	sport	it	will	be	criticised	for	
not	 supporting	 other	 sports	 events.	 The	 government	 therefore	
sometimes	 tried	 to	 assist	 but	without	 getting	 involved	 too	directly.	
The	 government	 became	 a	 coordinator	 at	 best	 (Interview	 with	
government	officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).					
Although	 the	 government	 saw	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘supervisor’	 in	 the	 initial	 stages,	 the	
former	 Nike	 manager	 (S1)	 mentioned	 that	 the	 government	 funded	 the	 SBL	
directly	in	the	beginning.			
The	SAC	did	fund	the	SBL	in	the	first	season.	The	first	funding	was	for	
renovation	 of	 the	 stadium.	 But	 the	 stadium	 was	 closed	 after	 four	
years.	Although	it	was	a	strange	policy,	I	feel	that	the	SAC	was	misled	
by	 the	 CTBA.	 How	 can	 you	 spend	 5	million	 dollars	 of	 budget	 on	 a	
facility	which	will	be	closed	shortly	afterwards?	(Interview	with	the	
sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author)			
The	 government	 seemed	 to	 have	 acted	 beyond	 its	 predefined	 role	 as	 ‘a	
supervisor’.	However,	a	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G5)	argued	that	this	
kind	of	support	did	not	violate	the	role	of	the	government.	
The	stadium	was	a	public	facility.	What	we	did	was	to	help	them	to	
operate.	 It	 benefited	 our	 citizens	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 (Interview	
with	government	officials,	28/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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In	 terms	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 government,	 this	 sponsor	 interviewee	 had	
reservations	 about	 the	 way	 the	 government	 supported	 the	 SBL	 because	 the	
Taipei	 stadium	was	 demolished	 to	 build	 a	 stadium	 for	 track	 and	 field	 for	 the	
Deaflympics	four	years	later.					
After	discussing	the	role	the	government	played	in	the	establishment	of	the	SBL,	
this	 former	Nike	manager	 (S1)	 talked	 about	 the	 role	 of	Nike	 as	 a	 sponsor	 and	
marketing	unit.		
Nike	 had	 a	 mission,	 which	 was	 to	 revive	 Taiwan	 basketball.	 Nike	
never	thought	to	make	profits	in	this	area.	Organising	events	is	not	a	
profit	 source	 for	Nike.	What	we	did	was	 to	 induce	a	 sporting	 fever	
and	 to	 increase	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 sport.	 After	 the	 CBA	 collapsed,	
there	had	been	four	years	without	a	long‐term	league.	After	internal	
evaluation,	we	believed	the	market	was	mature	and	the	players	had	
reached	a	certain	level.	Of	course	we	put	a	huge	amount	of	resources	
into	 it,	 and	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 seasons	 were	 successful	
(Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).				
The	 manager	 believed	 Nike	 could	 not	 make	 a	 profit	 in	 the	 process	 of	 the	
emergence	 of	 the	 SBL.	 All	 Nike	 did	 was	 to	 set	 up	 a	 positive	 atmosphere	 for	
basketball.	He	presented	data	to	illustrate	this.			
In	terms	of	the	Taiwan	sporting	goods	market,	the	sale	of	all	types	of	
sporting	 goods	 amounted	 to	 10	 billion	 NTD.	 Nike	 was	 the	 top	
company,	and	it	owned	50%	of	the	market.	At	that	time,	the	annual	
marketing	budget	of	Nike	was	10%‐15%	of	total	income.	We	can	use	
a	 rough	 calculation.	Nike	 had	 12%	of	 income	 for	marketing,	which	
was	 60	 million.	 This	 amount	 of	 money	 was	 used	 to	 buy	 channel	
promotion,	advertisement	and	sponsorship.	What	 I	want	to	 tell	you	
is	the	marketing	budget	of	the	SBL	at	that	time	was	over	60	million.	If	
the	annual	marketing	budget	was	over	fifteen	million,	 it	was	a	huge	
amount	for	a	sporting	company	in	a	normal	situation.	However	Nike	
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invested	 sixty	 million	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).		
This	manager	further	explained			
If	 you	 spend	 ten	 million	 annually	 on	 the	 co‐operation	 of	 media,	
including	 TV	 advertisements,	 on‐site	 advertisements,	 newspaper	
advertisements,	and	commercial	placements,	 it	would	have	been	an	
amazing	 amount	 in	 a	 normal	 situation.	 Then	 you	 had	 to	 sponsor	
events,	 players	 and	 clubs.	 The	 total	 amount,	 fifteen	 million	 was	 a	
huge	amount	(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	
by	the	author).	
Nike	 spent	 over	 60	 million	 NTD	 on	 marketing.	 Nike’s	 investment	 can	 be	
considered	 to	 be	 a	 key	 driver	 that	 transformed	 the	 SBL	 from	 nothing	 into	 a	
known	sport	event	in	Taiwan.	However,	the	money	came	from	neither	the	CTBA	
nor	 the	 SBL.	 If	 Nike	 could	 not	 make	 profits	 from	 the	 SBL,	 what	 was	 Nike’s	
incentive?	
There	 is	 a	 basketball	 culture	 in	 Taiwan.	 Basketball	 product	 selling	
was	a	larger	part	of	total	product	selling.	That	is	why	Nike	invested	
so	 much	 in	 the	 SBL.	 A	 middle	 term	 plan	 should	 put	 emphasis	 on	
young	 people	 and	 children	 to	 get	 recognition.	 Whether	you	 host	
consumer	 events	 or	 a	 basketball	 league,	 you	 should	 retain	 their	
interests	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).					
In	this	sense,	although	there	was	no	immediate	return	on	investment	for	Nike	to	
support	the	SBL,	interests	may	be	realised	in	the	long‐term	as	development	of	a	
basketball	culture	would	likely	lead	to	growth	of	merchandise	sales.		
Although	Nike	invested	a	lot	in	the	first	season,	it	quit	the	marketing	team	in	the	
second	season.	This	former	Nike	manager	mentioned:	
We	did	not	want	to	quit.	ESPN	kicked	us	out	actually	because	ESPN	
realised	the	value	of	the	advertising	billboard.	It	was	not	clear	when	
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we	signed	the	contract	with	ESPN	in	the	beginning.	As	a	manager,	 I	
told	 the	boss	of	Nike	 to	 fight	 for	 it.	Unfortunately,	 the	boss	 told	me	
not	to	fight	and	gave	it	to	them	for	free.	So	that	was	it.	We	gave	up	a	
product	 which	 had	 cost	 us	 so	much	 (Interview	with	 the	 sponsors,	
04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
From	 the	 second	season,	ESPN	enjoyed	 the	broadcasting	and	marketing	 rights.	
This	manager	argued	it	was	an	unreasonable	situation	for	one	company	to	hold	
two	sets	of	rights	together.	
ESPN	 led	 the	 marketing	 strategy	 and	 authorized	 the	 image	
advertising	to	another	public	relations	company.	I	told	SBL	clubs	that	
when	 you	merge	 cost	 and	 income	 units	 into	 one,	 the	 cost	must	 be	
very	 low.	 When	 ESPN	 had	 no	 pressure	 of	 ticket	 sales	 and	 club‐
marketing	 pressure,	 why	 did	 ESPN	want	 to	 spend	money	 on	 that?	
ESPN	 did	 not	 need	 to	 enhance	 the	 impression	 while	 the	 revenue	
from	 the	 advertising	 billboard	 was	 fine.	 In	 this	 sense,	 from	 the	
second	season,	all	marketing	expenses	reduced.	Nike	had	planned	a	
lot	 of	 outdoor	 billboards,	 newspaper	 commercials,	 radio	
commercials,	 and	 consumer	 events.	 We	 also	 did	 charity	 events.	
However,	 these	 marketing	 events	 never	 actually	 happened	 since	
ESPN	took	over	the	marketing	right	in	the	second	season	(Interview	
with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).								
The	 sponsor	 believed	 that	 the	 first	 season	 of	 the	 SBL	 had	 been	 successful.	
However	 since	 the	 league	 and	 ESPN	 took	 over	 the	 marketing	 rights,	 the	 SBL	
attendance	declined	because	the	league	did	not	make	a	marketing	plan	to	sustain	
the	basketball	fever.	In	particular	the	league	did	not	obtain	a	market	survey	for	
consumers,	and	the	league	did	not	lead	a	middle‐term	or	a	long‐term	plan	for	the	
development	of	the	SBL.		
In	 the	 first	 season,	we	designed	 a	 visual	 image	 and	 a	 slogan	 called	
“every	game	is	a	final	game”.	The	logos	they	used	belonged	to	Nike,	
and	we	have	the	copyright	for	them.	The	league	kept	using	the	same	
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theme	in	the	second	season.	There	was	no	creativity	from	the	league.	
If	 you	 look	 at	 the	 marketing	 theme	 for	 the	 eighth	 season	 and	
compare	it	with	the	marketing	theme	for	the	first	season,	there	is	no	
difference	(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	 translated	by	
the	author).		
However,	Nike	 treated	 this	 issue	 casually.	 The	 former	manager	mentioned	 the	
internal	discussion	within	Nike:	“Without	any	argument,	Nike	gave	it	to	them	to	
use.	I	was	so	frustrated	when	I	led	this	project.	However,	the	boss	did	not	want	
to	 fight	 for	 it”	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
This	manager	claimed	that	Nike	gave	the	marketing	resources	to	ESPN	for	free.	
However,	ESPN	failed	to	improve	or	to	build	on	the	existing	marketing	campaign,	
but	instead	it	kept	using	the	same	approach	to	attract	fans	even	though	this	had	
failed	to	prevent	the	downturn	of	the	SBL.	
The	manager	not	only	blamed	ESPN,	but	also	argued	that	the	CTBA	did	not	do	its	
job	well.		
The	function	of	the	CTBA	is	not	only	to	develop	the	SBL.	It	also	needs	
to	 set	 up	 the	 national	 team	 and	 to	 cultivate	 basketball	 talents.	
However	 there	 is	 no	 key	 person	 doing	 this	 at	 the	 moment.	 The	
current	general	secretary	is	a	referee.	The	vice	general	secretary	is	a	
journalist.	How	can	a	referee	and	a	journalist	take	the	responsibility	
of	developing	basketball	in	Taiwan	because	they	have	no	leadership	
experience	 in	 a	 professional	 sport	 league?	 	 (Interview	 with	 the	
sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author)	
He	also	argued	that	there	was	no	incentive	for	the	CTBA	to	work	hard	under	this	
system	because	all	profits	went	to	the	CTBA	automatically.		
Ticket	 revenue	was	 income	 for	 the	 CTBA,	 but	 they	 did	 not	 do	 any	
promotion	for	 it.	 In	previous	years,	 the	ticket	price	was	200	for	the	
upper	deck	and	500	for	the	lower	deck.	There	were	2000	seats	in	the	
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upper	 deck	 and	 800	 seats	 in	 the	 lower	 deck	 in	 total.	 They	 could	
obtain	800	thousand	NTD	of	income	for	a	single	regular	game.	For	a	
fully‐sold	game	they	could	have	1	million	NTD.	So	if	they	had	10	fully	
booked	games	 in	one	season,	 they	could	receive	10	million.	Then	 if	
they	 could	 sell	 30%	 tickets	 in	 the	 remaining	 90	 games,	 they	 could	
bring	in	300	thousand	NTD	per	game	which	means	a	total	27	million	
NTD	 for	90	games.	 So	 the	CTBA	could	have	earned	37	million	NTD	
per	year	even	without	promotion.	Even	though	the	SBL	did	not	run	
very	 well,	 it	 would	 still	 have	 150	 million	 at	 least	 because	 ESPN	
covered	 administrative	 fees,	 facilities’	 rental	 and	 costs	 of	 referees	
(Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
This	manager	argued	 that	 there	was	no	motivation	on	 the	part	of	 the	CTBA	 to	
enhance	the	operation	of	the	SBL.	Without	any	investment,	the	CTBA	could	still	
obtain	a	profit	because	of	the	deal	with	ESPN.	
I	don’t	want	to	say	that	ESPN	and	the	CTBA	had	any	under‐the‐table	
dealings	 because	 I	 don’t	 have	 evidence.	 However,	 the	 broadcasting	
rights	of	ESPN	were	given	by	 the	CTBA.	So	when	 the	CTBA	made	a	
request	 on	 ESPN,	 I	 don’t	 think	 ESPN	would	 refuse	 it.	 They	 helped	
each	other,	and	they	didn’t	want	too	many	people	involved.	Sharing	
profits	within	 only	 two	 entities	would	 be	 better	 than	 sharing	with	
seven	clubs.	In	this	sense,	the	clubs’	interests	were	sacrificed.	In	fact,	
it	 costs	 at	 least	 20	million	 to	 run	 a	 club,	which	means	 seven	 clubs	
invested	140	million	in	total	per	year.	Clubs	spent	140	million	just	to	
put	 on	 a	 show,	 and	 the	 CTBA	 earned	 a	 lot	 without	 making	 any	
investment	(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	
the	author).	
This	 manager	 claimed	 that	 the	 TV	 rights	 fee	 and	 the	 costs	 of	 broadcast	 were	
reasonable	and	affordable	to	ESPN.		
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I	 know	 the	 financial	 structure	of	 a	 sporting	 channel.	 The	 costs	 of	 a	
sporting	 channel	 are	 so	 called	air	 time	 costs.	 If	 you	want	 to	put	 an	
NCAA	match	on	the	programme	for	 two	hours,	 there	will	be	a	 two‐
hour	 cost.	 You	will	 need	 to	 buy	 the	 broadcasting	 rights	which	 cost	
USD$	 2000	 (equivalent	 to	 NTD	 60000)	 per	 hour.	 In	 addition,	 you	
have	 to	 buy	 the	 signal	 which	 costs	 USD	 2000	 (equivalent	 to	 NTD	
60000)	per	hour.	Therefore,	it	costs	NTD$	120	thousand	for	2	hours	
programme.	 If	 there	 are	 100	 matches	 for	 one	 SBL	 season,	 there	
would	 be	 300	 hours	 programme	 for	 ESPN	 to	 put	 on	 the	 TV.	
According	 to	 our	 calculations,	 300	 programme	 hours	 should	 cost	
ESPN	around	NTD$	36	million.	However,	the	broadcasting	of	the	SBL	
cost	ESPN	way	less	than	any	other	sporting	event	(Interview	with	the	
sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
This	manager	 argued	 that	 even	 though	 ESPN	 did	 not	 broadcast	 the	 SBL;	 they	
would	still	have	needed	to	set	up	substitute	programmes	which	might	cost	ESPN	
more.	 Furthermore,	 the	manager	 claimed	 that	 the	 SBL	was	 very	 important	 to	
ESPN	 because	 ESPN	 had	 to	maintain	 its	 own	 value	 in	 the	war	 of	 the	 cable	 TV	
networks	in	Taiwan.	They	could	not	afford	to	take	this	on.				
Why	 did	 ESPN	 want	 to	 broadcast	 the	 SBL?	 It	 was	 because	 of	 two	
incentives.	 The	 first	 was	 the	 on‐site	 advertisement‐selling.	 In	 the	
normal	situation	 in	which	ESPN	buys	a	programme	to	put	on	TV,	 it	
can’t	 sell	 on‐site	 advertising,	 so	 you	 can’t	 set	 up	 promoting	 events	
with	your	sponsors	and	the	buyers	of	advertisement.	However,	ESPN	
had	 the	 marketing	 rights	 for	 the	 SBL.	 Therefore	 when	 ESPN	
broadcast	the	SBL,	the	income	they	could	get	was	much	higher	than	
for	 broadcasting	 NBA	 games.	 Secondly,	 ESPN	 would	 have	 no	 local	
game	to	broadcast	if	it	didn’t	broadcast	the	SBL.	When	ESPN	wants	to	
sell	advertising	space	to	the	cable	TV	network	companies	of	central	
Taiwan	and	southern	Taiwan,	it’s	difficult	for	them	to	sell	it	because	
it	 does	 not	 have	 a	 local	 identity.	 Once	 ESPN	 had	 the	 option	 of	
broadcasting	 the	 SBL,	 and	 the	 SBL	 was	 becoming	 more	 popular,	
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ESPN	 could	 gain	 bargaining	 power	 when	 it	 negotiated	 with	 local	
network	 companies	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
This	 manager’s	 comments	 underlined	 how	 ESPN’s	 interests	 were	 not	 only	
associated	with	the	profits	from	broadcasting	and	advertisement‐selling,	but	also	
with	becoming	a	power	in	negotiations	with	cable	TV	network	companies.		
The	 relationship	 between	 the	 SBL	 and	 ESPN	 is	 just	 like	 the	
relationship	between	the	Chinese	Taipei	Baseball	League	(CPBL)	and	
Videoland	 sport	 channel.	 Why	 was	 the	 CPBL	 so	 important	 to	 the	
cable	 TV	 networks	 and	 why	 was	 the	 TV	 rights	 fee	 so	 high?	 One	
crucial	 reason	was	 the	 illegal	 sport.	While	 there	was	a	need	 for	 the	
illegal	 lottery,	 the	 broadcasts	 would	 not	 be	 replaced.	 The	 SBL	 did	
help	ESPN	a	lot.	However	the	cost	of	broadcasting	the	SBL	was	very	
low.	 But	 ESPN	 always	 told	 clubs	 that	 it	 cost	 a	 lot	 because	 live	
streaming	costs	a	lot,	equipment	costs	a	lot	and	staff	cost	a	lot.	What	
ESPN	did	not	mention	was	the	replacement	cost	which	it	would	inair	
if	 it	 did	 not	 broadcast	 the	 SBL.	 If	 ESPN	 did	 not	 broadcast	 the	 SBL,	
there	were	still	costs	incurred	for	them	to	put	something	else	on	TV	
(Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
ESPN	had	to	negotiate	with	 local	cable	TV	companies	 to	stay	 in	 the	network.	 If	
ESPN	 was	 unable	 to	 keep	 programmes	 that	 were	 of	 interest	 to	 local	
communities,	 local	 cable	 TV	 network	 companies	might	 not	 subscribe	 to	 ESPN.		
Since	ESPN	did	not	have	the	right	to	broadcast	the	CPBL,	it	needed	to	broadcast	
another	popular	sporting	event	to	maintain	the	value	of	its	channel.	That	is	why	
the	 former	Nike	manager	claimed	 that	 the	SBL	means	a	 lot	 to	ESPN,	and	 if	 the	
SBL	had	not	chosen	ESPN	as	 its	broadcaster,	 this	would	have	placed	ESPN	 in	a	
more	difficult	situation.	
In	 this	 context,	 this	 manager	 wondered	 why	 the	 CTBA	 decided	 to	 let	 ESPN	
broadcast	 the	 SBL	 because	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 clubs	were	 sacrificed	when	 the	
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CTBA	 chose	 ESPN.	 Prior	 to	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 sixth	 season,	 the	 clubs	 had	
preferred	Videoland	Sport	Channel	to	broadcast	the	games.			
This	manager	commented	on	the	decision‐making	process	 for	 the	broadcasting	
rights	of	the	sixth	season.	
The	CTBA	decided	to	take	the	letter	of	authorization	for	clubs	to	sign	
the	 contract	 with	 ESPN.	 However,	 Yulon	 and	 Taiwan	 Mobile	
Basketball	Clubs	did	not	give	the	CTBA	a	letter	of	authorization,	and	
the	 CTBA	 could	 not	 sign	 the	 contract	 with	 ESPN	 at	 the	 beginning.	
Some	 representatives	 of	 clubs	 claimed	 that	 they	 preferred	 the	
Videoland	 Sport	 Channel,	 but	 the	 CTBA	 was	 not	 able	 to	 give	 the	
broadcasting	right	to	the	Videoland	Sport	Channel	because	ESPN	had	
co‐operated	with	 the	CTBA	very	well	 (Interview	with	 the	sponsors,	
04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
In	the	end	ESPN	retained	its	role	as	the	SBL	broadcaster.	The	final	decision	was	
not	made	a	 consensus	of	 all	 of	 the	 clubs.	 	A	 former	Nike	manager	argued	with	
sarcasm	that	it	was	still	a	club	decision,	but	it	was	from	one	single	club	–	Dacin	–	
because	 the	 Dacin	 Tigers	 were	 owned	 by	 the	 former	 chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA,	
Wang.	
The	Dacin	Basketball	Club	was	a	CTBA‐owned	club.	What	Wang	said	
was	the	decision	of	the	Dacin	Basketball	Club.	You	can	predict	what	
the	CTBA	would	do	with	the	decision	of	the	Dacin	Basketball	Club.	It	
is	 really	 poor	 management	 to	 have	 one	 man	 own	 a	 league,	 a	
basketball	 association,	 referees,	 fixtures,	 and	 a	 club.	 Who	 could	
compete	with	him?	We	all	knew	what	the	situation	was	but	we	could	
not	change	it	because	we	did	not	have	resources	such	as	money	and	
connections	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	
by	the	author).	
This	 is	 rather	 what	 one	 might	 expect	 in	 a	 Taiwanese	 business	 environment,	
people	with	greater	resources,	specifically	money	and	connection,	would	able	to	
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control	basketball.	However,	not	only	did	Chairman	Wang	play	a	 “double	role”,	
but	also	did	Yen,	the	manager	of	Taiwan	Beer	basketball	club.		
You	can	say	that	Dacin	Tigers	represented	both	a	club	and	the	CTBA.	
We	now	have	a	manager	who	owns	two	clubs.	Yen	is	the	manager	of	
the	 Taiwan	 Beer	 basketball	 club,	 and	 he	 is	 also	 the	 owner	 of	 the	
Kinmem	 basketball	 club.	 Thus	 when	 Taiwan	 Beer	 played	 against	
Kinmem,	 the	 winning	 team	 could	 be	 fixed	 before	 the	 game	
(Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 04/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
A	 manager	 of	 a	 sport	 consulting	 company	 (S2)	 explained	 the	 organisation	 of	
Kinmen	basketball	club.	
Kinmem	Kaoliang	 Liquor	Basketball	 Club	 is	 not	 owned	by	Kinmem	
Kaoliang	 Liquor	 Company.	 Yen	 owns	 it.	 Kinmem	 Kaoliang	 Liquor	
Company	 only	 owned	 the	 naming	 rights,	 as	 sponsor,	 for	 NTD$	 1	
million	 every	 year.	Many	 years	 before,	 because	 the	 owner	 of	 ETTV	
was	 arrested,	 he	 wanted	 to	 sell	 his	 basketball	 club.	 However,	 the	
ETTV	 basketball	 club	 did	 not	 perform	 very	well;	 therefore	 nobody	
wanted	to	buy	 it	except	 the	Media	Corporation.	However,	 following	
the	 gambling	 scandal	 involving	 Media	 Corporation’s	 baseball	 club,	
the	CTBA	pushed	Media	Corporation	 to	give	up	 the	basketball	 club.	
Despite	the	potential	damage	to	public	image	and	brand	perception	,	
and	taking	over	a	problematic	club,	Yen,	the	manager	of	the	Taiwan	
Beer	basketball	club,	bought	the	club.	The	basketball	club	could	not	
put	the	name	“Taiwan	Beer”	on	it,	and	was	not	able	to	use	“Yen”	as	its	
name.	Finally,	they	sold	the	naming	right	to	Kinmem	Kaoliang	Liquor	
Company	 (Interview	with	 the	 sponsors,	 15/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).										
Notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 the	different	 stakeholders	had	different	 interests	
to	 realise,	 the	 interests	of	 the	players	 seemed	 to	have	been	 ignored	within	 the	
stakeholders’	network.	A	manager	could	sacrifice	players’	interests	to	protect	his	
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own.	 Interviewee	 S2	 mentioned	 that	 the	 manager	 of	 Taiwan	 Beer	 basketball	
club,	Yen,	signed	all	contracts	with	players.			
There	was	a	war	between	managers.	Someone	 tried	 to	push	Yen	 to	
leave	 his	 position.	 Yen	 wanted	 to	 prevent	 this	 situation,	 so	 he	
suggested	 that	 all	 players	 should	 sign	 contracts	with	 him.	 Then	 he	
applied	wages	from	the	company	to	pay	players.	Yen	wanted	to	keep	
his	position	 in	the	basketball	system	as	 if	he	“owned”	these	players	
(Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 15/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
When	players	become	the	property	of	a	manager,	their	interests	can	be	ignored	
when	 the	manager	 negotiates	with	 the	 club.	 Regardless	 of	whether	 the	 player	
wage	 level	was	high	or	 low,	 there	was	no	protection	 for	players.	 Players	were	
weakest	 in	this	system	as	they	might	simply	not	receive	wages	from	clubs,	and	
they	were	in	no	position	to	use	the	law	to	protect	their	interests.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 sixth	 season,	 the	 Kinmem	 Kaoliang	 Liquor	
Basketball	 Club	 had	 already	 spent	 NTD$	 1	 million,	 which	 was	 the	
amount	 of	money	 given	 by	 the	Kinmem	Kaoliang	 Liquor	 Company.	
The	 club	 could	 not	 afford	 to	 pay	 the	 players.	 So	 the	 club	 made	 a	
decision	 –	 they	 fired	 those	 players	 who	 had	 high	 wages.	 Players	
could	not	sue	the	club	because	they	had	signed	their	contracts	with	
Yen.	This	was	difficult	for	players,	as	they	did	not	receive	wages	for	
four	months	 (Interview	with	 the	 sponsors,	 15/01/2011,	 translated	
by	the	author).			
It	 would	 cost	 more	 than	 four	 months’	 salary	 for	 a	 player	 to	 take	 legal	 action	
against	the	club,	and	the	situation	would	have	been	even	worse	for	players	with	
below‐average	 wages.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 clubs	 were	 able	 to	 regulate	 and	
control	 players	 via	 these	 contractual	 arrangements.	 However,	 when	 the	 club	
deemed	a	certain	player	unsuitable	 for	whatever	reason,	 the	club	could	simply	
terminate	his	 contract.	 Players	 could	not	 challenge	 clubs	 or	managers	 because	
they	did	not	have	enough	power	or	resources	to	defend	their	position.		
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6.6	The	Perspective	of	the	Clubs	
The	 SBL	 is	 actually	 an	 official	 product.	 The	 SAC	 played	 a	 role	 in	 actively	
promoting	it.		A	manager	of	the	Dacin	Basketball	Club	(C1)	claimed	that	the	SBL	
was	created	by	the	SAC.	
At	that	time,	Minister	Lin	was	ambitious.	He	felt	that	it	was	a	pity	to	
suspend	the	CBA.	So	he	wished	to	re‐start	it.	Because	of	the	economic	
turndown,	 financial	 and	 organisational	 capacity	 needed	 to	 be	
provided	 to	make	 it	happen.	 So	 they	believed	 it	would	be	better	 to	
establish	 a	 league	under	 the	 structure	of	 the	CTBA	 (Interview	with	
the	clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	manager	of	Dacin	(C1)	claimed	that	one	of	the	reasons	the	SBL	was	operated	
by	the	CTBA	was	because	of	the	government’s	concerns	about	its	own	legitimacy	
in	terms	of	undertaking	this	role.	
While	 the	 government	 could	 not	 fund	 a	 commercial	 sport	 directly,	
the	 former	 Minister	 thought	 if	 the	 SBL	 could	 be	 set	 up	 under	 the	
organisation	of	the	CTBA,	the	government	would	be	able	to	indirectly	
support	the	SBL	because	it	was	proper	for	the	government	to	assist	
the	CTBA	(Interview	with	 the	clubs,	20/12/2010,	 translated	by	 the	
author).	
The	government	also	recruited	some	senior	basketball	players	and	politicians	to	
help	the	executive	team.	A	member	staff	of	an	SBL	club	(C3)	also	mentioned	the	
role	of	the	committee,	the	media,	and	clubs	when	the	SBL	was	formed.	
Lin	actively	promoted	the	committee.	He	invited	clubs	to	discuss	the	
establishment	of	 the	 league.	They	 set	up	 the	SBL	 committee	within	
the	 organisation	 of	 the	 CTBA	 to	 manage	 and	 operate	 the	 SBL.	
However	the	committee	was	still	under	the	structure	of	the	CTBA.	So	
the	CTBA	organised	the	competition	(fixtures,	facilities	and	referees).	
Then	 they	opened	a	bidding	process	 for	marketing	and	broadcasts.	
Videoland	Sport	Channel	and	ESPN	competed	in	the	bidding	process	
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and	ESPN	won	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	14/02/2011,	translated	by	
the	author).			
The	government	was	actively	involved	with	the	initiation	of	the	SBL	to	promote	
basketball.	In	order	to	have	a	higher‐level	competition	to	follow	on	from	the	High	
School	 Basketball	 League,	 the	 government	 provided	 a	 stage	 for	 the	 SBL”	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
One	of	the	managers	(C1)	argued	that	the	government	was	involved	during	the	
establishment	of	the	SBL	but	it	had	not	subsequently	intervened	in	the	operation	
of	the	league.		
The	government	gave	a	little	help	to	the	SBL	at	the	start,	a	little	bit	of	
financial	 help,	 but	 the	 government	 did	 not	 give	 any	 help	 after	 the	
second	year	because	 it	believe	of	that	the	CTBA	had	earned	ehough	
money	 from	 the	 SBL	 to	 allow	 them	 to	 survive	 (Interview	with	 the	
clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
One	manager	 (C2)	 believed	 that	 government	 only	 focused	 on	 sports	 in	 which	
Taiwanese	nationals	could	win	medals	in	international	competitions.	
Referring	 to	 our	 results	 in	 several	 international	 competitions,	 we	
have	a	better	record	of	achievement	in	baseball	than	in	other	sports,	
so	 the	SAC	normally	 focused	on	 the	Baseball,	 and	 this	 strategy	was	
understandable	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 26/12/2010,	 translated	
by	the	author).	
A	member	staff	of	an	SBL	club	(C3),	also	agreed	with	this	statement,	but	believed	
that	 this	 was	 the	 wrong	 strategy	 to	 pursue.	 He	 argued	 that	 basketball	 was	 a	
popular	 sport	 that	 was	 relatively	 easier	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 in	 terms	 of	
participation	 and,	 thus	 the	 government	 should	 invest	 more	 resources	 in	
developing	the	sport.	If	the	government’s	goal	was	to	win	medals,	it	should	have	
invested	more	in	the	national	teams	rather	than	in	professional	baseball.		
From	 the	 government’s	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 depends	 on	 what	 the	
government	 would	 like	 to	 see,	 if	 it	 prefers	 to	 win	 medals	 in	
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international	 competitions,	 it	 should	 use	 its	 money	 to	 support	 the	
Chinese	 Taipei	 national	 team	 rather	 than	 CPBL.	 From	 the	 sports	
participation	point	of	view,	it	would	be	more	effective	to	support	the	
basketball	 because	 there	were	 basketball	 courts	 everywhere	while	
the	 baseball	 pitches	 are	 scarce	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	
14/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
One	manager	of	the	clubs	(C1)	explained	how	the	government	supported	the	SBL	
clubs.	
The	 government	 wants	 to	 make	 the	 SBL	 more	 attractive,	 but	 it	
cannot	 give	 the	money	 directly	 to	 us	 and	we	 did	 not	 have	 a	 lot	 of	
money	 to	 hire	 foreign	 players.	 However	 the	 government	 came	 up	
with	 a	 strategy,	 which	 was	 to	 ask	 each	 team	 to	 write	 a	 plan	 to	
enhance	 competitive	 capability.	 The	 CTBA	 was	 to	 reimburse	 each	
team’s	 gate	 receipts.	 In	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 capacity	 of	 clubs,	we	
shifted	better	 training	 facilities,	which	would	also	 incur	extra	costs.	
However,	 total	 financial	 support	 was	 capped	 at	 NTD	 $1	 million	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
Although	 the	 government	 supported	 the	 SBL	 in	 an	 indirect	 way,	 the	 financial	
support	in	terms	of	the	amount	of	money	provided	was	dwarfed	by	that	spent	on	
baseball.	A	club	manager	(C2)	said	the	government	gave	more	than	ten	million	
NTD	to	support	amateur	baseball	teams	per	year.	
I	 think	 the	 government	 spent	 most	 of	 the	 funding	 on	 baseball	
because	you	can	see	how	they	gave	$10	million	to	amateur	baseball	
per	year,	but	 there	was	 just	a	 little	 for	 the	SBL	clubs,	 and	a	million	
dollars	of	sponsorship	from	the	CTBA,	which	meant	the	government,	
was	actually	quite	 ‘passive’	 in	 its	support	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	
26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
There	are	currently	seven	clubs	in	the	SBL.	The	scale	of	each	club	is	not	the	same	
since	the	parent	companies	may	have	varying	 levels	of	 financial	capability,	and	
thus	 the	wages	 of	 players	 are	 different.	 The	 average	 annual	 budget	 for	 a	 team	
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was	 about	 NTD$	 30‐40	million,	 but	 Yulon	 Club,	 for	 example,	 owns	 a	 stadium,	
which	incurs	an	extra	cost.	Taiwan	Beer	also	has	its	own	basketball	venue.	If	the	
cost	 of	maintaining	 the	 stadium	 or	 depreciation	 of	 it	were	 to	 be	 included,	 the	
total	 cost	 of	 each	 club	 would	 be	 likely	 to	 be	 higher	 than	 the	 NTD$30	 million	
suggested.	
In	terms	of	the	Taiwan	Beer	Basketball	Club,	a	club	manager	(C2)	mentioned	the	
annual	budget	of	the	club.	
Our	 current	 annual	 budget	 is	 24	million,	 the	 Bank	 of	 Taiwan	 is	 18	
million,	but	the	players	in	the	Bank	of	Taiwan	can	also	have	an	extra	
salary	 from	the	bank,	so	 the	18	million	 funding	 is	basic	 funding	 for	
the	club,	because	some	players	who	work	in	the	bank	branches	can	
also	have	the	bank’s	salary	as	well	as	the	wage	for	being	a	player.	For	
example,	 if	 a	 player	 has	 a	 salary	 of	 30,000~40,000	 per	month,	 the	
player	can	also	have	an	extra	salary	of	50,000~60,000	per	month	for	
being	 a	 player.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 total	 budget	 would	 total	 NTD$	 18	
million.	Thus,	their	overall	pay	may	not	be	less	than	ours	(Interview	
with	the	clubs,	26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	 funding	 from	 the	 government	 and	 broadcasting	 rights	 fee	 was	 thus	
insufficient	to	cover	the	annual	budget,	and	the	clubs	made	up	the	spending	for	
things	 such	 as	 the	 cost	 of	 advertising	 and	 marketing.	 A	 club	 manager	 (C2)	
mentioned	
Every	business	owner	certainly	hopes	that	the	club	can	help	him	or	
her	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 of	 sports	marketing.	 Taiwan	 Beer	 had	 a	
bad	record	when	I	became	the	manager	of	club.	The	club	was	almost	
dissolved	by	the	executive	board	of	The	Taiwan	Beer	Company	but	I	
picked	 it	up.	They	have	now	moved	on	over	eight	seasons,	and	our	
record	is	acceptable.	In	addition,	because	our	record	is	good	enough	
to	get	us	 to	 the	playoffs	and	even	 the	 finals,	 the	executive	board	of	
Taiwan	Beer	hopes	that	the	club	can	keep	running	like	this,	resulting	
in	 some	 side	 effects,	 which	 help	 to	 achieve	 their	 advertising	 and	
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marketing	 objectives	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 26/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
The	Dacin	Basketball	 Club	 also	 considered	 the	 running	 costs	 of	 the	 club	 as	 an	
‘advertising	fee’.	A	staff	member	of	Dacin	(C3)	claimed:	
Like	our	company’s	 concern,	we	 think	spending	20	or	30	million	 is	
the	same	as	spending	the	money	on	buying	advertisements,	because	
it	 has	 the	 same	 function	 of	 promoting	 a	 positive	 image	 of	 the	
company.	 We	 feel	 that	 spending	 the	 money	 on	 an	 advertising	
company	or	newspapers	and	magazines	produces	the	same	outcome	
as	 raising	 a	 club,	 which	 contributes	 to	 the	 positive	 image	 of	 the	
company	 (Interview	with	 the	 clubs,	 14/02/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
One	 of	 the	 managers	 from	 Dacin	 (C1)	 mentioned	 that	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	
running	 a	 basketball	 team	 was	 to	 enhance	 the	 corporate	 image,	 even	 if	 the	
financial	cost	of	doing	so	is	described	as	a	loss.	
There	was	no	doubt	 that	 the	 loss	of	 income	only	 resulted	 from	 the	
broadcasting	 fee.	 The	 largest	 amount	 of	 broadcasting	 fee	 received	
was	when	ESPN	co‐operated	with	Videoland	as	each	club	received	8	
million	in	those	years.	Of	course,	this	8	million	was	our	revenue,	and	
the	other	means	of	generating	revenue,	such	as	ticket	sales,	did	not	
belong	 to	 us.	 Another	 income	 was	 from	 selling	 merchandise.	 In	
addition	 to	 selling	merchandise,	we	also	hosted	a	 summer	 camp	 to	
increase	 our	 income.	 So	 in	 fact,	most	 of	 the	 income	 came	 from	 the	
broadcasting	 fee	 as	 the	 highest	 broadcasting	 fee	was	 up	 to	 10~20	
million	 NTD	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 26/12/2010,	 translated	 by	
the	author).		
The	biggest	source	of	income	for	the	clubs	was	thus	from	the	broadcasting	rights.	
However,	 the	 SBL's	 broadcasting	 rights	 were	 in	 a	 very	 peculiar	 and	 unstable	
situation:	 the	 amount	 of	 money	 paid	 to	 each	 club	 from	 broadcasting	 fees	
dropped	from	8	million	NTD	to	nothing	when	the	right	to	broadcast	the	games	
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was	provided	free	of	charge	to	ESPN.	This	therefore	put	a	great	deal	of	strain	on	
the	clubs’	finances.	
Honestly	 speaking,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 broadcasting	 fee,	 because	 this	
was	 going	 to	 be	 given	 to	 the	 clubs,	 most	 of	 the	 negotiations	 were	
between	 the	 ESPN	 and	 the	 seven	 clubs.	 Of	 course	 the	 CTBA	 had	
provided	some	support.	When	the	negotiations	did	not	go	well,	it	was	
Chairman	Wang	who	helped	to	negotiate,	and	then	he	asked	ESPN	to	
compromise.	However,	in	fact,	the	broadcasting	rights	were	wasted.	
The	good	times	only	lasted	for	two	years,	which	was	when	the	ESPN	
and	 Videoland	 broadcast	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Then	 it	 was	 worth	 56	
million	a	year.	Each	club	could	take	home	eight	million	dollars	each.	
However	no	one	wanted	to	broadcast	[the	games]	in	the	next	season,	
in	 the	end	the	result	was	that	ESPN	signed	with	us	reluctantly	on	a	
three‐year	contract	with	a	gradual	annual	decrease.	For	the	last	three	
years,	 the	 fee	paid	 to	 the	 teams	each	year	would	be	 lower	 than	 the	
previous	year,	especially	in	the	6th,	7th,	and	8th	seasons.	It	is	the	8th	
season	this	year;	this	years’	fee	was	the	lowest.	So	fit	was	9	million	in	
the	 8th	 season,	 and	 in	 the	 second	 year	 (the	 9th	 season)	 it	 was	 11	
million.	 Anyway,	 the	 total	 amount	 for	 those	 three	 years	 was	 20	
million	NTD	 to	 be	 shared	 among	 seven	 clubs.	 Fortunately,	 there	 is	
another	media	entity,	Elta,	which	was	interested	in	broadcasting	the	
matches	and	was	willing	to	pay	1.5	million	NTD	per	term	every	year.	
However,	these	three	years	have	been	difficult	for	us	because	we	did	
not	 have	 any	 income	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 26/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
In	 fact,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 income	 from	 broadcasting	 rights,	 the	 SBL	 also	 had	
income	 from	 ticket	 sales.	 However,	 regardless	 of	 how	 many	 tickets	 had	 been	
sold,	all	revenue	from	ticket	sales	belonged	to	the	CTBA.	
The	clubs	probably	enjoyed	the	best	income	during	the	2nd	and	4th	seasons.	The	
4th	season,	for	example,	had	an	income	of	about	20	million	NTD,	which	was	good	
enough	for	the	CTBA	to	cover	the	cost	of	games,	and	the	excess	income	could	be	
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used	to	support	the	national	team.	The	income	from	the	SBL	could	cover	all	costs	
of	the	CTBA.		
However,	 some	 clubs	 believed	 the	 Basketball	 Association	 was	 acting	 selfishly	
and	was	blindly	pursuing	its	own	interests.		
The	CTBA	may	think	that	they	want	all	the	ticket	revenue	because	of	
the	high	cost	of	hiring	courts	and	personnel.	With	little	help	from	the	
government,	 the	 ticket	 income	 cannot	 be	 distributed	 to	 the	 club.	
Nevertheless,	from	the	clubs’	point	of	view,	if	benefit	can	be	obtained	
from	the	ticket	income,	it	may	serve	as	an	incentive	for	the	clubs	to	
take	 on	 more	 responsibilities,	 such	 as	 organising	 fan	 clubs	 or	
campaigning	 to	 attract	 fans	 to	 watch	 the	 matches,	 or	 making	 the	
games	a	 little	more	exciting	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	14/02/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
The	reason	that	the	CTBA	could	dominate	the	decision‐making	of	the	league	as	a	
whole	 was	 that	 the	 SBL	 is	 a	 semi‐professional	 league	 and	 has	 been	 operated	
within	the	framework	of	the	CTBA.		
The	 benefit	 of	 this	 operation	 was	 that	 the	 league	 could	 use	 the	
CTBA's	resources,	but	the	downside	was	that	league	was	dominated	
by	the	CTBA.	The	operation	of	the	SBL	was	led	by	the	CTBA,	and	each	
club	 had	 the	 space	 to	 express	 its	 views.	 However	 it	 was	 not	
necessary	 for	 the	 CTBA	 to	 adopt	 the	 clubs’	 opinion,	 because	 that	
might	 damage	 the	 CTBA’s	 interests.	 The	 operation	 strategy	 run	 by	
the	CTBA	definitely	allowed	the	CTBA	to	prioritise	of	its	own	interest	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	14/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Although	some	interviewees	criticised	the	CTBA,	one	manager	believed	the	CTBA	
acted	 with	 fairness	 because	 it	 had	 adopted	 a	 collegiate	 system	 [a	 system	 of	
decision	making	by	unanimous	support].	Clubs	could	express	their	own	opinions,	
and	 the	decision	was	always	made	on	behalf	of	 clubs	and	 the	CTBA	when	they	
had	a	common	view.	
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The	collegiate	system	has	been	adopted	for	seven	years.	Of	course	in	
every	group,	the	man	who	is	most	powerful	or	has	more	resources	or	
has	more	stock	shares	can	speak	louder.	However,	all	decisions	in	the	
past	seven	years	have	been	made	on	the	basis	of	a	common	view	by	
the	 clubs	 (Interview	with	 the	 clubs,	 20/12/2010,	 translated	by	 the	
author).	
This	view	of	the	collegiate	system	was	however	challenged	by	some.	A	manager	
of	 an	 SBL	 club	 (C2)	 argued	 that	 the	 CTBA	 was	 dictatorial.	 The	 democratic	
process	was	just	a	superficial	element.		
There	was	no	real	collegiate	system.	 I	 think	 the	CTBA	only	allowed	
the	 clubs	 to	 get	 involved	 when	 they	 agreed.	 In	 a	 sense,	 the	 CTBA	
respected	the	clubs.	However,	the	final	decisions	were	still	made	by	
the	CTBA.	The	clubs	had	meetings	but	it	was	very	difficult	to	have	a	
common	view	on	all	issues.	Therefore	the	CTBA	could	still	make	the	
final	decision	 (Interview	with	 the	 clubs,	20/12/2010,	 translated	by	
the	author).		
Even	if	the	CTBA	took	its	own	interests	as	the	first	priority,	the	clubs	could	not	
challenge	the	CTBA,	as	a	staff	member	of	an	SBL	club	claimed.	The	clubs	needed	
the	SBL	 to	provide	 the	stage	 for	 their	basketball	players,	but	 the	CTBA	did	not	
necessarily	 need	 the	 SBL.	 This	 relationship	 was	 an	 issue	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
structure	of	the	SBL.	
The	 owner	 and	 manager	 of	 clubs	 cannot	 ask	 the	 CTBA	 to	 do	
something	because	the	SBL	which	is	provided	by	the	CTBA	is	a	stage	
for	the	clubs	and	players.	If	there	was	no	SBL,	do	you	think	the	CTBA	
would	be	damaged?	The	answer	 is	no	 for	 the	CTBA	but	yes	 for	 the	
clubs.	The	clubs	rely	on	the	SBL	more	than	the	CTBA.	The	clubs	have	
signed	contracts	with	players.	They	will	still	have	to	pay	players	even	
if	 there	 is	no	match.	The	CTBA	might	 feel	 relieved	 if	 there	were	no	
SBL,	 then	 they	 would	 only	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 national	 teams	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	14/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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The	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan,	especially	players’	development,	was	
compromised	as	 fighting	persisted	between	 the	CTBA	and	 clubs.	A	manager	of	
the	SBL	clubs	(C1)	claimed	that	the	CTBA	had	no	vision	for	basketball	in	Taiwan,	
so	 it	 did	 not	 concentrate	 on	 the	 development	 of	 talents	 and	 the	 career	
development	of	players.		
There	was	not	a	complete	draft	system	or	a	development	system	for	
players	in	the	SBL	because	there	was	no	income	for	the	clubs.	All	the	
SBL	 clubs	 did	 not	 make	 a	 profit,	 and	 all	 support	 came	 from	 the	
parent	 companies.	 In	 this	 situation,	 how	 could	 the	 clubs	 invest	 in	
players?	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 20/12/2010,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
The	manager	 also	mentioned	 that	 sport	 in	 Taiwan	 needed	more	 support	 from	
mega	enterprises.		
In	 other	 countries,	 private	 enterprises	 support	 professional	 sport	
clubs	 a	 lot.	 However,	 in	 Taiwan,	 big	 companies	 did	 not	 support	
professional	 sports.	 Only	 state‐owned	 companies	 supported	 the	
sport,	 but	 the	 budget	 was	 not	 enough	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	
20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
From	the	above	discussion,	 it	 can	be	concluded	 that	 the	 rights	of	players	were	
the	 lowest	 priority	 for	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs.	 This	 situation	 also	 happened	
when	a	player	 signed	a	contract	with	a	 club.	A	staff	member	 from	an	SBL	club	
(C3)	claimed	that	there	was	no	protection	for	player’s	contracts.	
The	manager	of	my	 club	 took	 charge	of	 the	 contract‐signing.	There	
are	only	three	people	who	know	the	details	of	every	single	contract:	
player,	 owner	 and	manager.	 I	 know	 some	 club	 did	 not	 even	 sign	 a	
contract	 with	 players	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 14/02/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).		
In	 other	 words,	 a	 player’s	 contract	 was	 non‐transparent.	 The	 only	 clear	
regulation	on	players’	contract	was	the	wage	cap,	which	was	set	by	the	CTBA	and	
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the	clubs	together.	The	maximum	wage	per	month	was	NTD	120	thousand	for	a	
domestic	 player	 and	 USD	 10	 thousand	 for	 a	 foreign	 player	 from	 the	 fourth	
season.				
A	 club	 manager	 (C1)	 mentioned	 that	 the	 wages	 of	 players,	 despite	 being	
regulated	with	 a	 cap,	were	 open	 to	 some	 flexibility,	 especially	 since	 the	 CTBA	
was	not	checking.	
Players’	wages	 should	 be	 specified,	 but	 I	mentioned	 that	 the	 CTBA	
was	 not	 very	 keen	 on	 checking	 the	 provisions	 (Interview	with	 the	
clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
A	member	of	the	staff	of	an	SBL	(C3)	club	argued:		
Many	regulations	of	the	CTBA	were	actually	only	there	for	reference.	
In	order	to	keep	the	better	players,	they	were	all	willing	to	do	some	
modifications,	such	as	wages	and	bonuses.	For	example	the	rule	said	
a	 foreign	 player’s	 height	 could	 not	 exceed	 200	 cm,	 but	 there	were	
definitely	some	foreigner	players	who	are	over	200cm.	Furthermore,	
the	wages	 of	 foreign	 players	were	 not	 supposed	 to	 exceed	USD	10	
thousand	as	a	maximum,	but	those	players	might	receive	more	than	
USD	 10	 thousand.	 This	 was	 all	 about	 winning	 games.	 Regulations	
were	 out	 there	 but	 under‐the‐table	 deals	 were	 still	 going	 on.	 If	 a	
foreign	 player	 can	 get	 USD	 10	 thousand	 every	 month,	 which	 is	
equivalent	 to	 NTD	 300,000,	 but	 an	 elite	 SBL	 player	 can	 only	 have	
NTD	120,000	every	month.	How	would	you	feel	if	you	were	playing	
as	well	as	the	foreign	player?	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	14/02/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
The	SBL	is	a	semi‐professional	league.	Therefore	it	allowed	some	flexibility	in	its	
operation.	The	responses	of	the	interviewees	from	the	clubs	were	mainly	critical	
of	 the	 CTBA.	 Furthermore,	 the	 obstacles	 to	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	
Taiwan	were	seen	by	some	as	stemming	 from	 ‘the	collegiate	system’,	and	 from	
the	 ‘flexibility’	 of	 regulations	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 interviewees	 from	 the	
group	of	clubs.	
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6.7	The	Perspective	of	the	Coaches	and	Players	
From	the	perspective	of	coaches	and	players,	the	reduced	competitive	capability	
of	the	national	team	and	the	poor	showing	in	international	competition	were	the	
main	 reasons	 for	 the	SAC	 to	promote	 the	 emergence	of	 the	SBL.	An	SBL	 coach	
(P2)	mentioned		
After	 playing	 in	 the	 CBA	 [China]	 for	 two	 years,	 the	 Sina	 Basketball	
Club	moved	back	to	Taiwan.	It	was	a	new	excitement	for	fans.	There	
was	 a	 game	where	 the	 Sina	 played	 against	 the	 national	 team.	 The	
result	was	 that	 Sina	defeated	 the	National	 team.	 Furthermore,	 fans	
supported	Sina	more	than	the	national	team	during	this	match.	This	
situation	reflected	 the	 fans’	negative	views	about	 the	CTBA’s	policy	
for	developing	basketball	(Interview	with	the	coaches,	29/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
The	 interviewee	then	claimed	that	 the	SBL	had	been	set	up	because	of	support	
from	a	former	Minister	of	the	SAC,	Lin.	
Lin	Te‐Fu	argued	that	basketball	should	break	out	of	the	traditional	
framework	 of	 the	 CTBA	 to	 set	 up	 a	 new	 league.	 The	 CTBA	 should	
only	 be	 an	 operating	 unit	 to	 plan	 fixtures	 (Interview	 with	 the	
coaches,	29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	 government	 co‐operated	 with	 clubs	 and	 the	 CTBA	 to	 establish	 the	 SBL.	
Although	 in	 the	 beginning,	 the	 government	 wanted	 to	 improve	 basketball	 by	
setting	up	a	league	that	was	different	from	the	amateur	league	of	the	CTBA,	the	
SBL	was	still	set	up	under	the	auspices	of	the	CTBA.		
The	reason	why	the	SBL	was	controlled	by	the	CTBA	was	because	the	
clubs	did	not	want	to	get	seriously	involved	with	the	operation	of	the	
league	 themselves.	 However	 there	 was	 one	 crucial	 turning	 point,	
which	 was	 the	 involvement	 of	 Wang	 Ren‐Da,	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	
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CTBA	and	the	owner	of	the	Dacin	basketball	club	(Interview	with	the	
coaches,	29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 this	 context,	 when	 the	 clubs	 had	 a	 meeting,	 the	 CTBA	 always	 got	 involved	
because	the	chairman	of	the	CTBA	owned	the	Dacin	Basketball	Club	and	thus	had	
a	voice	in	these	discussions.	The	six	other	clubs	were	worried	that	the	chairman	
would	not	 share	 resources	equally	because	he	wanted	his	own	club	 to	benefit.	
The	clubs	therefore	doubted	the	CTBA’s	position	and	did	not	want	to	follow	the	
instructions	of	the	CTBA.			
However,	one	of	the	players	(P3)	argued	that	the	clubs	still	co‐operated	with	the	
CTBA	because	the	CTBA	was	the	only	basketball	agency	recognised	by	FIBA	and	
the	CTBA	had	resources.	
If	 SBL	 clubs	want	 to	 do	 some	basketball	 exchange	 activity,	 they	 all	
need	 to	 go	 through	 the	 CTBA’s	 supervision.	 Moreover	 if	 the	 clubs	
want	 to	 have	 a	 match,	 the	 referees	 all	 come	 from	 the	 CTBA.	
Therefore,	 since	 the	 SBL	 does	 not	 have	 its	 own	 company	 and	
resources,	 the	 clubs	 need	 to	 co‐operate	 with	 the	 CTBA	 (Interview	
with	the	players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
This	player	further	mentioned	that	conflict	resulted	from	financial	issues.		
They	argued	with	each	other	because	of	money.	The	CTBA	wanted	all	
of	the	ticket	revenue	but	the	clubs	wanted	to	share	it	(Interview	with	
the	players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
As	previously	discussed,	financial	considerations	were	the	main	concern	for	the	
clubs.	A	coach	of	an	SBL	club	(P4)	argued	that	the	reason	that	the	financial	issue	
became	 so	 important	 was	 that	 the	 government	 did	 not	 really	 care	 about	
basketball.	
The	 government	 should	 encourage	 big	 companies	 to	 support	
basketball,	 not	 only	 using	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 responsibility	 in	
order	 to	 persuade	 them,	 but	 also	 giving	 some	 incentives	 to	 these	
companies.	Once	 some	big	 companies	 support	 basketball,	 the	 long‐
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term	prospects	 for	 the	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan	would	
be	better.	The	government	does	not	need	to	fund	basketball	directly,	
but	 it	 should	 leverage	 some	 resources	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 to	
support	 basketball	 (Interview	 with	 the	 coaches,	 18/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
From	the	coaches’	and	players’	perspective,	this	‘semi‐professional’	structure	of	
the	SBL	damaged	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.	The	CTBA	took	over	
the	 operation	 of	 the	 SBL	 because	 the	 clubs	 did	 not	 run	 the	 business	
professionally.	 Moreover,	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs	 did	 not	 treat	 players	
professionally.		
A	player	(P3)	did	mention	the	wage	of	players.	
The	CTBA	and	the	club	imposed	a	salary	cap.	The	highest	wage	for	a	
domestic	player	could	have	is	NTD$	120000	per	month.	I	think	it	 is	
unreasonable.	 Once	 a	 young	 elite	 player	 reaches	 the	 highest	 level	
(NTD$	120000),	he	will	not	have	any	ambition	to	play	really	hard	in	
the	game	(Interview	with	the	players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	
author).		
This	salary	regulation	indirectly	led	to	a	diminishing	of	the	appeal	of	SBL	for	the	
fans,	 because	 if	 the	 players	 lacked	 proper	 incentive	 to	 play	 hard,	 fan	 turnout	
would	not	improve.		
The	game	is	not	exciting	because	of	this	salary	cap.	A	player	with	the	
highest	wage	will	try	to	avoid	injury,	so	he	will	protect	himself	very	
well	in	the	game.	Because	he	knows	if	he	does	not	get	injured,	he	can	
have	 that	contract	 longer	 (Interview	with	 the	players,	13/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
Here	the	 interviewee	(P3)	also	mentioned	an	issue	regarding	the	fragile	nature	
of	the	contracts	held	by	SBL	players.	The	contract	between	players	and	clubs	was	
just	a	piece	of	paper	and	often	was	not	enforced.	If	a	player	were	to	get	injured,	
the	club	could	refuse	to	respect	the	contract	terms	they	had	signed.		
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The	SBL	is	not	a	professional	league.	Why	do	the	clubs	need	to	sign	a	
contract	 with	 players?	 The	 clubs	 only	 signed	 contracts	 with	 elite	
players	 who	 might	 want	 to	 transfer	 to	 China	 (Interview	 with	 the	
players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	other	words,	there	was	no	protection	for	players.	A	coach	(P4)	also	confirmed	
this	view.	
The	 contract	 is	 just	 a	 symbolic	 matter.	 The	 clubs	 can	 give	 more	
money	 to	an	elite	player,	 and	 they	can	 fire	a	player	anytime.	There	
was	no	policy	of	the	CTBA	to	regulate	this	situation	because	the	SBL	
is	a	private	organisation.	Furthermore,	there	is	no	player’s	union	to	
help	 players	 to	 negotiate	 with	 clubs	 (Interview	 with	 the	 players,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
In	 this	 sense,	 this	 coach	 believed	 the	 poor	 operation	 of	 the	 SBL	 was	 because	
players	did	not	have	a	stable	environment	within	which	to	perform.		
If	the	skill	level	of	the	SBL	players	does	not	improve,	fans	will	choose	
to	 watch	 NBA	 rather	 than	 the	 SBL	 (Interview	 with	 the	 players,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
6.8	Summary	of	the	Case	
In	this	case,	the	perceptions	of	the	key	stakeholders	tended	to	be	focused	more	
on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 relevant	 stakeholders	 in	 the	
emergence	of	the	SBL	in	2003	and	throughout	the	operation	of	the	SBL.	Table	6.1	
illustrates	 the	perspectives	of	 specific	groups	of	 stakeholders	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
key	responsibilities	for	the	establishment	of	the	SBL.	
With	 regards	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 SBL,	 the	 government	 was	 considered	
crucial	to	the	success	of	its	establishment.	Specifically,	the	former	Minister	of	the	
SAC,	 Te‐Fu	 Lin,	 was	 described	 as	 the	 key	 person	 with	 connections	 to	 the	
government’s	 resources	 to	 push	 through	 a	 new	 league	by	 interviewees	 from	a	
range	of	stakeholder	groups.		
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From	31st	January	2002	to	19th	May	2004,	Te‐Fu	Lin	served	as	the	Minister	of	the	
SAC.	He	only	served	as	a	commissioner	of	the	Department	of	Cultural	Affairs	in	
Yilan	 County	 Government.	 However,	 after	 he	 took	 office,	 he	 had	 two	 major	
achievements	in	the	sporting	domain	which	were	the	merger	of	two	professional	
baseball	leagues	and	the	establishment	of	the	SBL.	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 players/coaches,	 players’	 poor	 performance	 in	
international	 competition	 drove	 the	 government	 to	 promote	 a	 new	 league.	
However,	Lin,	the	Minister	of	the	SAC	claimed	that	the	intention	was	to	set	up	a	
stronger	league,	one	in	which	the	players	could	be	role	models.	Young	players,	he	
argued,	would	then	have	a	dream	to	chase.		
Indeed,	the	interviewees	from	the	clubs	mentioned	that	the	SBL	was	actually	an	
official	 product.	 The	 SAC	 played	 a	 role	 in	 actively	 promoting	 it.	 Even	 the	
interviewees	from	the	sponsors	group	argued	that	Lin	was	genuinely	supportive	
of	 basketball,	 beyond	 political	 motives.	 However,	 some	 interviewees	 from	 the	
government	 officials’	 group	 argued	 that	 if	 the	 government	 was	 seen	 as	 a	
promoter	of	‘sport	for	all’,	Lin	could	promote	the	establishment	of	the	SBL	as	his	
own	personal	 political	 achievement.	Although	 there	 are	 diverse	 views	 on	Lin’s	
motives	 for	 setting	up	a	new	 league,	 it	was	widely	held	 that	 the	 idea	of	 a	new	
league	came	from	Lin.	
The	government	official	and	an	interviewee	from	the	media	stakeholders	argued	
that	the	establishment	of	the	SBL	was	Lin’s	personal	preference.	The	government	
official	 highlighted	 how	 in	 Taiwanese	 political	 culture	 the	 Minister’s	 personal	
opinion	often	determines	policy.	This	means	 that	 the	direction	of	policy	would	
inevitably	 be	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	 politician’s	 personal	 preferences.	 The	
aides	and	officials	therefore	tended	to	work	very	hard	to	realise	policies	which	
reflected	the	Minister’s	preferences.			
As	a	consequence,	Lin	as	a	Minister	of	the	SAC	used	the	government’s	resources	
to	coordinate	with	the	CTBA,	clubs,	and	media.	However	he	did	not	set	up	a	new	
professional	basketball	 league	but	a	 ‘prospective‐professional’	 league.	This	was	
set	 up	 under	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 CTBA	 because	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs	
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argued	that	it	was	not	a	good	time	to	set	up	a	fully	professional	league,	and	the	
clubs	did	not	want	 to	 increase	 their	 annual	budget	 rapidly	 from	 ten	million	or	
twenty	million	NTD	to	fifty	or	sixty	million	NTD	as	a	professional	league	would	
require.		
As	one	might	have	expected,	the	SBL	has	not	been	successful	in	many	operational	
aspects	since	 its	 inception.	The	following	accounts	 that	we	summarised	help	to	
identify	which	stakeholders	were	perceived	as	acting	effectively	and	why,	as	well	
as	which	stakeholders	were	characterised	as	operating	ineffectively	and	why	in	
the	operation	of	the	SBL.		
The	 SBL	 was	 established	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 government,	 but	 the	
government	has	been	criticised	 for	being	over‐involved	 in	 the	operation	of	 the	
SBL.	 A	 government	 official	 argued	 that	 the	 reason	 why	 the	 SBL	 could	 not	 be	
professionalised	 was	 precisely	 because	 the	 government	 was	 involved	 in	 the	
internal	affairs	of	the	SBL.	However,	another	interviewee	from	the	media	group	
argued	 that	 the	government	did	not	have	a	practical	development	plan	 for	 the	
future	 of	 basketball	 but	 instead	 made	 a	 one‐off	 investment.	 In	 addition,	 an	
interviewee	 from	 the	 clubs	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 only	 provided	 limited	
assistance	 to	 the	SBL	at	 its	 inception,	but	 that	 the	government	did	not	provide	
any	 subsequent	 assistance	 after	 the	 second	 year.	 From	 the	 accounts	 of	
interviewees	 from	the	media	and	the	clubs,	 it	was	also	clear	 that	 they	believed	
that	the	government	only	focused	on	sports	which	had	potential	to	win	kudos	in	
international	competitions.	 In	this	sense,	even	though	the	SBL	is	a	prospective‐
professional	league,	which	means	it	was	intended	to	be	a	commercial	entity,	the	
key	 actors	 still	 demanded	more	 government	 assistance.	 A	 government	 official	
mentioned	 that	private	 companies	were	not	keen	on	 supporting	or	 sponsoring	
basketball,	but	the	players/coaches	argued	that	 it	was	up	to	the	government	to	
come	 up	 with	 policies	 to	 change	 this.	 Thus	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 key	 actors	
appears	ambiguous,	 if	not	self‐contradictory,	in	the	sense	that	while	they	asked	
the	government	to	provide	more	support,	at	the	same	time	they	were	criticising	
the	government	for	being	over‐involved.			
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In	 fact,	 regarding	 the	operation	of	 the	SBL,	 the	 relationship	between	 the	CTBA	
and	 the	 committee	was	perceived	as	being	a	 core	problem.	Given	 that	 the	SBL	
committee	 is	 composed	 of	 representatives	 from	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 SBL	 clubs,	
there	has	always	been	debate	about	who	 is	or	should	be	 the	 leader	of	 the	SBL.	
The	clubs	argued	that	the	CTBA	was	dictatorial	and	that	the	democratic	process	
was	 just	 a	 superficial	 element.	 In	other	words,	 the	 clubs	 thought	 the	CTBA	did	
not	have	the	legitimacy	to	establish	and	to	run	the	SBL,	which	was	the	solution	
proposed	 following	 the	collapse	of	 the	CBA.	Despite	 this,	 the	clubs	had	not	 left	
the	CTBA	or	the	SBL	(yet),	because	the	SBL,	 for	which	the	CTBA	is	responsible,	
provides	 the	 only	 stage	 for	 the	 clubs	 and	 players.	 Therefore,	 as	 a	 semi‐
professional	league,	the	operation	of	the	SBL	was	controlled	by	the	CTBA,	which	
owned	 all	 the	 ticket	 revenue.	 In	 addition,	 a	 government	 official	 and	 a	 sponsor	
mentioned	that	a	core	problem	had	arisen	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	president	of	
the	 CTBA,	 Wang,	 also	 owned	 an	 SBL	 club.	 This	 meant	 that	 he	 was	 not	 only	
involved	with	the	CTBA’s	affairs	but	could	also	influence	the	decisions	of	the	SBL	
committee.	 While	 the	 CTBA	 was	 in	 dispute	 with	 the	 SBL	 committee,	 the	 SBL	
committee	was	 unable	 to	make	 and	 to	 execute	 decisions	 effectively.	While	 the	
clubs	criticised	the	CTBA,	a	member	of	CTBA	staff	argued	that	the	reason	that	the	
CTBA	had	 taken	 the	 responsibility	 for	organising	 the	 competition	was	 that	 the	
SBL	committee	adopted	a	collegiate	system	in	which	full	consensus	was	required	
for	 any	 action	 to	 be	 agreed.	 However	 consensus	 inevitably	 proved	 difficult	 or	
even	 impossible	 to	 establish	 rendering	 the	 organisation	 unable	 to	 respond	 to	
changing	circumstances.	
The	conflict	between	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	(the	committee)	was	not	the	only	
problem	for	the	governance	of	the	SBL.	From	the	case	study,	it	was	also	clear	that	
“double	 agency”	 and	 the	 resultant	 conflict	 of	 interest,	 was	 a	 significant	
governance	issue.	Because	Ren‐Da	Wang,	who	owned	the	Dacin	Tigers,	served	as	
the	president	of	 the	CTBA,	he	 could	always	make	decisions	 for	 the	 league	 that	
were	of	benefit	to	him	in	the	absence	of	a	strong	leader	of	the	SBL.	In	addition,	
the	 sponsors	 also	 identified	 a	 club	 manager,	 Yen,	 who	 led	 the	 Taiwan	 Beer	
Basketball	 Club	 while	 actually	 also	 owning	 another	 club	 –	 Kinmen	 Kaoliang	
Liquor	 Basketball	 Club.	 In	 this	 sense,	 this	 individual	 managed	 not	 only	 two	
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competing	clubs	and	their	assets	but	also	was	able	 to	exercise	undue	 influence	
by	 having	 two	 votes	 in	 the	 SBL	 committee.	 This	 clear	 conflict	 of	 interests	was	
never	 addressed.	 The	 sponsors	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 situation	 meant	 that	 this	
individual	was	even	in	a	position	to	fix	the	result	of	a	game	if	he	wished	to	do	so.	
Thus,	we	see	that	these	conflicts	of	interest	ran	counter	to	the	principles	of	good	
corporate	 governance,	 with	 clear	 implications	 for	 the	 development	 of	 elite	
basketball.		
The	bidding	for	TV	rights	and	marketing	rights	represented	another	battlefield.	
Nike	and	ESPN	co‐operated	together	to	earn	marketing	and	broadcasting	rights	
in	the	first	season.	A	sponsor	argued	that	Nike	invested	a	huge	amount	when	the	
SBL	was	established.	However,	ESPN	broke	the	arrangement	with	Nike	in	order	
to	enjoy	the	TV	and	marketing	rights	alone.	The	Nike	representative	argued	that	
since	CTBA	had	awarded	ESPN	these	rights,	ESPN	had	no	 incentive	 to	 improve	
the	marketing	of	 the	SBL.	 It	simply	continued	the	same	marketing	campaign	to	
attract	customers;	this	had	resulted	in	the	downturn	of	the	SBL.	He	argued	that	
ESPN	 only	 used	 the	 SBL	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 to	 negotiate	 with	 local	 cable	
network	companies.	From	the	Nike	representative’s	viewpoint,	the	relationship	
between	 ESPN	 and	 the	 CTBA	 was	 the	 main	 difficulty	 in	 the	 SBL’s	 operation	
because	 the	 CTBA	 chose	 to	 co‐operate	 with	 ESPN	 to	 generate	 profits	 at	 the	
expense	of	the	clubs.		
From	 the	above	discussion,	 “profit”	 and	 conflicts	of	 interests	 seemed	 to	be	 the	
core	 element	 of	 the	 arguments.	 The	 clubs	 and	 sponsors	 argued	 that	 the	 CTBA	
was	 not	 professional	 enough	 to	 lead	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	
and	simply	wanted	to	receive	the	ticket	revenue.;	the	sponsors	criticised	ESPN	in	
that	 its	 main	 goal	 was	 to	 maximise	 short	 run	 profits	 from	 TV	 and	 marketing	
rights.;	 while	 the	 CTBA	 blamed	 the	 clubs	 for	 rendering	 the	 SBL	 committee	
inefficient.		
In	terms	of	systemic	governance,	in	the	process	of	the	emergence	of	the	SBL,	key	
stakeholders	were	the	SAC,	which	actively	promoted	a	new	league;	the	fans,	who	
became	a	pressure	group	promoting	government	involvement;	the	media	(ESPN)	
and	the	sponsor	(NIKE)	who	co‐operated	together	to	broadcast	and	market	the	
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SBL	in	the	first	season;	and	the	CTBA	which	provided	resources	to	organise	the	
fixtures;	as	well	as	the	clubs	and	players	who	actually	played	the	game.		
Beyond	 systemic	 governance	 issues,	 this	 case	 highlights	 also	 the	 character	 of	
political	 governance	 which	 appeared	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 SBL	 within	 this	
network	 of	 stakeholders.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 SBL	 is	 a	 good	 illustration	 of	 a	
government’s	attempts	 to	 steer	 the	sports	 system	 to	achieve	desired	outcomes	
(the	establishing	of	the	league,	and	associated	political	kudos).	However	its	long	
term	 influence	 is	 limited,	 since	 for	 political	 and	 financial	 reasons	 its	 financial	
investment	could	not	be	sustained.	
However,	 as	 attendance	 rates	 went	 down	 from	 the	 second	 year	 of	 operation,	
while	the	strategic	resources	and	thus	the	influence	of	some	stakeholders	waned,	
while	 that	 of	 others	 grew.	 The	 government	 was	 only	 able	 to	 make	 a	 one‐off	
investment	in	basketball.	The	Chairman	of	the	CTBA	actually	owned	an	SBL	club,	
and	 thus	 was	 able	 to	 operate	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	
Association	and	the	clubs.	The	CTBA	(with	the	key	influence	of	its	Chairman	was	
able	 to	 resist	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 clubs.	 NIKE	 left	 the	 marketing	 team	 in	 the	
second	year,	and	 the	CTBA	kept	all	 ticket	sales	without	sharing	with	 the	clubs,	
whose	 influence	was	 limited	 in	 this	 case	because	of	 the	 clash	of	 interests	with	
other	stakeholders.	We	discuss	these	matters	further	in	section	8.1	as	the	inter‐
linking	nature	of	the	three	cases	needs	to	be	highlighted	in	order	to	provide	the	
context	for	the	discussion	of	the	strategic	relations.		
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Table	6.2:	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	the	establishment	of	the	SBL	
Stakeholders Key	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes Main	Argument
Government	officials	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	– Lin	 *	Lin	had	his	own	preference
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	– Lin	 *	Lin	could	highlight	his	political	achievement
*	The	SAC	staff
	
*	Personal	emotions,	connections	and	relationship	will	affect	the	policy‐making	process.	
‘The	Minister’s	opinion	is	the	policy’	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	 *	Lin	preferred	the	SBL	to	be	set	up	under	the	structure	of	the	CTBA	because	the	CTBA	was	able	to	provide	referring	and	game	organising	resources.	
*	SAC,	CTBA,	Clubs	 *	The	SBL’s	semi‐professional	structure	was	a	compromise	decision	when	some	people	preferred	professional	league	and	others	not	
CTBA	staff	
*	Fans	 *	Pressures	from	fans	pushed	the	SAC	to	set	up	a	new	league
*	Fans	 *	Ticket	sales	helped	the	CTBA	to	maintain	the	SBL	
Media	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	– Lin
	
*	The	policy	– ‘To	create	a	basketball	league	suited	to	Taiwan’	did	not	come	from	aides	
but	from	Lin	himself.	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	 *	The	direction	of	policy	will	be	strongly	influenced	by	the	head’s	subjective	views.	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	 *	Lin	supported	ESPN/NIKE	as	the	broadcasting/marketing	unit.	
Sponsors	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	 *	Lin	was	strongly	supportive	to	helping	basketball	regardless	of	political	motives.	
*	The	government	 *	The	government	supported	the	establishment	of	the	SBL	because	the	government	played	a	role	as	a	promoter	of	Sport	for	all	
Clubs	 *	The	SAC	 *	The	SBL	actually	is	an	official	product.	The	SAC	played	a	role	in	actively	bringing	it	to	life	and	in	promoting	it.	
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*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	 *	Lin	invited	the	clubs	to	discuss	the	establishment	of	the	league.	
Coaches/players	
*	Players’	performance
	
	
*	The	reduced	competitive	capability	of	the	national	team	and	the	downturn	in	results	of	
international	competition	were	the	main	reasons	for	the	SAC	promoting	the	emergence	
of	the	SBL.	
*	Minister	of	the	SAC	–	Lin	
	
*	Lin	argued	that	basketball	should	break	out	of	the	traditional	framework	of	the	CTBA	to	
set	up	the	new	league.	
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Table	6.3:	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	the	operation	of	the	SBL	
Stakeholders Key	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes Main	Argument
Government	officials	
*	The	CTBA	and	the	SBL	committee	 *	The	CTBA	and	the	SBL	committee	have	always	been	in	dispute	over	the	issue	of	who	should	the	leader	of	SBL.	
*	Wang	– the	president	of	the	CTBA *	Wang	as	the	president	of	the	CTBA	owned	an	SBL	club
*	The	government	 *	The	SBL	cannot	be	a	‘professional’	league	because	the	government	has	been	involved	
*	The	government	 *	The	government	politician	was	over‐involved	in	the	choice	of	broadcasting	unit.	
*	Taiwanese	culture *	Big	companies	did	not	want	to	support	basketball
*	The	owners *	The	owner	only	cared	to	enhance	their	reputations	by	winning	games.
*	Taiwanese	Environment *	The	sport	industry	is	not	big	enough	to	support	professional	sports
*	The	CTBA	and	the	SBL	committee	 *	The	salary	cap	limited	the	development	of	the	SBL	
CTBA	staff	
*	The	SBL	committee
	
*	Adopted	a	collegiate	system	‐ Once	consensus	was	not	possible,	the	SBL	committee	
simply	proved	ineffective	
*	The	SBL	committee	 *	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	SBL	committee	was	the	reason	that	its	marketing	was	poor	
*	The	Clubs
	
*	CTBA	to	take	over	responsibility	for	choosing	broadcasting	unit	because	clubs	could	not	
come	to	a	shared	common	view	on	it.	
Media	
*	The	government	
	
*	The	government	did	not	use	the	budget	very	well	because	the	government	only	focused	
on	sports	in	which	Taiwan	could	succeed	in	international	competition.	
*	The	government *	the	government	supported	sports	for	‘political	motives
*	The	government	 *	the	government	did	not	have	a	practical	development	plan	for	the	future	of	basketball	but	instead	made	a	one‐off	investment	
	
	
195	
	
Sponsors	
*	Nike	 *	Nike	put	a	huge	investment	when	the	SBL	was	established
*	Nike	 *	Nike	supported	the	SBL	because	Nike	wanted	to	set	up	a	long‐term	basketball	culture	
*	ESPN	 *	ESPN	kicked	Nike	out	because	ESPN	realised	the	value	of	the	advertising	billboard.	
*	ESPN	 *	ESPN	did	not	have	the	pressure	of	ticket	selling	and	club‐marketing	while	the	revenue	from	advertising	was	considerable.	
*	SBL	 *	The	league	did	not	lead	a	middle‐term	or	a	long‐term	plan	for	the	development	of	the	SBL	
*	ESPN	
	
*	ESPN	did	not	improve	the	marketing	of	the	SBL,	and	kept	using	the	same	approach	to	
attracting	customers	that	had	caused	the	downturn	of	the	SBL.	
*	CTBA	
	
*	The	members	of	CTBA	staff	were	not	professional	enough	to	lead	the	development	of	
basketball	in	Taiwan.	
*	CTBA	and	ESPN *	The	CTBA	co‐operated	with	ESPN	to	make	profit,	and	sacrificed	the	interests	of	clubs.	
*	ESPN	 *	ESPN	used	the	SBL	as	a	stake	to	negotiate	with	cable	network	companies.
*	Wang	–	the	president	of	the	CTBA	 *	Wang	as	the	president	of	the	CTBA	owned	a	SBL	club,	and	could	influence	the	decisions	of	the	SBL	committee	–	an	unchallenged	conflict	interests	
*	Yen	–	the	manager	of	the	Taiwan	
beer	and	the	owner	of	Kinmen	
Basketball	Team		
*	People	with	the	greater	resources	(particularly	money)	could	control	basketball	
Clubs	
*	The	government		
	
*	The	government	gave	a	little	financial	help	to	the	SBL	at	the	start,	but	the	government	
did	not	give	any	further	assistance	after	the	second	year.	
*	The	government
	
*	The	government	only	focused	on	sports	in	which	Taiwan	could	win	medals	in	
international	competitions.	
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*	Clubs	
	
*	The	funding	from	the	government	and	broadcasting	rights	fee	was	insufficient	to	cover	
the	annual	budget,	and	the	clubs	made	up	the	spending.	
*	Blaming	of	the	CTBA	 *	No	matter	how	many	tickets	were	sold,	all	the	ticket	revenue	belonged	to	the	CTBA	
*	Blaming	of	the	CTBA
	
*	The	operation	of	the	SBL	was	controlled	by	the	CTBA	because	it	was	a	semi‐
professional	league.	
*	Blaming	of	the	CTBA	 *	The	CTBA	was	dictatorial.	The	democratic	process	was	just	a	superficial	element.	
*	Blaming	of	the	CTBA	
	
*	The	owners	and	managers	of	clubs	could	not	exert	influence	on	the	CTBA	because	the	
SBL	was	run	by	the	CTBA	and	provided	a	stage	for	the	clubs	and	players.	
*	Taiwanese	culture *	In	Taiwan,	big	companies	did	not	support	professional	sports.
*	CTBA	and	the	clubs	 *	There	was	no	protection	for	player’s	contracts	
Coaches/players	
*	Blaming	the	Clubs
	
*	The	reason	why	the	SBL	was	controlled	by	the	CTBA	was	because	the	clubs	did	not	
want	to	get	seriously	involved	in	its	operation	seriously.	
*	Wang‐ the	president	of	the	CTBA	and	
the	owner	of	the	Dacin	Tigers	Team	
	
*	Wang	Ren‐Da	who	was	the	chairman	of	the	CTBA	and	the	owner	of	the	Dacin	basketball	
club.	He	could	always	influence	the	final	decision	for	the	SBL	(conflict	of	interests)		
*	CTBA		 *	The	CTBA	wanted	all	ticket	revenue	while	the	clubs	wanted	to	share	it
*	The	government *	The	government	should	have	encouraged	big	companies	to	support	basketball
*	Blaming	of	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs *	Set	up	the	salary	cap	
*	The	clubs *	The	contract	between	players	and	clubs	was	not	respected	by	the	clubs	and	players	had	
no	redress	
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Chapter	Seven	
The	Critical	Contextual	Set	of	Factors:		
the	Sporting	Link	with	China	
	
7.1	Introduction	
Our	 two	 previous	 cases	 have	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 local	 dynamics	 in	 the	
interactions	between	groups	of	key	stakeholders	in	processes	affecting	the	development	
of	 basketball,	 particularly	 the	 development	 of	 professional/semi‐professional	
basketball,	 in	 Taiwan.	 Other	 than	 local	 dynamics,	 the	 sporting	 link	 with	 China	 also	
represents	an	important	contextual	element	in	the	governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan.		
After	failed	attempts	to	re‐open	the	CBA	in	2000,	the	Sina	Basketball	Team	took	over	all	
the	players	from	the	HungKuo	basketball	club	to	set	up	its	own	basketball	club	on	7th	
December	2000.	Because	prospects	for	basketball	development	in	Taiwan	looked	bleak	
without	a	professional	league,	the	Sina	organisation	expressed	its	intention	to	transfer	
to	 the	Chinese	League	 in	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 (PRC).	After	several	meetings	
with	the	CTBA,	the	Sina	basketball	club	decided	to	transfer	eight	players	to	the	Chinese	
league	on	May	2001	(Chang,	2001).	On	20th	September,	2001	Sina	officially	announced	
it	would	use	“Taiwan	(SuZhou)	Sina	Lions	Basketball	Team”	as	the	club	name	to	register	
in	the	Chinese	league	with	permission	from	the	Basketball	Administrative	Centre	(BAC)	
of	the	PRC(Lee,	2001;	Lee,	2001).	The	CTBA	immediately	contacted	the	BAC	of	PRC	to	
express	its	disapproval	of	this	move.	Sina	Basketball	Club	was	determined	to	transfer	to	
the	Chinese	League	 and	 reacted	 to	CTBA’s	disapproval	by	 terminating	 its	 registration	
with	the	CTBA	on	28th	September,	2001	(Wei,	2001).	The	BAC	of	PRC	soon	set	up	the	
fixture	 list	 for	 the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League	for	 the	coming	season	(2001‐
2002),	and	Sina	made	all	the	necessary	preparations(Lee,	2002).	On	the	5th	of	October	
the	 owner	 of	 Sina	 Basketball	 Club,	 Chiang,	 led	 the	 club	members	 to	 their	 new	 home	
“Suchou”.	Sina’s	pre‐season	training	began	on	8th	October	but	the	club	name	was	still	a	
debate	 until	 30th	 October	 when	 the	 name	 “Sina	 Lions	 (Taiwanese	 Enterprise)	
Basketball	Club”	was	finalised	(Gong,	2001).			
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After	two	seasons,	Chiang	decided	to	quit	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League	on	
March	 2003,	 and	 the	 club	 returned	 to	 Taiwan.	 Chiang	 noted	 that	 the	 club	 could	 not	
adapt	 to	 the	 style	 of	 the	 Chinese	 First	 Class	 Basketball	 League	 in	 the	 PRC	 and	 that	
problems	with	corrupt	referees	damaged	the	club.	Lin	(2003)	argues	that	Sina	was	the	
only	club	that	did	not	bribe	referees.	In	addition,	the	average	age	of	players	was	too	high	
but	Sina	could	not	get	new	blood	in	China	because	Sina	did	not	have	its	own	channel	to	
recruit	 young	 players	 from	 schools	 or	 academies.	 These	 problems	 eventually	 forced	
Sina	back	to	Taiwan.	
The	 relationship	 in	 basketball	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 China	 had	 become	 a	 matter	 of	
debate	 since	 the	 first	 Taiwanese	 player	 migrated	 to	 China	 in	 1999.	 Since	 2001,	 41	
known	 sports	 athletes/coaches	 have	migrated	 to	 China,	 33	 of	whom	were	 basketball	
athletes/coaches.	Chou	(2009)	argues	that	from	the	players’	perspective,	a	youth	policy	
in	the	national	team	11	and	the	suspension	of	the	CBA	in	Taiwan	were	the	tipping	point	
for	 those	 who	 migrated	 to	 the	 Chinese	 league	 from	 1999	 to	 2003,	 but	 that	 self‐
achievement	and	salary	increase	were	the	main	reasons	for	the	players’	migration	from	
2007	to	2010.		
However,	 the	sporting	 link	with	China	was	 further	complicated	by	political,	economic,	
and	cultural	changes	 in	cross‐strait	 relationship.	This	set	of	structures	cannot	be	 fully	
explained	by	considering	the	players’	perspective	alone.	For	example,	the	Taiwan	(ROC)	
government	became	actively	 involved	 in	the	naming	of	Sina	Basketball	Club	when	the	
club	 was	 in	 the	 process	 of	 registering	 in	 the	 Chinese	 League	 in	 2001;	 the	 Taiwan	
government	pressured	the	club	to	drop	the	name	‘Taiwan’	from	its	title.		
The	Taiwan	government	passed	legislation	entitled	‘Regulations	Governing	Permission	
for	 Athletes	 from	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 to	 Join	 Athletic	 Groups	 in	 Mainland	 China	 as	
Members	or	Official	Workers’	following	Sina’s	transfer.	The	government’s	concern	was	
related	to	the	issue	of	national	sovereignty	while	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	were	worried	
about	 losing	 players.	 In	 addition,	 when	 several	 players	 declared	 their	 intention	 to	
transfer	 to	the	Chinese	League	in	2008,	the	CTBA	hosted	a	general	meeting	to	discuss	
the	 matter	 and	 the	 outcome	 was	 that	 the	 executive	 board	 banned	 24	 elite	 or	 high‐
																																																								
11	National	team	began	to	use	young	talents	as	the	main	players	instead	of	senior	players.	
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potential	players	from	transferring	to	the	Chinese	League.	Other	players	who	were	not	
on	 the	 list	 of	 the	 top	 24	 players	 could	 apply	 for	 transfer	 to	 China.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
CTBA	wanted	to	use	this	regulation	to	stop	the	best	players	from	leaving	the	league.	The	
regulation	was	also	beneficial	to	the	clubs	because	they	considered	their	best	players	to	
be	 their	 investment.	 However	 some	 clubs	 had	 a	 potential	 business	 interest	 in	
transferring	 to	China	as	 the	 size	of	 the	Chinese	market	 could	afford	opportunities	 for	
their	parent	companies	 to	do	undertake	promotion.	 In	short,	different	 interest	groups	
had	 different	 interests	 to	 be	 realised	 through	 the	 basketball	 link	 with	 China.	 The	
different	 stakeholders’	 viewpoints	 are	 thus	 addressed	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	 capture	 the	
dynamics	of	Taiwan‐China	basketball	relationship.						
	
7.2	The	Perspective	of	the	Government	Officials	
When	the	owner	of	Sina,	Jiang,	decided	to	transfer	to	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	
League,	the	first	issue	he	faced	was	concerning	the	club’s	name.	The	BAC	of	PRC	firstly	
notified	the	CTBA	that	they	agreed	that	Sina	could	use	“Taiwan	(Suzhou)	Sina	Lions”	to	
register	 in	 the	 Chinese	 First	 Class	 Basketball	 League,	 and	 then	 Sina	 held	 a	 press	
conference	in	Taipei	to	announce	that	they	would	use	“Taiwan	Sina”	as	their	club	name	
in	 China.	 However,	 the	 SAC	 immediately	 rejected	 this	 decision	 and	 proposed	 to	 fine	
Sina.	 Then	 Sina	 changed	 its	 name	 to	 “Taipei	 (Suzhou)	 Sina	 Lions”,	 but	 the	 SAC	 still	
rejected	 it	 because	 issues	 of	 national	 identity.	 The	 transfer	 also	 violated	 regulations	
governing	sporting	links	with	the	PRC.	The	first	of	these	was	‘the	Regulation	of	Handling	
Cross‐Strait	 Sports	 Exchange,	 section	 5.2	 which	 states	 that	 a	 team	 may	 not	 go	 to	
mainland	 China	 to	 participate	 in	 national	 sports	 events	 (Sport	 Affairs	 Council,	 1998).	
The	second	was	 ‘the	Act	Governing	Relations	between	the	People	of	the	Taiwan	Area	and	
the	Mainland	Area’,	 item	33	stipulates	that	any	individual,	 legal	entity,	organisation,	or	
other	institution	of	the	Taiwan	Area	should	not	hold	any	position	or	become	a	member	
of	any	agency,	institution	or	organisations	of	the	Mainland	Area	which	is	affiliated	with	
political	 parties,	 the	 military,	 administration	 of	 any	 political	 nature	 or	 which	 are	
prohibited	with	public	 notices	by	 the	Mainland	Affairs	Council,	 the	Executive	Yuan	 in	
consultation	with	each	competent	authorities	concerned’	(Executive	Yuan,	1991,	2012;	
Ho	&	Chan,	2002;	Lee,	2002).		
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A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G4)	argued	that	the	government	did	not	want	Sina	
to	leave	because	cross‐strait	relations	were	still	tense.	
It	was	different	in	2001	compared	to	now.	The	relationship	between	Taiwan	
and	China	was	still	tense.	In	terms	of	the	name	issue,	our	national	sovereignty	
could	not	be	degraded	or	people	would	think	that	Taiwan	is	part	of	China.	It	
was	this	point	which	concerned	the	DPP	government	the	most.	According	to	
FIBA’s	regulations,	these	were	two	independent	organisations.	When	players	
wanted	 to	 transfer,	 they	 needed	 to	 report	 to	 the	 national	 basketball	
association,	and	players	should	 follow	the	Act	Governing	Relations	between	
the	 People	 of	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 and	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 reporting	 to	 the	
administrate	 department.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 was	 embarrassing	 for	 the	
CTBA	 for	 the	 club	 to	 leave.	 Therefore	 there	 was	 no	 flexibility	 for	 the	
government	and	the	club.	From	their	business	position,	transferring	to	China	
might	 obtain	 a	 better	 return	 at	 the	 time	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	
officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).								
Another	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G3)	mentioned	that	it	was	not	just	a	battle	
for	the	Club	and	the	government.	There	was	a	triangular	negotiation	between	the	club,	
Taiwanese	 government,	 and	 Chinese	 government.	 Sina	 was	 concerned	 about	 its	
business	interests,	while	the	Taiwanese	government	and	the	Chinese	government	both	
had	political	considerations.		
The	government	did	not	agree	[to	Sina’s	transferring]	at	the	beginning.	From	
the	 government’s	 perspective,	 the	 Taiwanese	 going	 to	 work	 for	 China	
suggested	reunification.	In	addition,	the	business	Sina’s	owners	had	in	mind	
been	not	purely	basketball‐related.	Sina	[which	is	an	online	media	company]	
wanted	 to	 enter	 the	 Chinese	 market	 because	 Sina.com	 saw	 great	 business	
potential	in	China,	so	it	wanted	to	do	some	promotion	through	basketball.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	Chinese	had	a	chance	to	get	a	Taiwanese	club	to	play	 in	
the	Chinese	league.	This	could	imply	that	Taiwan	was	part	of	China	because	
Sina	was	owned	by	a	Taiwanese.	The	Chinese	used	this	chance	to	promote	the	
idea	reunification.	The	Taiwanese	government	therefore	said	we	could	not	let	
them	put	Taiwan	in	the	club	name	because	it	would	seem	as	if	the	club	was	to	
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be	a	Taiwan	Provincial	team	in	the	PRC’s	Chinese	league	(Interview	with	the	
government	officials,	27/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Here	this	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G3)	suggested	that	China	often	politicised	
sports,	with	Taiwan	reunification	being	the	political	agenda.	
Recently	 they	 held	 many	 games	 such	 as	 national	 intercollegiate	 athletic	
games	and	national	rural	games,	and	they	asked	Taiwan	to	attend.	If	Taiwan	
really	sent	a	team	to	attend	the	Chinese	national	games,	Taiwan	would	be	like	
one	 of	 their	 provinces/counties.	 However	 Sina	 registered	 in	 the	 PRC	 First	
Class	Basketball	League	directly	without	having	 to	advance	 from	the	 lower‐
level	 leagues.	 China	 made	 an	 exception	 for	 Sina	 because	 Sina	 was	 from	
Taiwan,	and	they	had	some	political	motive	behind	this	move	(Interview	with	
the	government	officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 other	words,	 because	 the	 PRC	 government	 saw	 Sina’s	 participation	 in	 the	 Chinese	
League	as	an	opportunity	to	advance	their	political	agenda	through	the	perception	that	
the	club	represents	a	province	of	the	PRC,	the	Taiwan	government	demanded	that	Sina	
remove	‘Taiwan’	or	‘Taipei’	from	its	name.	
However	 another	 former	Deputy	Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	mentioned	 that	 if	 the	 Sina	
Lions	had	not	violated	the	law,	the	government	could	not	interfere	with	its	transfer	to	
China.		
Sina	had	some	business	 it	wanted	 to	develop	 in	China,	 and	 it	used	 the	Sina	
Lions	to	do	some	commercial	advertisements.	From	a	business	perspective,	it	
was	difficult	 to	 change	 their	 decision	by	moral	 persuasion.	At	 that	 time	we	
had	 no	 solution	 because	 they	 did	 not	 break	 the	 law	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).				
Finally	the	BAC	of	PRC	put	Sina	on	the	fixture	list	and	Sina	stated	that	it	would	transfer	
to	China	 in	October	2001	even	after	 the	club	was	 fined	 for	violating	 the	Regulation	of	
Handling	Cross‐Strait	Sports	Exchange.	After	negotiations,	Sina	agreed	not	to	use	country	
or	city	names	in	the	club’s	title.	The	cross‐strait	basketball	agencies	announced	the	club	
name	 at	 the	 same	 time;	 it	 was	 decided	 as	 “the	 Sina	 Lions	 Basketball	 Club”.	 The	 SAC	
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actively	enacted	‘the	Regulations	Governing	Permission	for	Athletes	from	the	Taiwan	Area	
to	Join	Athletic	Groups	in	Mainland	China	as	Members	or	Official	Workers’	 (Sport	Affairs	
Council,	2002)	to	make	Sina’s	action	legal	(Ho	&	Chan,	2002;	Lee,	2002).	
A	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G4)	mentioned	the	process	of	this	case:	
According	 to	 the	 Act	Governing	Relations	between	 the	People	of	 the	Taiwan	
Area	and	the	Mainland	Area,	Sina	was	not	allowed	to	transfer.	Also	according	
to	 FIBA’s	 regulations,	 all	 the	 basketball	 players	 belong	 to	 the	 national	
federation.	However	the	Constitution	of	 the	Republic	of	China	protected	the	
right	 to	work	 for	 all	 Taiwanese	 people.	 Therefore	we	 [SAC]	 had	 discussion	
with	 the	Mainland	 Affairs	 Council	 to	 see	 if	 there	 was	 any	 solution	 for	 this	
issue.	 Finally	 Sina	was	permitted	 to	 transfer	 to	 China	without	 breaking	 the	
law	(Interview	with	the	government	officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	
author).		
Later	Sina	registered	 in	 the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League	on	 time.	 In	 the	 first	
season	it	finished	8th	in	the	regular	season	and	played	in	the	playoffs.	However	the	club	
was	 not	 nearly	 as	 successful	 in	 the	 second	 season,	 after	 posting	 a	 losing	 record	 and	
finishing	second	to	last.	Finally	Sina	transferred	back	to	Taiwan	at	the	end	of	the	second	
season.			
In	 the	 case	 of	 Sina,	 the	 government	 reacted	 after	 the	 issue	 had	 surfaced,	 from	 the	
rejection	of	Sina’s	request	at	the	beginning	to	the	enacting	of	the	Regulations	Governing	
Permission	for	Athletes	from	the	Taiwan	Area	to	Join	Athletic	Groups	in	Mainland	China	as	
Members	or	Official	Workers	 at	 the	 end.	 The	 initial	 rejection	 and	 the	 latter	 regulation	
enactment	highlighted	inconsistency	in	the	thinking	of	the	government	at	the	time.		
From	the	2000s,	with	the	relaxation	of	cross‐strait	relationships,	migration	of	basketball	
players	became	an	important	issue	from	both	sides.	In	2008	when	a	core	player	of	the	
ROC	(Taiwan)	national	team	player,	Sean	Chen,	decided	to	transfer	to	China,	the	CTBA	
issued	a	statement	that	it	would	provide	a	list	of	24	Taiwanese	elite/potential	national	
team	players	who	would	not	be	allowed	to	transfer	to	China	(the	24	players	list)	(Chu,	
2008).	 However,	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	 regulation	 was	 only	 maintained	 for	 one	
year.	In	2009,	three	players	on	the	Taiwan	national	team	transferred	to	clubs	in	China,	
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and	many	more	would	follow	suit	after	2009.	In	terms	of	the	migration	of	players,	the	
attitudes	of	different	groups	of	stakeholder	were	different.					
Cross‐strait	moderation	was	thus	an	 important	context	 for	player	migration.	A	 former	
Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G3)	mentioned:	
Because	 of	 the	 amendment	 to	 Statute	For	Relations	Between	The	People	Of	
Taiwan	Area	And	The	People	Of	Mainland	Area,	Wen‐Ting	Zheng	and	Chi‐Che	
Lin	(national	team	players)	went	to	China.	However	compared	to	the	case	of	
Sina,	they	did	not	make	a	huge	impact	because	that	was	a	personal	matter.	In	
the	past,	 if	 players	or	businessman	went	 to	China	without	permission,	 they	
would	be	 fined.	Now	 if	 they	 conform	 to	 the	 law,	 they	 can	 transfer	 to	China	
(Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 27/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).		
A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	 suggested	 there	 were	 two	 reasons	 that	
Taiwanese	players	transferred	to	China.	One	was	because	of	the	moderation	of	the	legal	
limitations.	The	second	was	that	migration	of	players	had	become	a	normal	situation	for	
international	 sports.	 However	 he	 also	 mentioned	 that	 the	 migration	 of	 Taiwanese	
players	could	be	a	warning	signal	for	the	development	of	sports	in	Taiwan.		
We	did	not	provide	a	good	environment	 for	professional	 sports	 to	develop.	
When	you	have	an	opportunity	to	play	in	China,	and	they	are	going	to	pay	you	
USD	10000	per	month,	are	you	willing	to	go?	(Interview	with	the	government	
officials,	28/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author)	
Indeed,	some	interviewees	argued	that	poor	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan	was	
the	 reason	 for	 Taiwanese	 players	 and	 clubs	 wishing	 to	 transfer	 to	 China.	 A	 former	
Minster	of	the	SAC	(G1)	argued	that	the	Taiwanese	league	was	not	powerful	enough	to	
retain	players.	
The	 SBL	 committee	 could	 not	 constrain	 the	 clubs,	 so	 they	 wanted	 the	
government	 to	 constrain	 the	 clubs.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 government’s	 duty	 to	
constrain	them,	but	as	an	official	of	the	SAC,	I	think	it’s	a	shame	if	the	league	
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collapses.	After	all	we	established	the	league	at	the	beginning	(Interview	with	
the	government	officials,	13/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).			
The	 statement	 of	 this	 senior	 politician	 reveals	 a	 contradictory	 position	 held	 by	 the	
government.	 The	 government	 could	 prohibit	 the	 migration	 or	 it	 could	 amend	 the	
regulations	 to	 make	 the	 migration	 legal.	 A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	
(interviewee	G3)	mentioned	that	in	the	past	Taiwanese	people	could	not	work	in	China	
because	of	the	Act	Governing	Relations	between	the	People	of	the	Taiwan	Area	and	the	
Mainland	Area.	 In	 order	 to	 let	 Sina	 transfer	 to	 China,	 the	 government	 adopted	 a	 new	
regulation.	So	in	fact	the	government	did	not	reject	it.		
A	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G1)	 said	 the	 government	 could	 not	 stop	 private	
enterprises	from	developing	in	China.	
When	a	 club	wants	 to	 transfer	 to	China,	 you	cannot	 intervene	 if	 the	 club	 is	
owned	 by	 a	 private	 business.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 allowed	 to	 use	 Taiwan	 or	 a	
Taiwanese	city	name	for	the	club.	You	cannot	say	I	represent	Chinese	Taipei	
playing	in	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League.	However,	if	a	company	is	
registered	in	China,	 it	 is	a	Chinese	company.	Is	the	registration	legal	or	not?	
That	 is	 a	 business	 issue.	 The	 SAC	 cannot	 intervene	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	13/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).				
The	government	 seemed	 to	playing	a	passive	 role	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 interview	of	 this	
research	[December	2011].	Players	or	clubs	send	their	applications	to	the	SAC,	and	then	
the	SAC	would	examine	them	by	reference	to	cross‐strait	regulations.		
You	 should	 have	 a	 common	 view	 before	 you	 talk	 to	 the	 government.	 You	
should	firstly	deal	with	the	issue	“should	the	player	or	club	transfer	to	China?”	
Then	 the	 players	 or	 club	 could	 transfer	 after	 the	 SAC	 has	 examined	 the	
application	 by	 cross‐strait	 regulations	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	
officials,	18/01/2010,	translated	by	the	author).				
Another	 former	Deputy	Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G5)	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 should	
adopt	the	same	attitude	it	dis	with	other	cross‐strait	economic	issues.		
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We	 should	 maintain	 domestic	 competitive	 strength	 of	 basketball	 with	 the	
same	seriousness	as	the	government	does	with	economic	issues.	For	example,	
the	government	works	hard	to	ensure	that	companies	which	have	transferred	
to	China	still	maintain	their	roots	in	Taiwan.	I	know	Sina	had	its	business	in	
China.	 The	 situation	was	 like	 a	 normal	 factory	which	wants	 to	 set	 up	 new	
factory	 in	China.	 Is	 it	 really	 good	 for	 the	development	of	 an	 industry	 if	 you	
transfer	 all	 your	 properties	 and	 skills	 to	 China?	 (Interview	 with	 the	
government	officials,	25/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
When	 players	 transferred	 to	 China,	 the	 clubs	 had	 to	 bear	 the	 brunt	 of	 the	 teams’	
reduced	playing	strength.	Moreover,	when	elite	players	transfer	 to	another	country,	 it	
causes	 decline	 of	 interest	 and	 therefore	 of	 attendance	 in	 the	 domestic	 league.	 The	
migration	of	players	from	Taiwan	to	China	is	further	complicated	by	the	delicate	cross‐
strait	relationship.	
A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G3)	 was	 suspicious	 of	 the	 PRC’s	 motives	 for	
recruiting	Taiwanese	players	because	he	argued	that	Taiwanese	players	were	not	really	
necessary	for	the	Chinese	league.		
Although	 the	 cross‐strait	 relations	 have	 improved	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	
problem	has	not	yet	been	altogether	solved.	The	Chinese	government	is	two‐
faced.	They	might	say	one	thing	and	do	another.	So	we	have	to	beware	of	the	
knife	behind	the	smile	(Interview	with	the	government	officials,	27/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
Based	on	this	senior	politician’s	discourse,	despite	much	improved	cross‐strait	relations,	
some	elements	of	 the	Taiwan	government	may	still	have	a	distrustful	attitude	 toward	
China.	 Another	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	 argued	 that	 China	 actively	
recruited	Taiwanese	players	as	part	of	their	“united	front”	strategy.		
China	wanted	our	players	to	play	in	China	to	portray	an	image	that	both	sides	
coexist	 in	 peace	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 28/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
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Meanwhile	he	mentioned	that	the	Chinese	league	attracted	Taiwanese	players	because	
China’s	culture	and	language	were	similar	to	those	of	Taiwan.	However	did	the	Chinese	
league	really	provide	the	best	opportunities	for	Taiwanese	players,	or	is	it	just	a	matter	
of	the	convenience	of	the	transfer	in	contract	and	linguistic	terms.	
Language	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 the	 migration	 of	 players.	 There	 is	 no	
problem	for	our	players	to	adopt	Chinese	culture.	If	you	go	to	Japan	or	Korea,	
you	 cannot	 adapt	 to	 the	 environment	 very	 quickly.	 Of	 course	 it	 is	 very	
difficult	 for	a	player	 to	meet	 the	challenge	of	 the	NBA,	but	our	players	now	
just	want	to	go	to	China	because	they	use	the	same	language	and	they	can	pay	
more	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 28/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).	
Another	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	(G2)	argued	that	the	government	should	not	
be	too	sensitive	when	facing	cross‐strait	issues.		
Politicians	did	not	want	to	get	into	hot	water	with	political	debates.	However,	
the	government	should	encourage	high‐potential	and	elite	athletes	to	develop	
internationally	with	a	package	of	measures,	 so	 that	when	 the	national	 team	
needs	you,	you	have	to	come	back	(Interview	with	the	government	officials,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
He	 further	 mentioned	 that	 if	 club	 migration	 or	 player	 migration	 followed	 FIBA’s	
regulation,	the	government	should	not	intervene	in	it	just	because	it	involved	China.	
Is	 China	 different	 than	 America	 if	 we	 believe	 we	 have	 a	 state‐to‐
state	relationship	 with	 China?	 Players	 who	 want	 to	 go	 to	 China	 should	 be	
treated	 with	 the	 same	 standards	 as	 those	 going	 to	 America.	 We	 have	 our	
game	rule.	If	a	player	wants	to	transfer	to	another	country,	he	needs	to	apply	
to	the	CTBA.	When	the	CTBA	approves	his	application,	the	CTBA	will	send	it	
to	the	SAC.	In	such	a	case	normally	the	SAC	will	not	stop	it	(Interview	with	the	
government	officials,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
Base	on	the	discussion	above,	there	are	two	general	conclusions	to	highlight	about	the	
current	 situation	 of	 sporting	 links	 with	 China.	 Firstly,	 when	 a	 player	 follows	 the	
	
	
207	
	
appropriate	 regulations	 (in	 this	 case,	 FIBA’s)	 to	 transfer	 to	 China,	 the	 government	
cannot	stop	it	because	it	is	a	matter	of	personal	choice.	Secondly	it	is	different	when	a	
club	wishes	 to	 transfer	 to	China	because,	 for	 some,	 this	 involves	 the	 issue	of	national	
dignity	and	national	sovereignty	which	are	a	priority	concern	of	the	government.							
	
7.3	The	Perspective	of	the	Legislators		
While	 talking	 about	 the	 sporting	 link	 with	 China,	 both	 KMT	 and	 DPP	 politicians	
mentioned	that	the	Chinese	market	should	be	open	for	athletes.	However,	what	the	KMT	
and	DPP	legislators	referred	to	was	a	general	attitude	about	sporting	 links	with	China	
rather	than	specifically	referring	to	basketball.			
According	to	a	DPP	legislator	(L3),	although	there	had	been	little	discussion	about	sport	
affairs	 in	 DPP’s	 internal	 meetings,	 the	 DPP	 has	 tend	 to	 be	 quite	 liberal	 with	 player	
migration	because	the	party	believes	it	is	good	for	improving	long‐term	competitiveness	
of	the	sport.	
We	did	not	discuss	this	issue	(the	migration	of	players)	in	our	committee.	But	
I	don't	think	we	will	stop	them	[the	players].	The	future	of	the	SBL	is	limited.	
Although	players	leaving	might	damage	the	club,	you	should	let	them	go	if	it	
would	be	good	for	the	players’	career.	The	idea	that	you	don’t	want	them	to	
go	to	China	is	like	you	don't	want	Chien‐Ming	Wang	to	go	to	MLB.	It	does	not	
make	sense.	Therefore	even	though	the	national	team	or	a	club	might	lose	a	
player;	 you	 should	 let	 them	 go	 because	 it	 is	 good	 for	 the	 development	 of	
sports.	These	players	will	become	role	models	for	kids.	In	my	opinion	I	think	
migration	of	players	 is	good	for	 long‐term	sporting	development	(Interview	
with	the	legislators,	26/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
Another	DPP	 legislator	(L2)	reiterated	the	party’s	 liberal	stance	on	the	 issue	of	player	
migration:	
Basically	we	have	no	objection	to	this	 issue.	This	 is	a	sport	market	ruled	by	
market	 mechanisms,	 which	 is	 the	 driver	 behind	 Japanese	 elite	 players’	
transferring	to	MLB.	Even	though	the	sensitive	issue	of	cross‐strait	relations	
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is	 involved,	we	 should	 still	 look	 at	 it	 from	a	different	 angle.	We	 should	not	
emphasise	political	 issues	 too	much.	 Since	people	 recognise	 the	 strength	of	
Chinese	 sport	 development,	 I	 am	 happy	 with	 the	 exchange	 of	 cross‐strait	
sport.	I	expect	this	exchange	to	help	to	enhance	the	development	of	sport	in	
Taiwan	 (Interview	 with	 the	 legislators,	 11/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).					
While	referring	to	the	market	size	of	basketball	in	Taiwan,	a	DPP	legislator	argued	that	
there	should	be	an	Asian	Champions	League.		
We	 could	 set	 up	 a	 league	 with	 China,	 Japan,	 Korea	 and	 the	 Philippines.	
Taiwan	is	too	small	to	have	a	home‐away	game	system.	If	we	can	play	against	
China	 in	 a	proper	 league,	 people	would	 be	 attracted	 to	watch	 it	 because	 of	
their	 identity.	 Otherwise	 if	 you	 just	 play	 in	 Taiwan,	 there	 is	 going	 to	 be	
another	 downturn	 [in	 spectator	 numbers]	 (Interview	 with	 the	 legislators,	
11/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).			
A	KMT	legislator	(L1)	agreed	with	the	concept	of	‘market	size’.				
Because	the	market	of	Taiwan	is	too	small,	I	suggest	there	should	be	an	Asian	
league.	We	can	go	to	Japan,	and	Japanese	can	come	to	Taiwan.	It	would	be	a	
clearer	version	of	the	home‐away	concept.	The	increase	in	fans’	identity	with	
teams	 could	 improve	 attendance	 and	 profit	 generation	 (Interview	with	 the	
legislators,	22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).						
Although	 sport	 development	 in	Taiwan	 is	 inevitably	 complicated	by	 controversy	over	
Taiwan’s	 diplomatic	 recognition	 and	 national	 dignity,	 both	 KMT	 and	 DPP	 legislators	
claimed	 that	 political	 concerns	 should	 not	 affect	 cross‐strait	 sport	 exchanges.	 A	 DPP	
legislator	 (L2)	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 should	 eliminate	 obstacles	 to	 the	
development	of	sport.		
I	 think	 if	 we	 are	 playing	 in	 China,	 we	 will	 degrade	 our	 national	 dignity.	
However	for	sport	marketing,	this	is	a	trend,	and	we	cannot	stop	it.	Actually,	
we	believe	there	is	a	special	group	of	people	who	support	the	development	of	
sport,	 so	 if	 the	 government	 cares	 about	 sports,	 people	 will	 support	 the	
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government.	Therefore	there	 is	a	concern	about	the	election.	 If	we	raise	the	
level	of	 thinking	about	 the	development	of	sport,	 there	 is	no	orientation	 for	
the	 people	 who	 support	 sports.	 For	 example	 people	 who	 support	 baseball	
come	 from	both	DPP	and	KMT.	So	 there	 is	no	political	 ideology	 involved.	A	
clever	government	should	make	a	political	choice	to	support	sport;	however	
neither	President	Ma	nor	President	Chen	recognised	this.	This	is	poor	use	of	
sport	 policy	 (Interview	with	 the	 legislators,	 11/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).							
Here	this	legislator	was	critical	of	the	government	for	its	stance	on	sport	policy.	Despite	
this,	he	admitted	that	there	was	a	potential	electoral	benefit	for	a	politician	who	would	
support	sports.	He	argued	that	the	government	put	too	much	emphasis	on	the	political	
thinking	underpinning	cross‐strait	sporting	exchanges.		
A	KMT	 legislator	 (L1)	also	blamed	 the	government	 for	not	having	a	 fair	policy	 that	 is	
conducive	 to	 cross‐strait	 sporting	 exchange	 because	 regulations,	 particularly	 the	 Act	
Governing	Relations	between	the	People	of	the	Taiwan	Area	and	the	Mainland	Area,	make	
it	difficult	for	Chinese	sports	players	to	stay	in	Taiwan.	
Based	on	the	law,	a	Chinese	coach	could	work	in	Taiwan,	but	the	government	
tried	to	stop	coaches	from	working	in	China.	However,	in	fact	China	uses	its	
economic	 power	 to	 recruit	 talented	 people	 to	 work	 for	 them.	 They	 might	
offer	you	five	hundred	thousand	[NTD]	per	month	when	you	can	only	make	
fifty	thousand	[NTD]	in	Taiwan.	It	is	not	reasonable	to	limit	people	working	in	
Taiwan.	The	outcome	might	be	that	all	the	talented	people	will	work	in	China.	
We	 should	 get	 used	 to	 facing	 the	 challenge	 (Interview	with	 the	 legislators,	
22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).						
This	legislator	blamed	the	law.	He	suggested	that	government	should	be	more	open	to	
cross‐strait	sporting	exchanges	because	at	 the	moment	 the	exchange	between	Taiwan	
and	 China	 is	 treated	 differently	 than	 the	 exchange	 between	 other	 countries.	 Indeed,	
there	is	a	legislation	that	specifically	governs	relations	between	peoples	of	the	Taiwan	
area	and	the	mainland	area.	This	Act	 is	specially	enacted	for	the	purposes	of	ensuring	
security	and	public	welfare	in	the	Taiwan	Area,	regulating	dealings	between	the	peoples	
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of	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 and	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 and	 handling	 legal	 matters	 arising	 from	
national	unification.	With	regard	to	matters	not	provided	for	in	this	Act,	the	provisions	
of	other	relevant	laws	and	regulations	shall	apply.			
According	to	Article	11,	Chinese	people	could	be	employed	in	Taiwan,	but	they	need	to	
go	 through	a	 complicated	process	described	 in	 the	 following	passage	 (Extracted	 from	
the	published	English	version).		
Any	person	who	employs	any	of	the	people	of	the	Mainland	Area	to	work	in	
the	Taiwan	Area	shall	apply	to	the	competent	authorities	for	permission.		
Any	of	the	people	of	the	Mainland	Area	who	are	permitted	to	be	employed	in	
the	Taiwan	Area	may	not	be	employed	for	more	than	one	year,	during	which	
it	may	 not	 change	 its	 employer	 or	 work;	 provided,	 however,	 that	 with	 the	
permission	of	the	competent	authorities,	it	may	change	its	employer	or	work	
in	 case	 the	 employment	 relationship	 cannot	 continue	 due	 to	 its	 employer's	
business	 being	 shut	 down	 or	 suspended,	 or	 any	 other	 extraordinary	
situations.		
For	any	of	 the	people	of	 the	Mainland	Area	who	change	employers	or	work	
according	 to	 the	 proviso	 in	 the	 preceding	 paragraph,	 the	 duration	 of	 their	
employments	 shall	 be	 calculated	by	 combining	 the	periods	of	 employments	
before	and	after	the	change	of	their	employers	or	work.		
If	an	employer	cannot	meet	 its	recruitment	need	after	recruiting	publicly	 in	
the	 Taiwan	 Area	 with	 an	 offer	 of	 reasonable	 working	 terms	 and	 after	
applying	to	a	public	placement	service	office	for	recruitment	registration,	the	
employer	may	then	apply	to	the	Council	of	Labor	Affairs,	Executive	Yuan	for	
employment	of	the	people	of	the	Mainland	Area	to	fill	the	vacancies;	provided,	
however,	 that	 the	 employer,	 during	 the	 recruitment	 period,	 informs	 the	
labour	 unions	 or	 the	 workers	 of	 its	 business	 units	 of	 the	 full	 text	 of	 the	
recruitment	notice	and	posts	 such	notice	at	 the	workplace	 intended	 for	 the	
people	of	the	Mainland	Area	to	work.		
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The	labour	contracts	for	employment	of	the	people	of	the	Mainland	Area	shall	
be	in	fixed‐term.		
Rules	governing	the	granting	of	permission	and	the	administration	concerned	
as	referred	to	in	Paragraph	1	shall	be	drafted	by	the	Council	of	Labor	Affairs,	
Executive	Yuan	in	conjunction	with	the	authorities	concerned	and	submitted	
to	the	Executive	Yuan	for	approval.		
To	meet	the	employment	demand	derived	from	the	service	sectors	opened	in	
accordance	 with	 any	 international	 agreement,	 multinational	 enterprises	 or	
enterprises	of	the	Taiwan	Area	of	which	their	business	scales	in	Taiwan	reach	
certain	 threshold	 may	 employ	 the	 people	 of	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 with	 the	
permission	 of	 the	 competent	 authorities	 and	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 restriction	
referred	to	in	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	preceding	six	paragraphs	and		
Article	 95;	 rules	 governing	 the	 granting	 of	 permission,	 administration,	 the	
business	 scales	 of	 enterprises,	 employment	 terms	 and	 any	 other	
requirements	 thereof	 shall	 be	 drafted	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 Labour	 Affairs,	
Executive	Yuan	in	conjunction	with	the	authorities	concerned	and	submitted	
to	 the	 Executive	 Yuan	 for	 approval.	 (Article	 11,	 Act	 Governing	 Relations	
between	 Peoples	 of	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 and	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 and	 Its	
Enforcement	Rules)				
According	 to	 the	Article	 33,	 Taiwanese	 people	who	want	 to	work	 in	 China	 should	 go	
through	a	complicated	process	as	well.	
Except	 otherwise	 provided	 for	 in	 any	 other	 law,	 any	 individual,	 juristic	
person,	organization,	or	other	 institution	of	 the	Taiwan	Area	may	become	a	
member	 of	 or	 hold	 a	 position	 in	 any	 juristic	 person,	 organization,	 or	 other	
institution	of	the	Mainland	Area.			
Any	 individual,	 juristic	 person,	 organization,	 or	 other	 institution	 of	 the	
Taiwan	 Area	 shall	 not	 hold	 any	 position	 or	 become	 any	 member	 of	 the	
agencies,	 institutions	 or	 organizations	 of	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 which	 are	
political	parties,	the	military,	the	administration	or	of	any	political	nature	and	
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which	 are	 prohibited	 with	 public	 notices	 by	 the	 Mainland	 Affairs	 Council,	
Executive	Yuan	in	consultation	with	each	competent	authorities	concerned.			
Any	individual,	juristic	person,	organization,	or	other	institution	of	the		
Taiwan	Area	holding	a	position	in	the	Mainland	Area	or	becoming	a	member	
thereof	shall	obtain	the	permission	in	any	of	the	following	situations:		
Any	position	in	or	membership	of	the	agencies,	organizations	or	institutions	
of	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 which	 are	 political	 parties,	 the	 military,	 the	
administration	or	of	any	political	nature	and	which	are	not	prohibited	with	
public	notices	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	the	preceding	paragraph.		
Where	there	is	a	threat	to	national	security	or	 interests,	or	a	need	in	policy,	
and	 each	 competent	 authorities	 concerned	 has	 given	 public	 notices	 in	
consultation	with	the	Mainland	Affairs	Council,	Executive	Yuan.		
Any	individual	of	the	Taiwan	Area	holding	a	position	or	becoming	a	member	
of	the	juristic	persons,	organization,	or	other	institution	of	the	Mainland	Area	
may	not	engage	in	any	activity	detrimental	to	national	security	or	interests.		
The	determination	of	the	position	or	membership	referred	to	in	Paragraphs	2	
and	3	shall	be	made	by	each	competent	authorities	concerned;	if	there	is	any	
doubt,	 the	Mainland	Affairs	Council,	Executive	Yuan	 in	conjunction	with	 the	
authorities	concerned	and	scholars	or	experts	may	form	a	review	committee	
to	make	a	decision.		
Rules	 governing	 the	 public	 notices,	 permission	 requirements,	 application	
procedures,	 means	 of	 review,	 administration,	 and	 any	 other	 requirements	
referred	to	in	Paragraphs	2	and	3	shall	be	drafted	by	the	Mainland	Affairs		
Council,	 Executive	 Yuan	 in	 consultation	 with	 each	 competent	 authorities	
concerned	and	submitted	to	the	Executive	Yuan	for	approval.	
Those	who	had	already	held	positions	in	or	become	members	of	any	juristic	
person,	 organization,	 or	 other	 institution	 of	 the	 Mainland	 Area	 before	 the	
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coming	into	force	of	the	amendments	to	this	Act	shall	apply	to	the	competent	
authorities	for	permission	within	six	months	after	the	date	of	the	coming	into	
force	of	 the	 rules	 referred	 to	 in	 the	preceding	paragraph;	 those	who	 fail	 to	
apply	 by	 the	 expiration	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 time	 limit	 or	 whose	
applications	are	denied	shall	be	deemed	without	permission.	(Article	33,	Act	
Governing	Relations	between	Peoples	of	 the	Taiwan	Area	and	 the	Mainland	
Area	and	Its	Enforcement	Rules)		
Given	 the	 content	 of	 the	 law,	 the	 Taiwan	 government	 hesitated	 to	 fully	 open	 up	 the	
exchange	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 China.	 A	 KMT	 legislator	 (L1)	 argued	 the	 government	
should	work	harder	to	keep	‘political	issues’	out	of	the	development	of	sport.		
I	know	many	people	want	to	transfer	to	the	CBA.	However	nationality	is	still	a	
sensitive	issue.	It	is	easier	for	a	player	to	transfer	than	for	a	club	to	migrate.	
The	government	should	work	harder	to	make	the	exchange	happen	because	it	
would	be	good	for	our	sport	development.	I	suggest	the	sport	exchange	could	
be	 pure	 sport	 events	 without	 political	 concerns.	 However	 in	 reality	 the	
Chinese	government	 is	unpredictable,	because	we	don't	know	whether	 they	
want	 it	 or	 not,	 when	we	 are	 ourselves	willing	 to	 do	 it	 (Interview	with	 the	
legislators,	22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).								
Although	 this	KMT	 legislator	 (L1)	 argued	 that	 the	 cross‐strait	 sporting	 exchange	was	
necessary	 for	 the	development	of	sport	 in	Taiwan,	 the	government	has	 failed	to	make	
any	substantial	progress	because	economic	issues	have	been	their	top	priority.		
It	is	difficult	for	us	to	join	the	CBA	because	of	the	political	problem.	Currently	
the	 first	 priority	 for	 President	 Ma	 is	 the	 Taiwanese	 economy	 rather	 than	
dealing	 with	 the	 cross‐strait	 political	 issue	 (Interview	 with	 the	 legislators,	
22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
While	these	legislators	were	not	directly	involved	with	basketball	affairs,	they	focused	
more	on	general	 issues	of	 sport	 development	 in	Taiwan.	They	had	a	positive	 attitude	
towards	cross‐strait	sporting	exchange	and	highlighted	the	urgency	to	keep	sports	free	
of	political	considerations	and	intervention.	Despite	having	shared	a	common	mind‐set,	
in	reality,	both	KMT	and	DPP	failed	to	actively	promote	cross‐strait	sporting	exchanges.					
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7.4	The	Perspective	of	the	Clubs	
When	answering	the	question	as	to	why	Sina	had	decided	to	transfer	to	mainland	China	
in	 2001,	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 Sina	 Lions,	 Jiang,	 responded:	 “I	 can	 afford	 to	 do	 it,	 so	why	
not?”(Lin,	2003).	
There	were	three	stages	that	Sina	went	through	when	it	transferred	to	China.	The	first	
stage	was	the	acquisition	of	the	disbanded	Hung‐Kuo	basketball	team	at	a	price	of	NTD	
20	million.	This	was	followed	by	securing	the	sponsorship	of	the	BenQ	Corporation.	The	
team	name	 therefore	became	 the	BenQ	Sina	Lions	basketball	 team.	Finally,	 after	both	
basketball	 associations	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 China	 had	 officially	 approved	 of	 the	 transfer,	
BenQ	Sina	Lions	became	the	14th	team	in	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League.	In	
the	first	year,	the	BenQ	Sina	Lions	finished	in	the	top	eight.	In	the	second	year,	however,	
the	 aging	 team	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 bench	 and	 foreigner	 players	 became	 a	 major	
problem,	 and	 the	 team	 ended	 the	 season	 second	 last	 in	 the	 table.	Many	 analysts	 cite	
another	 reason	 for	 the	 team’s	 downturn	 in	 the	 second	 season,	which	was	 that	 other	
First	Class	League	teams	got	used	to	BenQ	Sina	Lions	team’s	tactics	(Lin,	2003)	A	former	
Nike	manager	(interviewee	S1)	mentioned	another	plausible	factor:	there	was	no	home	
advantage	 for	 the	 BenQ	 Sina	 Lions,	 which	 meant	 they	 were	 virtually	 playing	 in	
international	competition	in	every	match,	making	it	relatively	more	difficult	for	them	to	
win	games.	
The	decision	to	leave	the	Chinese	League	was	also	a	financial	one;	the	cost	of	playing	in	
China	was	about	USD	1.8	million	per	year,	which	was	much	higher	than	that	of	Taiwan.	
The	income	from	ticket	sales	and	sponsorship	was	only	USD	500,000,	and	the	loss	was	
financed	by	the	owner,	Jiang.	After	losing	NTD	100	million	in	two	years,	the	BenQ	Sina	
Lions	 quit	 the	 league	 and	 returned	 to	 Taiwan.	 Nevertheless	 Jiang	 still	 defended	 the	
decision,	he	stated:	"I	have	fought	this	good	fight	of	faith,	at	least	we	had	a	good	time;	it	
was	worth	it"	(cf.	Lin,	2003:	264).	
Jiang’s	personal	passion	for	basketball	was	also	shared	by	club	owners	of	the	SBL,	who	
found	 themselves	 in	 the	 same	 situation	 where	 their	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 sport	 far	
outweighed	the	return	on	investment.	Jiang	said	in	an	interview:	"Basketball	is	my	life’s	
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dream,	 how	many	people	 can	 actually	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 realise	 their	 dream?	 Since	 I	
have	got	the	ability,	if	I	didn’t	do	it,	I	would	definitely	regret	it"	(Cf.	Lin,	2003:	264).	
The	manager	of	a	club	mentioned	that	there	were	reasons	for	Sina	to	transfer	to	China.	
First,	the	CBA	collapsed	and	the	owner	of	Sina	felt	the	limits	of	basketball	development	
in	Taiwan.	Secondly,	the	owner	did	not	get	on	very	well	with	the	CTBA	because	he	was	a	
‘new	player’	who	had	owned	the	club	for	one	year	only.	A	club	manager	(C2)	claimed:	
When	Sina	decided	to	transfer	to	the	Chinese	league,	the	CTBA	was	the	first	
one	to	oppose	it	because	Sina	did	not	respect	the	CTBA.	So	the	CTBA	set	up	a	
lot	 of	 rules	 to	 stop	 clubs	 from	 going	 to	 China	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	
26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
From	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 CTBA	 could	 be	 the	most	 significant	 obstacle	 to	
players	 and	 clubs	 transferring	 to	 Mainland	 China.	 However,	 this	 club	 manager	 (C2)	
believed	Mainland	China	was	the	best	place	for	Taiwanese	players	to	go.	
If	a	player	wants	to	 improve	his	skills,	he	should	play	basketball	 in	the	CBA	
(Chinese	 professional	 league)	 because	 the	 SBL	 is	 not	 a	 professional	 league.	
Furthermore	it	would	be	hard	for	the	SBL	to	develop	into	a	fully	professional	
league	 because	 the	 available	 ‘hardware’	 and	 ‘software’	were	 insufficient.	 In	
addition	the	home/away	game	system	is	not	well	developed	(Interview	with	
the	clubs,	26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
By	this	time	the	CBA	was	much	more	developed	than	the	SBL.	The	CBA	was	already	a	
well‐established	 professional	 league;	 average	 salary	 of	 the	 players	 in	 the	 CBA	was	 at	
least	five	times	at	of	the	players	in	the	SBL.	Because	of	this,	a	club	manager	(C2)	argued	
that	 the	 Chinese	 basketball	 environment	was	 good	 for	 Taiwanese	 players	 to	 develop	
their	careers.	
The	development	of	the	CBA	is	better	than	the	SBL;	in	particular	the	annual	
budget	of	clubs	is	at	least	five	times	higher	than	in	the	SBL.	Thus	their	players	
are	treated	better.	The	skill	 level	 is	also	higher.	Furthermore	the	concept	of	
home	and	 away	games	 is	more	developed	 than	 in	Taiwan.	The	SBL	players	
therefore	 prefer	 the	 CBA,	 which	 provides	 them	 with	 real	 competition.	 In	
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addition	CBA	players	get	paid	better,	which	is	especially	important	for	such	a	
short	sport	career	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	
author).	
However,	another	club	manager	(C1)	believed	that	playing	basketball	in	mainland	China	
was	not	necessarily	the	best	option	for	Taiwanese	players.	
In	my	opinion,	unless	you	have	the	ability	to	survive	in	the	CBA,	you	should	
not	go	 to	 there.	There	 is	no	point	 in	going,	because	you	may	end	up	on	 the	
bench	for	the	whole	year.	Thus	every	player	should	evaluate	themselves.	Xue‐
Lin	Lee	 is	one	of	 the	best	guards	 in	our	national	 team.	Of	course	he	has	the	
ability	to	play	in	the	CBA.	But	not	everyone	can	play	in	the	CBA	since	it	is	not	
as	easy	as	people	imagine.	For	example	Sean	Chen	was	one	of	best	Taiwanese	
players	in	the	CBA	but	he	only	played	two	or	three	minutes	each	match.	In	the	
end	he	 transferred	back	 to	 the	SBL	 (Interview	with	 the	 clubs,	 20/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
This	manager	 (C1)	 implied	 players	who	want	 to	 transfer	 to	 China	might	 not	 be	 good	
enough	 to	 survive	 in	 the	 Chinese	 league,	 but	 the	 wage	 level	 in	 China	 was	 the	 most	
attractive	point	for	players.	
We	 need	 to	 have	 a	 good	 environment,	 and	 this	 can	 help	 to	 keep	 the	most	
talented	players	 in	Taiwan.	Now	the	CBA	seems	to	have	 treated	 the	players	
relatively	 well	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 reasonable	 that	 players	 want	 to	 play	
basketball	in	CBA.	Wen‐Ding	Tseng	wants	to	play	basketball	in	the	CBA	as	the	
pay	 is	better.	However	a	player	should	not	 just	get	whatever	he	wants	or	 it	
would	be	hard	for	clubs	to	satisfy	every	player’s	demand	(Interview	with	the	
clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
This	manager	(C1)	was	against	transferring	to	the	CBA.	
From	our	point	of	view,	it	will	damage	the	SBL	significantly	if	every	one	of	our	
talented	player	goes	to	play	basketball	in	the	CBA,	because	that	means	our	fan	
can	only	watches	 second	class	 competition	 in	Taiwan.	So	 I	 think	we	should	
not	become	an	SBL	training	camp	for	the	CBA	–	where	we	develop	talent	and	
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send	 it	 to	 China	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 20/12/2010,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
Another	manager	(C2)	disagreed	and	argued	that	it	would	be	good	for	the	development	
of	basketball	in	Taiwan	if	talented	players	played	basketball	in	the	CBA.	He	was	even	in	
favour	of	having	SBL	clubs	join	the	Chinese	league.	
We	should	let	more	good	talented	players	play	in	the	CBA,	as	they	will	bring	
back	good	training	methods.	We	will	still	constantly	develop	new	players	 in	
Taiwan,	so	fans	will	have	fresh	talent	available,	rather	than	feeling	bored	with	
the	 same	 look	 team	 every	 year	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 26/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
This	manager	 (C2)	also	 suggested	 that	 clubs’	 transfer	 to	China	would	be	good	 for	 the	
parent	companies.	
I	have	given	some	suggestions	to	the	Taiwan	Beer	Company	this	year.	I	have	
told	the	management	board	that	Taiwan	Beer	products,	including	alcohol	and	
tobacco,	are	in	high	demand	in	mainland	China.	In	order	to	help	the	company	
to	 market	 through	 advertising,	 the	 Taiwan	 Beer	 team	 should	 transfer	 to	
China	 and	 play	 in	 the	 CBA	 as	 it	 would	 be	 helpful	 for	 creating	 a	 positive	
economic	impact.	 In	this	situation,	we	hope	that	both	sides	can	have	a	good	
channel	to	communicate	these	issues.	(Interview	with	the	clubs,	26/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author)	
This	manager	(C2)	also	believed	that	problems	of	political	ideology	could	be	solved	but	
that	the	main	problem	was	that	some	clubs’	parent	companies	are	in	effect	state‐owned	
companies,	so	the	club	cannot	transfer	to	China.		
We	hope	our	roots	remain	in	Taiwan.	We	have	an	idea	of	having	two	teams	
(one	in	China	and	one	in	Taiwan).	The	private	companies	can	operate	in	this	
way	as	long	as	the	owner	supports	it;	however	the	government	cannot	accept	
this	 idea.	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 some	 state‐owned	 enterprises,	which	mean	
the	budget	is	funded	by	the	state.	Therefore,	it	will	be	difficult	to	implement	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	26/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
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Another	club	manager	(C1)	thought	that	although	playing	in	the	CBA	may	be	conducive	
to	basketball	development,	in	practice,	there	would	still	be	many	difficulties.	First	of	all	
there	is	a	difference	in	skill	level	between	the	SBL	and	the	CBA.	
In	 fact,	 I	 think	 currently,	 the	 level	 of	 our	 basketball	makes	 it	 impossible	 to	
play	in	the	CBA.	For	example,	our	players	are	much	shorter	than	CBA	players,	
and	the	players	are	likely	to	be	tired	with	all	the	travelling	around	China,	and	
can	we	afford	it	[financially]	at	the	moment?	If	we	really	want	to	compete	in	
China,	 we	 might	 only	 have	 two	 teams,	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 number	 of	 elite	
players	we	have.	Whatever	we	do,	there	is	no	chance	that	we	can	win	against	
the	 CBA	 teams	 with	 our	 current	 skill	 level	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	
20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	 addition	 this	 manager	 (C1)	 mentioned	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 league,	 the	
problem	of	travelling	and	finance.	
There	are	some	challenges	for	the	CTBA	and	clubs,	 the	first	 that	we	have	to	
solve	is	the	resource	of	talented	players.	The	second	is	the	financial	problem.	
Because	 playing	 basketball	 in	 Mainland	 China	 has	 high	 costs,	 mostly	 for	
travelling,	and	the	issue	for	the	sources	of	income	and	economic	background	
(Interview	with	the	clubs,	20/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
Although	this	club	manager	(C1)	also	mentioned	that	all	clubs	envision	an	Asia	League,	
he	 suggested	 that	 no	 club	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 determine	 the	 future	 of	 Taiwanese	
basketball	when	it	comes	to	links	with	China.	This	is	because	if	the	Chinese	government	
does	not	agree	with	the	Taiwanese	approach,	it	will	simply	reject	it.		
The	Asian	Basketball	Association	can	establish	an	Asian	professional	 league	
and	 have	 a	 leader	 to	 run	 this	 professional	 league.	 This	 idea	 is	 certainly	
feasible;	however	it	will	not	happen	if	the	Chinese	government	does	not	agree	
with	this	plan.	In	short	it	is	beyond	our	ability	to	determine	who	would	join	
this	 Asian	 professional	 league	 (Interview	 with	 the	 clubs,	 20/12/2010,	
translated	by	the	author).	
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Generally,	a	 staff	member	of	an	SBL	club	(C3)	saw	the	market	of	mainland	China	as	a	
challenge	and	recognised	its	potential	to	have	a	positive	influence	on	the	development	
of	 Taiwan	 basketball,	 but	 the	 issues	 about	 transferring	 to	 the	 CBA	 were	 still	 a	 live	
debate.	 Issues	 such	 as	politics,	 clubs’	 financial	 structure,	 different	 skill	 levels,	 and	 the	
future	development	of	the	SBL	remained	unresolved,	without	a	consensus	between	the	
clubs.	
The	CTBA	and	clubs	seemingly	encourage	players	to	accept	the	challenge	of	a	
high	 level	 league,	 but	 they	 felt	 bad	when	 they	 lost	 their	 players	which	 are	
their	 investments.	The	migration	of	players	has	actually	caused	the	greatest	
damage	to	the	clubs,	because	loss	of	an	all‐star	player	also	means	the	loss	of	
sales	of	tickets	and	merchandise.	Of	course,	 the	downturn	in	the	 league	will	
affect	the	CTBA	indirectly,	but	when	you	look	at	this	from	the	player's	point	
of	 view,	 he	 wants	 to	 transfer	 to	 the	 CBA,	 because	 the	 wage	 is	 three	 times	
higher	 than	 he	 got	 in	 the	 SBL.	 He	 can	 earn	 two	 to	 three	 million	 per	 year,	
which	means	he	can	earn	10	million	over	three	years.	A	basketball	player	has	
a	short	career;	he	never	knows	when	he	will	get	injured.	On	the	other	hand,	a	
lot	of	players	believe	that	they	can	play	in	the	CBA,	but	this	might	not	be	true	
because	his	skills	my	not	be	strong	enough	to	adapt	to	the	CBA	teams’	play	or	
his	 personality	may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 suitable	 for	 the	 CBA	 culture.	 That’s	
why	 club	 mangers	 have	 always	 had	 reservation	 about	 ‘the	 cross‐strait	
basketball	 issues’	 as	 there	 are	 too	 many	 uncertainties	 (Interview	 with	 the	
clubs,	14/02/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
	
7.5	The	Perspective	of	the	Media	
A	manager	of	a	sport	channel	in	Taiwan	(M2)	claimed	that	if	an	SBL	club	wanted	to	play	
in	 the	CBA,	 the	Chinese	government	would	be	willing	 to	adopt	 the	club.	However,	 the	
cost	 of	 running	 a	 team	 is	 extremely	 high,	 especially	 costs	 associated	 with	 relocation	
after	 transferring	 to	 the	CBA.	 Sina	 is	 the	best	 example;	 the	 club	owner	 sustained	 two	
years	of	financial	losses	before	deciding	to	quit.	
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Sina	 only	 played	 in	 the	 CBA	 for	 two	 years.	 The	 club	 had	 spent	 too	 much	
money,	 around	 80	 million	 RMB.	 Everything	 requires	 money,	 such	 as	 the	
stadium,	etc.	Just	because	they	allowed	you	to	play	in	the	CBA	does	not	mean	
you	 can	 spend	 less	money.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 player	wages,	 you	 have	 a	 lot	
more	invisible	costs,	such	as	management	and	marketing	fees	which	usually	
were	 2	 to	 4	 times	 higher	 than	 the	 personnel	 costs.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
maintaining	a	facility	was	another	difficult	 issue	as	you	have	to	keep	a	good	
relationship	 with	 local	 government	 including	 administrative	 department,	
municipal	 government,	 county	 government	 and	 provincial	 government.	
Which	means	this	business	was	much	more	complicated	than	simply	playing	
basketball	 against	 other	 clubs	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	 06/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author).	
After	 the	 Taiwanese	 club	 transferred	 to	 the	 CBA,	what	 kind	 of	 benefit	 could	 the	 club	
gain	when	cultural	and	political	issues	were	solved?	
It	is	unlikely	that	you	will	succeed	in	earning	money	in	the	CBA	because	the	
CBA	 has	 nothing	 that	 can	 make	 a	 profit.	 However	 the	 CBA	 clubs	 are	
concerned	 with	 other	 interests,	 such	 as	 the	 connection	 with	 their	 local	
business	and	with	other	 forms	of	political	cooperation.	However	Taiwanese	
clubs	 might	 not	 have	 those	 kinds	 of	 political/business	 connections.	 So	 the	
purpose	of	 the	Taiwanese	club	may	simply	be	 just	marketing	 for	 the	parent	
company	 and	 to	 play	 sport.	 You	 can	 see	 a	 Taiwanese	 professional	 club	 is	
supported	 by	 the	 marketing	 budget	 of	 the	 parent	 company.	 So	 the	
professional	 club	 is	 just	 like	 an	 advertisement	 for	 the	 parent	 company	
(Interview	with	the	media,	06/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
According	 to	 this	manager,	 the	motives	 for	 supporting	 a	 club	 are	 different	 in	 Taiwan	
from	 those	 in	 China.	 For	 a	 Chinese	 club,	 the	 owner	 might	 use	 the	 club	 to	 promote	
his/her	connections	in	order	to	make	money.	For	a	Taiwanese	club,	the	owner	spends	
money	on	the	club	in	order	to	meet	marketing	goals.		
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After	the	failure	of	Sina,	SBL	clubs	had	a	range	of	reservations	about	transferring	to	the	
CBA.	In	contrast	to	the	club	owners/managers,	the	players	are	still	attracted	by	the	CBA	
mainly	because	of	higher	wage.		
A	manager	of	a	sport	channel	(M2)	mentioned:	
All	 the	 players	 want	 to	 go	 to	 the	 CBA	 because	 of	 wages.	 In	 the	 SBL,	 the	
maximum	wage	is	NTD	120,000	per	month.	To	play	in	the	CBA	a	player	might	
be	offered	a	contract	that	is	worth	2	million	NTD	a	year	at	minimum,	which	is	
higher	 than	maximum	the	wage	of	SBL	players.	Wen‐Ting	Tseng	 (a	 starting	
player	of	the	national	team)	was	offered	NTD	6	million	a	year	which	is	two	to	
three	 times	 higher	 than	 his	 current	 wage	 in	 Taiwan.	 However	 it	 is	 not	
necessarily	the	case	that	the	player	can	only	get	what	they	asked	for	once	the	
player	 complies	 with	 the	 set‐conditions	 and	 the	 standard.	 Sean	 Chen	 (the	
captain	of	the	national	team)	got	an	offer	of	NTD	300	000	per	month,	but	only	
played	in	China	for	two	years.	The	club	sent	him	back	because	he	did	not	give	
a	 good	 performance	 (Interview	with	 the	media,	 06/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).	
For	 the	 players,	 the	 CBA	 remains	 a	 challenge,	 though	 they	 can	 have	 relatively	 high	
wages	compared	to	the	SBL.	Their	major	goal	is	to	survive	in	the	CBA.	As	manager	of	a	
TV	sport	channel	(M2)	claimed:	
You	 need	 to	 have	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 ability	 to	 play	 in	 the	 CBA.	 If	 you	 are	
capable,	 they	will	ask	you	 to	stay,	otherwise	 they	will	ask	you	 to	 leave,	 like	
Sean	Chen	is	coming	back	after	this	year.	 It	 is	all	about	demand	and	supply.	
You	are	a	foreign	player	if	you	are	not	from	China.	So	it	all	depends	on	your	
ability	(Interview	with	the	media,	06/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Currently,	all	the	players	who	wish	to	play	in	the	CBA	need	to	follow	FIBA’s	regulations.	
The	list	of	24	players	which	the	CTBA	announced	was	just	an	internal	memo	to	protect	
the	 interests	 of	 the	 CTBA	 and	 clubs.	 The	 interviewee	 agreed	 to	 this	 because	 of	 their	
mutual	interests.	The	sport	channel	manager	(M2)	argued:	
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The	list	of	24	players	was	for	the	CTBA’s	own	protection.	They	did	not	want	
players	to	go,	and	China	wanted	to	keep	a	good	relationship	with	the	SBL,	so	
they	have	also	agreed	that	they	won’t	contact	the	players	on	the	list.	It	is	an	
internal	rule,	but	the	rule	did	not	make	any	sense.	The	CTBA	had	no	reason	to	
stop	the	players	from	earning	money	in	the	CBA.	Therefore	they	cancelled	the	
list,	 and	 now	 the	 players	 need	 to	 follow	 FIBA’s	 regulations.	 For	 example,	 a	
transfer	to	a	different	club	needs	to	have	a	leaving	team	statement	from	the	
original	 club	 (Interview	 with	 the	 media,	 06/01/2011,	 translated	 by	 the	
author).	
	
7.6	The	Perspective	of	the	Sponsors	
From	the	business	sector’s	perspective,	a	former	Nike	manager	(S1)	mentioned	that	if	a	
club	were	to	transfer	to	China,	it	might	lose	its	sponsor	because	some	sponsors	cannot	
support	a	Chinese	club	or	a	club	registered	in	China.	
The	Taiwan	Beer	Company	 is	a	state‐owned	company.	 It’s	not	allowed	for	a	
state‐owned	company	to	register	in	China.	The	Taiwan	Beer	Basketball	club	is	
sponsored	by	the	employee	welfare	committee	of	the	Taiwan	Beer	Company.	
If	the	Taiwan	Beer	Basketball	club	insists	on	transferring	to	China,	it	is	going	
to	lose	its	biggest	sponsor	as	the	budget	is	supervised	by	the	Legislative	Yuan	
(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).				
In	addition	 to	 the	concern	our	 finance,	whether	Taiwanese	players	could	adapt	 to	 the	
culture	of	Chinese	basketball	 is	another	concern.	A	 former	Nike	manager	(S1)	 implied	
that	Taiwanese	clubs	might	not	adapt	to	the	home	advantage	of	Chinese	clubs	and	the	
culture	of	Chinese	referees.		
The	 CBA	 [China]	 has	 its	 own	 culture.	 Home	 advantage	 was	 significant	 for	
their	clubs.	 If	your	home	court	was	 in	 Jiangsu	and	there	were	some	players	
coming	 from	 Jiangsu,	 you	 might	 have	 some	 kind	 of	 home	 advantages.	
However	 if	you	don't	want	to	develop	the	home	advantage	and	only	recruit	
Taiwanese	 players,	 you	 won’t	 have	 such	 home	 advantage.	 How	 could	 you	
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compete	 with	 them?	 Furthermore,	 if	 you	 didn’t	 want	 to	 get	 close	 to	 the	
referees,	 you	 lost	your	home	advantage.	Therefore	 the	only	 support	 for	 the	
club	was	from	the	companies	from	Taiwan.	When	the	club	performed	badly,	
these	owners	would	quit.	How	long	could	the	club	last	in	the	Chinese	league?	
(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author)	
Financial	 considerations,	 skill	 level	 of	Taiwan’s	 basketball	 player,	 cultural	 differences,	
and	political	 issues	seemed	to	be	 the	 four	main	concerns	of	a	Taiwanese	club	when	 it	
considered	transferring	to	China.	However,	 the	former	Nike	manager	(S1)	argued	that	
the	issue	of	migration	of	a	Taiwanese	club	was	not	only	about	‘adapting	to	the	Chinese	
market’	but	also	about	the	‘impact	on	the	Taiwanese	market’.	
When	Sina	transferred	to	China,	it	crushed	the	system	of	both	sides	became	of	
a	lack	of	holistic	thinking.	While	all	good	players	transferred	to	China,	Sina	let	
its	 second	 team	 lose	every	game	 in	 the	Taiwanese	 league.	Then	 ticket	 sales	
were	badly	affected.	Sina	damaged	the	Taiwanese	league	when	it	transferred	
over	completely	to	China.	Sina	should	at	least	have	left	a	competitive	team	in	
Taiwan	as	its	roots	(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	
the	author).	
From	the	Nike	manager	(S1),	SBL	ticket	sales	declined	following	Sina’s	transfer	to	China.	
Furthermore	 this	manager	 believed	 losing	 players	 to	 the	 Chinese	 league	was	 against	
CTBA’s	interest	because	it	would	affect	sponsors’	willingness	to	support	the	Taiwanese	
basketball	if	all	the	elite	players	transferred	to	China.		
Every	 elite	player,	 such	 as	Chi‐Che	Lin,	Wen‐Ting	Tzeng,	 and	Lei	Tian,	may	
have	 two	 hundred	 teenager	 fans	 to	 buy	 the	 tickets	 every	 game.	 If	 they	 all	
played	 in	China,	 these	 fans	might	not	watch	 the	game.	 If	 the	 fan	attendance	
declined,	 the	media	would	not	want	 to	broadcast	 it	 and	 the	 sponsor	would	
not	want	to	sponsor	it.	In	this	sense,	the	CTBA	would	oppose	player	transfer	
(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	fear	of	 losing	fan	base	and	sponsorship	might	be	the	reason	for	the	emergence	of	
‘the	 24	 players	 list’.	 This	 manager	 believed	 the	 list	 was	 a	 solution	 by	 which	 to	 limit	
players	in	their	cooperation	with	the	clubs	and	the	CTBA.		
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When	the	club	disclosed	to	the	CTBA,	 the	need	to	restrict	some	players,	 the	
CTBA	announced	the	list	of	24	players.	After	the	clubs	signed	contracts	with	
players,	the	CTBA	announced	that	its	list	of	24	players	had	become	invalid.	In	
short,	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 CTBA	 and	 Wang	 was	 “the	 migration	 would	 be	
allowed	 after	 I	 confirmed	 my	 favourite	 players	 would	 stay	 with	 me.”	
Furthermore,	 the	 clubs	 owed	 the	 CTBA	 because	 the	 CTBA	 helped	 them	 to	
restrict	 players.	 So	 the	 CTBA	 could	 ask	 the	 club	 to	 deliver	 some	 benefits	
(Interview	with	the	sponsors,	04/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
The	opinion	above	is	similar	to	the	viewpoint	of	another	interviewee.	The	manager	of	a	
sport	marketing	company	(S2)	argued	that	 if	an	owner	had	enough	new	talent	 for	his	
own	team,	he	would	allow	some	of	his	players	to	transfer	to	China.		
The	 manager	 of	 the	 Taiwan	 Beer	 Basketball	 Club,	 Yen,	 helped	 players	 to	
transfer	 to	 China.	 Because	 players	 believed	 in	 him,	 he	 could	 attract	 more	
players	to	fight	for	him.	When	Chi‐Che	Lin	transferred	to	China,	he	got	more	
elite	players.	Also	he	managed	 two	clubs.	So	 there	were	a	 lot	of	players	 for	
him	 to	 allocate.	 Even	 a	 player	 who	 performed	 very	 well	 in	 the	 Kinmen	
Kaoliang	 Basketball	 Team	 was	 transferred	 by	 Yen	 to	 the	 Taiwan	 Beer	
Basketball	 Team	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	 15/01/2011,	 translated	 by	
the	author).		
These	 two	 interviewee’s	 opinions	 are	 slightly	 different.	 But	 we	 can	 still	 detect	 a	
common	perspective	on	 the	attitude	of	 the	 clubs,	which	was	 that	 ‘while	 there	was	no	
lack	 of	 players,	 the	 club	 would	 allow	 players	 to	 transfer’.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	
manager	of	a	sport	consulting	company	(S2)	argued	that	most	of	the	clubs	still	did	not	
want	players	 to	 transfer	 freely.	This	was	because	most	of	 the	clubs	had	 just	a	 few	all‐
star	players	on	the	roster,	and	the	clubs	would	suffer	revenue	losses	due	to	a	decline	in	
ticket	sales	if	their	all‐star	players	transfer	to	China.	
Although	Yen	had	many	players,	most	of	the	clubs	had	a	lack	of	elite	players.	
The	 league	might	 collapse	because	of	players’	 transferring	 to	China	and	 the	
subsequent	 decline	 in	 fan	 attendances	 (Interview	 with	 the	 sponsors,	
15/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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This	group	of	interviewees	took	on	a	financial	and	marketing	perspective	to	explain	the	
issue	of	the	clubs	and	players’	transferring	to	China.	From	their	perspective,	the	players	
wanted	to	go	to	China	because	of	higher	wages,	and	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	cooperated	
to	 prevent	 it	 because	 they	 wanted	 to	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo	 and	 defend	 their	 own	
interests.	Furthermore,	although	the	Chinese	league	was	attractive	to	players	and	clubs	
because	 of	 higher	 wages	 and	 larger	 markets,	 there	 were	 still	 many	 concerns.	 For	
example,	although	Chinese	and	Taiwanese	people	use	the	same	language	and	share	the	
same	 history,	 there	 are	 still	 many	 cultural	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	
Moreover,	 the	players	and	 the	 clubs	needed	 to	evaluate	whether	 the	player’s	 abilities	
suited	Chinese‐style	basketball.						
	
7.7	The	Perspective	of	the	Players	and	Coaches	
An	SBL	coach,	interviewee	P2	(who	was	also	a	player	of	the	Sina	Lions)	claimed	that	the	
reason	 that	 Sina	 had	 transferred	 to	 China	 was	 that	 the	 owner	 believed	 the	 Chinese	
market	was	better	than	the	Taiwanese	one.	Even	though	there	was	same	debate	about	
Sina’s	case,	it	proved	the	value	of	Chinese	league.	
The	 government	 said	Sina	 could	not	 go	 to	China	 at	 that	 time.	 It	 used	many	
measures	 to	 stop	 Sina.	However	 Sina	 achieved	 some	 things	 in	 China	 in	 the	
end.	Although	it	lasted	for	only	two	years,	there	were	achievements	for	both	
players	 and	 the	 club.	 The	 first	was	 the	 club	maintained	 the	players’	wages.	
The	 second	 was	 the	 players	 could	 prove	 their	 abilities.	 Take	 myself	 as	 an	
example,	 at	 that	 time	 I	 retired	 from	 the	 national	 team,	 the	 Chinese	 league	
provided	me	a	great	chance	to	challenge	myself	at	another	level	of	basketball.	
As	 a	 player,	 the	 Chinese	 league	 not	 only	 provided	 higher	wages	 but	 also	 a	
stage	(Interview	with	the	coaches	and	players,	29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	
author).	
One	thing	this	coach	mentioned	was	that	Sina	set	an	example	where	it	let	people	outside	
Taiwan	 recognise	 the	 capability	 of	 Taiwanese	players.	But	 this	 viewpoint	was	 for	 the	
players.	In	terms	of	the	club,	the	coach	argued	that	it	was	difficult	for	a	club	to	transfer	
to	China.	The	best	solution	might	be	a	cross‐strait	basketball	exchange.		
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Although	it	might	be	a	trend	to	transfer	to	China,	it’s	difficult	to	achieve	that	
in	the	short	term	because	of	the	political	issues.	If	you	talk	about	the	market,	
the	trend	did	exist.	However,	we	should	also	think	about	how	to	let	Chinese	
clubs	 come	 to	 Taiwan.	 Not	 only	 can	 our	 players	 transfer	 to	 China	 but	 also	
their	 players	 could	 move	 to	 Taiwan.	 This	 could	 also	 benefit	 for	 domestic	
basketball	 development	 (Interview	 with	 the	 coaches	 and	 players,	
29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
While	 this	 coach	 argued	 that	 Taiwan	 should	 be	more	 open	 to	 cross‐strait	 basketball	
exchange,	another	coach	 (P4)	claimed	 the	clubs	should	 think	about	whether	 they	 ‘are	
good	enough	to	survive	in	China?’			
The	clubs	definitely	want	to	go	to	China	because	there	is	a	bigger	market	for	
them	in	which	to	operate.	However,	will	the	Chinese	government	allow	you	to	
transfer	to	the	Chinese	league?	The	clubs	should	think	about	the	difficulties	of	
the	current	situation	(Interview	with	the	coaches,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	
the	author).	
Here	 the	 coach	 mentioned	 the	 changing	 attitude	 of	 the	 Chinese	 league	 or	 Chinese	
government.	 In	 the	 past	 the	 Chinese	 league	 had	 encouraged	 the	 Taiwanese	 clubs	 to	
transfer	 to	 China,	 but	 nowadays	 they	 only	 recruited	 Taiwanese	 players	 to	 join	 their	
teams.	 Sina	was	probably	 treated	by	 the	Chinese	 league	 and	government	 as	 a	 one‐off	
exception	 because	 allowing	 a	 Taiwanese	 club	 to	 join	 the	 highest	 division	 of	 Chinese	
league	 directly	 was	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 Chinese	 system.	 The	 Chinese	 league	 system	
stipulates	 that	 clubs	 must	 have	 competed	 and	 outperformed	 other	 teams	 in	 lower	
classes	 before	 being	 promoted	 to	 the	 First	 Class.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 difficult	 for	 a	
Taiwanese	club	to	achieve.					
An	SBL	player	(P3)	mentioned	the	club	owners	thought	basketball	 in	Taiwan	was	still	
semi‐professional,	 so	 they	 had	 reservations	 about	 for	 the	 costs	 for	 the	 clubs.	 Under	
these	circumstances,	it	is	difficult	for	the	clubs	to	transfer	to	China	and	the	owners	did	
not	want	to	pay	too	much	to	the	players.		
Many	 players	 have	 transferred	 to	 China.	 The	 Chinese	 paid	 five	 times	more	
(Interview	with	the	players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
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While	 this	 player	 blames	 the	 club	 owners	 for	 under‐investing	 in	 basketball,	 another	
coach	(P1)	also	blamed	the	poor	development	of	the	domestic	league	as	another	reason	
for	players	to	leave.	
If	a	player	wants	to	earn	more,	of	course	he	must	transfer	to	China.	We	could	
not	afford	the	wages	they	are	asking	for.	On	the	other	hand,	recently	we	had	
some	 problem	 on	 the	 marketing	 and	 broadcasting	 (Interview	 with	 the	
coaches,	22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
The	coach	indicated	that	wages	were	not	the	only	reason	for	players	to	want	to	transfer	
to	China;	the	fact	that	players	felt	unsafe	in	the	Taiwanese	league	was	another	factor.		
The	first	reason	why	the	players	wanted	to	go	to	China	was	the	poor	financial	
structure	of	the	clubs.	Secondly,	our	facilities	were	not	good	enough.	Players	
felt	the	development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan	had	got	worse	(Interview	with	
the	coaches,	22/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
In	terms	of	the	issue	of	the	migration	of	players,	an	SBL	player	(P3)	complained	that	in	
spite	 of	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs’	 opposition	 to	 players’	 transfer	 to	 China;	 they	 never	
came	up	with	an	effective	way	to	improve	the	domestic	environment.		
The	clubs	did	not	want	 the	 teams	 in	Taiwan	 to	become	a	 training	camp	 for	
the	 Chinese	 league.	 Taiwan	 should	 raise	 the	 basic	 salary	 of	 players	 and	
provide	 a	 better	 environment	 for	 players	 than	 the	 Chinese	 league	 could	
provide.	The	CTBA	did	not	want	players	to	go	to	China	as	well,	but	they	did	
not	 have	 a	 valid	 regulation	 by	 which	 to	 restrict	 them	 (Interview	 with	 the	
players,	13/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).		
There	was	 a	 regulation	 for	 the	 CTBA	 to	 restrict	 player	 transfers.	 An	 SBL	 player	 (P3)	
noted	the	sanctions	adopted	to	restrict	mobility.		
The	committee	members	of	the	CTBA	selected	24	players.	Most	of	players	in	
the	 list	were	players	of	 the	national	 team.	When	 the	players	who	played	 in	
China	returned	to	Taiwan,	they	would	be	suspended	for	one	year	(Interview	
with	the	coaches	and	players,	29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).	
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The	original	intension	behind	the	list	of	24	players	was	to	avoid	the	collapse	of	the	SBL,	
which	 might	 come	 about	 if	 all	 of	 the	 best	 Taiwanese	 players	 transferred	 to	 China.	
However,	 the	 regulation	 only	 lasted	 one	 year.	 After	 that	 if	 a	 player	 did	 not	 have	 a	
contract	with	a	club,	he	could	transfer	to	China.	Actually	when	the	policy	was	relaxed,	
the	club	and	the	CTBA	no	longer	had	a	plan	to	manage	player	migration.	Thus	the	list	of	
24	 players	 remained	 an	 issue	 in	 debates	 about	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan.	 Some	 people	
believed	 the	 list	was	good	 for	domestic	basketball	development,	while	others	did	not.	
Furthermore	one	coach	 indicated	that	 the	 list	was	not	decided	by	the	CTBA	and	clubs	
together.	The	timing	of	the	announcement	of	the	list	benefitted	the	Dacin	Tigers.	
When	 the	 CTBA	 announced	 the	 24	 player	 list,	 some	 players	 had	 already	
played	in	China.	If	these	players	decided	to	return	to	Taiwan,	they	would	have	
been	 punished	 immediately	 (Interview	 with	 the	 coaches	 and	 players,	
29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).				
The	coach	(P2)	suggested	that	the	timing	damaged	other	clubs’	interests.		
It’s	 reasonable	 to	 say	some	elite	players	 should	be	 restricted,	but	 the	CTBA	
should	not	announce	the	list	after	we	let	the	players	go.	It	turned	out	that	the	
Dacin	Tigers	were	the	only	team	that	did	not	break	the	regulation	(Interview	
with	the	coaches	and	players,	29/12/2010,	translated	by	the	author).			
This	coach	argued	that	the	CTBA	should	have	discussed	with	clubs	about	how	to	deliver	
compliance	with	this	regulation.	Without	the	discussion,	when	the	players	returned	to	
Taiwan,	 they	 could	 not	 play	 for	 their	 original	 club	 [because	 players	 would	 be	
suspended].	The	Dacin	Tigers	thus	won	the	league	easily.		
The	24	player	list	might	be	not	a	reasonable	regulation	to	make	players	stay	in	Taiwan.	
However,	 an	 SBL	 coach	 (P4)	 argued	 that	measures	would	 be	 taken	 to	 retain	 talented	
players	in	the	country.			
The	 CTBA	 should	 have	 thought	 about	 this	 earlier.	 Did	 they	 see	 the	 core	
problem?	 They	 might	 say	 just	 a	 few	 players	 moving	 to	 China	 would	 not	
influence	the	market.	However,	if	every	club	loses	two	players,	there	will	be	
fourteen	players	moving	 to	 China	 in	 total.	 Specifically,	 these	 players	 are	 all	
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the	best	players	 in	 their	 clubs,	 the	performance	of	 the	clubs	and	 the	 league	
would	definitely	deteriorate	with	the	migration	of	players.	There	is	no	reason	
for	a	parent	company	to	spend	50	million	every	year	to	support	a	club,	which	
is	 a	 training	 camp	 for	 the	 Chinese	 league	 (Interview	 with	 the	 coaches,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
Thus	this	coach	was	clearly	opposed	to	the	migration	of	players,	and	he	also	suggested	
that	the	clubs	were	not	happy	with	this	either.	
The	clubs	were	not	happy	with	this	situation.	If	players	could	transfer	freely,	
there	 would	 be	 no	 elite	 players	 in	 Taiwan.	 So	 the	 policy	 should	 be	
‘conditionally	open’.	Like	the	Taiwanese	IT	industry,	which	was	not	permitted	
simply	to	move	to	China,	all	the	players	who	want	to	transfer	to	China	should	
go	 through	 an	 evaluation	 by	 the	 SAC	 (Interview	 with	 the	 coaches,	
18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
However	this	coach	also	noted	that	for	Taiwanese	clubs,	it	was	difficult	to	make	talented	
players	stay	because	the	clubs	limited	their	investment	in	basketball.	
Compared	to	the	generous	Chinese	clubs,	the	Taiwanese	clubs’	policy	was	‘to	
spend	less’.	So	it	was	also	difficult	 for	the	Taiwanese	clubs	to	ask	players	to	
stay	(Interview	with	the	coaches,	18/01/2011,	translated	by	the	author).	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 coaches	 and	 players,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 common	 view	
concerning	 club	migration.	 They	 indicated	 that	 the	 Chinese	market	 might	 offer	 good	
financial	returns	for	the	clubs.	However,	it	was	difficult	for	the	clubs	to	transfer	to	China	
at	that	moment	because	of	the	political	and	economic	differences	between	Taiwan	and	
China.	On	the	other	hand,	there	were	still	debates	about	players	transferring	to	China.	If	
the	interviewees	from	this	group	adopted	the	players’	perspective,	they	would	agree	it	
was	good	 for	players	 to	pursue	higher	wages	and	 to	accept	 the	challenge	of	a	higher‐
level	league.	However,	if	the	interviewees	adopted	the	clubs’	position,	they	argued	that	
players	might	not	suit	 the	Chinese	 league.	 In	addition,	 the	migration	of	players	would	
damage	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 clubs	 as	 well	 as	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	
Taiwan.			
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7.8	Summary	of	the	Case	
The	third	case	in	this	research	moves	from	a	‘local’	focus	onto	sporting	links	with	China.	
In	the	context	of	relations	with	China,	the	interaction	between	the	various	parties	was	
not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 a	 sporting	 exchange	 because	 of	 its	 clear	 implication	 in	 the	
contexts	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 and	 diplomacy.	 This	 case,	 in	 part	 therefore,	
explores	the	macro	context	relationship	between	of	the	two	Chinas	(Republic	of	China	
and	People’s	Republic	of	China)	in	the	professional	basketball	system.		
The	first	part	of	the	case	focused	on	a	specific	decision	–	the	Sina	Lions	Basketball	Club’s	
transfer	 to	 China	 in	 2000,	which	 took	 place	 after	 the	 CBA’s	 suspension	 in	 2000.	 The	
interviews	 revealed	 that	 there	 were	 three	 key	 sets	 of	 actors:	 the	 Taiwanese	
government,	 the	 Chinese	 government,	 and	 the	 Sina	 Lions	 Basketball	 Club.	 The	
interviewees	from	the	group	of	Taiwanese	government	officials	claimed	that	there	was	
a	 political	 concern	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	 government	 which	 motivated	 its	
activity.	 It	 believed	 that	 China	 (PRC)	 was	 using	 basketball	 to	 promote	 reunification.	
During	that	period,	while	the	relationship	between	China	and	Taiwan	was	still	tense,	the	
government	tried	to	use	legislation	to	stop	Sina	from	transferring	to	China.	In	addition,	
the	interviewees	from	the	clubs	argued	that	the	CTBA	did	not	support	Sina	because	Sina	
withdrew	 from	 the	 CTBA,	 which	 was	 considered	 a	 disrespectful	 move	 by	 the	 other	
actors.	The	CTBA	positioned	itself	as	a	basketball	administration	and	argued	that	if	the	
clubs	had	an	issue,	they	should	“sit	down	and	discuss”	matters	with	the	CTBA.	However,	
according	to	the	media	representative,	 the	owner	of	Sina,	 Jiang,	had	already	discussed	
the	 issue	 of	 transfer	 to	 China	with	 the	Chinese	 authorities.	 So	 Jiang	 insisted	 on	 going	
ahead	with	the	transfer	even	though	he	would	be	fined	by	the	Taiwanese	government.	
The	 government	 officials	 commented	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 Jiang	 was	 so	 confident	 and	
determined	 in	making	 this	move	 because	 he	 had	 a	 business	 plan	 to	 realise	 in	 China.	
Finally	 the	 Sina	 Company	 and	 the	 government	 did	 sit	 down	 and	 talk.	 All	 parties	
compromised	to	some	degree.	Sina	decided	to	avoid	using	a	sensitive	name	for	the	team	
when	 registering	 in	 China.	 The	 Taiwanese	 government	 enacted	 ‘the	 Regulations	
Governing	 Permission	 for	 Athletes	 from	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 to	 Join	 Athletic	 Groups	 in	
Mainland	China	as	Members	or	Official	Workers’	 to	make	Sina’s	action	 legal.	Table	7.1	
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illustrates	the	explanations	of	the	key	responsibilities	of	the	various	stakeholders	in	the	
migration	of	Sina	to	the	Mainland.			
The	second	part	of	this	case	was	related	to	the	situation	concerning	migration	of	players	
and	clubs	in	the	SBL.	Basically,	there	were	two	types	of	attitude,	negative	and	positive.	
Based	on	the	attitude	of	the	key	actors,	they	had	different	explanations	for	the	players’	
or	 clubs’	 migration.	 The	 government	 and	 the	media	 attributed	 the	 players’	 desire	 to	
transfer	 to	 China	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 higher	wage	 levels	 (average	 salary	 in	 the	 Chinese	
league	was	five	times	that	in	the	SBL).	The	players,	however,	argued	that	the	wage	itself	
was	 not	 the	 only	 factor.	 They	 were	 concerned	 that	 the	 SBL	 did	 not	 provide	 a	 good	
environment	for	the	players’	career	development.		
Indeed,	 the	 Chinese	 market	 became	 attractive	 not	 only	 to	 players	 but	 also	 to	 club	
owners.	Club	owners	recognised	the	potential	for	profit	if	their	clubs	could	transfer	to	
China.	However,	 interviewees	from	the	media	and	a	sponsor	claimed	that	 it	was	not	a	
time	for	the	clubs	to	go	because	finance	would	be	a	problem.	The	interviewees	from	the	
clubs	agreed	with	this	argument	and	shared	the	common	view	that	the	transfer	would	
only	 be	 good	 for	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 parent	 company.	 But	 the	 downside	 to	 a	 club’s	
migration	to	China	was	that	that	the	costs	of	running	a	club	in	China	may	be	too	high	to	
make	a	profit.		
In	 terms	of	 the	migration	of	players,	 the	 interviewees	 from	the	clubs	claimed	that	 the	
Chinese	league	provided	a	better	stage	for	the	players	and	it	also	benefited	the	players	
in	 terms	of	 skill	 development.	However,	 the	 clubs	 also	 argued	 that	players’	migration	
could	 have	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 basketball	 development	 in	 Taiwan	 because	 players’	
performance	may	 decline,	 causing	 ticket	 and	 the	merchandising	 sales	 to	 reduce	 as	 a	
consequence.	The	players/coaches	were	particularly	concerned	with	the	issue	because	
losing	good	players	is	equivalent	to	making	a	loss	on	an	investment.	
The	media	interviewee	also	claimed	that	players’	transferring	to	China	also	harmed	the	
CTBA	because	of	 declining	 ticket	 sales.	However,	 this	was	not	 explicitly	 stated	by	 the	
CTBA	staff,	who	argued	that	maintaining	the	stable	operation	of	the	CTBA	and	retaining	
talents	to	keep	a	good	level	of	play	were	their	main	priorities.	
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Despite	 on‐going	 arguments	 over	 which	 organisation	 should	 lead	 the	 SBL,	 the	 CTBA	
shared	a	common	view	with	the	clubs	on	the	migration	of	players	in	2008.	The	sponsors	
believed	that	this	 is	 the	reason	the	CTBA	co‐operated	with	the	clubs	to	 list	24	players	
who	were	 not	 allowed	 to	 transfer.	 This	measure	 taken	 by	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs	 to	
prevent	players	 from	 transferring	was	 eventually	 terminated	 in	2009.	 From	 then,	 the	
players	were	permitted	to	transfer	to	China	in	accordance	with	FIBA	regulations.	To	this	
date,	the	loss	of	talented	players	to	the	Chinese	league	still	remains	a	lingering	concern	
for	 clubs,	 which	 are	 concerned	 with	 declining	 levels	 of	 play	 and	 the	 subsequent	
downturn	 of	 the	 SBL.	 The	 government	 officials	 also	 argued	 that	 China	might	 use	 the	
migration	of	the	players	as	a	way	to	promote	unification.		
This	 third	 case	 was	 about	 more	 than	 simply	 the	 basketball	 business	 and	 it	 has	
significance	for	understanding	the	governance	system	and	the	changing	of	the	structure	
of	 key	 stakeholders	 as	 issues	 change.	 In	 the	 two	 previous	 case	 studies,	 the	 key	
stakeholders	 (those	 most	 significantly	 influencing,	 or	 influenced	 by,	 governance	
decisions)	 were	 the	 CTBA,	 the	 clubs,	 the	 media,	 the	 sponsors	 or	 the	 SAC	 and	 our	
commentary	 has	 focused	 for	 example	 on	 the	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 involved	 in	 the	
system.	 However,	 in	 this	 case,	 though	 government	 was	 a	 key	 stakeholder,	 the	
department,	which	ultimately	took	responsibility	to	negotiate	with	the	club,	was	not	the	
Sports	Advisory	Council	but	the	Mainland	Affairs	Council.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	the	
government’s	main	concern	was	not	sport	development	but	national	dignity.	The	issues	
of	club	migration	and	player	migration	illustrate	how	the	Taiwan	government,	the	club	
and	 the	 Chinese	 government	 dealt	with	 the	 issue	 of	 cross‐strait	 basketball	 exchange,	
and	the	actors	and	the	 interests	represented	 in	the	systemic	governance	 illustrated	in	
case	three	are	almost	entirely	different.	We	will	return	to	discuss	the	interrelationship	
of	 the	 network	 of	 stakeholders,	 and	 how	 different	 stakeholders	 used	 different	
actions/tactics	to	fulfil	their	interests	in	this	very	different	context,	in	section	8.1	of	the	
next	Chapter.		
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Table	7.1:	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	the	Sina’s	transferring	
Stakeholders Responsibility	for	outcomes Main	Argument
Government	officials *	The	Taiwanese	government *	The	Taiwanese	government	was	concerned	most	about	the	name	for	
political	reasons.	
*	The	Taiwanese	government	
	
*	the	government	did	not	want	Sina	to	leave	because	cross‐strait	
relations	were	still	tense	
*	Sina	
	
*	Sina	was	concerned	about	its	business	interests
*	The	Chinese	government
	
*	China	often	used	sports	as	a	vehicle	to	promote	reunification.
*	The	Taiwanese	government
	
	
*	if	the	Sina	Lions	did	not	violate	the	law,	the	government	could	not	stop	
the	club	when	it	wanted	to	transfer	to	China	
*	Sina	
	
*	Sina	agreed	not	to	use	country	or	city	names	as	the	club	name.
*	The	Taiwanese	government
	
*	The	SAC	actively	enacted	‘the	Regulations	Governing	Permission	for	
Athletes	from	the	Taiwan	Area	to	Join	Athletic	Groups	in	Mainland	
China	as	Members	or	Official	Workers’	to	make	the	Sina’s	action	legal	
*	The	government *	The	government	could	not	stop	private	enterprises	from	developing	in	
China.	
Clubs	 *	The	CTBA *	Sina	did	not	respect	the	CTBA
Media	 *	Sina’s	owner	– Jiang *	Jiang	said:	I	can	afford	to	do	it,	so	why	not?	He	thus	said	this	on	a	
matter	of	individual	power	and	performance	
*	Sina’s	owner	– Jiang *	Jiang	said:	I	have	fought	this	good	fight	of	faith,	at	least	we	had	a	good	
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time,	and	it	was	worth	it.
Sponsors	 *	Sina	 *	Sina	could	not	get	used	to	the	home	advantage	enjoyed	by	the	Chinese	
clubs	and	the	culture	of	Chinese	referees.	
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Table	7.2:	Responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	the	SBL	players’	migration	to	China	
Stakeholders Responsibility	for	outcomes Main	Argument	
Government	officials *	The	SBL *	The	Taiwanese	league	was	not	powerful	enough	to	retain	players.
*	The	Clubs
	
*	The	club	did	not	support	player	to	transfer	because	it	would	cause	the	decline	of	
attendances	for	the	domestic	league.	
*	China *	China	wanted	Taiwanese	players	to	migrate	was	because	of	its	united	front	strategy.	
*	Players *	Players	want	to	go	to	China	because	China	uses	the	same	language	(culturally	
comfortable)	and	its	clubs	can	pay	more	(economically	better	off).		
Legislators	(Law	makers)	 *	DPP	supported	players	to	transfer *	Migration	of	players	is	good	for	long‐term	sporting	development
	
*	DPP	supported	players	to	transfer *	this	exchange	to	help	to	enhance	the	development	of	sport	in	Taiwan
*	DPP’s	work *	If	we	play	in	China,	we	will	degrade	our	national	dignity.
*	DPP’s	purpose	
	
*	There	was	a	potential	electoral	benefit	for	a	politician	who	would	support	sport	
*	(KMT)	blamed	the	government
	
	
*	The	government	for	not	having	a	fair	policy	of	cross‐strait	sporting	exchange	while	
according	to	the	Act	Governing	Relations	between	the	People	of	the	Taiwan	Area	and	
the	Mainland	Area,	Chinese	people	coming	from	the	PRC	did	not	find	it	easy	to	stay	
in	Taiwan.	
*	(KMT)	suggested	the	government	
should	migrate	the	impact	
*	The	government	should	work	harder	to	not	let	‘political	issues’	intervene	in	the	
development	of	sport.	
Clubs	 *	Club	manager	 *	Unless	you	have	the	ability	to	survive	in	the	CBA,	you	should	not	go	to	there
*	Club	manager	
	
*	The	Chinese	basketball	environment	was	good	for	Taiwanese	players	to	develop	
their	careers	
*	Players	 *	The	wage	level	in	China	was	the	most	attractive	point	for	players.
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*	Clubs	
	
*	Clubs		
*	Clubs	should	let	more	good	talented	players	play	in	the	CBA,	as	they	will	bring	back	
good	training	methods.	
*	In	terms	of	clubs’	migration,	finance	is	the	main	problem.	
*	Clubs	 *	The	migration	of	players	has	actually	caused	the	greatest	damage	to	the	clubs,	
because	loss	of	an	all‐star	player	also	means	the	loss	of	sales	of	tickets	and	
merchandise.		
*	The	league *	The	downturn	in	the	league	will	affect	the	CTBA	indirectly
Media	 *	The	clubs *	Clubs	would	have	financial	difficulties	in	China
*	the	club	owner
	
*	Clubs	owner	wanted	transfer	to	China	in	order	to	meet	marketing	goals	for	their	
own	companies.	
*	Players *	Players	wanted	go	to	China	because	of	higher	wages	than	in	Taiwan.		
*	The	CTBA *	The	CTBA	used	the	24	player	list	to	restrict	players,	and	maintain	the	SBL	which	is	
owned	by	the	CTBA.	
CTBA	staff	 *	CTBA *	The	original	intension	behind	the	list	of	24	players	was	to	avoid	the	collapse	of	the	
SBL,	which	might	come	about	if	all	of	the	best	Taiwanese	players	transferred	to	
China.	
Sponsors	 *	Sponsors *	State‐owned	companies	cannot	support	a	club	to	play	in	China.
*	Clubs *	Clubs	prefer	the	Chinese	market but	have	financial	concerns.
*	Players *	Players	wanted	to	transfer	because	of	higher	wage	levels.
*	Clubs
	
*	Clubs’	concern	was	not	only	about	‘adapting	to	the	Chinese	market’	but	also	about	
the	‘impact	on	the	Taiwanese	market’	
*	CTBA
	
*	The	CTBA	did	not	want	Taiwanese	players	to	transfer	to	China	because	it	would	
affect	sponsors’	willingness	to	support	the	Taiwanese	basketball	if	all	the	elite	
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	 players	transferred	to	China.	
*	CTBA	and	clubs
	
*	the	24	player	list	was	a	solution	though	which	to	limit	players	in	their	cooperation	
with	the	clubs	and	the	CTBA	
*	Clubs *	If	all‐star	players	transfer	to	China,	the	ranking	of	the	club	would	become	poor,	and	
ticket	sales	would	decline.					
Coaches/players *	The	owners
	
*	The	owner	believed	that	the	Chinese	market	was	better	than	the	Taiwanese	
equivalent.	
*	The	Chinese	league
	
*	China	only	recruited	Taiwanese	players	to	join	their	team	because	the	system	would	
break	down	if	Taiwanese	clubs	joined	the	highest	class	of	Chinese	league	without	
playing	in	the	lower	leagues	gaining	get	promotion.	
*	The	Taiwanese	owner *	The	Taiwanese	owners	did	not	want	to	pay	more	to	players
*	The	Players
	
*	Many	players	have	transferred	to	China.	Chinese	paid	five	times	more.
*	The	players *	Players	felt	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	had	deteriorated.
*	Clubs
	
*	The	clubs	did	not	want	the	teams	in	Taiwan	to	become	a	training	camp	for	the	
Chinese	league.	
*	The	CTBA
	
*	The	CTBA	did	not	discuss	with	clubs	how	to	deliver	policy	of	the	24	player	list.	
*	The	owners *	Players	wanted	to	leave	because	the	clubs	did	not	invest	in	basketball.
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Chapter	Eight		
Conclusion	
	
8.1	The	Governance	of	Basketball	in	Taiwan	
This	 study	 addresses	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 sports	 governance	 in	 the	 context	 of	
Taiwanese	basketball.	 It	 is	a	part	of	wider	study	which	considers	 three	cases	/	
junctures	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 governance	 of	 Taiwanese	 basketball.	 The	 first	 is	 a	
critical	 incident	 –	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Basketball	 Alliance	 (CBA),	
Taiwan’s	 first	 professional	 basketball	 league,	 in	 1999.	 The	 second	 is	 a	 critical	
process	 –	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 and	 running	 a	 new	 semi‐professional	 or	
prospective	 professional	 league,	 Super	 Basketball	 League	 (SBL).	 The	 third	 is	 a	
critical	 contextual	 set	of	 factors	 related	 to	 the	 development	 of	 sporting	 and	
economic	 relations	with	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China.	This	 focus	on	 incident,	
process	and	context	allows	us	to	evaluate	governance	issues	at	different	levels	of	
specificity.	
Figure	8.1:	The	World	of	Taiwanese	Basketball	
	
The	 analysis	 of	 these	 three	 cases	 has	 focus	 on	 the	 following	 themes:	 (i)	
stakeholder	 perspectives	 on	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 and	 the	
emergence	 of	 the	 SBL;	 (ii)	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	 and	 tactics	 between	 various	
Context
Process
Incident
The	Relationship	with	China	
What	 factors	 in	 the	 context	 provided	
resources	 for	 actors	 to	 pursue	 their	
goals?	
The	Emergence	of	the	SBL	
What	 processes	 were	 involved	 and	
how	did	they	operate?	
The	Collapse	of	the	CBA
What	 were	 the	 factors	 perceived	 as	
critical	by	the	various	stakeholders?	
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stakeholders,	such	as	media,	the	state,	clubs,	national	federation,	politicians	and	
players	in	the	basketball	system;	(iii)	the	relationship	between	the	development	
of	 professional	 basketball	 and	 the	 Taiwanese	 politico‐economic	 domain	 and	
more	 specifically	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 PRC.	 These	 themes	 illustrate	 how	
stakeholders	 behaved	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals,	 but	 also	 identify	 the	
formation	or	the	contexts	within	which	actors	sought	to	achieve	their	goals.	We	
will	 consider	 these	 matters	 of	 action,	 context	 and	 outcomes	 forming	 further	
contexts	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 cases,	 using	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 of	
governance	theory	and	at	a	‘meta‐level’	of	strategic	relations	theory.	We	start,	in	
summarising	 matters	 considered	 to	 date,	 with	 governance	 theory	 and	 in	
particular	with	 systemic	 governance,	 as	 a	means	 for	 capturing	 the	 interplay	of	
stakeholders.	
	
8.1.1	Actions/Tactics,	 Interests	and	Outcomes	of	Stakeholders	 in	 the	Case	
of	the	Collapse	of	the	CBA	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 CBA’s	 collapse,	 different	 stakeholders	 had	 different	
perspectives	 on	 this	 matter.	 Data	 acquired	 for	 this	 research	 suggests	 that	
inadequate	organisational	structure,	 ineffective	marketing	strategies,	 loss	of	TV	
rights	 fee,	 the	 owners’	 philosophy,	 and	 the	 Asian	 financial	 crisis	 were	 all	
perceived	 as	 contributing	 factors	 with	 differing	 levels	 emphasis	 by	 different	
stakeholders.	 If	 we	 analyse	 this	 from	 the	 approach	 of	 governance	 theory,	 the	
interrelationship	 of	 stakeholders	 conforms	 to	 what	 some	 commentators	
characterise	 as	 a	 complex	 web,	 a	 transversal	 (i.e.	 non‐hierarchical)	 system	
(Henry	&	Lee,	2004).	As	shown	in	figure	8.1,	in	such	networked	governance,	no	
single	stakeholder	could	dominate	the	development	of	the	CBA	entirely.		
In	the	web	of	systemic	governance,	different	stakeholders	may	be	driven	by	their	
own	interests	to	compete	or	to	co‐operate	with	each	other.	We	seek	not	only	to	
identify	how	well	principles	of	good	organisational	governance	were	established,	
but	 also	 to	 explore	 the	 local	 dynamics	 among	 stakeholders;	 indeed	 some	
outcomes	of	the	operation	of	the	system	might	have	produced	bad	organisational	
governance.	 The	 notions	 of	 systemic	 and	 political	 governance	 are	 therefore	
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useful	 to	 this	 study	 as	 they	 help	 to	 analyse	 the	 interaction	 between	 various	
stakeholders.	They	also	help	understand	the	nature	of	their	action	and	how	they	
exercise	 their	 power.	 The	 question	 to	 be	 contemplated	 is	 if	 traditional	
hierarchies	of	power	no	longer	obtain,	then	who	are	the	stakeholders?	What	are	
their	interests?	Are	they	complementary,	conflictual	or	neutral	to	those	of	others	
in	 the	 system?	How	do	 they	 go	 about	 realising	 their	 interests?	What	 are	 their	
resources,	tactics	and	strategies?		
From	 our	 consideration	 of	 the	 previous	 case	 study,	 we	 can	 appreciate	 the	
perceived	importance	to	some	actors	of	the	TV	rights	fee	to	the	development	of	
the	CBA.	Here	we	begin	to	identify	relationships	among	stakeholders	by	focusing	
on	the	TV	rights	fee.	The	TV	rights	for	the	first	season	(1994‐1995)	were	sold	to	
TVIS	for	NTD$	15	million.	In	the	second	season	ETTV‐U2	outbid	TVIS	to	obtain	
the	TV	rights	for	NTD$	45	million,	following	the	CBA’s	success	in	the	first	season.	
After	the	second	season,	ETTV‐U2	won	the	bid	for	the	third	to	the	fifth	season	for	
a	total	of	NTD$	328	million.	In	other	words,	ETTV	had	to	pay	an	average	of	over	
NTD$	100	million	per	year	 to	 secure	 the	TV	rights.	The	reason	why	ETTV	was	
willing	 to	 pay	 such	 a	 large	 amount	 was	 because	 there	 was	 competition	 from	
other	 cable	 network	 companies	 (Lee,	 2000;	Wen	 2010).	 The	 strategic	 context	
was	 thus	 an	 oligopoly,	 in	 which	 competition	 was	 intense.	 ETTV	 could	 sell	 its	
rights	 to	 other	 cable	 TV	 network	 companies	 as	 a	 means	 to	 off‐set	 its	 costs.	
Intense	competition	among	media	companies	for	rights	to	broadcast	sport	meant	
that	the	value	of	the	TV	rights	fee	was	way	beyond	what	was	generally	estimated	
on	the	basis	of	market	value.		
Wen	(2010)	argued	that	the	CBA	put	too	much	emphasis	on	the	‘size’	of	the	TV	
rights	 fee.	 The	 amount	 of	 TV	 rights	 fee	 should	 have	 been	 decided	 not	 by	 an	
unrealistic	bid	due	 to	competition	among	the	cable	networks	but	rather	by	 the	
market	value.	As	economists	argue,	oligopolistic	competition	has	a	 tendency	 to	
promote	 bids	 based	 on	 competitive	 positioning	 rather	 than	market	 value.	 The	
reason	 that	 ETTV	 asked	 the	 CBA	 to	 refund	NTD$	 30	million	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
fourth	 season	was	because	 it	 recognized	 that	 the	market	value	of	 the	CBA	had	
been	overestimated.	Even	 though	 the	CBA	received	a	huge	TV	rights	 fee,	 it	did	
not	use	the	income	in	a	sustainable	manner	to	set	up	a	 long‐term	development	
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and	marketing	plan.	Other	revenues	such	as	sponsorship	and	advertisement	did	
not	increase	in	the	same	way.			
This	development	resulted	in	the	CBA’s	first	announcement	of	a	‘lockout’	on	21st	
January	1999	after	the	ETTV	refused	to	pay	the	broadcasting	fee.	At	first,	ETTV	
refused	to	pay	the	TV	rights	fee	for	the	fifth	season	because	total	revenue	from	
broadcasting	the	games	was	far	 lower	than	first	anticipated	and	far	 lower	than	
the	rights	fee	it	had	paid	out.	ETTV	demanded	that	a	reduction	in	the	rights	fee	
be	 negotiated	 with	 the	 CBA,	 which	 rejected	 the	 demand	 and	 insisted	 that	 the	
contract	 be	 followed.	 The	 two	 reached	 a	 stalemate	 and	 the	 CBA	 decided	 to	
suspend	ETTV’s	right	to	broadcast.	Finally	ETTV	quit	 the	broadcasting	entirely,	
and	the	CBA	was	suspended.	When	the	league	first	announced	the	lockout	in	the	
beginning,	 there	 was	 some	 room	 for	 manoeuvre.	 However,	 with	 different	
stakeholders	 having	 different	 and	 mostly	 conflicting	 goals,	 ‘re‐opening’	 of	 the	
league	 was	 not	 an	 outcome	 commonly	 sought	 after	 by	 all	 stakeholders.	
Eventually	the	league	was	suspended	indefinitely.		
The	state	tried	to	step	in	when	the	CBA	was	suspended;	the	then	Vice	President	
Lien	 was	 actively	 involved	 in	 discussion	 regarding	 ‘how	 to	 save	 professional	
basketball’.	 On	 25	March	 1999	 Vice	 President	 Lien	 hosted	 a	meeting	with	 the	
Chairman	 of	 the	 CBA	 and	 club	 representatives.	 Lien	 promised	 to	 improve	 the	
environment	 for	 the	 CBA.	 In	 this	 meeting,	 he	 emphasized	 that	 “it	 was	
everybody’s	 responsibility	 to	 promote	 sport.”	 He	would	 provide	 support	 for	 a	
certain	period	to	help	the	CBA	to	re‐open	so	that	“young	people	could	cheer	for	
their	favourite	sport	again”	(Lin,	1999).	
Vice	President	Lien	instructed	the	Sport	Affairs	Council	(SAC)	to	cooperate	with	
the	 CTBA.	 Therefore	 the	 SAC	 not	 only	 communicated	with	 the	 CTBA,	 but	 also	
provided	funding	to	host	a	warm‐up	tournament,	the	CBA	Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament,	 in	 preparation	 for	 re‐starting	 CBA.	 In	 fact,	 the	 CBA’s	 suspension	
happened	when	 the	presidential	election	 in	2000	was	 just	a	 few	months	away.	
The	 KMT	 government	 intended	 to	 use	 ‘supporting	 basketball’	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	
increase	the	populating	and	rate	of	support	for	the	party.		
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According	to	Wei’s	(1999a)	report,	an	important	precondition	for	the	CBA	to	re‐
open	was	the	finding	of	“a	new	owner	for	Tera	Mars	Basketball	Team”.	After	the	
KMT	councillor	Chien‐Zhi	Chen	who	as	Speaker	of	Taipei	City	Council	intervened,	
the	 KMT	 even	 instructed	 its	 own	 state‐owned	 business,	 the	 Broadcasting	
Company	of	China	(BCC),	to	buy	the	Tera	Mars	Basketball	Team,	which	had	been	
struggling	 in	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 KMT	 then	 escalated	 policy	 support	 into	 a	
physical	 investment.	 KMT	 councillor	 Chien‐Zhi	 Chen,	 who	 was	 the	 Taipei	 City	
Council	 Speaker,	 argued	 that	 rejuvenation	 and	 charity	 were	 objectives	 which	
would	 help	 the	KMT	 to	 improve	 its	 reputation.	 Therefore	 assisting	 the	 CBA	 to	
start	up	again	and	buying	 the	Tera	Mars	 team	were	consistent	with	 the	KMT’s	
objectives.		
However,	 under	 Ren‐Da	 Wang’s	 leadership,	 the	 Chinese	 Taipei	 Basketball	
Association	(CTBA)	exhibited	reluctance	over	the	re‐opening.	On	6	October	1999	
Wang	had	 a	meeting	with	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 SAC,	 Zhao,	 to	 exchange	 opinions	
about	the	re‐opening	of	the	CBA.	When	Zhao	suggested	that	the	CBA	should	re‐
open	first	then	deal	with	all	the	problems	during	the	season,	Wang,	the	chairman	
of	 the	 CTBA,	 insisted	 the	 CBA	 be	 re‐opened	 only	 after	 sorting	 out	 the	 league	
structure	 and	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 facilities	 (Chang,	 1999).	 From	 the	 case	
study,	 it	 is	 clearly	 evident	 that	Wang	was	motivated	 by	 two	 incentives:	 firstly,	
Wang	hoped	to	secure	government	funding	to	build	a	new	stadium,	the	contract	
for	which	would	be	awarded	to	his	own	building	company;	secondly,	if	attempts	
to	re‐open	the	CBA	were	to	fail,	elite	basketball	clubs	and	players	would	return	
to	 the	 amateur	 league,	 which	 was	 hosted	 by	 the	 CTBA.	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	 Wang	 would	 have	 been	 a	 position	 to	 benefit	 regardless	 of	
whether	the	CBA	would	be	re‐started	successfully	or	not.	
When	the	CBA	announced	its	suspension	of	activities,	it	was	expected	that	Wang	
(the	president	of	the	CTBA	and	the	owner	of	the	Dacin	Tigers)	would	lead	the	re‐
opening	 of	 the	 league	 (Wei,	 1999b).	 However,	 Wang	 did	 not	 take	 on	 the	
responsibility	for	leading	this	because	of	differences	between	the	CTBA	and	the	
SAC.	 Zheng‐Zhong	 Chen,	 the	 manager	 of	 the	 Hung‐Fu	 Rams,	 took	 on	 the	
responsibility	 for	 leading	 the	 re‐opening	 committee.	 Zheng‐Zhong	 Chen’s	 first	
mission	was	to	maintain	the	structure	of	the	league,	which	meant	finding	a	new	
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owner	for	the	Tera	Mars	team.	Because	Zheng‐Zhong	Chen	played	an	important	
role	in	KMT	councillor	Chien‐Zhi	Chen’s	campaign	team,	Chien‐Zhi	Chen	helped	
him	 to	 secure	 funding	 from	 the	 Broadcasting	 Company	 of	 China	 (BCC)	 for	 the	
Tera	 Mars	 team	 (Wei,	 1999a).	 The	 BCC	 eventually	 bought	 the	 Tera	 Mars	
franchise.	
After	the	Tera	Mars	Basketball	Team’s	ownership	had	been	decided,	and	with	the	
SAC’s	 funds	available	 to	breathe	 life	 into	 the	 league	project,	 the	club	managers	
announced	 together	 that	 the	 3‐month‐long	 CBA	 Millennium	 Memorial	
Tournament	would	tip	off	on	1	January	2000	(Wei,	1999c).	However,	while	all	of	
the	CBA	clubs	participated	in	the	CBA	Millennium	Memorial	Tournament,	some	
of	the	clubs’	parent	companies	were	in	financial	crisis.		
According	to	Wen	(2010),	every	CBA	club	lost	NTD$	50	million	on	average	every	
season.	This	 loss	 could	be	absorbed	by	 the	parent	 companies	when	businesses	
and	economic	prospects	were	good.	However,	 in	1997	the	Asian	financial	crisis	
hit	the	CBA	clubs’	parent	companies	heavily.	Even	Hung‐Kuo,	which	was	one	of	
the	largest	building	companies	in	Taiwan,	could	not	survive.	This	raised	serious	
questions	about	the	financial	viability	of	basketball	clubs?		
In	the	case	study,	some	interviewees	argued	that	the	dispute	over	the	TV	rights	
fee	was	 the	 last	straw	in	 the	CBA	collapse.	 In	effect,	 this	 issue	was	used	by	 the	
parent	 companies	 of	 some	 clubs	 as	 a	 pretext	 to	 quit	 the	 basketball	 business.	
When	the	CBA	was	suspended,	reviving	the	league	was	not	a	common	objective	
shared	by	 the	 clubs.	 The	 owner	 of	Hung‐Kuo,	 for	 example,	 had	 lost	 interest	 in	
funding	the	basketball	club	because	the	company	had	been	troubled	by	overdue	
debt	 repayments	 totalling	 NTD$	 60	 billion	 (Tian,	 2011).	 Hung‐Kuo	 eventually	
announced	dissolution	of	the	club	in	November	2000.	In	addition,	the	owner	of	
the	 Yulon	 Basketball	 Team,	 Kai‐Tai	 Yen,	 believed	 re‐opening	 the	 CBA	 held	 no	
value	for	his	team	since	the	team’s	main	rival,	Hung‐Kuo,	was	no	longer	around.	
Due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 key	 rivals,	 Yen,	who	 ran	 Yulon	 as	 a	 profit	making	
franchise,	saw	no	hope	of	making	a	profit	 in	the	CBA	in	the	future	(Wei,	2000).	
He	believed	the	environment	then	was	no	longer	conducive	to	the	running	of	a	
for‐profit	professional	basketball	 league.	He	 therefore	announced	 in	November	
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2000	 that	Yulon	would	quit	 the	professional	 league	and	 return	 to	 the	 amateur	
level	(Chang,	1999b).		
Although	financial	viability	appeared	to	be	Yen’s	only	consideration,	Wei	(2000)	
argued	 that	 political	 factors	 also	 contributed	 to	 Yulon’s	 decision.	 In	 2000,	 the	
KMT	had	been	actively	 involved	 in	 the	 rebuilding	of	 the	CBA,	 following	Zheng‐
Zhong	 Chen’s	 lead	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 re‐opening	 team.	 The	 restarting	 of	 the	
CBA,	 it	 seemed,	 had	 become	 an	 instrument	 of	 KMT	 political	 promotion.	
Moreover,	 after	 the	DPP	won	 the	presidential	 election	 in	 the	 same	year,	 Sin‐Yi	
Lin,	 the	 president	 of	 one	 of	 Yulon’s	 car	 companies,	 was	 recruited	 to	 be	 the	
Minister	of	the	Economy	in	the	DPP	government.	At	that	moment,	Yen’s	business	
was	 seen	 by	 the	 public	 as	 heavily	 linked	 with	 political	 groupings	 and/or	 the	
government.	However,	according	to	Wei	(2000),	Yen,	as	a	businessman,	did	not	
want	 to	 support	 an	 activity	which	was	 closely	 associated	 in	 the	 public’s	 view,	
with	 political	 activities,	with	 the	 connotation	 of	 a	 KMT	 or	 DPP	 orientation,	 he	
therefore	decided	that	Yulon	was	going	to	quit	the	CBA.	
With	two	marquee	teams	quitting	the	league,	it	was	highly	likely	that	re‐opening	
of	 the	 league	 would	 fail,	 but	 Zheng‐Zhong	 Chen	 was	 able	 to	 use	 his	 political	
connections	 to	 drum	 up	 support	 from	 the	 government	 and	 the	 clubs.	
Unfortunately,	despite	Chen’s	efforts,	Dacin	and	Lucky	remained	unsupportive	of	
the	 re‐opening.	 Failure	 to	 get	 enough	 clubs	 on‐board	 resulted	 in	 Chen’s	
announcement	on	23	November	2000	that	the	league	was	to	be	abandoned.	
Different	 parent	 companies	 have	 different	 business	 cultures,	 resulting	 in	
different	goals	and	reasons	for	supporting	basketball	clubs.	Some	businesses	ran	
clubs	 for	 historical	 reasons,	 having	 been	 recruited	 by	 the	 government	 or	 for	
family12	reasons.	 For	 such	 teams	 ranking	 in	 the	 league	was	 their	 first	 priority.	
Other	 clubs	were	 running	 for	marketing	 purposes.	 However	most	 of	 the	 clubs	
were	 funded	 because	 of	 the	 owners’	 personal	 interest	 (Wen,	 2010).	 During	
periods	 of	 poor	 economic	 conditions,	 business	 culture	 determined	 a	 club’s	
survival.	 An	 interviewee	 in	 the	 case	 study	 (Interviewee	 S2)	 argued	 that	 the	
																																																								
12	Basketball	 development	 is	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 concern	 of	 the	 Yen’s	 family	 since	 Kai‐Tai	 Yen’s	
father,	Chin‐Ling	Yen	served	as	the	first	chairman	of	the	CTBA.		
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owners	did	not	run	professional	sports	as	an	 independent	business	branch	but	
as	 an	 appendage	 to	 their	 main	 business.	 Because	 of	 this,	 decisions	 were	
inevitably	 influenced	 by	 the	 fiscal	 performance	 of	 the	 parent	 companies.	 This	
may	thus	be	a	critical	factor	behind	the	failure	to	re‐open	the	CBA	regardless	of	
government	support	and	SAC	funding.		
Henry	and	Lee	(2004)	point	out	that	that	the	government	may	seek	to	influence	
and	 to	 steer	 rather	 than	 command	 the	 sport	 system	 particularly	 when	 the	
resources	 come	 from	 a	 mixture	 of	 public,	 voluntary	 and	 commercial	 sectors	
rather	 than	solely	 from	the	public	 sector.	Notwithstanding	 the	character	of	 the	
forms	 of	 political	 governance	 which	 appeared	 in	 this	 critical	 event,	 the	 CBA	
collapsed	eventually,	with	different	stakeholders	 failing	to	meet	different	goals.	
Five	clubs	returned	 to	 the	amateur	 league.	The	Hung‐Kuo	Basketball	 team	was	
bought	by	Sina	and	subsequently	transferred	to	China.	The	media	lost	its	chance	
to	make	profits	through	broadcasting.	 	 	The	SAC	did	not	deliver	on	its	policy	of	
‘saving	professional	basketball’.	KMT	 invested	heavily	with	millions	dollars	but	
did	 not	 receive	 support	 from	 ‘professional’	 basketball	 teams	 in	 return.	 Some	
players	lost	the	stage	on	which	to	display	their	skills	while	others	lost	their	job.				
In	summary,	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	illustrate	the	
actions,	 tactics,	 interests	 and	 outcomes,	 which	 stemmed	 from	 the	 governance	
system.	Table	8.1	below	provides	a	brief	summary	of	what	actions	or	tactics	the	
stakeholders	had	undertaken,	and	 the	 interests	as	well	as	 the	outcomes,	which	
characterised	the	critical	incident.	
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Figure	8.2:	Systemic	Governance	of	Sport	–	the	Collapse	of	the	CBA		
	
Club		
(Hung‐Kuo)	
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(Lucky)	
Players
State	
Political	Party
Club	(TERA/BCC)	
Club	(Yulon)	
Club	(Hung‐Fu)	
Media	
CTBA
Club	(Dacin)	
KMT	
Ren‐Da	Wang:	
Chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA	
Owner	of	Dacin	
Sport	Affairs	Council	(SAC)	
DPP	
Vice	President	
Key:	
Overt	/	formal	inter‐stakeholder	links			
Covert	/	informal	inter	stakeholder	links	
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Table	8.1:	Actions/Tactics,	 Interests	and	outcomes	of	Stakeholders	 in	the	collapse	of	the	
CBA	
Stakeholders	 Actions/Tactics	 Interests	 Outcomes	
Media	(ETTV)	 *Refused	to	pay	TV	rights	
fee	
*Push	the	league	to	
reduce	the	TV	rights	
fee	
*CBA	collapsed	
*Lost	potential	
profits	from	
broadcasting	a	
professional	league	
Government	
(SAC)	
*Asked/negotiated	with	
the	CTBA	to	support	
*Funded	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	as	a	
preparation	for	re‐
opening	the	league	
*Policy	delivery	‐
follow	the	direction	
of	White	Paper	
*Support	the	
government’s	policy:	
Competitive	sport	
and	Sport	for	all	
*Response	to	public	
opinion	
*CBA	collapsed	
*National	team	
performed	badly	
after	CBA	collapse	
Club	(Hung‐Kuo)	 *Spent	NTD$	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*Attended	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	as	a	
preparation	for	re‐
opening	the	league	
*Quit	basketball	to	
save	money	for	the	
parent	company	
during	the	Asian	
financial	crisis	in	
2000	
	
*announced	
dissolution	because	
of	financial	
difficulties	of	the	
parent	company	
*Sold	the	club	to	Sina	
*Sina	transferred	to	
China	
Club	(Yulon)	 *Spent	NTD$	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*Attended	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	as	a	
preparation	for	re‐
opening	the	league	
*CBA	could	be	good	
for	parent	
company’s	
reputation	
*Owner’s	‘hobby’	
*Decided	to	quit	
because	of	Hung‐
Kuo’s	dissolution	
*Register	in	the	
CTBA’s	division	A	
Club	(Hung‐Fu)	 *The	manager	took	
responsibility	to	
organise	the	re‐opening.	
*Entrusted	the	manager’s	
company	to	handle	the	
re‐opening	process	
*Insisted	the	CBA	would	
re‐open	on	time	to	
convince	the	other	
owners	
*Attended	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	
*Spent	NTD$	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*The	re‐opening	
organisation	
belonged	to	the	
manager		
*The	manager	earned	
most	of	the	money	
for	organising	the	
re‐opening.		
*Potential	leader	of	
the	CBA	if	the	league	
could	be	re‐opened.	
	
*Could	not	achieve	
re‐opening	
*Register	in	the	
CTBA’s	division	A	
Club	(Lucky)	 *Spent	NTD$	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*Attended	the	CBA	
*Quit	basketball	to	
save	money	for	the	
parent	company	
*Registered	in	the	
CTBA’s	division	A	
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Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	
during	the	Asian	
financial	crisis	
	
Club	(Tera/BCC)	 *Tera	sold	the	club	to	the	
Broadcasting	
Corporation	of	China	
(BCC)	
*Attended	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	
*Spent	NTD$	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*Tera	wanted	to	go	
through	the	Asian	
financial	crisis	
*Maintain	the	club’s	
operation	to	
dissolution	
*Registered	in	the	
CTBA’s	division	A	
Club	(Dacin)	 *Spent	10	million	to	
prepare	re‐opening	
*Attended	the	CBA	
Millennium	Memorial	
Tournament	
*Support	the	decisions	
from	the	CTBA,	not	the	
league	
*Satisfy	the	owner’s	
wishes		
*Support	the	CTBA’s	
decision	
*Register	in	the	
CTBA’s	division	A		
CTBA	 *Chairman	of	the	CTBA	
asked	the	SAC	to	fund	his	
own	company	to	build	a	
new	stadium	as	a	
condition	of	supporting	
re‐opening	
*Make	profits	for	the	
chairman’s	company	
*Control	the	clubs	if	
they	all	register	in	
the	CTBA’s	amateur	
league	
*Most	of	clubs	
registered	in	its	
amateur	league	
Politician/party	
(KMT)	
*Vice	president	of	ROC	
(Taiwan)	hosted	a	
meeting	to	support	re‐
opening	of	the	league	
*Gave	funding	to	Tera	
*BCC	spent	NTD$	25	
million	to	buy	Tera	to	be	
a	club	owner	
*Media	Exposure
*Enhance	KMT’s	
reputation	
*Political	motives	‐	
people	might	vote	
KMT		
*CBA	collapsed	
*Spent	millions	to	
support	an	amateur	
club	
Players/coaches	 *Asked	for	wages	at	a	
professional	level	
*Higher	wages
*professional	stage	
*No	professional	
environment	
*Lower	wage	level	
because	the	clubs	
registered	in	an	
amateur	league		
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8.1.2	Actions/Tactics,	 Interests	and	Outcomes	of	Stakeholders	 in	 the	Case	
of	the	Emergence	of	the	SBL	
As	mentioned	in	the	case	study,	the	SBL	is	not	a	traditional	amateur	basketball	
league.	The	SBL	was	set	up	as	a	semi‐professional	league	because	the	nature	of	
the	stakeholders’	network	had	changed.	Specifically,	the	reason	why	the	SBL	did	
not	 fully	professionalise	was	because	the	stakeholders,	who	had	different	goals	
in	the	basketball	system,	employed	different	tactics	to	act.	Finally	the	outcome	of	
the	 competition/co‐operation	 among	 the	 stakeholders	was	 a	 semi‐professional	
league	 hosted	 by	 the	 government‐appointed	 CTBA	 and	 operated	 with	
commercial	 marketing	 strategies	 by	 ESPN.	 Here	 we	 analyse	 the	 stakeholders’	
tactics,	interests	and	outcomes	when	the	SBL	emerged.	
After	 the	 CBA	 was	 suspended,	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 basketball	 tournament	 in	
Taiwan	was	the	Division	One	amateur	league.	Surprisingly,	even	with	free	entry	
into	the	stadiums,	the	games	remained	unappealing	to	the	general	public	and	the	
media	showed	little	or	no	interest	in	broadcasting	them.	Because	of	the	difficult	
situation	 where	 basketball	 was	 rapidly	 losing	 popularity,	 possibly	 causing	
declining	 performance	 by	 the	 national	 team	 in	 international	 competitions,	 the	
Minister	of	the	SAC	took	the	initiative	to	help	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	to	launch	a	
new	league.	  
As	we	mentioned	in	the	case	study,	the	SBL	represented	a	‘compromise	product’.	
The	SAC,	the	CTBA,	and	the	clubs	 intended	to	transform	an	unexciting	amateur	
league	to	a	more	attractive	one.	They	tried	to	have	a	comprehensive	coverage	on	
all	 aspects,	 including	 regulations,	 broadcasts,	 facilities	 and	 fixtures,	 in	 order	 to	
attract	fans.	Nevertheless,	they	did	not	have	enough	resources	to	establish	a	fully	
professional	 league.	 Although	 the	 government	 should	 not	 assist	 a	 commercial	
sport	 directly,	 the	 SAC	 still	 funded	 the	 SBL	 under	Minister	 Lin’s	 lead.	 The	 SAC	
therefore	became	a	guarantor	for	the	SBL	and	provided	resources	for	it.	The	SAC	
provided	NTD$	20	million	to	renovate	the	stadium.	The	Minister	of	the	SAC,	Te‐
Fu	 Lin,	 visited	 private	 businesses	 to	 seek	 support	 and	 to	 raise	 funding	 for	 the	
SBL.	The	SAC	also	provided	NTD$	800	thousand	to	each	club	to	win	their	support	
for	the	launching	of	the	SBL.			
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The	SAC	also	authorised	the	CTBA	to	be	the	main	organiser	of	the	SBL	because	
the	 CTBA	 claimed	 that	 it	 had	 human	 resources	 including	 refereeing	 and	 game	
staff.	Thus	 the	 clubs	were	under	 the	authority	of	 the	CTBA.	Even	 though	 there	
was	 an	 SBL	 committee,	 the	 power	 to	 take	 decision	 on	 games	 matters,	
broadcasting,	 marketing,	 and	 ticket	 sales	 still	 lay	 with	 the	 CTBA.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	the	CTBA	received	revenue	from	all	ticket	sales	and	used	it	to	pay	
expenses	 related	 to	 event	 organisation.	 The	 clubs’	 external	 income	 was	 only	
from	broadcasting	rights	and	minor	marketing	activities.	For	two	seasons	prior	
to	the	2008	financial	crisis,	the	broadcasting	rights	were	worth	NTD	56	million	in	
the	fourth	season	and	fifth	season.	In	recent	seasons,	due	to	poor	TV	ratings	and	
decreasing	 level	 of	 sponsorship,	 each	 club	 received	 only	 NTD	 3.1	 million	 per	
seasons.	 Even	 in	 the	 future,	 limits	were	 established	 such	 that	 each	 club	would	
receive	only	NTD	3.35	million	in	the	11th	season.		
Table	8.2:	Broadcaster	and	Broadcasting	Rights	Fee	
Season	(Year)	 Broadcaster	 Rights	Fee	 Club	sharing	
1st	Season	(03‐04)	 ESPN	 5600000	 800000	
2nd	Season	(04‐05)	 ESPN	 27500000	 3500000	
3rd	Season	(05‐06)	 ESPN	 35000000	 5000000	
4th	Season	(06‐07)	 ESPN	+	Videoland	 56000000	 8000000	
5th	Season	(07‐08)	 ESPN	+	Videoland	 56000000	 8000000	
6th	Season	(08‐09)	 ESPN(free)	+	ELTA	 6440000	 920000	
7th	Season	(09‐10)	 ESPN	+	ELTA	 23000000	 3285714	
8th	Season	(11‐12)	 ESPN	+ELTA	 23000000	 3285714	
(Source:	Interviewee	C3)	
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 there	 were	 always	 arguments	 between	
clubs	(in	the	committee	for	the	 league)	and	the	CTBA	about	who	should	be	the	
decision	maker	 for	 the	SBL.	After	 the	2004‐05	season,	most	of	 the	 clubs	asked	
the	 CTBA	 to	 transform	 the	 SBL	 into	 a	 fully	 professional	 league.	 However,	 the	
CTBA	 did	 not	 accept	 this	 proposal.	 In	 April	 2006,	 the	 ETTV	 Basketball	 Club	
partnered	with	4	other	clubs,	namely	Taiwan	Beer,	Taiwan	Bank,	Videoland,	and	
YMY,	 to	 announce	 their	 intent	 to	 resign	 from	 the	 SBL	 and	 to	 set	 up	 a	 new	
league(Sun,	 2006a,	 2006b).	 The	 CTBA	 reacted	 by	 inviting	 the	 clubs	 to	 the	
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negotiation	 table	where	 technical	 issues	 such	as	 ticket	 sales,	broadcasting,	 and	
marketing	 with	 clubs,	 and	 the	 future	 operation	 of	 the	 SBL	 were	 open	 for	
discussion.	The	 clubs	 eventually	 agreed	 to	 stay	 in	 the	SBL	under	 the	 condition	
that	 they	and	the	CTBA	would	work	out	a	 fairer	resource‐sharing	system	(Sun,	
2006b).	 However,	 to	 date,	 there	 are	 still	 debates	 regarding	 how	 to	
‘professionalise’	 the	 league	 and	 how	 to	 share	 ticket	 sales	 equally	 in	 a	 system,	
which	is	still	monopolised	by	the	CTBA.		
Since	 the	 broadcasting	 fee	 was	 not	 enough	 for	 the	 clubs	 to	 maintain	 their	
operation,	funding	for	the	clubs	mostly	came	from	their	parent	companies	or	the	
clubs’	owners.		This	structure	thus	presented	a	source	of	potential	crisis.	Because	
the	 clubs	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 funding	 from	 the	 parent	 companies,	 the	
latters’	 motive	 for	 running	 the	 clubs	 become	 a	 key	 determinant	 for	 their	
sustainability.	 It	 was	 a	 positive	 sign	 that	 the	 club	 owners	 loved	 basketball	
themselves,	but	unfortunately	none	of	 the	owners	 treated	running	a	basketball	
club	 as	 a	 potentially	 independent	 profitable	 business.	 Other	 than	 personal	
interest	 in	 the	 sport,	 their	 ulterior	motive	 for	 sponsoring	 the	 clubs	was	 to	use	
basketball	as	an	avenue	to	build	reputation	for	the	company	or	to	increase	brand	
awareness.	 Because	 of	 this,	 there	 was	 lack	 of	 long‐term	 planning	 for	 the	
development	of	the	clubs,	which	would	be	in	jeopardy	once	the	marketing	goal,	
was	met,	no	longer	needed,	or	funds	ran	out.			
TV	 broadcasting	 always	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	
basketball	in	Taiwan.	When	the	SBL	was	under	construction,	Minister	Te‐Fu	Lin	
sought	 the	 media’s	 assistance	 for	 a	 proposed	 plan	 covering	 the	 new	 league’s	
broadcasting	 and	 marketing.	 The	 CTBA	 hosted	 a	 bid,	 during	 which	 different	
companies	 proposed	 their	 plans	 on	 how	 to	 do	 the	 broadcasting	 and	 how	 to	
promote	the	league.	Finally	ESPN	won	the	bid.	Not	only	did	ESPN	broadcast	the	
league,	but	it	also	undertook	the	marketing	job	for	the	SBL.	Although	ESPN	was	a	
multinational	 enterprise,	 the	 scale	 of	 its	 organisation	 and	 staff	 was	 not	 big	 in	
Taiwan.	
ESPN’s	 goals	 were	 to	 boost	 its	 audience	 rating	 and	 to	 build	 brand	 value.	
Compared	 to	 Videoland	 Sport	 Channel,	 which	 broadcast	 professional	 baseball	
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and	 billiards,	 ESPN’s	 lack	 of	 coverage	 and	 broadcasting	 of	 local	 sport	
competitions	put	 it	 in	 a	poor	position	 to	 attract	 a	 local	 audience.	Broadcasting	
the	 SBL	 thus	 became	 an	 important	 business	 for	 ESPN	 to	 increase	 its	 market	
share	 and	 to	 win	 over	 local	 people’s	 identity	 and	 loyalty.	 ESPN	 won	 the	 bid	
because	it	co‐operated	with	Nike,	which	had	a	lot	of	resource	and	experience	in	
promoting	 the	 High	 School	 Basketball	 League.	 ESPN	 was	 in	 charge	 of	
broadcasting	 and	 Nike	 took	 responsibility	 for	 its	 marketing;	 the	 deal	 allowed	
Nike	 to	 pocket	 sixty	 percent	 of	 the	 advertisement	 sales,	 while	 the	 remaining	
forty	percent	would	go	to	ESPN.	In	fact	“SBL	was	indispensable	to	ESPN	because	
ESPN	 had	 to	 maintain	 its	 own	 value	 in	 the	 war	 of	 the	 cable	 TV	 networks“	
(interviewee	S1).	ESPN	would	not	have	a	local	game	to	broadcast	if	they	did	not	
broadcast	 the	 SBL.	 When	 ESPN	 wanted	 to	 sell	 advertising	 space	 to	 cable	 TV	
network	companies	in	central	Taiwan	and	southern	Taiwan,	it	would	be	difficult	
for	 them	to	sell	 it	because	 it	does	not	have	a	 local	 identity.	 In	other	words,	 the	
ESPN’s	 interests	 were	 not	 limited	 to	 making	 a	 profit	 from	 broadcasting	 and	
advertisement	 sales	 alone,	 but	 also	 from	 increased	 bargaining	 power	 on	 price	
negotiations	with	Cable	TV	network	companies.		
Nike	was	another	key	stakeholder	when	the	SBL	emerged.	As	a	leading	sporting	
goods	 company	 in	 Taiwan,	 Nike	 applied	 its	 experience	 in	 promoting	 the	 High	
School	Basketball	League	and	spent	over	NTD$	60	million	on	marketing	for	the	
SBL.	The	former	manager	of	Nike	argued	that	the	company	had	not	earned	much	
profit	when	the	SBL	was	set	up.	Nike	 invested	 in	the	SBL	because	 it	was	 in	 the	
company’s	 interest	 to	 revive	 Taiwanese	 basketball	 culture,	 which	 could	 then	
translate	 into	 long‐term	 profits	 from	 merchandise	 sales.	 However,	 Nike	 was	
forced	 to	quit	 the	broadcasting/marketing	 team	by	ESPN	 in	 the	 second	season	
because	ESPN	wanted	to	enjoy	the	sole	benefits	from	the	rights.			
Figure	 8.3	 illustrates	 a	web	 of	 the	 interrelationship	 among	 stakeholders.	 Once	
again	the	feature	of	political	governance	appeared	in	the	emergence	of	the	SBL.	
The	 case	 of	 the	 SBL	 is	 a	 good	 example	 to	 show	 the	 processes	 by	 which	
governments	 or	 governing	 bodies	 seek	 to	 steer	 the	 sports	 system	 to	 achieve	
desired	outcomes.	According	to	Lee	(2011),	this	could	be	done	by	applying	moral	
pressure,	by	use	of	 financial	or	other	incentives,	or	by	licensing,	regulation	and	
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control,	 to	 influence	 other	 parties	 to	 act	 in	 ways	 consistent	 with	 desired	
outcomes.	The	circumstances	surrounding	the	processes	of	the	emergence	of	the	
SBL	 manifest	 the	 local	 dynamics	 among	 stakeholders	 within	 the	 basketball	
system,	 and	 how	 the	 stakeholders	 set	 up	 a	 field	 (the	 SBL)	 for	 themselves	 to	
pursue	their	own	interests	in	the	post‐CBA	era.	Table	8.3	below	provides	a	brief	
summary	 of	what	 actions	 or	 tactics	 the	 stakeholders	 had	 undertaken,	 and	 the	
interests	as	well	as	the	outcomes,	which	resulted	from	this	process.	
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Figure	8.3:	Systemic	Governance	of	Sport	–the	emergence	of	the	SBL	
	
Media	
(ESPN)	
Sport	Affairs	Council	(SAC)	
Players	/	Coaches
Fans	(the	general	public)	
Clubs
Marketing/	Sponsor		
(Nike)	
CTBA
Key:
Overt	/	formal	inter‐stakeholder	links			
Covert	/	informal	inter	stakeholder	links	
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Table	8.3:	Actions/Tactics,	Interests	and	outcomes	of	Stakeholders	in	the	emergence	of	the	
SBL	
Stakeholders	 Actions/Tactics Interests Outcomes	
Government	
(SAC)	
*Minister	of	the	SAC	sought	the	
Media’s	assistance	
*Minister	of	the	SAC	discussed	
with	club	owners	
*Provided	funding	to	renovate	
the	facilities	
*Recruited	committee	to	
organise	a	new	league	
*Funded	clubs	in	the	first	season	
*Funded	the	CTBA	to	organise	a	
new	league	
*Ease	public	
pressure	
*Revive	Taiwanese	
basketball	culture	
*Fulfil	the	Minister’s	
ambition	
*Highlight	The	
Minister’s	
achievement	
*Earn	public	
supporting	for	the	
government	
*Set	up	the	SBL
*Give	
authorization	
to	the	CTBA	
*Set	up	a	semi‐
professional	
league	
Clubs	 *Raise	the	budget	to	a	semi‐
professional	level	
*Asked	the	government	to	
support	
*Supply	of	players	
*Set	up	SBL	committee	by	clubs	
owners	
*Enhance	the
reputation	of	the	
parent	companies	
*Use	basketball	as	a	
marketing	
strategy	for	the	
parent	companies	
*Satisfy	the	owners’	
hobby	
*Obtain	the	
government’s	
funding	in	the	
1st	season	
*Obtain	TV	
rights	fee	
*Lost	all	ticket	
sales	
*	ineffective	
committee	
CTBA	 *Ask	the	government	to	set	up	
the	SBL	under	the	structure	of	
the	CTBA	because	it	owned	
resources	(referees,	organising	
staff)	
*Intervened	in	the	club’s	
decisions	as	the	chairman	of	
the	CTBA	owned	a	club.	
*Take	the	CTBA’s	
interests	as	the	
first	priority	
*Reject	the	
decisions	(might	
damage	the	CTBA)	
from	the	clubs		
	
*Become	a	role	
of	supervisor	
for	the	SBL	
*Dominate	the	
decision	
making	
process	
*Obtain	all	
revenues	from	
ticket	sales	
Media	(ESPN)	 *Co‐operated	with	Nike	to	earn	
the	bid	of	SBL’s	broadcasting	
and	marketing	
*Assisted	the	CTBA	to	set	up	the	
SBL	
*Used	the	broadcasting	as	a	
condition	to	negotiate	with	the	
CTBA	and	clubs	to	lower	the	
TV	rights	fee	
*Profits	from	
advertising	
*A	power	to	
negotiate	with	
Cable	TV	network	
companies	
*ESPN+Nike	
became	the	
broadcasting	
/marketing	
unit	
*Flexibility	for	
the	price	of	TV	
rights	fee.	
*Enjoy	the	
benefits	of	
broadcasting	
for	seven	
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seasons	
Sponsor	(Nike)	
	
*Co‐operated	with	ESPN	to	earn	
the	bid	of	SBL’s	broadcasting	
and	marketing	
*Provided	marketing	resources	
	
*Profits	from	
advertisement	and	
marketing	
*Interests	from	
long‐term	
basketball	culture	
*60%	share	of	
the	
advertisement	
sales	in	the	1st	
season	
*Forced	to	quit	
SBL’s	
marketing	
team		from	the	
2nd	season	
players	 *Make	their	best	performance,	
to	be	recruited	in	the	league	
*Certainty	of	
employment	
*Highest	wages	
*to	be	treated	as	
the	clubs’	/	
owners’	
properties	
Fans	 *Use	negative	view	for		
basketball	as	a	pressure	to	
push	the	government	to	get	
involved	
	
*	Revive	Taiwanese	
basketball	culture	
*Better	
performance	for	
international	
competitions			
*	Set	up	the	SBL
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8.1.3	Actions/Tactics,	 Interests	and	Outcomes	of	Stakeholders	 in	 the	Case	
of	the	Migration	of	Sina	
In	 September	 2001	 Jiang,	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 Sina	 Lions	 decided	 to	 transfer	 his	
basketball	club	to	China.	As	discussed	 in	the	case	study	section	 in	the	previous	
chapter,	this	case	involved	many	issues,	such	as	players’	career	after	the	collapse	
of	 the	 CBA,	 future	 development	 of	 the	 club,	 and	 owners’	 ambition.	
Notwithstanding	Sina	being	a	privately	owned	business,	its	migration	resulted	in	
a	special	relationship	between	various	stakeholders	on	both	sides	of	the	Taiwan	
Straits,	including	the	governments,	the	clubs,	and	basketball	federations.	On	16th	
September	2001	the	General	Administration	of	Sports	(China)	approved	of	Sina’s	
registration	in	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League.	Consequently,	Sina	also	
announced	its	registration	as	“Taiwan	(Suchou)	Sina	Lions	Basketball	Team”	in	
the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League	on	20th	September.	Taiwan’s	Mainland	
Affairs	Council,	Executive	Yuan,	and	Sport	Affairs	Councils	soon	expressed	their	
concerns.		
As	 indicated	 earlier,	 the	 Sina	 Lions	 transferred	 to	 China	 with	 the	 Taiwan	
government’s	support	in	the	end.	However,	this	case	was	significant	beyond	the	
national	 level.	 Even	 though	 this	 was	 a	 sport	 incident,	 the	 government	
department	which	was	concerned	extended	from	the	Sport	Affairs	Council	to	the	
Mainland	Affairs	Council.	Thus	the	web	of	governance	changed	its	form.	Here	we	
will	discuss	the	interrelationship	of	stakeholders	when	Sina	decided	to	transfer	
to	China.						
Since	Taiwan	experienced	an	economic	recession	in	1999,	Taiwanese	enterprises	
lost	 confidence	 in	 domestic	 development	 and	 sought	 to	 develop	 overseas	
business.	 The	 Chinese	 market	 was	 especially	 attractive	 to	 Taiwanese	
businessmen	 (Lee,	 2001).	 A	 similar	 situation	 happened	 in	 Taiwan’s	 basketball	
development.	The	Chinese	 league	was	attractive	 to	basketball	players	and	club	
owners.	Jiang,	the	owner	of	Sina,	was	one	owner	who	wanted	to	transfer	his	club	
to	China	 in	order	 to	raise	his	company’s	 reputation	as	well	as	 to	obtain	profits	
from	 TV	 broadcasting	 and	 advertising.	 Therefore	 when	 the	 General	
Administration	of	Sports	[China]	agreed	to	allow	Sina	to	register	in	the	2001/02	
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season,	it	was	a	great	chance	for	Jiang	to	extend	his	business	to	a	‘greater	China	
basketball	 system’.	 This	 was	 the	 reason	 that	 Jiang	 insisted	 on	 transferring	 to	
China.	 He	 even	withdrew	 from	 the	 CTBA	 and	 declared	 that	 he	would	 have	 no	
hesitation	in	quitting	all	Taiwanese	basketball	events	if	Sina	were	not	allowed	to	
transfer	to	China	(Liang,	2001).	
Table	8.4:	Key	events	in	the	case	of	Sina’s	migration	
Date	 Event
07/Dec/2000	 All	Hung‐Kuo	players	transferred	to	Sina
May/2000	 Sina	informed	the	CTBA	that	it	would	take	its	club	and	8	players	to	China	
16/Sep/2001	 General	Administration	of	Sports	(China)	agreed	that	Sina	could	register	in	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League		
20/Sep/2001	
Sina	officially	announced	it	would	use	“Taiwan	(SuZhou)	Sina	
Lions	Basketball	Team”	as	the	club	name	to	register	in	the	Chinese	
First	Class	Basketball	League	
28/Sep/2001	 Sina	withdrew	from	the	CTBA	
08/Oct/2001	 Sina	began	its	pre‐season	training	in	Suchou,	China	
30/Oct/2001	 Sina	confirmed	its	club	name	‘Sina	Lions	(Taiwanese	Enterprise)	Basketball	Club	to	begin	its	Season	
Mar/2003	 Sina	withdrew	from	the	Chinese	First	Class	Basketball	League,	and	returned	to	Taiwan.	
	
However,	the	thinking	of	the	Taiwan	government	was	somewhat	different	from	
that	of	the	other	stakeholders.	The	Taiwan	government	believed	the	reason	that	
Sina	 successfully	 registered	 in	 the	 Chinese	 Division	 A	 was	 because	 Sina	 used	
‘Taiwan’	or	‘Taipei’	in	its	club	title,	implicitly	legitimating	the	notion	of	Taiwan	as	
part	of	China	(Lee,	2001).	When	the	Mainland	Affairs	Council	responded	to	Sina’s	
migration,	 it	 emphasised	 that	 the	 government	 could	 understand	 that	 many	
players	 would	 want	 to	 play	 in	 China	 because	 the	 basketball	 environment	 in	
Taiwan	was	not	good	for	a	players’	career.	However,	any	exchange	activity	had	to	
be	 legally	 permissible,	 and	 it	 had	 to	 safeguard	 national	 dignity	 (Lee,	 2001).	
Apparently	 it	 was	 a	 political	 consideration	 rather	 than	 a	 basketball	 business	
decision	when	the	Chinese	government	insisted	that	Sina	use	‘Taiwan’	or	‘Taipei’	
in	 its	 club	 title.	 Despite	 of	 the	 objection	 from	 the	 clubs	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Second	
Class	 Basketball	 League,	 the	 Basketball	 Administrative	 Centre	 (China)	 allowed	
Sina	 to	register	 in	 the	Chinese	First	Class	League	because	China	wanted	 to	use	
Sina’s	 ‘Taiwan	 features’	 as	 a	 political	 indicator	 (Gong,	 2001).	 A	 former	Deputy	
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Minister	of	the	SAC	suggested	that	China	often	used	sports	as	a	subtle	vehicle	to	
promote	reunification.		
Recently	 China	 has	 held	 many	 games	 such	 as	 the	 national	
intercollegiate	 athletic	 games	 and	 national	 rural	 games,	 and	 has	
invited	Taiwan	to	attend.	 If	Taiwan	really	sends	a	team	to	attend	the	
Chinese	 national	 games,	 Taiwan	 would	 be	 like	 one	 of	 its	 provinces.	
Therefore	 when	 Sina	 registered	 in	 the	 Division	 A	 directly	 without	
playing	 in	 the	 lower	 level	 leagues	 to	 get	 promotion,	 China	 actually	
broke	 the	rules.	The	reason	why	Sina	had	this	privilege	was	because	
Sina	 was	 from	 Taiwan,	 and	 there	 was	 some	 political	 motivation	 in	
relation	to	this	issue.	(Interviewee	G3)	
At	the	beginning,	the	Mainland	Affairs	Council	argued	that	players	could	not	be	
members	 of	 the	 Chinese	 league.	 According	 to	 Article	 33	 of	 the	 Act	 Governing	
Relations	 between	 Peoples	 of	 the	 Taiwan	Area	 and	 the	Mainland	 Area	 and	 Its	
Enforcement	Rules:	
Any	individual,	juristic	person,	organization,	or	other	institution	of	the	
Taiwan	Area	shall	not	hold	any	position	or	become	any	member	of	the	
agencies,	institutions	or	organizations	of	the	Mainland	Area	which	are	
political	 parties,	 the	 military,	 the	 administration	 or	 of	 any	 political	
nature	and	which	are	prohibited	with	public	notices	by	the	Mainland	
Affairs	 Council,	 Executive	 Yuan	 in	 consultation	 with	 each	 of	 the	
competent	authorities	concerned.	
Players	 who	 violated	 the	 regulation	 had	 a	 fine	 imposed	 of	 more	 than	 NTD$	
100,000,	and	not	more	 than	NTD$	500,000.	However,	 in	 the	end,	 the	Mainland	
Affairs	 Council	modified	 the	Regulations	Governing	Permission	for	Athletes	from	
the	Taiwan	Area	to	Join	Athletic	Groups	in	Mainland	China	as	Members	or	Official	
Workers	in	order	to	improve	the	plight	of	the	players	allowing	them	to	move	to	
China	 (Lee,	 2001).	 A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 (G4)	 mentioned	 the	
turning	point	of	this	case:	
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According	 to	 the	 Act	 Governing	 Relations	 between	 the	 People	 of	 the	
Taiwan	Area	and	the	Mainland	Area,	 Sina	was	not	allowed	 to	 transfer	
to	China.	In	addition	according	to	FIBA’s	regulations,	all	the	basketball	
players	belong	to	the	national	federation.	If	a	player	wants	to	transfer	
to	 another	 country,	 he	 must	 get	 permission	 from	 the	 federation.	
However	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	China	protected	the	right	
of	work	for	all	Taiwanese	people.	Therefore	we	(SAC)	had	discussions	
with	the	Mainland	Affairs	Council	to	see	if	there	was	any	solution	for	
this	issue.	Finally	Sina	was	able	to	transfer	to	China	without	breaking	
the	 law.	 (Interview	 with	 the	 government	 officials,	 28/01/2011,	
translated	by	the	author)		
Sina	 believed	 its	 migration	 was	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 sport	 business.	 As	 one	
interviewee	of	this	study,	a	former	Deputy	Minister	of	the	SAC	argued	that	‘Sina	
wanted	to	open	the	Chinese	market	because	it	needed	the	business	potential	of	
China’	 (interviewee	G3).	On	 the	other	hand,	Sina’s	migration	would	be	positive	
for	 improving	 Taiwanese	 players’	 skills.	 Therefore	 Sina	 argued	 that	 this	 was	
purely	a	sport	matter	[without	political	purpose].	The	players	also	had	a	meeting	
and	 decided	 to	 support	 the	 club’s	 decision.	 They	 declared	 that	 the	 players’	
responsibility	was	 to	 play	 the	 game.	 The	 club	 should	 solve	 all	 the	 legal	 issues	
(Lee,	2001).		
In	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 case,	 the	 government	 and	 Sina	 were	 in	 a	 state	 of	
confrontation.	 When	 the	 Chinese	 government	 insisted	 the	 club	 should	 put	 an	
area	name	in	its	title,	Sina	wanted	to	transfer	to	China	with	a	club	title	containing	
‘Taiwan’	 or	 ‘Taipei’	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 benefits/interests	 from	 the	 Chinese	
market.	The	government’s	concern	was	Sina’s	migration	could	damage	national	
dignity,	 and	 it	 could	 use	 the	 Act	 Governing	 Relations	 between	 Peoples	 of	 the	
Taiwan	Area	and	the	Mainland	Area	and	Its	Enforcement	Rules	to	stop	Sina.	If	the	
government	and	Sina	did	not	compromise,	the	outcome	would	have	seen	that:	
1. Sina	could	not	transfer	to	China,	but	withdrew	from	the	CTBA	and	refused	
to	attend	all	 the	basketball	events,	which	would	mean	that	 the	domestic	
league	and	the	national	team	would	lose	some	elite	players.		
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2. The	government	would	be	 criticised	 for	obstructing	 the	development	of	
basketball	and	depriving	players	of	their	work	rights.			
Finally	as	the	Chinese	government	did	not	insist	that	there	should	be	‘Taiwan’	in	
the	club	title,	 the	Mainland	Affairs	Council	and	Sina	adopted	a	common	view	in	
October	 2001	 and	 thus	 avoided	 confrontation	 (Chen,	 2002).	 The	 Minister	 of	
Mainland	Affairs	Council	declared	that		
1. The	 government	 could	 understand	 the	 need	 of	 a	 club	 or	 a	 player	 [to	
transfer	to	China].		
2. In	 this	 case,	 the	 government	 hoped	 the	 club	would	understand	 that	 the	
government	had	a	concern	about	the	state’s	interests.		
3. There	was	some	room	in	this	case	for	compromise.	The	government	had	
some	flexibility	in	dealing	with	this	case	(Tang,	2001).	
From	the	statement,	the	government	implied	that	it	could	help	Sina	to	transfer	if	
Sina	 consider	 the	 state’s	 interest.	 Finally	 Sina	 decided	 not	 to	 use	 ‘Taiwan’	 or	
’Taipei’	 in	 its	club	 title	 (and	China	agreed	with	 it),	and	the	Taiwan	government	
deliberated	and	agreed	to	accept	Sina’s	transfer	as	legal.	
Sina	and	 its	players	eventually	 transferred	 to	China.	This	 case	has	a	 significant	
meaning	 for	 the	 governance	 system	 because	 it	 was	 more	 than	 simply	 a	
basketball	business	when	it	related	to	China.	The	department,	which	ultimately	
took	responsibility	to	negotiate	with	the	club,	was	not	the	SAC	but	the	Mainland	
Affairs	Council.	The	government’s	main	concern	was	not	sport	development	but	
national	dignity.	Even	though	Sina	returned	to	Taiwan	after	two	years,	the	case	
illustrates	 how	 the	 Taiwan	 government,	 the	 club	 and	 the	 Chinese	 government	
dealt	 with	 this	 cross‐strait	 basketball	 exchange.	 Table	 8.4	 below	 provides	 a	
description	 of	 what	 actions/tactics	 the	 stakeholders	 (see	 figure	 8.4)	 had	
undertaken;	and	the	interests	reflected,	as	well	as	the	outcomes,	gained,	from	the	
migration	of	the	Sina	Lions.	
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Figure	8.4:	Systemic	Governance	of	Sport	–	the	Migration	of	Sina	
	
Club	(Sina)
Government	(the	Sport	Affairs	Council)	
China
Sponsor	(BenQ)	
Players	
Government		
(the	Mainland	Affairs	Council)	
CTBA
Key:
Overt	/	formal	inter‐stakeholder	links			
Covert	/	informal	inter	stakeholder	links	
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Table	8.5:	Actions/Tactics,	Interests	and	outcomes	of	Stakeholders	in	the	Migration	of	Sina	
Stakeholders	 Actions/Tactics Interests Outcomes	
Government	(the	
Mainland	Affairs	
Council)	
*Rejected	at	the	beginning	
by	the	Act	Governing	
Relations	between	the	
People	of	the	Taiwan	Area	
and	the	Mainland	Area	
*Moral	persuasion	
	
*Protect	national	
sovereignty	
*Taiwan	is	not	part	
of	China	
*Sina	should	not	use	
‘Taiwan’	or	‘Taipei’	
in	its	club	title	
	
*Develop	the	Entitled	
Regulations	
Governing	
Permission	for	
Athletes	from	the	
Taiwan	Area	to	Join	
Athletic	Groups	in	
Mainland	China	as	
Members	or	Official	
Workers	to	make	
the	legitimacy	of	
Sina’s	migration	
*	Sina	used	the	name	
‘BenQ	Sina	Lions	
(Taiwanese	
Enterprise)	
Basketball	Club	to	
register	in	China	
Government	(the	
Sport	Affairs	
Council)	
*Asked	Sina	to	follow	
FIBA’s	regulation	
*	Raise	this	issue	to	
national	level	to	let	the	
government	involved	
*Followed	the	
Executive	Yuan	
(the	Mainland	
Affairs	Council’s	
decision)	
*Sina	transferred	to	
China	
Club	(Sina)	 *Recruited	all	Hung‐Kuo’s	
players	
*Sought	BenQ’s	
sponsorship	
*Insisted	Sina’s	migration	
would	realised	
*Withdrew	from	the	CTBA	
*Parent	company’s	
marketing	in	
China	
*Achieve	the	
owner’s	ambition.	
*Change	its	name	to	
satisfy	the	
government	
*Transferred	to	China	
*Lost	NTD$100	
million	in	2	years	
and	returned	to	
Taiwan	
China	 *Asked	Sina	to	use	Taiwan	
or	Taipei	in	its	club	name	
*Allowed	Sina	to	play	in	the	
Division	A	without	
achieve	promotion	from	
Division	B	
*Set	up	fixture	for	Sina	
*Promote	
reunification	
*Promote	its	own	
league	
*Sina	did	not	use	
‘Taiwan’	or	‘Taipei’	
in	its	club	title	
*Sina	played	in	China	
for	two	years	
*Portray	an	image	of	
reunification	
CTBA	 *Raise	this	issue	to	national	
level	to	let	the	
government	involved	
*	Asked	Sina	to	follow	
FIBA’s	regulation	
*The	CTBA	would	not	
select	players	who	
transferred	to	China	in	
*Former	CBA	clubs	
registered	in	the	
amateur	which	
owned	by	the	
CTBA	
*five	former	CBA	
clubs	registered	in	
the	amateur	league	
*Sina	transferred	to	
China	
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national	team	squad
Players	 *Ask	for	their	right	to	work	
overseas	to	be	respected.		
*Higher	wages
*Play	in	a	
challenging	league	
*Media	exposure	
*Transferred	to	China	
as	Sina’s	player	
*Lost	chance	to	be	a	
member	of	national	
team	squad	
Sponsor	(BenQ)	 *Sponsored	Sina *Marketing	benefits	
in	China	
*Owned	the	naming	
right	:	Sina	used	
BenQ	Sina	Lions	as	
its	club	name	to	
register	in	China	
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8.1.4	The	Governance	Discussion	for	the	Players’	Migration	to	China	
After	Sina	returned	to	Taiwan,	 the	SBL	began	 its	 first	season	 in	2003.	The	 first	
and	 second	 seasons	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 successful	 operationally	 and	 financially	
because	 the	 league’s	marketing	were	conducted	well	by	ESPN	and	Nike.	 It	also	
received	 ample	 support	 from	 the	 government.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	the	semi‐professional	approach	to	developing	the	SBL	was	jointly	set	up	
by	the	government,	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs.	The	league	was	designed	to	be	set	up	
somewhere	between	 the	 status	of	professional	 and	amateur	 league	 in	order	 to	
maintain	the	financial	stability	of	the	league	and	keep	the	competitive	balance	of	
the	 clubs.	 At	 the	 time,	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 seemed	 to	 be	 enjoying	 stable	
development	in	this	mode,	and	from	June	2002	to	September	2007,	there	was	no	
player	 transfer	 to	 China	 or	 any	 other	 country	 (Chou,	 2009).	 However,	 as	
previously	mentioned,	 it	 is	believed	 that	management	 failures	after	 the	second	
season	 and	 the	 ousting	 of	 Nike	 from	 the	 SBL’s	 marketing	 team	 had	 gradually	
resulted	in	SBL’s	decline	in	popularity.	Eventually,	the	clubs	and	the	CTBA	had	a	
conflict	of	interests,	and	from	2007,	players	began	to	transfer	to	China.					
Table	8.6:	Key	issues	in	the	case	of	Sina’s	migration	
Date	 Event	
Nov.	2003	 The	SBL	began	its	first	season	
2004	 Nike	was	forced	to	leave	SBL’s	marketing	team.	ESPN	took	over	all	TV	rights	and	marketing	rights.		
Apr.	2006	 4	clubs	intended	to	withdraw	from	the	SBL	to	set	up	a	new	league.	The	CTBA	convinced	the	clubs	to	maintain	their	presence	the	league	
2008.11	 Disputes	 about	 the	 TV	 rights	 fee.	 ESPN	 obtained	 the	 TV	 rights	 and	marketing	rights	free.	The	clubs	had	no	revenue	from	TV	rights	
2009.08	
4	 clubs	 intended	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 SBL	 to	 set	 up	 a	 new	 league	
because	of	the	share	of	ticket	sales.	The	CTBA	then	communicated	with	
the	clubs	convincing	them	to	maintain	the	league	
~2009	 SBL	players	began	to	transfer	to	China.					
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In	 1995	 China	 began	 the	 professionalisation	 of	 basketball	 by	 reforming	 the	
system	 of	 the	 CBA	 (the	 First	 Class	 Basketball	 League)	when	 the	 State	 General	
Administration	 of	 Sports	 persuaded	 stakeholders	 to	 ‘stick	 with	 the	 right	
direction	and	seize	the	opportunity	to	develop	the	sport	 industry’	(Wang	et	al.,	
2008).	In	2001	the	Chinese	Basketball	Association	authorised	the	sale	of	naming	
rights,	 marketing	 rights,	 and	 75%	 of	 facilities	 rights	 to	 the	 International	
Management	Group	(IMG).	On	April	2004	the	president	of	the	Chinese	Basketball	
Management	 Centre	 announced	 the	 launch	 of	 ‘the	 polestar	 project	 for	 the	
Chinese	basketball’	with	the	aim	of	rebuilding	the	league	brand	and	developing	
the	league	culture	as	a	truly	professional	sport.	The	objective	of	this	project	was	
to	 develop	 the	 CBA	 (the	 First	 Class	 Basketball	 League)	 into	 a	 world‐class	
professional	basketball	 league.	Nowadays,	 the	CBA	 is	 recognised	as	 the	biggest	
and	the	strongest	professional	league	in	Asia	(Wang	et	al,	2008).		 
China	 has	 adopted	 a	 relaxed	 policy	 in	 relation	 to	 Taiwanese	 citizens	 in	 China,	
who	 are	 regarded	 as	 ‘residents	 of	 Taiwan	 Province’,	 seeking	 employment	 in	
China.	The	Chinese	government	provided	trade,	education,	and	working	benefits	
to	Taiwanese	citizens	(Tseng	&	Wu,	2010).	In	terms	of	sports	policy,	according	to	
regulations	 on	 the	 administration	 for	 registering/transferring	 of	 Athletes	 and	
coaches	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Men’s	 Professional	 Sports	 and	 regulation	 on	 the	
administration	of	wages	for	players	and	coaches	in	the	CBA,	players	 from	Taiwan,	
Hong‐Kong	and	Macao	had	the	same	rights,	obligations,	and	wage	regulations	as	
Chinese	players.	Specifically,	 in	the	regulation	on	the	administration	of	wages	for	
players	and	coaches	 in	the	CBA,	 Taiwanese	 players	were	 recognised	 as	 Chinese	
domestic	players.	The	quota	and	wages	of	Taiwanese	players	were	not	limited	by	
the	restrictions	placed	on	foreign	players.	Given	the	context	of	the	enhancement	
of	 the	 basketball	 environment	 in	 China	 and	 the	 Taiwan‐friendly	 policies,	
Taiwanese	players	began	to	transfer	to	China	from	2007.			
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Table	 8.7:	 Key	 contents	 of	 regulations/laws/rules	 of	 China	 for	 Taiwanese	 players	
transferring	to	China	
Laws,	Regulations,	Rules	 Key	contents	
Provisions	on	the	Administration	of	
the	Employment	of	Taiwan,	Hong	
Kong	and	Macao	Residents	in	the	
Mainland	(2005)	
Taiwanese	have	rights	to	obtain	employment	in	China	
and	to	join	the	social	insurance. 
Regulations	on	the	administration	
for	registering/transferring	of	
Athletes	and	coaches	of	the	Chinese	
Men’s	Professional	Sports	(2008)	
Players	from	Taiwan,	Hong‐Kong	and	Macao	were	in	
the	catalogue	of	domestic	players.	
Regulations	on	the	administration	of	
wages	players	and	coaches	in	the	CBA	
(2009)	
The	quota	and	wages	of	Taiwanese	players	were	not	
limited	by	the	restrictions	placed	on	of	foreign	players.	
	
In	contrast	to	China’s	liberal	policy,	the	Taiwan	government’s	regulations	aimed	
to	restrict	the	exit	of	elite	players.	Even	though	the	Taiwan	government	enacted	
the	 Regulations	Governing	Permission	 for	Athletes	 from	 the	Taiwan	Area	 to	 Join	
Athletic	 Groups	 in	Mainland	 China	 as	Members	 or	 Official	Workers	 when	 Sina	
transferred	 to	 China	 in	 2002,	 the	 Taiwan	 government	 still	 had	 reservations	
about	 the	 issue	 of	 players/clubs	 migration	 to	 China.	 In	 our	 interviews,	 the	
government	officials	believed	the	Chinese	government	had	a	hidden	motive,	that	
of	promoting	Taiwan	as	part	of	a	greater	China.	Even	though	both	the	KMT	and	
the	DPP	 legislators	 agreed	 that	 free	migration	of	 professional	 athletes	was	 the	
prevailing	trend	in	world	sports,	the	government’s	main	focus	was	not	on	sport	
policy.	 The	main	 concern	 of	 the	 Taiwan	 government	 was	 with	 political	 issues	
such	as	national	dignity	and	national	sovereignty.		
After	the	conflict	between	the	clubs	and	CTBA	in	the	fourth	season	of	the	SBL,	in	
2007	a	number	of	players	 transferred	 to	China.	 In	2008	 the	media	 (Lee,	2008)	
reported	that	Sean	Chen,	who	was	an	elite	player	in	the	SBL	and	a	member	of	the	
national	 team,	 intended	 to	 transfer	 to	 China	 to	 seek	 better	 opportunities.	
Because	 Sean	 Chen	 was	 an	 icon	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan,	 the	 CTBA	 began	 to	
oppose	his	migration	to	China.	The	CTBA	firstly	rejected	Chen’s	request	based	on	
the	fact	that	he	was	a	member	of	the	national	team.	In	June	2008	the	CTBA	held	a	
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general	meeting	to	discuss	the	issue	of	players’	migration.	After	that	meeting,	the	
CTBA	announced:	
 A	 Player	 who	 wants	 to	 transfer	 to	 another	 country	must	 follow	 FIBA’s	
regulations.	 The	 player	 must	 have	 a	 leaving	 certificate	 from	 his/her	
original	club	in	order	to	apply	for	permission	to	migrate.	After	the	CTBA	
passes	his/her	application,	the	CTBA	will	inform	the	receiving	party.		
 In	order	to	maintain	the	quality	and	skill	level	of	the	domestic	league,	the	
CTBA	will	list	24	elite	players	who	will	not	be	permitted	to	transfer.	Other	
players	who	meet	regulations	may	be	permitted	 to	transfer	 to	 the	other	
country	for	one	year.	After	one	year,	the	player	would	need	to	apply	FOR	
AN	extension.		
 According	 to	 the	 committee’s	decision,	 the	 following	players	who	are	 in	
the	national	team	squad	would	not	be	permitted	to	transfer:		Chih‐Chung	
Chen,	Shih‐Nien	Chen,	Hao‐Chieng	Hsu,	Chih‐Chun	Wang,	Hsueh‐Lin	Lee,	
Chih‐Fong	Chang,	Ching‐Ming	Yang,	 Sean	Chen,	Chi‐Che	Lin,	Ching‐Heng	
Oh‐Yang,	Che‐Yi	Yang,	Chih‐Chiang	Hsu,	Ching‐Bang	Lin,	Shou‐Cheng	Ho,	
Yi‐Hui	 Lin,	 Chien‐Lung	Wu,	 Cheng‐Ju	 Lu,	 Tai‐Hao	Wu,	Wen‐Ting	 Tzeng,	
Chia‐Hung	Jian,	Chi‐Yi	Lee,	Feng‐Yung	Lee,	Ying‐Li	Yue,	Chi‐Wei	Chen	
The	CTBA	announced	the	list	of	24	players	because	it	believed	a	rapid	change	of	
policy	on	players	transferring	to	China	would	damage	the	training	of	the	national	
team	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 SBL.	 Although	 losing	 elite	 players	would	 be	
likely	 to	 lead	to	declining	skill	 levels,	according	to	the	 interview	data,	 the	main	
reason	 for	 making	 the	 list	 was	 actually	 to	 protect	 revenue	 from	 ticket	 sales	
because	all	revenue	from	the	SBL’s	ticket	sales	belonged	to	the	CTBA.	
However,	the	policy	of	the	24	player	list	was	abandoned	in	2009	when	another	
icon	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan,	Chi‐Che	Lin	decided	 to	 transfer	 to	China.	Because	
the	24	players	list	was	not	consistent	with	the	regulations	of	FIBA	and	it	did	not	
follow	the	trend	in	world	sports,	players	kept	arguing	with	the	CTBA.	After	one	
year’s	discussion,	and	with	pressure	from	the	general	public,	 the	CTBA	decided	
to	 relax	 the	 policy.	 Finally	 Chi‐Che	 Lin	 signed	 a	 contract	 with	 the	 Zhejiang	
Guangsha	Lions	Basketball	Club	in	September	2009,	for	a	wage	of	approximately	
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NTD$	5	million	per	season,	which	was	the	highest	wage	ever	paid	to	a	Taiwanese	
player.	Subsequently	Sean	Chen	who	was	stopped	from	transferring	by	the	CTBA	
in	2008	signed	a	contract	with	the	DongGuan	New	Century	Leopards	basketball	
club	 in	 November	 2009,	 and	 his	 wage	 for	 the	 first	 season	was	 approximately	
NTD$	3	million.	Basically	a	Taiwanese	player	could	on	average	earn	wages	five	
times	greater	in	the	CBA	[China]	than	in	the	SBL	[Taiwan].		
Table	 8.8:	 Key	 contents	 of	 regulations/laws/rules	 of	 Taiwan	 for	 Taiwanese	 players	
transferring	to	China	
Law,	Regulations,	Rules	 Key	contents
Military	service	law	(1937)	 It	 is	 every	 R.O.C.	 male’s	 duty	 to	 serve	 in	 the	 army.	
Young	 athletes	 could	 not	 free	 to	 travel	 abroad	 or	
transfer	to	other	countries	freely.	
	
Act	 Governing	 Relations	 Between	
Peoples	 Of	 The	 Taiwan	 Area	 And	 The	
Mainland	Area	(1992)	
According	 to	 article	 11	 and	 article	 13,	 people	 from	
Taiwan	 who	 want	 to	 work	 in	 China	 needed	 to	 have	
their	case	evaluated	by	the	government.	
Regulations	 Governing	 Permission	 for	
Athletes	 from	 the	 Taiwan	 Area	 to	 Join	
Athletic	 Groups	 in	 Mainland	 China	 as	
Members	or	Official	Workers	(2001)	
A	temporary	regulation	passed	by	the	government	 to	
support	Sina’s	migration.	The	previous	regulation	was	
abandoned	 on	 28.2.2004	 and	 changed	 to	Regulations	
Governing	Permission	for	people	from	the	Taiwan	Area	
to	 Join	 corporates	 or	 institutes	 in	Mainland	 China	 as	
Members	or	Official	Workers	
The	24	players	list	from	the	CTBA	 In	order	 to	maintain	 the	quality	and	skill	 level	of	 the	
domestic	 league,	 the	CTBA	will	decide	on	a	 list	of	24	
elite	players	who	would	not	be	permitted	to	transfer.	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	we	outlined	how	the	restriction	on	players	from	leaving	
was	actually	decided	by	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	together.	Although	the	CTBA	and	
the	 clubs	 had	 conflicts	 about	 the	operation	 of	 the	 SBL,	 they	were	 on	 the	 same	
side	 to	 stop	 players	 from	 leaving.	 They	 believed	 that	 players’	 transferring	 to	
China	 would	 lower	 the	 excitement	 of	 the	 SBL;	 and	 if	 the	 clubs	 lost	 their	 star	
players,	 they	 would	 lose	 their	 ticket	 sales	 and	 audience	 ratings	 as	 well.	 In	
addition,	the	SBL	clubs	worried	that	they	might	become	a	training	camp	for	the	
Chinese	 league	 in	 the	 future.	 From	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 studies,	 the	 clubs	
considered	 players	 as	 their	 property.	 The	 clubs	 and	 players	 shared	 a	 (loyalty)	
connection	 which	 had	 developed	 since	 the	 players	 were	 in	 high	 school.	
Therefore	 even	 if	 a	 player	 became	 a	 free	 agent;	 he	 would	 still	 need	 to	
‘communicate’	 with	 the	 club.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 a	 player	 transferred	 to	
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another	 country	 eventually,	 the	 clubs	wanted	 assurance	 that	 the	 player	would	
play	for	the	club	again	upon	his	return	to	Taiwan.		
In	effect,	after	2009,	the	official	attitude	of	the	CTBA	towards	players’	migration	
was	 ‘simply	 following	FIBA’s	 regulations’.	One	player	claimed	 (interviewee	P3)	
“although	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	were	not	happy	with	players’	leaving,	they	did	
not	have	a	valid	regulation	by	which	to	restrict	players’	migration.”	In	addition,	
the	 level	 of	 players’	 wages	 and	 the	 cultural	 similarities	 were	 attractive	 to	
Taiwanese	players.	Therefore	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	could	not	stop	this	trend.	
The	clubs	even	asked	the	government	to	intervene.	However,	a	former	Minister	
of	the	SAC	claimed	that	“it	was	not	government’s	duty	to	constrain	the	players”	
(interviewee	G3).	Although	Sina’s	case	and	players’	migration	were	both	related	
to	cross‐strait	relationship,	the	government	did	not	actively	intervene	in	players’	
migration.	A	 former	Deputy	Minister	of	 the	SAC	suggested	that	 there	were	two	
factors	 which	 facilitated	 Taiwanese	 players’	 transfer	 to	 China.	 One	 was	 the	
moderation	 of	 the	 law.	 The	 second	 was	 migration	 of	 players	 had	 become	 a	
normal	situation	in	international	sport	(interviewee	G4).	
A	 former	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 argued	 that	 “although	 the	 cross‐strait	
relations	had	improved	in	recent	years,	we	have	to	be	wary	of	the	knife	behind	
the	smile”	(interviewee	G3).	This	quote	shows	that	the	Taiwan	government	still	
had	some	suspicions	about	the	political	issue.	However,	another	former	Deputy	
Minister	 of	 the	 SAC	 suggested	 that	 the	 government	 should	 keep	 developing	
talented	players	and	 let	 them	migrate	 in	order	 to	honour	Taiwan	 (interviewee	
G2).	 Therefore	 even	 though	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	 clubs	
turned	 from	 competing	 to	 cooperating	 and	 the	 government	 was	 asked	 to	
intervene,	 the	 government	 seemed	 to	 stay	 neutral.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
opening	policy	of	the	Chinese	government	and	the	resources	of	the	Chinese	clubs	
were	 irresistible	 to	Taiwanese	players.	These	developments	set	 the	context	 for	
the	transfer	of	more	than	ten	players	to	China	from	2007.		
Because	there	were	different	stakeholders	involved	in	this	case,	the	governance	
system	 appeared	 to	 take	 a	 different	 form	 (See	 Figure	 8.5).	 In	 the	
interrelationship	of	the	stakeholders’	web,	different	stakeholders	used	different	
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actions/tactic	 to	 fulfil	 their	 interests	 because	 they	were	 in	 different	 positions.	
Table	 8.8	 provides	 a	 description	 of	 the	 actions/tactics	 the	 stakeholders	 had	
undertaken;	also	included	in	the	table	are	their	interests,	as	well	as	the	outcome	
of	the	issue	of	players’	migration	to	China.	
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Figure	8.5:	Systemic	Governance	of	Sport	–	the	Players’	Migration	
	
Taiwanese	
Government	
SBL	Clubs	
Chinese	Government
China	Clubs	
Players/Coaches	
CTBA	
Legislator
Key:
Overt	/	formal	inter‐stakeholder	links			
Covert	/	informal	inter	stakeholder	links	
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Table	8.9:	Actions/Tactics,	interests	and	outcomes	of	stakeholders	for	players’	migration	
Stakeholders	 Actions/Tactics	 Interests	 Outcomes	
Taiwan	Government		 *Stated	“it’s	not	the	
government’s	duty	to	
constrain	player	
movement”	
*Help	to	maintain	the	
SBL’s	operation	
*Followed	cross‐strait	
relationship	
regulations	
*Maintain	domestic	
basketball	
development	
*Protect	national	
sovereignty	
*Players	can	transfer	
freely	but	
government	
officials	worried	
the	knife	behind	
the	smile	of	China	
Legislator	 *’Mentally’	supported	
players	to	challenge	
overseas		
*Supported	moderation	
of	the	legal	limitation	
*Good	reputation	for	
supporting	players	
*might	have	positive	
image	when	
running	campaign.	
Chinese	
Government	
*adopted	a	relaxing	
policy	for	residence	
of	people	from	
Taiwan	
*gave	the	convenience	
and	benefits	for	
trade,	education,	and	
work	to	Taiwanese	
*Taiwanese	players	
were	recognised	as	
Chinese	domestic	
players.	
*Portray	an	image	
that	both	sides	co‐
exist	in	peace	
	
*The	Chinese	League	
was	attractive	to	
Taiwanese	players	
China	(clubs)	 *Provide	Higher	wages
*Higher	level	basketball	
*Portray	an	image	
that	both	sides	co‐
exist	in	peace	
*Media	exposure	
*Recruit	best	
Taiwanese	players	
*Best	Taiwanese	
players	played	in	
China	
	
Players/Coaches	 *Ask	for	their	right	to	
work	overseas	
*Asked	to	transferred	
to	China	because	of	
similar	language	and	
culture	
*Higher	wages
*Higher	level	
basketball	
competition	
*Follow	FIBA’s	
regulations	to	
transfer	
*Some	players	
adapted	the	
Chinese	league	very	
well,	some	did	not.	
CTBA	 *Co‐operate	with	clubs	
to	set	up	the	list	of	24	
players	to	stop	
players	
*Use	the	list	of	24	
players	to	stop	
*Maintain	the	
operation	of	the	
SBL	
*Ensure	the	ticket	
sales	
*Maintain	the	
*Abandoned	the	list	
and	follow	FIBA’s	
regulation	to	let	
players	transfer	
*SBL	might	become	
training	camp	for	
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players	
*The	CTBA	would	not	
select	players	who	
transferred	to	China	
in	national	team	
squad	
sponsorship	of	the	
SBL	
the	CBA	
*	The	CTBA	select	
players	who	
transferred	to	
China	in	national	
team	squad	
because	the	list	was	
invalid.	
SBL	Clubs	 *Co‐operate	with	CTBA	
to	set	up	the	list	of	24	
players	to	stop	
players	
*Asked	government	to	
constrain	players	
*Signed	contracts	with	
elite	players	and	used	
contracts	to	restrict	
players’	transferring	
*	Ensured	the	players	
who	transferred	to	
China	would	return	
to	the	club	when	they	
returned	to	Taiwan	
*Protect	their	
‘investment’	in	
players	
*Maintain	the	clubs’	
competence	
*Keep	fans’	
supporting	
*Maintain	the	ticket	
sales	to	ensure	the	
revenue	from	TV	
rights	fee	
	
*Elite	players	
transferred	to	
China	
*Seek	new	talented	
players	
*Become	training	
camp	of	the	CBA	
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8.2	Go	Beyond	 the	explanation	of	Governance:	a	Strategic‐Relational	
Perspective	for	the	Development	of	Basketball	in	Taiwan		
With	regard	to	governance	theory	as	employed	in	the	case	study,	there	are	two	kinds	of	
discourse	 across	 the	 analysis.	 Since	 systemic	 governance	 relates	 to	 competition,	
negotiation	 and	 mutual	 adjustment	 between	 the	 various	 stakeholders,	 systemic	
governance	can	be	regarded	as	an	heuristic	concept,	which	illustrates	and	explains	how	
organisations,	stakeholders	or	interest	groups	behave.	The	use	of	the	web	framework	in	
the	 previous	 sections	 shows	 that	much	 of	 the	 commentary	which	 is	 developed	 there	
reflects	 the	 dynamics	 of	 systemic	 governance.	 From	 this	 heuristic	 discourse,	 we	
identified	 who	 the	 key	 stakeholders/organisations	 were	 and	 how	 they	 behaved,	 in	
order	to	map	out	how	the	governance	system	operated	in	material	contexts.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 political	 governance	 is	 partly	 heuristic	 as	 it	 concerns	 itself	 with	
explaining	how	the	steering	of	policy	 is	undertaken	by	governmental	actors.	Thus	 the	
webs	 of	 interaction	 also	 illustrate	 aspects	 of	 political	 governance	 in	 relation	 to	 how	
government	or	national	governing	bodies	achieve	 (or	do	not	achieve)	 their	goals,	 and	
how	 they	 do	 so	 by,	 for	 example,	 forms	 of	 regulation,	 fiscal	 measures	 or	 ‘moral’	
leadership.	In	particular,	in	this	research,	we	identify	the	actors	who	were	influenced	by	
the	government	or	the	Chinese	Taipei	Basketball	Association	(CTBA)	and	the	outcomes	
that	emerged.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	emergence	of	the	Super	Basketball	League	
(SBL),	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Sport	 Affairs	 Council	 (SAC)	 used	 government	 funding	 to	
support	the	clubs	in	facility	renovation	as	a	means	to	get	support	from	the	clubs	to	set	
up	the	new	league.		
Corporate	governance,	in	contrast	to	the	other	two	governance	types	identified,	relates	
to	what	constitutes	good	practice.	It	reflects	normative	concerns	about	what	should	be	
done	 in	 the	 organisation	 to	 promote	 principles	 such	 as	 transparency,	 accountability,	
democracy,	 responsibility,	 equity,	 effectiveness,	 and	 efficiency.	 Although	 corporate	
governance	 may	 appear	 to	 reflect	 only	 secondary	 interests	 for	 some	 actors,	 it	 does	
represent	a	normative/prescriptive	(rather	than	heuristic)	discourse	which	is	employed	
by	 some	actors	 at	 some	points	 in	 the	discussion	about	development	of	 the	basketball	
system.		
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Figure	8.6:	Two	major	types	of	discourse	with	governance	analysis	
	
At	 this	point	we	are	able	 to	move	 from	our	concern	with	 ‘governance’	as	 the	primary	
focus	 to	 ‘strategic	 relations’.	 Specifically,	we	are	moving	 from	governance	explanation	
which	 is	 related	 to	 political	 or	 business	 interests	 to	 a	meta‐theoretical	 level	 analysis	
which	is	related	to	the	nature	of	social	actions.	In	Chapter	3	we	have	addressed	the	role	
of	 structure,	 strategy	and	agency	 in	 the	 strategic‐relational	 approach,	 as	 illustrated	 in	
Figure	8.7.		
Figure	8.7:	structure,	strategy	and	agency	in	the	strategic‐relational	approach	
	
Source:	Adapted	from	Hay	(2002:	131).	
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Strategic	 relations	 theory	 operates	 under	 a	meta‐theoretical	 framework,	 in	which	 the	
strategic	 environment	 is	 strategically	 selective,	 and	 “social	 and	political	 outcomes	are	
contingent	 upon	 strategic	 choices;	 the	 context	 itself	 presents	 an	 unevenly	 contoured	
terrain	which	 favours	 certain	 strategies	 over	 others”	 (Hay,	 2002:	 129).	Moreover	 the	
actors	within	the	context	are	conscious,	reflexive	and	strategic.	They	are	able	to	design	
or	 revise	 their	 actions	 by	 the	 use	 of	 strategic	 resources	 to	 which	 they	 had	 access,	
including	the	knowledge	they	gained	from	the	context	in	order	to	realise	their	intention.	
In	 the	process	of	 strategic	 calculation,	 corporate	governance	 is	used	as	a	 resource	 for	
persuasion	 (or	 legitimation)	 by	 some	 actors	 but	 it	 is	 also	 something	 which	 is	
consciously	 or,	 unconsciously	 strategically	 ignored	 by	 others.	 We	 thus	 treat	 this	
prescriptive	discourse	 as	 a	 strategic	 resource	 in	 the	 strategic	 relations	 framework.	 In	
this	sense,	the	outcomes	of	events	are	effected	by	a	dynamic	process	of	strategic	actions	
undertaken.	 However,	 strategic	 actions	 or	 outcomes	 will	 influence	 or	 transform	 the	
future	 context,	 and	 the	 actor	 will	 gain	 some	 knowledge	 through	 this	 process	 which	
becomes	a	resource	for	future	action.		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 strategic	 relations	 features	 of	 spatio‐temporal	 relationality	 of	
structure	and	agency	at	play	in	the	case	study,	even	though	different	events/processes	
have	taken	place	at	different	levels	and	in	particular	time	periods,	one	set	of	events	or	
outcomes	 forms	 the	 context	 for	 the	 next	 event.	 Figure	 8.8	 shows	 the	 link	 between	
different	events	within	the	strategic	relations	framework	for	the	three	case	studies.	
Figure	8.8:	The	relationship	between	three	cases	
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Box	A	shows	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	which	became	a	key	element	in	the	context	for	the	
migration	of	Sina	and	the	emergence	of	the	SBL.	However,	the	outcome	–	collapse	of	the	
CBA	–	was	a	product	of	strategic	actions	undertaken	by	actors	with	access	in	the	context	
to	 the	 resources	 to	 undertake	 such	 an	 action.	 Figure	 8.9	 illustrates	 the	 strategic	
relations	for	the	collapse	of	the	CBA,	which	is	also	Box	A	in	Figure	8.8.	
Figure	8.9:	structure,	strategy	and	agency	in	the	case	of	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	
		
This	case	reflects	the	facts	that	the	collapse	of	the	professional	league	was	the	outcome	
of	the	interaction	of	strategic	actors	and	the	strategically	selective	context.	In	effect,	this	
outcome	was	not	‘inevitable’	but	‘strategically	selected’.	From	our	previous	case	study,	
we	 know	 that	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 CBA’s	 suspension	 (the	 CBA’s	 lockout	when	 the	
ETTV	 refused	 to	 pay	 the	TV	 rights	 fee),	 the	 clubs,	 league,	 CTBA,	 and	 the	 government	
expected	the	league	would	be	re‐opened.	We	could	argue	that	re‐opening	the	CBA	was	
one	of	the	outcomes	for	some	significant	stakeholders	to	choose.	However,	the	context	
did	not	provide	resources	to	support	this	outcome.	The	main	support	and	funding	of	the	
league	came	 from	the	owners	of	construction	companies	who	were	devastated	by	 the	
Asian	 Financial	 Crisis	 in	 1997‐1998.	 Combined	 with	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 context,	 the	
suspension	of	the	CBA	actually	presented	an	opportunity	for	the	owners	to	reconsider	
their	investment	in	basketball.	At	the	same	time,	with	the	national	presidential	election	
fast	 approaching,	 the	 KMT	 became	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 re‐opening	 operation,	
including	negotiations	with	the	CTBA,	addressing	the	ownership	of	the	Tera	Mars	team,	
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and	provided	funding	for	the	warming‐up	tournament.	The	KMT	believed	these	actions	
would	earn	the	support	from	young	voters.	However,	Wang,	chairman	of	the	CTBA	and	
owner	of	the	Dacin	Tigers	Team,	took	advantage	of	the	situation	by	using	the	resources	
of	 the	 CTBA	 and	 Dacin	 to	 solicit	 funding	 from	 the	 government	 for	 Wang’s	 building	
company	to	build	a	new	stadium	for	the	league	as	a	condition	to	support	the	re‐opening.	
Eventually,	Wang	did	not	support	the	re‐opening	as	the	government	refused	his	request	
for	 funding	 to	build	a	new	stadium.	Finally,	when	every	stakeholder	had	his/her	own	
strategic	goal	to	pursue	with	the	consideration	of	the	context	(please	refer	to	table	8.1),	
the	outcome	‐	indefinite	suspension	of	the	CBA	–	was	selected	by	given	actors	within	the	
dynamics	of	the	interaction	between	of	the	strategic	actor	and	the	context.	
The	case	of	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	became	an	important	context	for	the	development	of	
basketball	 in	 Taiwan	 since	 the	 2000s	 because	 it	 would	 continue	 to	 influence	 many	
actors	 in	 their	 strategy	 decisions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Sina’s	 migration	 to	 China’s	 well‐
developed	basketball	league,	the	interests	of	the	Chinese	market	for	the	club	owner,	and	
the	political	considerations	between	Taiwan	government	and	Chinese	government	were	
main	 concerns	 in	 the	 strategic	 calculation.	 However,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 can	 be	
considered	to	be	the	principal	trigger	factor	which	initiated	Sina’s	transfer	to	China.	
Figure	8.10:	structure,	strategy	and	agency	in	the	case	of	Sina’s	migration	
	
Figure	 8.10	 illustrates	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 resulting	 in	 the	 decline	 of	
professional	basketball	development	in	Taiwan.	Since	the	clubs	and	the	players	lost	an	
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elite	stage	on	which	to	play,	they	gained	strategic	learning	about	the	deficiencies	of	the	
Taiwan	 basketball	 environment.	 After	 comparing	with	 the	 Chinese	 league	 and	 its	 the	
environment,	 the	 level	 of	 skills	 of	 players,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 cultural	 similarities,	
migration	 to	 China	 became	 a	 desirable	 option.	 The	 Chinese	 league	 (or	 Chinese	
government)	used	the	collapse	of	the	CBA	and	the	advantage	of	the	Chinese	market	as	a	
strategy	 to	 attract	 the	 Taiwanese	 club.	 Of	 course,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 strategy‐making,	
different	actors	had	different	considerations	(please	refer	to	table	8.4),	for	example,	the	
Taiwan	 government’s	 primary	 concern	 was	 with	 national	 dignity	 while	 the	 Chinese	
government	might	have	used	the	club’s	migration	to	promote	unification,	and	Sina	was	
primarily	 concerned	 about	 the	 commercial	 interests	 of	 its	 parent	 company.	However,	
through	 this	 case,	we	 can	 still	 recognise	 that	 the	 effects	of	 the	previous	 event,	 in	 this	
case,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA,	 would	 still	 influence	 the	 future	 context	 and	 actors’	
strategies.		
In	the	sense	of	spatio‐temporal	relationality	of	structure	and	agency,	again,	in	2002	the	
collapse	of	the	CBA	and	the	Sina’s	migration	became	a	significant	context	for	actors	to	
form	their	strategies	when	the	SAC	promoted	a	new	league.	
Figure	8.11:	structure,	strategy	and	agency	in	the	case	of	the	emergence	of	the	SBL	
	
From	the	data	analysis,	we	recognised	that	 former	Minister	of	 the	SAC,	Lin,	was	a	key	
person	 in	 the	promotion	of	 the	SBL.	He	used	 the	government’s	 resources	 to	subsidise	
the	clubs’	operating	budgets	and	the	renovation	of	the	facilities.	However,	the	interview	
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data	shows	that	at	the	beginning,	he	favoured	re‐opening	of	the	CBA	or	setting	up	a	new	
professional	 league.	 But	we	 realise	 that	 in	 the	 end,	 the	 SBL	was	 a	 prospective	 (semi‐
professional)	 league	which	was	 constructed	 under	 the	 CTBA’s	 organisation.	We	 have	
discussed	 the	 process	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SBL	 with	 the	 key	 stakeholders’	
interests	and	the	nature	of	their	actions	(please	refer	to	table	8.3).	When	applying	the	
strategic	 relational	 approach,	 this	 process	 was	 inevitably	 influenced	 by	 the	 previous	
events,	 for	 example,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 CBA	 resulted	 in	 the	 downturn	 of	 the	
development	of	basketball	 in	Taiwan,	as	well	as	the	national	teams’	poor	performance	
in	 international	 competitions.	 As	 pressure	 from	 the	 general	 public	 mounted,	 the	
government	 initiated	 the	 idea	 of	 professionalising	 the	 basketball	 league.	 However,	
considering	 the	 other	 actors	 within	 this	 process,	 some	 club	 owners	 enhanced	 their	
strategic	 knowledge	 after	 the	 CBA	 collapsed.	 Thus,	when	Minister	 Lin	 discussed	with	
them	 the	matter	of	 the	new	 league,	 they	argued	 that	 it	would	be	difficult	 for	 them	 to	
raise	 the	 budget	 to	 the	 professional	 level;	 and	 some	 club	 owners	 worried	 that	 the	
market	 size	 in	 Taiwan	 could	 not	 support	 full	 professionlisation.	 Since	 the	 notion	 of	
strategic	relations	theory	informs	us	that	the	interaction	of	the	strategy	and	context	can	
shape	 the	 development	 of	 the	 context	 as	 well	 as	 the	 very	 conduct	 and	 identity	 of	
strategic	 actors	 after	 the	 event	 (Hay,	 2002:	 134),	 the	 clubs	 had	 already	 acquired	 the	
knowledge	 that	made	 them	question	 “whether	 it	was	necessary	 for	Taiwan	 to	have	 a	
professional	league”.	Furthermore,	the	CTBA	learned	that	it	might	lose	its	dominant	role	
in	Taiwanese	elite	basketball	if	the	professionalisation	of	the	CBA	had	been	continued.	It	
thus	used	its	resources,	such	as	its	control	of	the	supply	of	referees	and	its	ability	of	to	
organise	 tournaments,	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 new	 league	 should	 be	 set	 up	 under	 its	
organisation.	 As	 we	 know,	 the	 SBL	 finally	 became	 a	 compromise	 product	 and	 was	
organised	by	 the	CTBA	with	government	 funding	and	media	coverage.	 In	 the	sense	of	
the	 framework	 of	 the	 strategic	 relations,	 this	 ‘prospective‐professional’	 structure	was	
selected	by	the	strategic	actors	and	the	context	together.		
However,	 this	 prospective‐structure	 became	 the	 next	 case’s	 context	 very	 soon.	 In	
chapter	 six,	 we	 not	 only	 analysed	 the	 process	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 SBL	 but	 also	
discussed	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 SBL	 including	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 CTBA	 and	 the	
clubs	 for	 the	 sharing	 of	 ticket	 sales,	 the	 poor	 operation	 of	 the	 league,	 and	 the	 poor	
marketing	by	the	league	and	ESPN.	These	management	failures	could	have	been	a	result	
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of	SBL’s	‘semi‐professional	structure’	which	was	the	outcome	of	the	previous	case.	This	
semi‐professional	 structure	caused	 the	confusion	of	power	between	 the	clubs	and	 the	
CTBA	 about	 who	 should	 be	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 SBL	 and	 resulted	 in	 the	 management	
failures	that	obstructed	the	development	of	the	SBL.	When	the	SBL,	as	the	highest	level	
basketball	 league,	 could	 not	 lead	 the	 development	 of	 basketball	 in	 Taiwan,	 the	
Taiwanese	league	was	no	 longer	the	only	option	for	the	player	(and	clubs).	Moreover,	
with	rapid	development	of	the	Chinese	basketball	league	and	attractive	offers	from	the	
Chinese	 clubs,	 players	 were	 willing	 to	 fight	 with	 the	 clubs	 and	 the	 CTBA	 for	 their	
freedom	to	transfer	to	China.	Although	in	2008,	the	CTBA	and	the	clubs	tried	to	use	the	
‘24	player	 list’	 to	 restrict	 elite	players’	migration,	players	eventually	 could	 transfer	 to	
China	 if	 they	 became	 free	 agents	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 FIBA’s	 regulations;	 player	
migration	 to	 other	 countries	 has	 also	 become	 an	 international	 trend	 even	 though	 the	
CTBA	and	the	clubs	might	not	fully	support	their	decision.			
Figure	8.12:	structure,	strategy	and	agency	for	the	players’	migration	to	China	
	
In	the	above	discussion,	we	emphasise	that	current	strategic	actions	will	 influence	the	
context’s	 selectivity	and	actors’	 tactics.	Undoubtedly	 the	outcome	of	previous	event	 is	
not	necessarily	the	determining	factor	of	the	current	event,	but	the	concept	of	strategic	
relations,	 in	particular,	 spatio‐temporal	 relationality	of	 structure	and	agency	provides	
us	with	 a	 dynamic	 understanding	 for	 the	 interaction	 of	 actor	 and	 context	 across	 the	
three	 cases.	 Specifically	 this	 meta‐theoretical	 strategic	 relational	 approach	 the	
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governance	analysis	in	the	previous	chapters	helps	us	to	realise	the	trajectories	and	the	
nature	of	development	of	the	governance	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	which	is	the	aim	of	the	
thesis.		
8.3	Conclusion	
In	 our	 earlier	 discussion	 of	 critical	 realism	 we	 focused	 on	 the	 appeal	 to	 underlying	
reality	on	the	part	of	Bhaskar’s	framework.	Strategic	relations	theory	is	also	realist	in	its	
intensions,	however	here	what	is	focused	on	is	not	(real)	structures,	but	what	is	real	is	
the	 strategic	 context	 in	which	 actors	 find	 themselves,	 and	 the	 dialectical	 relationship	
between	this	and	actors	strategic	choices/actions	whether	this	be	“intuitive,	routine	or	
habitual	strategies	and	practices”	or	“explicitly	strategic	action”	(Hay,	2002:	132).		
Jessop	 (2005:	 41)	 argues	 that	 Bhaskar’s	 arguments	were	 a	 general	 defence	 of	 realist	
ontological	methodology	rather	than	a	defence	of	any	particular	realist	position.	Indeed	
as	Jessop	points	out	there	are	shared	ontological	foundations	between	forms	of	critical	
realism	and	strategic	relations	theory	(Jessop,	2005:	42).		
For	social	forms	are	a	necessary	condition	for	any	intentional	act;	their	pre‐
existence	 implies	 their	 autonomy	 as	 possible	 objects	 of	 scientific	
investigation;	 and	 their	 casual	 efficacy	 confirms	 their	 reality.	 But	 human	
agency	 is	 required	 for	 the	 actualisation	 of	 these	 causal	 powers.	 These	
principles	 underpin	 Bhaskar’s	 transformational	 model	 of	 social	 action,	
Archer’s	detail	 account	of	 the	development	of	 selfhood	and	collective	 social	
action,	and,	indeed,	the	strategic‐relational	approach	(Jessop,	2005:	42).	
The	major	 proponents	 of	 critical	 realism	 and	 structuration	 theory	 (see	 Archer	 et	 al.,	
1998;	Archer,	1995;	Stones,	1991)	have	focused	their	mutual	critiques	around	elements	
of	the	chronological/primacy	of	structure	over	agency.	Structuration	theory	arguing	for	
the	immanence	of	structure	and	agency	(with	no	instance	of	one	being	possible	out	with	
an	 instance	 of	 the	 other),	 and	 critical	 realism	 premised	 upon	 the	 logically	 necessary	
conceptualisation	 of	 structure	 on	 temporary	 prior	 to	 action	 or	 agency.	 Jessop	 argues	
that	strategic	relations	theory	goes	beyond	this	debate	in	useful	ways.	This	 is	perhaps	
best	illustrated	reference	to	Jessop’s	own	diagrammatic	representation	of	the	‘league’	of	
the	strategic‐relational	approach.	
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Jessop	 begins	 with	 the	 crude	 dichotomy	 of	 structure	 and	 agency,	 with	 external	
constraints	 on	 actions	 and	 intensions	 of	 free	willed	 agents	 representing	 the	 (‘naive’)	
building	 blocks	 of	 his	 schema.	 These	 constraints	 constitute	 the	 context	 within	which	
agents	are	socialised	into	behaviours	and	form	structures	 in	relation	to	the	domain	of	
activity.	
Jessop’s	 second	move	 is	 to	 argue	 that	within	 these	 structures	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	
make	strategic	calculations	(given	structural	context,	action	X	will	produce	outcome	Y).	
Thus	 strategic	 calculation	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ‘strategically	 inscribed	
selectivity’.		
The	third	move	in	his	argument	is	to	point	to	the	reflexivity	of	agency.	“If	I	do	X	then	Y	
will	happen,	but	if	another	agent	sees	me	doing	X	to	achieve	Y	then	they	may	make	their	
own	 reflexive	 strategic	 choice	 to	 try	 to	 ensure	 that	 Z	 will	 happen”.	 Thus	 I	 select	my	
strategies	 and	 tactics	 ‘recursively’.	 This	 has	 the	 implication	 that	 structures	 are	
reflexively	recognised	(rather	than	simply	emergent).		
The	 forth	move	 is	 to	 identify	what	 strategies	 are	 employed	 to	 transform	 selectivities,	
and	to	identify	the	limits	to	this	transforming	selectivity.		
It	 is	 through	 these	 four	 ‘moves’	 that	 we	 arrive	 at	 a	 strategic	 relations	 account	 of	
structural	coherence	(or	pattern	forms	of	incoherence),	in	the	case	of	our	study	this	is	
the	 coherence/incoherence	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	 our	 three	 cases.	 As	 a	meta‐theoretical	
level	 of	 explanation	 this	 form	 of	 realist	 account	 is,	 I	 argue,	 complementary	 to.	 In	
particular	 systemic	 and	 political	 governance	 explanations	 of	 individual	 and	 group	
behaviours	 and	 outcomes,	 but	 also	 employs	 analysis	 of	 the	 use	 by	 some	 actors	 of	
corporate/good	governance	and	political	governance	as	strategic	resources	consciously	
or	unconsciously	to	effect	particular	outcomes.	
As	Jessop	argues	
A	major	advantage	of	the	strategic‐relational	approach	as	developed	here	and	
elsewhere	 is	 its	 explicit	 concern	 with	 the	 spatio‐temporality	 of	 structures,	
agents,	and	agency	and	 its	 integration	of	 this	 into	the	 initial	presentation	of	
the	 core	 concepts	 rather	 than	 their	 subsequent	 introduction	 on	 an	 ad	 hoc	
basis	(Jessop,	2005:	51).	
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Figure	8.13:	A	Strategic‐Relational	Approach	to	Structure	and	Agency	
	
Adapted	from	Jessop	(2005:	50)	
This	 reflects	 the	 research	 approach	 adopted	 in	 this	 study	 that	 we	 have	 sought	 to	
provide	 spatio‐temporal	 forms	 of	 explanation,	 though	 in	 a	 strict	 sense	 we	 have	 not	
employed	a	classic	retroductive	methodology.	This	approach	has	rarely	been	employed	
in	sports	policy	analysis	with	exceptions	being	Girginov	(2001,	2009)	 	and	Lee	(2005)	
though	in	both	cases	the	context	of	analysis	was	somewhat	different	(even	though	the	
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latter	 study	 was	 Taiwan‐based).	 By	 focusing	 on	 these	 three	 inter‐related	 studies	 we	
have	 been	 able	 to	 produce	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 outcomes	 of	 one	 case	 provide	 the	
strategically	inscribed	selectivity	of	the	next	which	with	recursively	selected	strategies	
and	tactics	on	the	part	of	stakeholders	produces	the	structured	coherence/pattern	(and	
at	 times	 incoherence)	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	 (male)	 prospective‐professional	 basketball	
system.		
As	Hufty	(2011:	p.	403),	writing	about	political	governance,		points	out	“governance	has	
become	 an	 important	 focus	 of	 attention;	 but	 debates	 show	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 at	 the	
conceptual	 level	 and	 a	 confusion	between	 the	use	of	 the	 concept	 for	prescriptive	 and	
analytical	 purposes.”	 This	 study	 has	 employed	 the	 threefold	 typology	 of	 governance	
developed	 by	 Henry	 and	 Lee,	 namely	 of	 systemic;	 good	 /	 corporate;	 and	 political	
governance.	The	first	of	these	represents	an	analytic	/	heuristic	approach	to	explaining	
how	governance	is	effected;	the	second	a	prescriptive	approach	as	 to	how	it	should	be	
effected;	 the	 third	 represents	 a	 mixture	 of	 analytic	 /	 heuristic	 and	 of	 normative	 or	
prescriptive	 accounts	 of	 how	 states	 in	 particular	 (but	 not	 just	 states)	 seek	 to	 obtain	
outcomes	without	direct	control	of	sports	systems.	The	emphasis	in	this	study	has	been	
largely	on	the	first	of	these	approaches.	This	is	not	to	say	that	explaining	the	failure	of	
the	basketball	system	has	ignored	potential	failings	in	corporate	governance.	However	
we	 have	 been	 largely	 concerned	 with	 understanding	 how	 different	 stakeholders	
perceived	or	explained	governance	failings,	suggesting	to	whom	or	to	what	they	ascribe	
cause	or	(where	they	use		pejorative		terms)	‘blame’	for	certain	outcomes.	This	is	not	to	
say	that	we	cannot	identify	aspects	of	good	corporate	governance	as	being	respected	or	
not	in	the	three	case	studies.	Clearly	there	are	examples	of	what	stakeholders	identify	as	
good	or	bad	corporate	governance.	 	However	it	 is	to	say	that	identifying	the	quality	of	
governance	 decisions	 from	 a	 corporate	 or	 good	 governance	 perspective	 is	 not	 our	
primary	concern.	
We	 can	 and	 do	 point	 to	 explanations	 by	 stakeholders	 of	 particular	 outcomes	 being	
attributable	 to	 failings	 in	 corporate	 governance	 terms.	 For	 example,	 the	management	
arrangements	 for	 the	 SBL	 do	 not	 provide	 for	 independent	 and	 transparent	 decision‐
making	because	the	appointment	of	the	manager	of	the	league	from	2003	has	not	been	
that	of	an	independent	regulator	but	rather	management	responsibility	was	undertaken	
in	 turn	 by	 the	 managers	 of	 the	 individual	 clubs.	 This	 has	 reduced	 the	 potential	 for	
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transparency	 and	 maximised	 the	 potential	 for	 self‐interest	 rather	 than	 efficiency	 or	
long‐term	effectiveness.	
A	further	example	of	corporate	governance	failings	is	represented	in	the	channelling	of	
funding	from	government	through	the	CTBA,	although	the	responsibility	for	delivering	
the	 league	 programme	 lay	 with	 the	 clubs.	 The	 CTBA	 thus	 have	 authority	 without	
responsibility,	 and	 the	 clubs	 had	 responsibility	 without	 authority	 ‐	 a	 clear	 failure	 in	
democratic	terms	leading	to	major	problems	between	the	stakeholders.	
The	third	example	of	such	failure	relates	to	the	dual	role	played	by	the	owner	of	one	of	
the	 six	 clubs	 who	 was	 also	 Chairman	 of	 the	 CTBA.	 This	 individual	 also	 owned	 a	
construction	company	and	was	perceived	as	having	sought	to	use	his	influence	to	gain	a	
contract	for	the	construction	of	a	major	stadium.	When	the	government	declined	to	fund	
this	 construction	 the	 individual	 concerned	 refused	 to	 support	 the	 attempt	 to	 re‐
establish	the	league,	and	thus	the	initiative	failed.	
These	are	but	three	examples	of	governance	failure	 in	prescriptive	terms	but	they	are	
also	 examples	 of	 social	 construction	 of	 incidents	 which	 nevertheless	 have	 real	
consequences.	Abuse	of	power	as	described	in	the	third	example	may	or	may	not	have	
occurred,	 but	 the	mere	 suspicion	 that	 it	 had	 explains	why	 stakeholders	 subsequently	
acted	as	they	did	in	certain	circumstances.	The	consequences	of	such	constructions	are	
often	thus	very	real. 
Within	 this	 context,	we	have	argued	 that	 the	development	of	Taiwanese	basketball	 is	
only	to	be	captured	by	an	understanding	of	the	different	stakeholders’	constructions	of	
governance	features,	and	their	subsequent	rationales	for	action.	If	we	are	to	understand	
the	 development	 of	 basketball,	 we	 need	 to	 consider	 in	 Jessop’s	 terms	 the	 spatio‐
temporal	 relationality	of	 structure	and	agency,	not	only	analysing	 the	 current	 context	
and	 actors’	 actions,	 but	 also	 referring	 to	 the	 previous	 critical	 events	 and	 processes	
which	shape	the	possibilities	for	future	outcomes.			
We	 end	 this	 concluding	 section	 by	 underlining	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 contribution	 of	 this	
analysis	to	understanding	the	development	of	basketball	in	Taiwan	in	the	period	under	
consideration.	 Explanation	 of	 these	 three	 cases	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 micro‐level	 of	 the	
individual	 actor/stakeholders;	 at	 the	 meso‐level,	 encapsulated	 in	 governance	 theory;	
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and	at	 the	macro	 level	 through	a	 consideration	of	 strategic	 contexts	and	actors.	More	
specifically,	the	nature	of	temporally	produced	outcomes,	which	become	key	features	of	
the	context	of	subsequent	decisions	(e.g.	the	next	case	in	this	series	of	three),	provides	
innovation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 explanation	 which	 goes	 beyond	 the	 single	 case,	 offering	 a	
diachronic	frame	for	analysis	of	the	unfolding	developments	in	these	three	cases.				
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Appendix	I	
Sample of Interview Transcript and Translation 
A：主要一開始的時候，可能是一些政府的基本角色，在經營到籃球的部份，像一開
始我們在看的是政府，就你擔任主委怎麼樣去支持運動政策？為什麼要去支持運
動政策？ 
 B：在台灣現在要成為職業運動的，在以前大概就只有職棒和職籃，其他都還沒有職
業化，那政府在對職業運動方面的態度，一般來講，因為都把它界定為職業運動
就是一種商業，比較商業性的，那就是應該以球團他們自己去努力，那在政府頂
多是在運動設施上面，就例如你要打棒球，就有棒球場；你要打籃球就有籃球場，
但是籃球，在我上任之前，前五年前就倒了，後來就只有最高級的比賽就是總統
盃的甲組聯賽，那總統盃的甲組聯賽是最高級的，但是都沒有觀眾，那在一個政
府主管來講，就會覺得如果你連最高級的都這麼，就是社會普遍的不認同或不重
視，這個運動要很大力的去推展事實上是很難的啦。那我推展棒球跟籃球是有點
不一樣的心態，那棒球的部份，就是我們如果要以國家名義去參加亞運或奧運的
話，是有奪牌的希望。籃球就不是這樣，籃球我記得那個時候，亞運的話好像打
到第八名還是第九名，以前我們大概都可以在五名內，後來就是連中東加進來以
後，大概排名都排到最後去，但是大家關心籃球的人非常多，為什麼很多，就是
台灣會打籃球的人特別多，就是因為我們的運動設施它是最多的、運動人口是最
多的…你看，就連社區裡都有籃球架，然後學校裡面有籃球場，所以它的運動人
口是最多的，連國中的女生都曉得籃球的規則，所以籃球在台灣可以說是最普遍
的一項球類運動，那如果這個職業運動把它弄好的話，就會有人看。會有人看，
甚至是有職業的球員，他就有薪水，有薪水那又很高的話，就會讓很多人嚮往，
像打棒球的朋友，像小時候在練的時候，他就想像王建民一樣，那籃球也是這樣，
如果那個最高級能再往上提，然後一個球員就會受到很多的崇拜，像明星一樣，
就會讓很多人小朋友他們然心嚮往之的那樣。 
1. At the beginning, I want to know the role of the state in sport. Can you tell me what 
role does the state play in sport and elite sport when you were the minister of the 
SAC (Sport Council Affairs)? And why should the state support sport? 
There are only two sports can be professionalised which are baseball and basketball.  The 
government’s attitude towards professional sports, generally, is we treat them as a 
business, a private commercial business. So the clubs should operate by themselves. The 
government will just help them on the facilities. For example, if you want to play 
baseball, we will give you baseball field; if you want to play basketball, there will be a 
basketball court.  However the professional basketball was suspended five years before I 
took the minister of the SAC. So the highest-level basketball game in Taiwan is the 
president cup tournament. But there was no one watching it. It reflected that people 
didn’t care about that sport while a highest-level game performed like that. As a head of 
government official, I felt that is difficult to promote sports in this phenomenon. In fact, 
the attitude is different between basketball and baseball when I promote them. In terms 
of baseball, there is a hope for we to win a medal when we send a national team to play 
in the Asian game or the Olympic game. But the basketball is different. I remember the 
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national basketball team won 7th or 8th place this time in the Asian game. We were top 5 
when I was in charge of the SAC. After the Middle East country joined, our ranking kept 
going down. However, there are a lot of people cares the basketball very much in Taiwan. 
Most of People play basketball because we have enough facilities. Even local 
communities have their own basketball court. The number of participation of basketball 
in Taiwan is significant. Even a girl junior high school student knows the rule of 
basketball. So basketball is the most popular sport in Taiwan.  If we can make the 
professional basketball very well, people will like to watch it. If people like to watch, the 
professional player will get a high salary. The high salary could be a incentive for 
children and teenager to chase. Children and teenagers who play baseball will image 
themselves to be Chien-Ming Wang. Basketball can be the same. If we can raise the 
game level, then players could be role models, like a star. Children and teenagers will 
yearn for it. 
A：所以政府在這裡面的政策是推展這個運動還是教育層面？ 
B：是要推展這個運動，因為以青少年來講，如果比政策上更深依然就青少年，講粗
俗點，就是把他困在球場，讓他的精力在球場上面發洩，而且對他的將來成長還
是有幫助的。有人講打籃球好像對身體發育，是因為常常要跳投，事實上是不錯
的然後青少年很多的精力可以在球場上面發洩，這個對整個國家的青少年的政策，
也是一種好的，那我們也希望說這個在國際上的比賽，我們的成績不要經常是墊
底的，甚至我們可以把國際賽的排名往前推，就以主管體育的人就會這樣想，就
以國家來想，以後如果你去比賽不要經常是墊底的，我們可以更往前推。 
2. So why the state want to support sport? For more detail.  
In terms of teenagers, roughly, we can trap them on the court. Let them use their energy 
on the court. Also it’s helpful for their body growth. It’s good for state’s teenager policy.  
We also hope we are not the bottom of the ranking when we attend the international 
competitions. As a person who is in charge of the sport in Taiwan, there are two aspects. 
Internationally, if we can push our ranking up in the international level, the national 
identity and exposure can be raised at the same time. Domestically, It’s helpful to 
decrease the teenagers’ problem and enhance people’s fitness if more teenagers delicate 
in sport. This is the attitude of basketball. Two aspects of it.  
Then if you want to talk baseball, there is another viewpoint.  
A：所以像是棒球的思考是比較屬於奪牌的那種 
B：會比較有奪牌的，又可以比較跟國際接軌的，甚至可以跟美國的職棒，就像足球
一樣嘛，他們就會嚮往到歐洲去打足球一樣，可以在故鄉揚明益萬，然後大家就
會效法，有一個這樣的明星出來的話，整個運動就會往上提升，所以我講說最後
這一提，那時候就是因為考量這樣又考量到現況，那時候的現況就是甲組聯賽，
那時候我記得好像有六隊，就是台啤、中廣、裕隆、九太、達欣、台銀好像有六
隊，那時候我就是帶著承辦員就去拜訪他們的老闆一一的拜訪，就聽取他們對籃
球的意見，然後最後就找他們來一起討論，我是去拜訪像嚴凱泰也有去拜訪台銀
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的董事長，台啤的董事長中廣的董事長我也去拜訪，就去聽取他們的意見。你要
去聽聽企業主對於他的球隊期待是什麼？還有他對於這個球隊的想法是什麼。 
3. So what is the thinking of baseball? 
Baseball has potential to win a medal. An also it can connect international level and 
compete in the international level. Even we can compete with the MLB. Like football, 
players want to play in the Europe, and then be a star in their home country. And they 
can be role models. Then the sport can be promoted.  
So if you refer to this question (another interview question about the establishment of the 
SBL), when I wanted to set up a new league, the “thinking of role model” and the 
atmosphere of basketball were the points I cared about. I visited owners of leading teams 
in division one league one by one. Listened to their voices. Finally invited them to 
discuss in the SAC. I visited Yen (the owner of Yulon). I also visited the chairman of the 
board of Taiwanese bank, the chairman of the board of Taiwanese beer company..etc. I 
want to hear the voice of the parent company. I want to understand their expectations and 
what he think about his own team.  
A：所以說那時候是您去找他，而不是他來找你？ 
B：對對對，我一一的去拜訪他們，然後到最後才討論出一個結果說，如果要恢復職
籃的話，好像在段期間大家職籃的夢靨才能跟過，就從甲組聯賽跟職籃的取中間
點，才有 SBL，就是準職籃的的，強度又比甲組聯賽高一些！ 
4. You went to visit them? 
Yes, I visited them one by one. Then finally we had a conclusion that we can’t afford a 
professional league at that moment. We took the middle point between the division one 
and the CBA to set up the SBL higher than the division one, which is a compromise, and 
perspective –professional league.  
A：那當初像這個決定做這個的決策，那您開始去拜訪就一開始是怎樣想說，是誰提
出說決定要… 
B：這個當然是討論出來的，就說體育界一直都有說，如果有機會的話是不是職籃能
夠再現，那有一派的人就說，現在沒有向職籃那樣的空間。那我去拜訪了那個企
業主以後，就發現他們對他們的球隊也會繼續支持。這個支持不能無底洞的支持，
有些期待是這樣，那有一些他們只能容許到這樣的一個程度，譬如說一個職業籃
球如果要六千萬養一支球隊，然後他們現在大概都在兩、三千萬左右。他也沒辦
法爭資到說六千萬，就也考慮到現狀，又有一些理想性，中間就是 SBL才就是這
樣誕生出來的。所以這個也沒有當時就預計出說會成為 SBL才去找他們說，先問
了才去爭取說大家的意見也知道整個球隊的狀況，企業主對球隊的支持度怎麼樣
是這樣來的。 
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5. Who made the decision? Why did you want to visit the club owners? 
Of course the decision was been discussed. I always heard voice from sport domain.  
Some people push me to re-organise the professional basketball league. Some people 
told me that there are no enough resources, market, and capacity to develop a 
professional league.   
After I visited the club owners, I realise that they are still support their own team. They 
had their own expectation on basketball and their team. However, they didn’t want to put 
an endless support in it. The support for the owners is limited. For example, maintaining 
a professional team needs around 60 million per year. But the owner can just afford 30 
million per year. He could not raise the budget to 60 million. So we considered the 
current situation (Division one) and the ideal (Professional). The SBL set up at the 
middle point by this context. So at the beginning, I didn’t assume such a league. The idea 
of the SBL came out after I visited them. It came out after consulted people, understood 
the operation of teams and realise the supporting situation of the owners.  
 
A：那所以就是最主要的話，我們都有看到這裡面的系統在起來的時候，是體委會、
政府部門、各球團他們，大概都包括，還有轉播。那最主要是哪些人在決定，還
是說大家意見都是一起被採納的？ 
B：當然說，一開始真的講還是體委會在發動的，這件事情是體委會發動，由我去拜
訪這些，然後把他們招集過來成立 SBL，那 SBL裡面的一些的規則、一些規定當
然是籃協這邊他參予比較多，譬如裁判的制度、球員的制度…等等。他們就參與
比較多，那在這個過程裡面球團事實上，這個就是職業球隊跟業餘，經常在全世
界各國都一樣，業餘的跟職業的同一類性質的，譬如說棒協跟職棒再心態上是不
一樣的，這個都很難免啦。我的意思你知道吼！這都很難免，一個是業餘一個是
職業，那這個又界兩者之間，當時也有聲音說這個應該是要在籃協之外成立的，
那我是比較主張放在籃協裡面，運用籃協現有的人力還有整個裁判系統，然後我
們又有職業這樣的精神在，但我們又不是職業，那所以像那個轉播啦、哪個球場，
這個都是體委會的意見，體委會的意見就是說體委會也有資源，那時候我記得花
了好幾千萬去整修白館，讓白館變成是 SBL的固定場地，那個轉播我也是去找那
個 USBL，當時講說要給他幾年，後來我把他接頭了，籃協好像第二年還是第三
年開始標那個…不然 USBL好像也有點生氣，就說你們一開始大家都不看好，他
又先投入了，那投入了以後那個緯來就要介入，後來為了這個，那時候我好像已
經離開了(A：那是第四季第五季)那在這裡面我還記得有一個 SBL，有一個選秀制
度也還沒有完全去建立，那另外一個就是跟大專的學生，因為他有大部份都是大
專或是研究所的學生在打 SBL，然後他們又在大專杯的時候又打，看是怎麼樣去
做區隔，這當時都有討論到，後來當時好像沒有認真的再繼續把它變成是一個規
則，譬如說你第二年可以打大學的，但你三四年就是打 SBL。 
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6. In the SBL case, who are the most influential groups/ individuals in relation to the 
elite basketball system? 
Of course, the SAC raise the discussion at the beginning. I went to visit them and invite 
them to set up the SBL. In terms of the rules and the system, of course, it developed by 
the CTBA (Chinese Taipei Basketball Association) the most. For example, the rule of 
players and referees. In this case, you know that, the attitudes of a professional league 
and amateur are different. But the SBL is set up between professional and amateur. SO 
some people told me that the SBL should set up outside the CTBA. However, I 
advocate that the SBL should set up under the CTBA system. Then we can use the 
resources of the CTBA like some human resources and the referee system…etc. Then 
we can put some professional spirit in it. However, it’s not a professional league 
operated by them. So the SAC can have opinion for the broadcasting and facilities. The 
opinion means that the SAC had some resources. I remembered that we spent tens of 
millions to renovate the white stadium (Taipei Stadium) and made it the fixed court for 
the SBL. The broadcasting contract was also been discussed by my effort. I asked 
ESPN to broadcast the SBL. I told the ESPN that I was willing to give them multi years 
contract. However, the ESPN pissed off when the CTBA began to do the bidding of 
broadcasting in the 2nd or 3rd season of the SBL. But I had left in that time.  
I remember there was a UBA league (University Basketball Association) caused some 
problems. There was no draft system for the SBL. Most of the SBL players played the 
UBA league as well. We didn’t know how to do the market-separation. You saw same 
players played in the UBA league in weekdays and played in the SBL on the weekend.    
A：因為我們其中有一個問題就是這個養成系統跟教育系統和球員招募到底是怎麼樣
去成行，因為這就牽側到教育部體育司，對那這個東西是到現在好像還沒有是… 
B：這個就是要有人去強力的介入，我講的是說介入，為什麼？你看我們現在很多的
制度都是球團，球團很強勢，那每一個球隊他都很想要有好的球員在他的手上，
那譬如說他在高中的時候他就給營養費阿，就先把你綁起來再說，到大學的時候
也是先把你綁起來給營養費，那這個人以後就沒辦法很自由的選秀，你不太可能
就釋放出來，如果這個沒有很強力的去做介入的話，就被綁緊緊，如果這樣的話
強者恆強，那你這個就不好看啦，就是那個競爭度就不高就不好看了。不好看沒
有人要看的時候，你每次都第一名有什麼用，但是球團他不會想到這個，他以單
一球團的話他只求勝，我想要贏。好啦，那所有的你資源比較多，每個球團的資
源都不太一樣、老闆投入的經費也不太一樣。我這裡給你八萬，那如果我要這個
人那不是就要十萬，這樣也不好。所以這個會牽側到選秀的這個問題，選秀的話
我當時我比較強力主張說這個要比較非強團的人來做這件事情，如果以球團的話
他一定會先為自己球團，那對於跟大專要怎麼樣做切割，這個也要處理好，譬如
說你現在是打輔大的，但是你在打 SBL時你可能就是一個企業隊，就有一點重複
了，所以在這方面要怎麼樣去把 SBL跟大專做分割，然後他要怎樣去做永續的經
營、怎麼樣去做選秀，這些好像也都還沒有完整的去建立，所以 SBL就這樣在不
斷的紛擾當中，前面幾年還好啦那時候大家不看好，然後我看最後到那個決賽的
時候，我看白館那邊在排隊，我就覺得很欣慰，終於觀眾都回來了，應該是要坐
下來有比較中間人、立場比較中間的。 
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7. You mentioned about the draft system. Who was responsible for setting up the player 
recruitment and the education system? 
It needs some one to intervene. What do I mean for “intervene”? At the moment, most 
of rule came from clubs. Clubs are mighty. Team owners want good players to play for 
them. They gave funding to player when they were high school student. Tried to control 
players. When players went to university, they also gave them funding. So players 
cannot free to choose in the future. Clubs are not easy to “release” players they brought 
up. So if there is no powerful intervention, players are always controlled by clubs. So 
the leading teams are always leading. Nobody wants to watch when the game is not 
competitive enough. But the clubs do not care about this. They just want to win. Every 
club has different resources for their own team. If they just use their financial strength 
to make a “player’s salary rivalry”, it is not good for the draft system. So for the draft 
system, I argued that the draft should be operate by “the third-party” unit which is not 
come from clubs because the club staff will just care about his own club. However, 
there is no one to complete this system yet. The SBL operated under chaos. I think 
there should be a person with middle, neutral position to deal with the draft system. 
A：所以現在就是因為比較沒有辦法大家的力量都差不多，並沒有人可以出來做一個
決策像你當初說… 
B：事實上講說政府的心態政府主管的單位心態，一般來講，政府不太願意介入那個
比較有職業性的、有賣票的這樣的體育運動，他會比較注重在業餘的方面，那這
個看主治者的心態是怎麼樣，我當然那個棒球我也是花了很多心力去整合兩個聯
盟，因為看沒有觀眾啦、兩邊都不好啦，看怎麼樣把它整合在一起，然後重新出
發，籃球也是這樣，那我的態度就會比較積極取處理比較火車頭的那部份。 
8. It seems nobody can do the final decision? Who has the power to do it? 
In fact, government has its own attitude. In general, the government is not willing to 
involved in a “professional”, “ticket-selling” sport. It will care about the amateur sports 
more.  
But it depends on the attitude of people in power; I made efforts to deal merging of two 
professional baseball leagues. Because I saw that there is nobody want to watch it. That 
situation is not good to both two leagues. I thought about how to integrate them to 
restart a league. Basketball got the same thought, my attitude is try to be the “head” 
who is push the development of basketball, aggressively.  
A：所以你的意思是如果可以政府其實可以成為最有影響力的… 
B：因為政府它有資源，如果用的好的話就例如白館就免租金，租金都可以省，那個
冷氣、記分板我都幫你用，棒球的時候我也是用這樣阿。那你說哪幾個棒球場要
整理，說台南哪個地方要整理，好我答應把他整理好。 
A：所以說政府還是可以，只是政府沒有出來大家就沒辦法，就變成互相角力？       
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B：我的意思是說如果我們把環境做好、基本的做好，那剩下的當然說要看你這個聯
盟或是你這個球團去努力，那台灣還有職業運動還有一個比較奇怪的，就是球團
很強、聯盟很弱，棒球也一樣，這邊 SBL委員會有時候他要去做限制的時候，那
球團還會仰遠說我就不參加…連為了一個轉播的權利金分配的怎麼樣都可以這樣，
這表示說這個聯盟還是不夠強。 
9. So do you mean the government has potential to be the most influential unit?  
Because government has “resources”. If you have a good proposal, you can free to use 
the white stadium. Even I can paid for the air condition and hardware. Like baseball, I 
did the same thing. They told me which field need to be rebuilt. Then I promised them 
to rebuild them. 
What I mean is “We can make the environment and the basic construction well, then 
the clubs should take responsibility for the league.”  
There is a strange situation in Taiwanese professional sports. “The clubs are strong and 
the leagues are weak.” The decision made by the SBL committee could be ignore by 
clubs. Clubs will threaten the league that they want to quit if they push them to follow a 
rule that they don’t want to follow.  
A：所以在政策上面，不管是籃球還是我們其他運動政策大概都是這個狀態… 
B：我看大概都是這個狀態，政府對於職業運動基本上只是樂觀其成，它通常不太會
去很大力的去支援！ 
10. Is this a same situation in basketball, baseball or other sports? 
I think they are all the same. Basically, government will not support professional sports 
strongly.  
A：你剛有提到那個權利金，像如果權利金在分配上面就已經政府比較沒有在管？ 
 B：這個就沒有在管了。 
 A：所以就是自己協調。 
B：門票都歸給你們。 
 A：政府就是基礎，看要怎麼把它帶起來，怎麼用你們自己去用 
B：因為他們有他們的機智。 
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11. In terms of TV rights fee? Did you involved in this issue? 
It’s not the SAC’s business. 
Like the ticket revenue is all belong to the league. They can decide how to use by 
themselves. 
The government is the fundamental. They had their own mechanism.  
  A：那像你剛有講到說就是看主事者嘛，不同的是像那時候是從國民黨到民進黨執政，
那這中間的時候，像在你的立場你會覺得政府還是運動還是在體育方面有不同的
處裡。 
  B：我倒是覺得要政黨對於體育政策的傾向，我覺得不是那麼強，譬如說我不是民進
黨那時候我就特別對哪項運動我都沒有，倒是常存在這個體委會或是體育界的心
態，那個心態比較重要，那個心態就是對職業運動大家都不願意去接觸，他們都
覺得這個比較商業性的，我是比較不一樣，我是看到整個體育發展，那個火車頭
如果不往上拉的話，你底下拼命推，如果台灣沒有職棒的話，小孩子玩那個…或
是球隊的數目一定都會減少。 
12. You mentioned the people in power. Is there any difference between the three 
periods (from KMT to DPP, From DPP to KMT) in sports policy generally, and 
towards professional sport and basketball in particular 
I don’t think there is a significant tendency between different parties. Like I worked for 
DPP government. I am fair to treat every sport. However, the attitude of the SAC or 
sport domain is that they don’t want to touch the professional sport”, because the 
professional sport is a commercial, private business. I am different. I got a vision for 
the sport. If the head doesn’t want to promote, if there is no professional sports, the 
children will have no goal to chase.  
A：所以在政黨方面沒有那個… 
B：我這樣觀察是不是那麼明顯 
13. Is there any difference in sport policy between different parties? 
From my observation, there is no difference. 
A：可是剛也有講到我們其實會想要看小孩子還是說小球員他們未來的發展，像你剛
才有講到說營養金那個綁緊，那有點合約上問題，就是政府對於那些營養金、合
約那些的態度是怎麼樣？ 
B：我是覺得這個很好阿，你在高中生的時候就給營養費，但是你不能說這個就既為
己有，就說每個球團你要培養好的球員給大家以後聯盟可以用，但是這個人不是
你的，主要我的意思是這樣，當然我很樂界說高中生的時候就有人給他營養費這
很好，但是這個人不是你的，那時候就像棒球的時候，就希望每一個棒球隊都要
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去支持一個高中的球隊，但他將來還是要透過公開選秀，這個公開選秀不一定是
為了這個球隊效益，但是他會增強我們整個聯盟的可看性。 
A：可是球團又覺得他在花錢 
B：但是你花他也花就沒影響了，球團就想贏，每一次都你冠軍那誰要看就不好看了，
所以這個選秀制度也很重要，你要從最後一名的人他會先選嘛然後他來補充他的
戰力，人家會發展他的制度一定有他的道理，他要盡量讓你這六隊七隊你要平均
戰力，這樣比賽起來又精采刺激那會有人看，在很多職業運動裡面都有明星，有
明星出來了以後，然後他可以去代言也可以幫你公司做形象…等等。那他變成明
星以後，底下的人就會像鮭魚一樣力爭上游想要到達這個目的地，這個運動就會
蓬勃了，這個運動一蓬勃的話，那我們在亞運的那種成績自然就會好了，就是這
樣。 
A：那所以態度上是當然是好，但像那些合約上政府有規範嗎？像薪水？ 
B：沒有！沒有！事實上他們都會相約就不要超過十五萬或超過幾萬…這個就要給球
團相約，譬如以我的立場我當然是希望你們領的薪水越高越好，只要你們公司付
的起，當時我在跟棒球的那些球團講說如果你有辦法一個月一百萬，他們最高好
像二十幾萬，我說如果你有辦法到達一百萬，我相信做假球的機會就會比較少，
他們就會好像這個工作保護的好，所以就是說如果別人拿一百兩百萬給你，你的
心就會比較動搖了，所以當然我是希望說職業球團他能夠給球員更多薪水更好，
但是這個我當主委我就不能去規定…這還是要看公司的作法，不然後來他們就自
己協調。 
14. You said that you cared about the development of children and teenager players. 
You also mentioned that the culture of funding in Taiwan. Is there any regulation of 
the contract between teams and players? 
 
I think it is good that you can support/sponsor high school players. However, players 
are not you assets. What I mean is that we can bring out potentials, but they are not 
belong to one person. Take baseball for example, we hope every professional team can 
sponsor a high school team, but after the high school players graduate, they should join 
the draft. The draft is not set for one specific team. The draft can enhance the 
performance of the league. 
 
The draft system is important. Nobody wants to watch a league that he can know who is 
the champion in advance. The players’ level should be balanced between teams. Then, 
the game will be excited enough to attract fans. There are many “stars” in the 
professional sport. They can do some marketing, promotion for their own team or 
company. Stars can be incentives to push players of gross roots to chase their own 
dream.  Then the sport will develop vigorously. So we can get more medals in the 
Asian game.  
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We don’t have a law to regulate the contract. In fact, the club owners and companies 
had their own deal to limit the wages of players. It is all come from the clubs. For my 
viewpoint, I hope players can have a higher wage level as long as your team can afford. 
I told those clubs if you can pay a player one million per month, the gambling scandal 
would disappear.  So of course I hope they can give players more but I can’t regulate 
that as a minister of the SAC. It decided on the clubs.    
A：所以像你剛剛在講他們的需要還是球團一定會有需要、還是對球員、還是對籃協
有需要，你是怎麼去知道的它們就是… 
B：他們透過開會或者我找他們談，譬如說我就去找球團的老闆，他們除了老闆以外
還有領隊，我要看看老闆支持球隊他們的支持度是如何。 
A：所以有時候會不會有什麼要求說要補助我們兩千萬… 
B：那個球團我就不補助，因為那個是你公司的名字，達欣就是達欣工程的，但是你
們一起比賽的這個聯盟這個部分，場地、設施、宣傳…體委會可以來支持 
15. How do you get to know about the needs and attitudes of the stakeholders such as 
team owners, players, and fans? 
They had some meetings. Sometime I went to visit them. For example, I visited club 
owners. Also team leaders, I tried to figure out their attitude to the teams and the league.   
A：所以當初他們要求過嗎一開始的時候？所以要求補助我們還是說… 
  B：補助的這個事情是沒有，直接補助球團是沒有，大概他們也說不出口，這些都是
有名的，所以權利金就是給你們去分，就是說政府不會從裡面在撈錢進來，我就
提供基本的設施、提供器材…你能夠用這些去生財，就是你的。但是我也知道你
不足 
16. Are you ever contacted by players, fans, team owners other government 
departments or governing bodies etc. requesting support or action?  
I didn’t support clubs because it’s private sector. Like Team Dacin is owned by Dacin 
engineering. But the facilities, promotions and the league, the SAC can pay for it. 
Clubs didn’t ask for the direct funding ever. But they can share the TV rights fee, they 
didn’t need to pay to the government. I mean I knew it’s not enough, but I just can give 
you the basic facilities. It’s your duty to “use it”. 
 
 
A：那像籃協也是一個很大的在處理這事情，那政府跟籃協的關係是？ 
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B：他是一個人民團體，那政府當然要促進這個體育運動的話，也是需要透過人民團
體去執行，我的意思是說他要組成國家隊的時候，當然是籃協而不是體委會。在
國際上大家認可的是協會，不是政府，所以你看出外參加比賽的時候，就是奧會，
奧會底下就是協會，他不會用國家，他是代表國家隊但不是政府官員去主導，是
協會，他們認可的是協會，這個體育運動組織就是這樣。 
A：我在問這個問題的時候，是因為有些時候我們在看那些籃球發展還是聯盟發展的
時候，我們想要釐清的是政府在帶還是籃協在帶，因為現在就是我們在讀的一些
文獻，大家都在講說籃協怎麼樣、政府怎麼樣…所以我才會說政府跟籃協之間到
底對於那種推動還是說發展 
B：基本上是籃協在推動，但是政府運用他的公家的資源來協助籃協，政府不可能去
所有的海洋運動、所有的運動都政府來做，它一定會有很多的人民團體，這些組
織政府可以去補助或是單案的補助、有整年度的補助，然後你也要向民間去做捐
助，來發展這個單項的運動。 
17. The CTBA (Chinese Taipei Basketball Association) seems played an important role 
on the development of basketball; can you talk something about the relationship of 
the government and the CTBA? 
It’s an agency. If the government wants to promote the sport, it should be operate by 
the agency. The national team composes by the federation. They recognise the 
federation, not the country in the international competitions. The national team 
represents a country but the government does not manage it. It’s lead by the federation.  
Basically, the promotion of basketball operated by the CTBA. But the government used 
its resources to help the CTBA. The government cannot handle all sports. So the 
government agency and federations can ask seek supports and funding from the 
government. And the agency seek supporting from social organisations as well. 
  A：那如果我們在回到籃球，那時候你在擔任主委的時候，之前是 CBA倒掉了，那
一定是因為他倒掉了然後有什麼衝擊，到最後你才決定開會來弄 SBL，那這些衝
擊是因為很多衝擊對政府、對我們教育就像你剛提到的教育體系，還是國際成績
都有很大的影響，所以才決定開始做 SBL。我意思是說有哪些衝擊才讓你…？ 
  B：普遍都認為說，有職業運動對於該項運動的推展是有幫助的，有普遍大家都認為
說怎樣去振興籃球運動，這是一般關心體育的人都會這樣想，那我也去了解了他
為何會倒掉…後來就像放風箏一樣，大家越放越高，然後我們台灣喜歡運動的這
些企業主，公司也不是大到非常大，然後這個收入又很少然後支出又很多，就是
在這方面我也去了解，然後也去找企業主就是這樣一步一步鋪成過來的。SBL是
一個最終的產品，不是原來就有 SBL然後在用這個東西去說服他們，不是這樣，
這也是討論出來… 
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18. Back to the basketball issues. What impact has the collapse of the CBA in 1998 had 
for elite sports (basketball) business? I think it’s a factor influenced you to promote 
the SBL. 
Generally, the development of professional sport is helpful to the promotion of the 
sport. People who cared about sport thought about revitalise basketball in Taiwan at 
that moment. So I went to understand the reason why it collapsed. I realised it’s 
because companies that supported the professional teams were not big enough to afford 
it. The SBL is a final product after discussion. We didn’t assume such a league in the 
beginning.  
Including baseball, the parent companies of clubs are not big companies. Some big 
companies were worried about that the professional sport might damage their corporate 
image. For example, the Acer was interesting at the beginning, but they worried about 
that might damage their image before benefit it. So, the big enterprise didn’t want to 
support professional sports sometimes.  
Regarding to the basketball, just the owner of the Yulon (Nissan) likes basketball and 
his company has power.  There were an interesting dialogue between me and the 
president of the Taiwan beer. He said if the team record (ranking) always sucks with no 
contribution to the company, why my company need to spend money for players to play. 
Workers in my company worked hard to carry the beer just earned a little money. Why 
I should spent tens of millions on basketball. He told me if the team can’t perform well, 
he wants to dismiss it.   
So when the business owner thinks about his budget, he will care about the reputation 
of his team. If the team can perform well, it benefits its own company. Otherwise, the 
owner will says that why I should do it. The business owner plays an key role in the 
professional sport because the revenue of the professional sport is not enough to 
support a team. Play the professional sport is to lose money because our sport market is 
not big enough to support it.   
 A：你剛提到像 CBA當初倒的原因你也有在了解，因為我們在看的時候是在看金融海
嘯，然後那些企業就沒有辦法支持下去 
B：這個就是台灣現在很多…包括棒球，就是集團的母公司不是非常龐大的公司規模，
譬如說棒球那時候像宏碁還有一家銀行，那原來也有意思但他們又會怕對我公司
的企業形象還沒有幫助之前，就讓我企業公司受損，所以很多大型都不太願意。
籃球也有幾個，像裕隆他本身就是喜歡然後他的企業又有力，像公家的中廣就比
較沒有台銀也沒有這些都是公家單位，然後我去台啤跟那個董事長那時候有一段
精彩對話，他是說如果都打這麼爛的話，我公司幹嘛繼續出這個錢讓他們好像沒
有對公司有很大的貢獻又不是打的很好，然後大家就是搬啤酒這樣工人、公司的
人這樣才賺多少錢而已，然後一年給你花兩三千萬的部份，他說如果再打不好的
話，公司也不要。所以說這企業主他在分配他的預算的時候，他也要看如果這支
球隊它在社會上是很受到重視，而且聲望也很好那母公司也是盟利，但是如果也
不好企業主就會想我為何這樣，所以在職業運動裡面大概企業主也是一個很大的
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關鍵，而且台灣現在的這個職業運動所帶來的收入是源源的不夠他去養一支球隊，
所以算起來都是賠錢，我們的運動產業還沒有大到說可以去支撐它。 
A：那所以之後我們做了 SBL之後，那些有比較好嗎？所以說像你說的對於球員未來
的發展還是…但在你現在的立場，我們覺得我們也知道現在有點又風雨飄搖… 
B：這就是說，我也有看過體育界記者寫過，他們在吵鬧之餘他們要去想想當時"林德
武"主委，大家都不太認為說那不可能的任務，然後好不容易的 SBL像今天這樣
的成果，大家都要放狠話說沒有就算了，大家去想想，這個時候大家就要堅去球
隊各自的願望，我建立了不算長，但至少我建立了，後續的有一些規則是要去建
立，但是沒人強力去介入的時候，這裡就是拖延。 
A：最後還有一個是比較最近的或是說當初比較特殊的是就是像跟大陸的關係，如果
說那時候的政府，當然說那時候沒有球員到大陸去… 
B：那時候”新浪”在大陸，在那邊，後來就回來 
A：SBL之後新浪在大陸，那像政府對於這些說球員去大陸還是說球隊去大陸，態度
是…？ 
B：球隊去大陸的話，如果是企業的話大概你也管不到，但是不能用掛台北，像是新
浪那時候好像是掛在杭州還是…？新浪是企業的，那你不能說我代表台北中華台
北去那邊打甲組，政府很明顯就是你不能用我們這裡的地名去那邊打，但是如果
你自己球隊要去，沒有辦法限制 
19. We all know there was an Sina team issue. Does the state have a role to limit or 
push teams or players to play in China? 
The Sina did play in China but they came back later. 
If a team owned by a private business want to play in China, we can’t control it. 
However they can’t use Taipei or Taiwan in their team’s name .  While the Sina 
belongs to the private sector, they can’t say that they represent Taiwan or Taipei. 
Obviously, the government will not allow you to use our (city) names to play in China. 
But there is no limitation if your own team want to play there.  
I always feel that we can discuss sport issues with China but we all know they always 
want to dwarf us. I do not matter if we do the sport exchange with China but they keep 
dwarfing us on the “name issue”. I don’t know if the roles reversed someday, will we 
do this as well. We had already used Chinese Taipei to attend international 
competitions.  
Our space was compressed in the international level.  It might relate to our sport 
performance. If we can perform well, things will be different. So the Sport is power. It 
is not a war age; the country should show their power in the sport field.  
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A：那如果限制地名，那像現在台啤想要去註冊 CBA台灣啤酒，那怎麼辦？ 
B：它是企業，但它不代表台北 
A：所以主要是私人的… 
B：這支球隊是台啤的，那至於說如果它有球員在大專讀這是另外一個問題，就說那
個球員的身分，那他到底能不能去那邊打… 
A：那如果像台啤過去打，那 SBL減少一隊，那看板球隊… 
B：這個就是聯盟沒力，如果聯盟有力，那個季節好像不一樣也可以接受…美國職棒
很有力，就說他的正式球員不能去參加奧運，那個是聯盟去規定。他是保有我是
世界上最強的聯盟，比賽強度是世界最高，奧運都沒有我最好的球員去，他要保
持他商業上的利益、獨家，那是聯盟規定的不是每一個球團規定。那如果你說一
個聯盟，SBL 聯盟委員會能約束到一個球團那是沒辦法，這個就由政府去做約束，
政府就是角色不對因為他是企業的球隊它要去大陸打，政府幹麻去限制人家。台
啤在大陸有註冊台啤的話他就是一個大陸的公司，他到底是不是大陸的公司合不
合法那是另外商業的問題，他的球員有沒有在唸大學有沒有受到管制是另外一個
問題，所以政府沒有辦法去約束。以體委會的角色來講，我怎麼能去限制你，但
是以聯盟 SBL委員會來講，你都去那打，這裡就沒了，那我們這裡就要解散了。
我們也不是說六隊都去那裡，就欠你這隊你不能做害群之馬，可惜我們當初好不
容易弄出來。 
20.  But if one team, for example Taiwan beer, go to play in China, it must impact 
Taiwan basketball. 
It’s because the league is weak. The MLB is powerful so it can say that who play in the 
MLB can’t play in the Olympic. They want to show that the MLB is the strongest 
league in the world. Players play in the Olympic are not as good as mine. They want to 
keep their own business interests. It is not possible for the government to limit the club 
wants to play in China when the SBL can’t constrain clubs. It is not the government’s 
role because it is private sector. Why should a government limit it? If the Taiwan beer 
registers in Chian, it’s a Chinese company. “Legal or not“ is another business issue. “Is 
their players studying in the universities” is another issue. As the role of the SAC, how 
can I limit it? But for the SBL committee, if teams all go to play in China, the SBL will 
be dismissed. Or maybe just one team go to China, it will be one black sheep to damage 
a league that we made great effort to set up. 
 
 
 
 
